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PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE "RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT": A BUMPY JOURNEY

Vítor Manuel Ramon Fernandes

vrf@sapo.pt

Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa (Portugal) and Member and Visiting College Research Associate of Wolfson College, University of Cambridge.

Between 2015 and 2016, he was a Visiting Professor at the University of Cambridge's Department of Politics and International Studies. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the Universidade Nova de Lisboa; a Master's in Economics (University of Kent, Canterbury, UK) and in Business Management (ISCTE-IUL); and a degree in Economics (Faculty of Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa). He is also a graduate of the National Defence Course of the National Defence Institute. He was a Vice President at the bank J.P. Morgan, initially as an economist in Paris, at the Global Markets Division, and later, at the Corporate Finance Department in Madrid. He was also an Associate Consultant at McKinsey & Co, in Lisbon, and a director of several companies, including OGMA – Indústria Aeronáutica de Portugal, SA; IDD, SA, in the area of defence; and Diário de Notícias, SA, in the area of media. He is the author of the book *Peace and War in Raymond Aron: Ontology and Epistemology of the International Order*, published by the Edições Instituto da Defesa Nacional in 2016.

Abstract

The aim of this article is to study the "Responsibility to Protect", its evolution since 2000 and what can be expected for its future. Concurrently, the paper takes into account the need to protect populations, victims of certain types of aggression and to preserve the international order. Major criticisms of this doctrine are highlighted, as well as some of its impacts on the international community and, significantly, some of the difficulties that have arisen during its development – a process that has been controversial and troubled. Some of the main risks and uncertainties that affect its future are investigated, considering that a set of emerging countries who do not agree with the Western liberal order intends to be more active in international affairs. The fundamental argument is that the future of this doctrine might continue to be troubled and full of uncertainties. Thus, for RtoP to evolve in a favourable way, it will be necessary, on the one hand, that the members of the Security Council of the United Nations engage in genuine multilateral cooperation in order to safeguard the changes taking place in the international order; and, on the other hand, that the States consider such crimes to be an essential issue of international security and part of their interests.

Keywords

Responsibility to Protect; Humanitarian intervention; ICISS; UNSC; Sovereignty

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PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE "RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT": A BUMPY JOURNEY¹

Vitor Manuel Ramon Fernandes

Introduction

Despite the numerous examples of atrocious violence against innocent populations, it was probably during the 1990s, with the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and approximately 8,000 Bosnians killed in Srebrenica in 1995, that the international community became truly aware of the need to discuss humanitarian intervention.² There was also the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in March 1999, which bombed the former Republic of Yugoslavia in order to protect the Albanian population in Kosovo from ethnic cleansing. At the time, NATO's intervention was considered "illegal but legitimate".³ Regarding the horrors committed, it was legitimate because it was needed and, therefore, morally justified. However, it was illegal in so far that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had not authorised it and consequently consisted of a violation of international law. These events have inspired debate, clarifying a whole range of issues related to the need to intervene in certain specific situations. This debate consolidated the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), which aims to overcome all the controversy surrounding humanitarian intervention (Holzgrefe & Keohane, 2003; Welsh, 2006). The debate has involved States that argue in favour of intervention to end certain types of conflicts and others that block this type of action through political and legal arguments related to respecting State sovereignty. The fact that language has been changed in order to seek distance from the notion of "right to intervene" and to refer to a "responsibility to protect" is significant.⁴

The purpose of this article is to analyse the evolution of RtoP in order to understand to what extent "the new norm of 'the responsibility to protect' will prove to be the solution" (Evans, 2008: 11) in preventing or avoiding such crimes and atrocities. Some of the

¹ The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013, with the aim of publishing Janus.net. Text translated by Thomas Rickard.

² In this study, humanitarian intervention is used essentially to refer to "the threat or use of force across borders by a State (or group of States), which aims to prevent or end widespread violations of the fundamental rights of individuals other than their own citizens, without the permission of the State within whose territory force is applied" (Holzgrefe & Keohane (eds.), 2003: 18). Thus, humanitarian intervention is a coercive act of protection that uses force with the intention of protecting fundamental rights.

³ Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned*, Oxford University Press, 2000: 4.

⁴ The interpretation of the concept of sovereignty in terms of responsibility and, consequently, the "responsibility to protect" was initially proposed by Francis Deng (1993, 1995) and served as inspiration for the report later produced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001), although such an interpretation was not explicitly mentioned in this report.



impacts of this doctrine in the international community are analysed and some risks and uncertainties that point to a strained future are considered. Given the different views related to the international order, and which have become more pronounced, the key argument is that the development of RtoP is fraught with uncertainties. Therefore, the doctrine of RtoP will only progress, particularly in terms of its implementation, through genuine multilateral cooperation of UNSC members and if States consider this type of crime as an essential issue of international security.

The starting point: the ICISS report⁵

At the 54th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1999, Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, called for the reaching of a consensus on humanitarian intervention, resulting in the creation of the ICISS in September 2000 with the support of the government of Canada. The report, completed in December 2001, describes a mechanism of intervention envisaged in very specific cases of aggression, such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, it details various associated responsibilities, separating them into the "responsibility to prevent", the "responsibility to react" and the "responsibility to rebuild". The concept that underlays these responsibilities is human security and it is based on the principle that intervention, including military intervention, is only legitimate when a State does not have the ability to end certain crimes that are about to occur (ICISS, 2001: 15-16).

The foremost intention is to create a resolution by diplomatic means as a way of implementing RtoP, avoiding military intervention (Pattison, 2015: 936) and having an organ, the UNSC, with the responsibility of seeking to foresee potential conflicts in order to avoid certain types of crimes, ideally without direct military intervention – unless it becomes absolutely inevitable or even desirable in preventing an escalation of violence. For this reason, the "responsibility to prevent" is the most important of them all and must always be carried to exhaustion before other options are considered (ICISS, 2001: xi). It was also essential to attenuate the importance of the military dimension in order to advance the debate in political terms, because excessive concentration on intervention would have raised major concerns for certain countries and led to greater opposition in discussions needed to reach consensus.

In regard to the "responsibility to react", the main difficulty lies in the tension between the respect for State sovereignty and the need to intervene. The report establishes six principles for military interventions based on the Just War Doctrine⁶ (ICISS, 2001: 32): 1 – right authority; 2 – just cause; 3 – right intention; 4 – last resort; 5 – proportional means; and 6 – reasonable prospects.

Concerning the "responsibility to rebuild", the report refers to a moral responsibility and need to have a strategic plan on how to proceed to reconstruction in the post-conflict phase, but without materialising it in terms of operationalisation (ICISS, 2001: 39-45).

⁵ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001).

⁶ Based on St. Augustine (354-430). For more recent references see Lee (2012) and Rengger (2013).



Main criticisms of the ICISS report and RtoP

There are fundamentally three types of criticism: 1) those that consider the report as excessively ambitious; 2) those that, on the contrary, consider that its ambitions do not go far enough; 3) those that criticise its vague and ambiguous character. In the first, the international order in the post-Cold War is seen as very supportive of the liberal ideas of the West (and particularly of the USA) – countries that have been most favourable to intervention. This situation may lead to an attempt to morally legitimise certain Western practices, giving rise to "the convergence of morality and *Realpolitik*, whether expressed in the 'responsibility to protect' or the 'war against terrorism'" (Chandler, 2004: 75). Therefore, it is essentially to limit the rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction by giving it a more acceptable meaning. As a result, the predominance of these liberal theses of peace would be a further shift in the balance of power in favour of the West in the context of the international order, rather than a change in focus in relation to the issue of sovereign rights. For this reason, Chandler (2004: 64-65) considers that it is fundamentally about reformulating the "right to intervene" in a moral and ethical perspective that justifies and legitimises intervention whilst making it compatible with the sovereignty of States. However, sovereignty ends up being reduced. Despite supporting RtoP, Bellamy (2005) questions whether the doctrine is not actually a new "Trojan Horse" of the most powerful States. Others argue that RtoP allows some great powers to take advantage of certain practices and that the ICISS report "raises the spectre of a return to colonial habits and practices on the part of the major Western powers"(Ayoob, 2002: 85). The idea is that great powers could, or would tend to, intervene in some States to achieve their own foreign policy objectives based on humanitarian arguments.

The 2003 intervention in Iraq was considered by some as corroborating to these latter arguments. Nevertheless, it does not seem legitimate to make a link between the Iraq War and RtoP, since this intervention was justified by the fight against terrorism after the events of September 11th 2001. In addition, several interventions had previously been made in which "the rhetoric of humanitarianism had been used most stridently in cases where the humanitarian motive was weakest" (Weiss, 2007: 37). However, this conflict exposed some of the more problematic issues generated by this type of military intervention, first of all regarding sending troops to intervene and how all the consequences that are associated with the post-military conflict phase are seen in the countries of origin.

Those who consider that the report's ambitions do not go far enough criticise the fact that intervention is only considered in certain types of extreme situations, which results from a compromise between those who, respectively, had a more comprehensive or restricted view on intervention (Weiss, 2004: 139).

Regarding the ambiguous and vague characteristics of the report's conclusions, it does not appear that such a report could be expected to be absolutely exhaustive and detailed. It was unable to articulate, in a coherent and innovative way, the different responsibilities – prevent and rebuild – in order to withdraw focus on the issue of military intervention and reduce opposition to the idea of RtoP. On the other hand, by giving too much responsibility to the UNSC in relation to the authorisation to intervene, it does not specify a solution for cases in which the body might have intractable problems (Bellamy, 2009: 62-63). To prevent such situations, the UNSC would need to become more efficient and be reformed, which would not be just an option but an imperative to establish RtoP



(Etzioni, 2006: 80). One of the weaknesses of the report is the lack of clarity about how prevention would materialise (Roberts, 2003: 149). Bellamy (2009: 63) states that the same can be said about rebuilding, where Alley (2004: 159) emphasises that nothing is mentioned in relation to these interventions by institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The 2005 World Summit

Motivated by the attention that the "war on terror" attracted after the September 11th attacks, the ICISS report really only began to have some impact on the international community between 2004 and 2005, but without unanimity amongst the different countries. Countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany strongly supported the report, whilst others, such as Argentina, Australia, Colombia, Croatia, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Republic of Ireland, Rwanda, the Republic of Korea, Sweden and Tanzania, only vaguely supported it. Asian countries and several permanent members of the UNSC have rejected the report. In this context, the position of Russia and China should be highlighted, motivated by the loss of power of permanent members of the UNSC, whilst the United States was against the commitment to use their military forces in situations where their interests are not at stake and decided to limit themselves to resolution condemnation (Welsh, 2006: 185).

It was largely due to the efforts of Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1997 to 2006, and particularly with the convening of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP)⁷, that RtoP was established as an "emerging norm", associated with a responsibility to protect that should be exercised by the UNSC (United Nations, 2004: paragraph 203). The HLP report recognises that there is a link between responsibility and sovereignty and presents a set of guidelines on the use of force and the responsibilities of the General Assembly of the United Nations and, in particular, the UNSC.

The recommendations of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as set out in the 2004 report, were presented at the 2005 World Summit. This event marked a key moment, from a normative perspective, regarding RtoP because it was at this General Assembly of the United Nations that all countries unanimously accepted the notion of a responsibility to protect their populations from certain types of aggression. However, in order to achieve the desired consensus and result, the text approved at the 2005 World Summit differs substantially from the previous ones, particularly the ICISS report, being much less demanding. It is only through the inclusion of paragraphs 138 and 139⁸, which specify that each State has a responsibility to protect its population but, alternatively, also the international community – according to the Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations – that the subject became more relevant. These paragraphs demonstrate a common will to act on the crimes listed – but their character is generic. There is no specific reference to the use of force within and much less outside the UN, such as within regional organisations. The text is fundamentally normative and

⁷ United Nations (2004). Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. A/59/565, 2nd December, New York. Hereinafter, referred to as the HLP.

⁸ United Nations (2005). 2005 World Summit Outcome Document: Resolution. A/RES/60/1, 24th October, New York.



ideological and its focus is on promoting and assisting States in implementing norms of behaviour that are consistent with human rights.

There were also important concessions and simplifications of some crucial ideas in order to make progress (Bellamy, 2006: 155). It is also in this way that the terminology "Responsibility to Protect" could be included in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the final document. On the one hand, the fact that any intervention must be authorised by the UNSC implies that the scope of intervention is very limited and conditioned. In addition, the text does not even contain any obligation of military intervention. The argument underlying RtoP is fundamentally based on a logic of non-intervention, faithful to the principle of respect for sovereignty established in the UN Charter. Moreover, the permanent members of the UNSC do not lose any of their privileges and are able to stop intervention through their veto power. Nevertheless, the veto would not be used in cases of humanitarian emergency and when national interests are not at stake.⁹

The 2005 World Summit achieved several of its objectives, notably with regard to the adoption of the principles underlying the ICISS report, intervention by the UNSC in certain circumstances and restrictions on the veto power of its permanent members (Bellamy, 2006: 153). However, there were commitments between the various parties involved that have consequences and the legitimacy to intervene outside the framework of the UNSC was severely limited. Wheeler (2005: 105) considered that there were reasons for a measured optimism regarding the capability of avoiding cases such as that of Rwanda. That is, it will be more difficult for members of the UNSC to ignore certain humanitarian situations, although, unless there is political will, many of the commitments made will have little effect. Differently, Weiss (2007: 127) considers that it was a step backwards "because humanitarian intervention has to be approved by the Security Council".¹⁰ Therefore, what RtoP actually means relates to that defined in the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/1 of 24th October, which is much inferior to what the 2001 ICISS report contains.

The 2009 debate in the UN General Assembly and Ban Ki-moon's report

Since 2006, many countries have opposed RtoP for various reasons, some of which relate to the consequences of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Bellamy, 2011: 28-33). Hence, on 15th July 2008 Ban Ki-moon (2008) provided a new impetus to RtoP by referring to its three pillars.¹¹

Following this speech and a three-day debate at the UN General Assembly in July 2009 – when Ban Ki-moon reinforced the idea that RtoP, which had been accepted by the States at the 2005 World Summit, is a non-negotiable commitment – the report *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* (United Nations, 2009) was written in January 2009. This report and its findings do not change the characteristic of the crimes listed

⁹ Despite everything, it should be noted that this was not explicit in the final text of the 2005 World Summit.

¹⁰ The expression used by Weiss is that the RtoP has become "RtoP lite". This comment follows other considerations noted above, in which the author stated that the ambitions of the RtoP did not go far enough.

¹¹ The first pillar refers to the responsibility of States to protect their populations against crimes referred to in RtoP; the second, to the responsibility of the international community to help States meet these prevention and protection obligations; and the third, to the commitment of decisive and timely action consistent with the UN Charter. The RtoP is based on these three pillars, according to the speech of the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on 15th July 2008 in Berlin, organized by the Managing Global Insecurity and the Bertelsmann Foundation. See United Nations (2009).



above, do not establish any sequence of implementation in relation to the three pillars and do not consider one pillar more important than another (United Nations, 2009: 2). In addition, it is based on previous works, but it is essentially defined by taking into account paragraphs 138 and 139 resulting from the 2005 World Summit in order to emphasise the idea that the conclusions of that summit are not renegotiable and thus reinforce what was previously agreed. Edward Luck, a Special Adviser to Ban Ki-moon, said that "for the UN and its Member States, the principle of a responsibility to protect relates to that contained in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the *Outcome Document* – nothing more and nothing less" (Bellamy, 2011: 33).

Recent Developments of the Doctrine and Practice of RtoP

Despite the attention RtoP has received, since 2005 the developments have been problematic and haphazard regarding the application of the doctrine, both in terms of prevention and reaction. This is despite the fact that there have been some cases of success, including examples such as Guinea and Kenya. However, there have been more cases in which the international community has not intervened to prevent humanitarian catastrophes and atrocities, such as the cases of Darfur and Sudan. Nevertheless, Bellamy (2015: 182) points out that "In the first ten years RtoP has emerged as an international norm. With only a small handful of exceptions, States accept that they have made a commitment to RtoP and agree on its fundamental components."

The most recent case of a military intervention that received much attention is the 2011 intervention in Libya. The international community decided to intervene in a decisive way to stop an escalation of violence against the civilian population. This intervention had been considered, for some time, a case of success, if not the greater case of implementation of the RtoP and an example of the effectiveness of the UNSC in terms of decision-making at crucial moments.

Through the proposal submitted by the United Kingdom, France and Lebanon, with the support of the Arab League and the African Union, Resolution 1973 on an intervention in Libya was adopted by the UNSC on 17th March 2011 with ten votes in favour, none against and five abstentions (China, Russia, India, Germany and Brazil). It should also be noted that on 26th February 2011 the UNSC had already adopted Resolution 1970 related to the situation in Libya, which had a reference to the International Criminal Court and imposed an arms embargo on the Gaddafi regime. On 19th March, the United States began air strikes, which NATO took control of on 31st March.¹² Since this intervention is largely documented and analysed (Hehir & Murray, 2013, Hehir & Pattison, 2016), the key issue is that, according to the understanding of a number of countries that voted in favour, or abstained, the objective of the Resolution 1973 was to protect the population against the aggressions of the Gaddafi regime. However, NATO interpreted the mandate much more widely and eventually acted as an opponent of the Libyan regime by assisting forces contrary to it. The result was the fall of Gaddafi on 20th October 2011, when he was captured and killed by opponents who had benefited from NATO support.

The intervention in Libya was considered by many to be an excellent example of the application of RtoP, but its implementation was controversial and underlies the need for clearer implementation rules (Thakur, 2013: 61). Moreover, it is largely due to the

¹² For a detailed and critical analysis regarding the intervention in Libya, see Hehir and Murray (2013).



interpretation of the mandate with its implementation through NATO intervention that the non-intervention in Syria can be explained. Countries such as Russia and China expressed their disagreement with the interpretation of the mandate for Libya and future decisions regarding interventions in 2011 and 2012 in Syria. It is also the ideal argument for critics of RtoP to try to discredit the doctrine (Morris, 2013: 1265-1266).

Despite this, in 2011 Brazil presented, when it was one of the non-permanent members of the UNSC, a new notion entitled "Responsibility while protecting". The document reinforces the idea that matters of international peace and security are within the purview of the UNSC and considers that there is a need to improve the procedures for those responsible for controlling such matters. It also reinforces the need to pay more attention to the use of non-coercive methods, to have a more judicious use of force and to not cause more harm than good. In this way, Brazil intended to contribute to the doctrine, but also to position itself in relation to the P5 in a constructive and non-revisionist way insofar as the RWP is complementary to RtoP. Being positive in terms of promoting the debate has so far not led to a substantial advance in RtoP, which has been the subject of major concerns and objections mainly related to the use of force and its control (Stuenkel, 2016: 9-11). Therefore, these critical events, together with the current international political situation regarding the relationship between some permanent members of the UNSC, show that a new UNSC resolution on RtoP interventions will be hard to approve. However, the theme is still current, as stated by Seybolt (2008: 1) when he mentioned that "Once considered an aberration in international affairs, humanitarian intervention is now a compelling foreign policy issue".

What does the future hold for RtoP?

Recently, Bellamy (2015: 161) affirmed that "In the first decade, RtoP has moved from being a controversial and indeterminate concept seldom utilised by international society to a norm utilised almost habitually". But the reality may be different and the possibility of RtoP to continue its course in a troubled way is high. If, on the one hand, RtoP is generally accepted as the current reference when discussing and taking into account the need to protect victims of a particular type of violence – and, therefore, it is difficult to speak of humanitarian intervention outside the scope of RtoP – on the other hand, there are a number of issues that deserve attention and may hamper the development of RtoP. What happened in Libya might prevent other interventions from being authorised by the UNSC, since the situation after the intervention is considered by many to be worse in terms of international security as Gaddafi's Libya acted as a buffer zone in relation to southern extremist groups. Increasingly, countries pay more attention to the consequences of interventions and, fearing the consequences, they will tend to oppose them.

Progress in conceptual and principle terms has been considerable, and it should be noted that the doctrine of RtoP is perfectly consistent with the Westphalian international order. The fact that States share and follow mutually agreed norms and procedures generates a sense of legitimacy and sharing of common principles that is normatively important in the relationship between States (Welsh, 2004: 177; Franck, 1990: 24). Agreement through an organisation like the UN also has an added value (Claude, 1966: 374).

However, there are still debates and controversies regarding RtoP and interventions in general. In this sense, the problem is not only in relation to its implementation and



operationalisation. The adoption of international norms often has underlying principles with which these emerging countries, mostly divergent from the liberal order, do not agree (Newman, 2013: 235-236). In terms of International Relations-theory, this issue is also seen as part of the debate between pluralism and solidarism, regarding the potential of States in international society to share norms, rules and institutions (Buzan, 2004: 45).¹³ This is an important debate and, therefore, deserves attention. Essentially, this issue reveals different views about the international order. And the international order is evolving with the occurrence of power transitions, which may also have important consequences for the development and operationalisation of RtoP. It is important to point out that the United States has never been very receptive to the idea of having to commit military forces to interventions when their interests are not involved. The United States Congress has not officially declared war since World War II and the country has had some freedom to decide when to use military force in several countries.

In addition, international tensions and changes in the balance of power are also expected to increase as some countries, such as China, Russia and India, seek to have more influence in international affairs. What is at stake is a need for greater representation and reciprocity in decisions, mainly in the UNSC, since the way this body is currently composed does not reflect principles of representation, but it is fundamentally derived from a power-based policy that was determined in 1945 (Keohane, 2006: 60). China and Russia are permanent members of the UNSC, which is not the case for India and other countries that want to participate more actively.

There is also great concern about the selectivity with which RtoP is often implemented. In this respect, there are many cases. One is the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 and 2011, where the forces of Alassane Ouattara, the presidential candidate who won the elections in 2010, were opposed to Laurent Gbagbo, the former president who had suffered electoral defeat. Despite the adoption of Resolution 1975 by the UNSC¹⁴ and its preamble paragraph 9 condemning the series of violations and abuses of international law, along with odious violence against civilians, there was no intervention similar to the one in Libya.¹⁵ Many countries are dissatisfied with this selectivity and consider that it is actually about great Western powers acquiring a right to intervene according to their interests.

Moreover, "humanitarian considerations can play a part in motivating government to intervene, but States will not use force unless they judge that vital interests to be at stake" (Wheeler, 2000: 30).¹⁶ Thus, this will always depend on national interests, even for countries that feel obliged to intervene, which will tend to cause suspicion to others, regardless of whether one seeks to reconcile issues of humanitarian obligations, respect sovereignty, international order and use of force in appropriate terms (Wesley, 2005: 55). The intervention in Libya demonstrates that responses to crises that occur within States are largely dependent and determined by geopolitical interests (Hehir, 2013: 157-

¹³ On this subject, see Mayall (2000). This author defines pluralism as the view that States, like individuals, can and do have differing interests and values, and consequently that international society is limited to the creation of a framework that will allow them to coexist in relative harmony (Mayall, 2000: 14). Similarly, he defines solidarism as the view that humanity is one, and that the task of diplomacy is to translate this latent or immanent solidarity of interests and values into reality" (Mayall, 2000: 14).

¹⁴ The adoption of Resolution 1975 related to Côte d'Ivoire took place on 30th March 2011 and Resolution 1973 for Libya on 17th March of the same year.

¹⁵ Although there were peacekeeping forces on the ground.



158). What this means and implies is that, regardless of all the other factors mentioned above, in order to intervene, States need to consider that their interests are at stake, if not for a matter of international security.

Conclusion

Although the evolution of the doctrine of RtoP has been, at least, troubled, significant progress has been made over the years. It is undeniable that States have different views of the international order and that many of them will always be difficult to reconcile. Therefore, based on how RtoP has evolved and without undermining all the progress regarding human rights, its future might continue to be filled with uncertainties. There are still various conceptual and principle issues that are difficult to resolve due to historical reasons. The consequences of the intervention in Libya and the current international situation should be taken into account, since they do not favour the development of RtoP.

Issues related to decision-making and controlling processes in international organisations, particularly in bodies such as the UNSC, should increasingly be on the agenda and have more importance. It is about preventing the evolution that has been observed in the international order in relation to the emergence of a set of countries and transitions of power that need to be taken into account. This issue is particularly relevant for countries that do not (or only partially) identify themselves with Western liberal values and have demonstrated disagreement over the dominance of RtoP by liberal Western countries.

Therefore, for the doctrine to be operationalised and implemented, a genuine multilateral cooperation by UNSC members, mostly the permanent members, is needed, which is not easy. Moreover, it will probably depend as well on States to consider concerns about such crimes as an essential issue of international security and as an integral part of their interests.

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FROM CITY-STATES TO GLOBAL CITIES: THE ROLE OF CITIES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Domingos Martins Vaz

dvaz@ubi.pt

Sociologist, professor at the Department of Sociology of the Universidade da Beira Interior (UBI, Portugal) and researcher at the Interdisciplinary Centre of Social Sciences (CICS NOVA) of the Universidade Nova de Lisboa. He has published and researched urban and rural issues, mobility and territorial development.

Liliana Reis

lilianareis@ubi.pt

Assistant professor at the Universidade da Beira Interior (UBI, Portugal); director of the Degree in Political Science and International Relations and the Master's in International Relations at the same institution; and researcher at the Centre for Research in Political Science at the Universidade do Minho and Universidade de Évora. PhD in Political Science and International Relations from the Universidade do Minho. She has researched about the European Union and global governance and participated in several national and international conferences. She recently received the honourable mention of the José Medeiros Ferreira Prize.

Abstract

Global governance has altered institutional architecture and the systemic and institutional conditions under which power is exercised, as well as the characteristics of the political system, the form of government, and the system of intermediation of interests. However, although it has surpassed the State's dimension of power, it created new interstate dimensions and new relations between powers, particularly at the level of cities. Cities have helped to solve common problems in a more efficient and effective way by facilitating the exchange of knowledge, sharing of solutions and resources, and building capacity to implement and monitor progress in order to achieve collectively agreed goals, in a bottom-up approach. Cities have the virtue of securing the most direct social and political contract between societies and the notion of authority. This study, therefore, aims to reflect on this emerging, less hierarchical and rigid governance and address complex global challenges such as climate and demographic change; increasing crime rates; disruptive technology; and pressures on resources, infrastructure and energy. As a global/local interface, cities can ensure effective solutions to current challenges and act together in areas where the global agenda has stalled.

Keywords

Subnational actors; Threats and risks; Globalisation; Multilevel governance; City networks

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FROM CITY-STATES TO GLOBAL CITIES: THE ROLE OF CITIES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE¹

**Domingos Martins Vaz
Liliana Reis**

1. Introduction

The proportion of the global population living in cities has grown rapidly. Massive concentrations of people exist now on a scale that has hitherto been deemed inconceivable, leading to the formation of worldwide urban systems with rapid transformation effects on societies and on the functioning of the economy and global politics. As a consequence of these transformations, the current challenges faced by cities bring us, in certain situations, closer to the idea of "city-states",² from the perspective of the concentration of diverse activities and innovation, as well as of action in networks and their relevance in understanding the phenomenon of global governance.

The article analyses and questions the role of cities and the decentralisation of power at the level of national and international governance, which is a consequence of the globalisation process. The holistic approach presented contributes to improving the analysis of current global governance processes, emphasising the role of cities as actors capable of generating responses to global risks and threats (terrorism, climate change, crime, among others), considering that many of them have an urban genesis. Thus, the first section assesses the role of cities in the process of globalisation, the city as a centre of power and the globalisation as a multidimensional phenomenon. The second section deals with the formation of city networks, their role and the issue of governance, particularly multilevel governance. In the third section, the main challenges and problems faced by cities are discussed, putting into perspective their role as subnational actors for the enrichment and maturation of the process of global governance. We conclude that city networks are a new form of action composed of subnational actors, previously excluded from the international scenario, and they represent a new world reality with

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² The term has an English origin, dating from the nineteenth century, and covers the cities of the Greco-Roman world and medieval Italy. Although this conception of State refers to the pre-classic civilizations of the Fertile Crescent (from Phoenicia to Mesopotamia, especially in Sumer), it reached its maximum splendour between the fifth and fourth century B.C. (the period of Classical Greece) as a political system constituted by an independent city, which has sovereignty over a surrounding territory and functions as a political, economic and cultural centre, with emphasis on Athens, Sparta and Troia. The need to conquer and survive are still the explanatory hypotheses for the emergence of this form of political organisation in the Greek cities scattered throughout the Mediterranean (City-state, Infopédia, 2003-2017). Today, globalisation, the decentralisation of States' power and the local need for global solutions have changed the context dominated by national States. The foreign policy of many cities is no longer limited to simple commercial promotion or twinning ceremonies. Many cities and regions consider themselves actors within the context of networks with common interests and, as sub-national actors, they develop paradiplomatic actions in the international scenario.



their own structures and innovative ways of equating and interacting in the international system.

2. Cities and Globalisation

2.1 The city as a centre of power

Cities have always been centres of power throughout history. They are originated from a process of sedentarisation and their political existence is inseparable from their material existence. They are centres of power and administration, where myths and symbols are produced, ceremonial places; it is where the temples are located, where the gods are able to guarantee the dominion of the territory (Rolnik, 1994).³ Since ancient times, from the Sumerians to the Greeks, the role of cities as crucial points of interests and decisions connected communities of citizens. They assumed and equated themselves with State functions. The Greek cities of Sparta and Athens, as political units, played a prominent role in "international" relations in terms of defence, with the formation of alliances between city-states, which subsequently fought against each other in the Peloponnesian War.

The city is also one of the first social groupings open "to all strangers",⁴ unlike the village or the clan, causing evident dynamic effects. Cities allowed, and still do, meeting, sharing and innovation. Hence, even today they are identified with "civilization" and cosmopolitanism. Not only are many different individuals concentrated in the cities, but also individuals from very different places. This exchange (of ideas and information) allows the cities to be the centre of change (Mumford, 1989). They respond to all kinds of yearnings, combine economy and knowledge, security and power.

Innumerable examples of transformations originated in the cities, as meeting places, warehouses, stops for "many and wild people". These are found throughout history, such as Florence or Lisbon during the Renaissance;⁵ or Birmingham with the Industrial Revolution. Cities are the engines of the production of knowledge and progress as well as agents of protagonism.

One can even admit that, in the current situation of weakening or fragility of traditional political decision-making centres, such as States, other actors claim leading roles, such as international organisations, transnational corporations, as well as cities. The current international panorama favours the role of cities and even considers the possibility of using a Hanseatic type of system. Due to the absence of a unifying political power, in the

³ Today, do contemporary metropolises still have these characteristics? Don't their shiny glass and metal towers represent the decision centres of the destiny of States, countries and the world? Are not their advertising hoardings, shop windows and TV screens the temples of new gods? It seems to us that in these non-centralised metropolises urban power has never been so centralised. The instantaneousness of the computer and the video image support control systems organised in heavily centralised and hierarchical structures exist, without this necessarily implying space concentration.

⁴ For Mumford (1989:133), the city is one of the first social groups open "to all strangers", unlike the village or clan, causing dynamic effects as a source of innovation and technical progress, in contrast to the countryside.

⁵ It was shown as a global, multi-cultural and mixed city and as a sixteenth-century commercial centre in the exhibition "The Global City", at the Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga (National Museum of Ancient Art). "This city had a world inside itself, which could be seen by walking through Rua Nova dos Mercadores, which was the centre of commerce. There are not many European capitals of the Renaissance where we could buy macaws, monkeys and civets, where there were thimbles from Ceylon [now Sri Lanka] to sell, where the variety of Chinese and Japanese wares were as large as here," says Gschwend, who shares with the historian Kate Lowe the curation of the exhibition *Jornal Público*, February 23, 2017.



late Middle Ages, the management of the vast area of the Baltic Sea was ensured by an alliance of cities (Lubeck, Bergen, Hamburg, Riga . . .) and by a league of merchants, the Hanseatic League (Moita, 2017).

An analogy with this experience can be established, albeit not artificially, given the growing global governance of multinational corporations and large metropolises. But this is not only explained by the recent emergence of authentic city-states, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, neither by the expansion of megacities, which are classified as global cities in different continents (Sassen, 1991, 2002, 2005, 2007). In fact, local powers, especially those of large urban concentrations, are today affirming themselves as actors in their own international life and developing an active role that interferes with the current processes of globalisation; the national and international research that has been produced in International Relations on the centrality of cities in the current international system shows this (Curto et al., 2014; Tavares, 2016; Santos, 2017).

The intensity of contemporary urbanisation has contributed inexorably to this. According to the United States' National Intelligence Council, 65 million people join the urban world population every year, which is equivalent to seven cities the size of Chicago or five cities the size of London. This dynamic is particularly strong in China and India (National Intelligence Council, 2012). Africa, especially Nigeria, has also made a great contribution. UN reports (2014; 2017) on global urbanisation clearly show the strength of the flow of migrants. From 1990 to 2014, the number of cities with more than 10 million people increased from 10 to 28, with the majority being in Asia. Most of the world's population lives in urban areas. It is estimated that by 2050 there will be an additional 2.5 billion people living in cities and the urban population will grow by 66%.⁶

More than two thirds of the European population live in urban areas and this share continues to grow.⁷ The development of cities will determine the future economic, social and territorial development of the European Union.⁸ This is reflected in the objectives of the strategy of Europe 2020, which calls for a real partnership with European urban areas, cities and towns for its implementation and continues to strengthen public support for sustainable urban policies across the EU.

⁶ In 1950, less than one-third (30%) of the world's population lived in urban spaces (Harvey, 2004).

⁷ In the "Europe of 28", in 2017, 74.5% of the population live in urban areas and this share continues to grow, albeit in a much more moderate way. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the urban population steadily grew. Whilst in 1950 the rural European population was still larger than the urban, currently more than two thirds of the European population live in urban areas (Eurostat, 2016), although occupying only 17% of the total European territory (PBL, 2016). In this sense, the United Nations has stressed that in 2050 Europe will have an urban population of around 80% (UN, 2014). The development of cities will determine the future economic, social and territorial development of the European Union.

⁸ In several official documents since 2004 the EU has emphasised that cities play a crucial role as engines of the economy, as places of connectivity, creativity and innovation, and as service centres for their surroundings. Among the most relevant on the role of European cities are:

- The Urban Acquis of 2004, which recognises "the importance of cities' contribution to Europe's economic, social and environmental success";
- The 2005 Bristol Agreement, which underlines the importance of sustainable communities for Europe's greatest development and identifies the characteristics of these sustainable communities;
- The Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities, which refers to the importance of the greater integrated use of urban development for political approaches;
- The 2007 Territorial Agenda, which points out the issues faced by cities and urban areas in the context of territorial cohesion;
- The 2008 Marseille Declaration, which calls for the application of the Leipzig Charter's principles through the development of a European Reference Framework for Sustainable Cities;
- The 2010 Toledo Declaration, which recognises the role that European urban areas and cities can play in achieving the goal of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pursued in the Europe 2020 strategy.



Large cities have emerged as a strategic place for numerous types of operations in different thematic areas, since "multiple globalisation processes assume concrete localised forms, electronic networks intersect with thick environments (whether financial centres or activist meetings" and "new subjectivities arise from the encounters of people from all around the world" (Sassen, 2012). The link between these cities and globalisation becomes evident. Authors such as Dollfus (1998) advance the idea of creating a "world megapolitan archipelago" composed by groups of cities that contribute to guiding the world, which is one of the strongest symbols of globalisation combined with the concentration of innovation and management activities. This is because new processes of urbanisation materialise in the recent trend of the appropriation of cities by global business interests, redefining different territories and their relationship with agents that have transforming power.

In many geographical regions, power is shifting from central governments to regional and local governments. That is why the foreign policy of many cities is no longer limited to mere commercial promotion or twinning. The American economist Stephen J. Kobrin states that there are already many cities and regions that have begun to feel freer from central governments and that "a modern version of the medieval city-state order is emerging".⁹

In historical terms, it can be said that the most stable territory in traditional societies was, in general, fragmentary and excluding in relation to other outside cultures, but deeply integrating and holistic for the inner social group. In contrast, in the contemporary world, globalisation is a vital necessity for the reproduction of the system, resulting in a form of territorial organisation, increasingly shaped by mobility, flows and networks. An important trend is the one that considers the network as an element of territory or one of the forms of territory.

2.2 Multidimensional globalisation

Globalisation can be synthesised by the idea that many local realities are part of broader phenomena, with global reach and significance. There is a complex of social relations transcending national territories to the extent that what happens in a given place is influenced by events from a great distance (Giddens, 2001). The global mode of operation involves very disparate domains, which is why one speaks of dimensions of globalisation, in the plural, as Appadurai (1996) does by suggesting that the current world is characterised by the existence of five "fluid landscapes", formed by flows of individuals, media, technology, capital and ideology. In this way, we can say that the main characteristic of this new arrangement of the social is to establish new coordinates in the relations of space-time, producing multiple flows and new forms of organising human life.

Understanding this new reality requires theory that understands the phenomenon of globalisation according to an approach that goes beyond a strictly economic view and that privileges, above all, the political and cultural dimensions of contemporary changes. There is certainly a difference between an orientation that favours structures and a reality where mobility, circulation and insertion into multiple belongings are central. What characterises the contemporary world are all kinds of flows that recreate it and give it

⁹ Stephen J. Kobrin quoted in A. J. Teixeira (2015: 11).



vitality permanently. Traditional theory seems to have subdued "rhizomatic" proliferation and, according to Deleuze and Guattari (1980), preferred stable referents: territories, organisations, institutions, the State. The entire planet is currently crossed by unceasing flows of various kinds – financial, commerce, information and populations – and this new situation challenges the observer's point of view and encourages its reordering.¹⁰

An alternative to economic and geopolitical theories of globalisation that intervenes the geocultural dimension, in the perspective developed by Appadurai (1996: 2004), has gained in interest. This author highlights the crisis of the traditional nation-state and shows the impact of the circulation of individuals and information in the contemporary world. The means of social (mass) communication and (mass) migrations have, according to Appadurai (1996), had a decisive effect on the "imagination", which is, for him, the constitutive characteristic of modern subjectivity – that is the "sentiment of identity" of each one. When analysing globalisation, the author attributes a central place to "imagination", according to Durkheim's notion of collective representation. We can point out here a parallel with Anderson's (1991) reflection on the formation of the nation-state and the "imagined community" as its main component. Anderson shows the role of new communication techniques linked to the invention of the press and its impact on the structuring of centralised nation-states that concentrate the exercise of sovereignty and the monopoly of legitimate violence in a territory with well-defined borders. With Appadurai's (1996) "imagination", the idea of invention prevails in a context where the media plays a determining role, not only disseminating but also shaping cultural processes and making them more flexible. The link between the definition of sovereign spaces, the ways of information circulation and their diffusion through a device of appropriate technologies allows for the recontextualisation of the nation-state and re-equating the issue of sovereignty.

Therefore, globalisation has two very precise effects. First, in the geopolitical framework, the nation-state as a stable reference had a very strong importance, with members of society as its privileged base. Discourse on the nation dichotomously opposed similarity and difference, belonging and exclusion, which was a characteristic of modern culture (Anderson, 1991). It was a context where the processes of identity induction took place within a permanent dynamic of opposition between "us" and "them", between the inside and outside. However, migrations, on the one hand, and media flows, on the other, have shaken this once dominant framework. The conditions of late modernity have posed difficulties to binary thinking, producing in the nation-states scenarios that Anderson

¹⁰ The connection of the networked world increased information processing capacity, which is essential to the development of economic and social activity and became available in real time. It can be mentioned, from the growing international movement of travellers with economic and cultural impact: i) travel and tourism; ii) globalised business administration; iii) study in other countries; iv) participation in scientific events and congresses; v) flows of international migrants. As an example, we can say that international trade represents, in most countries, a large percentage of GDP, and its economic, social and political importance has grown in the last decades. Industrial and transportation development, globalisation, the emergence of multinational companies and outsourcing had a great impact on the growth of this trade. The volume of world trade had a twentyfold increase since 1950. This increase in manufactured goods exceeds the growth of their production rate by three times. The EU-28 accounts for around 15% of world trade in goods. Between 2006 and 2016, the evolution of the EU-28's goods exports by main trading partner varied considerably. Among the major trading partners, the highest growth rate was registered in exports to China, which nearly tripled; whilst exports to South Korea almost doubled. Exports to Norway and Japan grew more slowly and were 26% and 30% higher in 2016 in comparison to 2006; whilst there was no change in exports to Russia in the same period (Eurostat, 2017).



(1991) defined as the "crisis of the hyphen", being difficult today for many States to consider themselves unitary nations.

Secondly, in a world marked by the "power of the imagination", Appadurai (1996) does not ignore the relation between the local and the global. To a certain extent, the author reacts to the pessimistic view that globalisation means, in the long term, the disappearance of the cultural specificities of the territorialised world of the past. The "end of territories" would be associated with the crisis that destabilises States whose sovereignties are called into question by the proliferation of economic flows and the constitution of new transnational groups. Thus, globalisation marks, to a large extent, the decline of a civilization where transmission and tradition played a preponderant role and where the subject defined itself by a locality, region and nation.

The proliferation of deterritorialised groups, the diversity of diasporas observed everywhere, has the effect of creating new translocal solidarities (Appadurai, 1996). Identity constructions that go beyond the national framework have emerged. State policies contribute in their own way to maintaining this situation and producing migratory movements. Appadurai (1996) insists on the great heterogeneity of these forms of circulation. Refugees, specialised workers in international enterprises and organisations, tourists and students represent very different types of migrants and constitute a type of delocalised "transnation" in their own way.

Considering these conditions, will we be entering the post-national era? New forms of organisation playing a leading political role in very diverse areas – such as the environment, economy and humanitarian relations – are fluid and flexible in contrast to the rigid structures of traditional state apparatus. The affirmation of cities in global governance and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) being developed, often in connection with crisis situations, represent a new political model more directly anchored in civil society, which clearly transcend national boundaries. Transnationality, which increasingly characterises the globalised world, imposes new networked solidarities and more flexible modes of action. Thus, emerging post-national sovereignties can be interpreted and the very idea of patriotism does not lose all its value as it makes sense to speak of a "mobile, plural and contextual" patriotism. This is another notion that confronts the classical conceptions of the nation-state that do not admit that there can be mobile forms of sovereignty and a new type of commitment, where civic and political action make the national framework implode.¹¹ In addition, the formation of transnational institutional groups – such as the paradigmatic case of the European Union – has confronted the traditional framework of sovereignty.

3. City Networks and Governance

3.1 City networks

As globalisation progresses and urbanisation intensifies, the globalised economy structures the space of flows theorised by Castells (2005),¹² which is embodied in a

¹¹ The protests that mobilise organisations that bring about causes as diverse as those that are developed around environmental, inequalities or hegemonic counter-globalisation issues show this action.

¹² This author proposes that there is a new spatial form characteristic of the social practices that dominate and shape the networked society: the space of flows. For Castells, flows are the intentional, repetitive and programmable sequences of interchange and interaction between physically disjointed positions held by social actors in the economic, political and symbolic structures of society. In this network, no place exists



spatial organisation around control and command centres. This corresponds to Sassen's (2012) idea of a "global city", in which some world cities dominate international finance and most of international consulting and business services. The world economy is administrated from these cities, where policies and international strategies come from, and whose main challenge is to expand the dynamics of growth in all sectors of activity. It is a process that affects not only the world cities that are at the top of the hierarchy but all the cities that are part of the global network.

It is interesting, therefore, to analyse the performance of city networks and their increasing importance in understanding the phenomenon of global governance, which composes a new reality in the international scenario. This process has developed since the 1980s and 1990s, given the changes that have led to the reappearance and expansion of paradiplomacy in the world (Curto et al., 2014; Neves, 2010; Moita, 2017; Santos, 2017).¹³ Since the intensification of globalisation, the network-state has emerged – that is the State that shares authority over a network – after end of the Cold War and the subsequent fall of the bipolar system (Borja & Castells, 1997; Lecours, 2008; Araújo, 2011). In this context, cities and regions have assumed new economic and political roles in the international scenario due to the decline of a hierarchy that had the State as the sole holder of power and decentralisation, which gives subnational agents autonomy to act as global actors (Araújo, 2011; Curto et al., 2014; Tavares, 2016; Santos, 2017).¹⁴

City networks date back to antiquity, from Greek city-states to Spanish America, which had been organised as a large network of cities. Being organised in networks implies that cities have autonomy and have to cooperate with other municipalities horizontally, allowing access to information and resources in order to be more direct and less bureaucratic. Based on Araújo (2011), the main characteristics of these networks can be systematised:

- There is no hierarchy in the relationship between its members;
- They have global reach;
- Agility – both for decision-making and the exchange of information;
- The multiplicity of actors;
- The democratisation of knowledge through the inclusion of municipalities of various geographic, economic and social characteristics.

Networks are both a consequence and a cause of global governance as they contribute to its development. Governance is understood as a phenomenon that dispenses with the

by itself, since positions are defined by flows. Consequently, the communication network is the fundamental spatial configuration: places do not disappear, but their logic and meaning are absorbed by the network.

¹³ Based on Neves (2010) and Moita (2017), paradiplomacy is understood as the capacity of non-state actors to establish international cooperation agreements from their own interests, regardless of the State's actuation. This is an expanding process, due to the logic of economic globalisation, boosting competitiveness and given the dynamisation of processes of cultural internationalisation. This reality has led to the proliferation of international partnerships and the dissemination of various kinds of networks. Since the urbanisation process is intensifying, the role of cities should also be emphasised because they have increasingly affirmed themselves as important "nodes" of very diverse globalised networks, aiming to influence the international agenda, have an active voice along with multilateral organisations, and they are now key poles of internationalisation and relevant agents of new non-state "diplomacy", paradiplomacy.

¹⁴ Resulting, especially, in the creation of associations of cities and local governments; the establishment of bilateral agreements and international technical cooperation programs between cities; the twinning of cities; trade missions; and international networks of cities (Araújo, 2011).



government, since government implies activities supported by a formal authority with coercive powers, whilst in governance objectives are achieved not necessarily through formal authority but through common and shared goals by all those who are part of the system (Rosenau, 2000). Therefore, governance is more comprehensive than government and its objectives and ways of achieving them are longer lasting. Thus, city networks are examples of governance without government, as there is no central authority in this type of organisation and the relationship between its members is horizontal; its common objectives and symmetrical cooperation enable its existence.

City networks fall into the concept of governance in two different ways, although they may differ in their scope of action. First, horizontal cooperation, consensus-based decision-making, a lack of hierarchy among members, and therefore a central authority, demonstrate how governance functions as an organisation and a form of order. Global networks, such as United Cities and Local Governments, focus on broader issues in the international scenario, whilst regional networks, such as Mercocities, strive to find solutions to regional and local problems. These two examples also demonstrate the networks' intention and objectives to maintain horizontal cooperation and no hierarchies of any kind, whether political, economic or cultural.¹⁵ On the other hand, the international development of city networks shows the existence of global governance as an international order. If the internal action of cities and their greater autonomy in the domestic context is the result of decentralising federal or national power, in networks, cities demand greater affirmation in order to influence the decisions of governments and the international organisations they lead.

3.2 Governance and multilevel governance

The expression of governance emerged from reflections conducted mainly by the World Bank since 1992, "with the objective of deepening the knowledge of the conditions that would guarantee an efficient State" (World Bank, 1992: 1). The introduction of the concept results from the inability of the term "government" or "governability" to capture new dynamics after the end of the bipolar period of the Cold War and States as the main actors in the international system. The concept of governance was thus intended to shift the focus of attention from State action to a broader view, involving not only a holistic approach to subnational, national and international public management, but also intersecting economic, political, social, environmental and cultural dimensions.

According to the document *Governance and Development* of the World Bank (1992: 3-5), the governance paradigm should include "patterns of articulation and cooperation between social and political actors and institutional arrangements that coordinate and regulate transactions within and across boundaries of the international system"; and "traditional mechanisms of aggregation and the articulation of interests, such as political parties and lobby groups, as well as informal social networks, hierarchies and

¹⁵ For example, according to the Mercocities Network's Bylaw, the decisions of the network council – formed by two cities from each country member of Mercosur and one city from each associated country, as well as the Board of Directors – should always be made by consensus. In the UCLG, even though decisions are made by simple majority, the number of representatives of each local government in the World Council and in the Executive Board is defined according to the population and the political engagement of its members. Moreover, it follows the principle that no part of the world should have more than a quarter of the total number of seats or more than twice the number of seats allocated to any other part of the world.



associations of various kinds." Thus, the institutional format of the decision-making process should be open to the participation of all interested actors.

Keohane and Nye (1974: 41) used the term "transgovernmental" for the first time to describe interactions among "sub-units of governments" in response to the "greater complexity" of governance. Risse-Kappen (1995: 17) also defined transgovernmental networks as "sub-units of national governments acting independently of established policies". Slaughter (2004: 26) recognised the functions of information exchange and political coordination of cities through "a dense web of networks". This author would even defend a new world order based on the existence and functioning of transgovernmental networks, capable of allowing governments to benefit from the flexibility and decentralisation of non-state actors and, at the same time, strengthen the State as the main actor in the international system.

However, this decentralisation of governance to the supranational, but essentially the subnational level, has made it possible for cities to assume a central role not only in governance but also in the management and sharing of responsibilities in resolving States' problems from an endogenous and exogenous point of view. In fact, a number of authors (Curtis, 2016; Hershell & Newman, 2002) that consider cities as the closest units between the governed and rulers have emerged. Regarding international relations, cities have the potential to solve global challenges as many of them surpass the local level and are not restricted to the limits of city. As in The Hague Declaration during the launch of the Global Parliament of Mayors (GPM), cities have the right to "take action together, across borders, in domains where the global agenda has been stalled or thwarted" (2016: 2).

The institutionalisation of a city network provides not only a channel for cities facing similar challenges and a platform for sharing knowledge and resources, but also an opportunity to address and mitigate many challenges and problems the world has faced (Barber, 2013).

Nevertheless, according to traditional theories – in which the nation-state is seen as the central authority – subnational governments act under the (single) influence and direction of national governments.¹⁶ In this way, the conceptualisation of governance would be mainly top down, deriving from the international to national level and then to the regional and local level, so that the role of local governments as relevant primary agents of global governance would be marginalised over time.

In contrast, there are a variety of methods to design public and international policies for multilevel governance. In this model of governance, a distinction is made between the State as an institution and the State as an executive, which pursues its own interests – which does not exactly mean "national interest". Moreover, the State as a main actor is now involved in a complex network of relations at the international level as well as at the level of domestic politics (Marks, 1996:26). The theory of multilevel governance considers all actors involved in the various stages of the decision-making process relevant. This is the rationalist component of this theory – all the people and groups involved in this policy will have as much or more influence over the current impact as

¹⁶ Realism and neo-realism, and liberalism and neoliberal-institutionalism are considered as traditional theories of International Relations.



those who initiated or legislated this policy. In fact, who formulates it and who implements it may be or may not be the same actor.¹⁷

Thus, a premise underlying multilevel governance concerns the world turning inside out and outside in (Anderson, 1996: 135). With the hierarchical dilution or at least the reduction of the State's structures of authority and the very subversion of traditional State sovereignty, there are other subnational actors paradoxically retrieve State sovereignty – the local governments. In this sense, supranational institutions are more than just the sum of its constituent parts and subnational institutions are more than central government administration. Thus, the multilevel approach does not condemn States to death. With the hierarchical dilution or at least the reduction of the State's authority structures and the very subversion of its traditional hierarchical order, States seek their repositioning in the international system and better adaptation of internal governance through regional and local agents.

Under this conception of multilevel governance, the conception of "glocal" governance emerges, based on a vertical link between local citizens and global policies, which does not advocate the replacement of States by cities, but the privileged position of cities to link their citizens to policies (Robertson, 1995). Glocal governance, with municipal governments as major actors, serves as a vertical link and fills this gap.¹⁸ For Robertson and White (2003: 14), "rather than speaking of an inevitable tension between the local and the global it might be possible to think of the two as not being opposites but rather as being different sides of the same coin", presenting "glocalisation" as the connection of the local with the global system.

4. Threats and Risks: Glocal Answers

Cities contribute both to the current threats and risks and to their solutions. This illogicality is observed in the characterisation of urban areas, often related to high concentrations of economic activity, employment and wealth, high rates of literacy among residents and the daily flow of passengers, which suggests that there is an abundance of opportunities in these innovation, distribution and consumption centres (Eurostat, 2017; United Nations, 2014). However, cities are also characterised by a series of social inequalities and it is common to find people who enjoy a comfortable life and live close to others facing considerable challenges, for example, in relation to housing, unemployment and crime. These polarised opportunities and challenges are often strongly contrasted, since the patterns of inequality in cities are generally more widespread than those observed in States as a whole. While the concentration of economic activity in cities can contribute to attracting a highly qualified workforce in pursuit of diverse opportunities, bringing together large numbers of people also leads to several negative externalities, including crime (Eurostat, 2016: 46; Zukin, 2010).¹⁹

¹⁷ This idea is related to a key element of multilevel governance: the eradication of the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign policies, that is between States' domestic and international plans, which emerges as methodologically indispensable in the theoretical framework of this model.

¹⁸ With one of the main modern democratic theories, Robert Dahl (1956) argued that nation-states and state-based international organisations failed to meet the challenges they faced.

¹⁹ In 2014, the proportion of people in the EU-28 living in areas with problems related to crime, violence or vandalism was considerably higher among urban residents (19.9%) than those living in suburbs (11.8%) or rural areas (7.3%). The inhabitants of EU-28 cities were, on average, 2.7 times more likely to live in an area with problems related to crime, violence or vandalism than those living in rural areas.



Although cities generate growth and development, it is where the greatest threats are found, which can be called the "urban paradox". For example, even though cities lead to growth, they also have higher unemployment rates (Eurostat, 2016; Curtis, 2016). Globalisation has led to job losses – especially in the secondary sector – which increased due to the economic crisis. Many cities face a significant loss of inclusive power and cohesion and increased exclusion, segregation and polarisation.

Currently, threats to the international system and, particularly, to States are diffuse and interdependent. Indeed, in the most recent data of the World Economic Forum (2017), the following risks were pointed out:

- Geopolitical risks (failure of global and regional governance, State collapse, failure of national governance structures, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attacks, inter and intrastate conflicts);
- Societal risks (large-scale involuntary migration, food and water crises, profound social instability, spread of infectious diseases, failure of urban planning);
- Economic risks (energy price shock, illicit trade, unemployment, fiscal crises, deflation, failure of critical infrastructure, failure of financial mechanism and institutions);
- Environmental risks (natural disasters, biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse, extreme weather events, failure of climate-change mitigation and adaption, man-made environmental disasters);
- Technological risks (cyberattacks, adverse consequences of technological advances, breakdown of critical information infrastructure, data fraud and theft).

These broader and more diversified threats confront and go beyond the powers of the Westphalian State. On the one hand, they require global responses, given the globalised characteristics of threats and risks; and, on the other hand, requires an investigation that considers the responses from "inside" States, within a subnational sphere. In relation to the risks and threats listed by the World Economic Forum, several authors have converged on the possibility of cities to respond to global problems. Regarding geopolitical risks, some authors (Graham, 2004; Dickson, 2002) argue that only cities are able to respond to new international threats, since many of these risks are in cities themselves (unemployment, social exclusion, terrorist groups recruitment, prostitution, drug trafficking, organised crime...). It is also at the urban level that both knowledge of problems and responses to societal risks are found (Saunders, 2010; Zukin, 2010). With respect to environmental risks, several authors (Taedong, 2015; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2005) have insisted that climate change, although traditionally considered a global issue, has become an urgent local challenge. Cities are responsible for more than 70% of greenhouse gas emissions and 80% of energy consumption. With 90% located along the coast, cities face common climate threats, such as rising sea level and coastal storms. These problems justify the need for a "glocal" arrangement, with an overlap between local and global issues. As Rosenau (2000: 4) wrote, "What is domestic is also international and what is international is also domestic".

Thus, democratic global governance must move away from the national structure, bound to national sovereignty, and towards decentralised local authorities. As the ancient Athenian democracy and the "public sphere" of Habermas (1962) suggest, cities are the



place where citizens can engage in the ongoing political process, influence policies that affect their lives and make the authorities to take the responsibility for them. Regarding the "glocal" governance, municipal governments are seen as the vertical link that enables citizens to participate in the formulation of global policies through local institutions and national authorities. With city diplomacy and "glocal" governance, international decision-making can also be more democratic.

5. Conclusion

In the history of mankind, such a strong acceleration of change has never been registered as that during the last century and, especially, over the last 50 years. We are in a world of cities, where globalisation has given a major boost to urbanisation. The comprehensive approach to the role of cities in global governance leads us to highlight the concepts of global governance and city networks, given their growing importance on the international agenda.

Governance refers to the means and processes that are used to produce effective results. It cannot be an isolated action of the civil society looking for greater spaces of participation and influence. On the contrary, the concept comprises the joint action of State and society in the search for results and solutions to common problems. It is undeniable that the emergence of non-state actors is central to the development of governance practice. The action of global cities consists of a new type of authority that has gradually become more important, assuming itself as a new form of organisation, which is more horizontal and has no central power and hierarchy among members.

City networks are a form of governance and today they take on new characteristics in paradiplomacy, although their creation is not a new phenomenon, as we have observed. Currently, they have been developed by the need of local governments to talk to each other in order to find solutions to the common problems they face. One of the main objectives of network organisation is to achieve better results than what the agents involved would if working separately, such as municipalities. By working in a network, they are better positioned to face situations involving international actors and to interact and exchange experiences with other members.

We conclude that city networks are a new form of action composed of subnational actors who have increasing power to solve many current international challenges in the international system.

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THE SUBVERSIVE WAR DEALS WITH THE PORTUGUESE STRATEGIC SCHOOL AND THE PORTUGUESE EXPERIENCE IN THE AFRICAN COLONIAL WARS

António Horta Fernandes

ahf@fcsb.unl.pt

Lecturer at the Department of Political Studies of the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences,
Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal).

Abstract

Subversive war has returned to have increased importance in different international scenarios in which major Western powers are involved. These complex scenarios, in some cases even insurgency and counter-insurgency phenomena, were joined by a very different phenomenon: terrorism. Therefore, and given the conceptual confusion and baneful practical consequences of a misvaluation of what a subversive war and concomitant strategies mean, it is imperative to revisit through the doctrine of the Portuguese School of Strategy and the Portuguese experience in the field, as they configure, even today, judicious axes to understand the nature of the typology of the conflict in question.

Keywords

Strategy; War; Subversion; Counter-subversion; Portugal

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THE SUBVERSIVE WAR DEALS WITH THE PORTUGUESE STRATEGIC SCHOOL AND THE PORTUGUESE EXPERIENCE IN THE AFRICAN COLONIAL WARS¹

António Horta Fernandes

Reflection on subversive war already has a tradition based in Portugal dating back to the colonial war period, in the sixties of the twentieth century (Fernandes, 2004). After the wars of emancipation of the former European colonies in Africa and Asia, the typology of the subversive wars slept until it was reborn in force in some military campaigns post-11 September 2001. However, its rebirth seems to have been accompanied by a certain, if not a conceptual, confusion. There has been talk of hybrid wars (Kilcullen, 2009), wars of chaos (Telo and Pires, 2013), multi-generational wars (Kaldor, 2012 – a new edition where he responds to his critics) and subversive with terrorism (Reis, 2016a).² And in all these cases, somehow, the doctrine already grounded decades ago had been forgot. It would be normal for many non-Portuguese authors to disregard the conceptualisation of polemologists and strategists of a small power. It is no longer customary that some recent Portuguese authors do not use this Portuguese doctrine as a reference, not for any kind of tardy nationalism, but simply because this doctrine, along with the old French doctrine, is still what has evolved to understand the phenomenon of war of subversion and concomitant actions of counter-subversion, or insurrectionary wars, avoiding any serious conceptual setbacks. The greatest of these is the importance attached to the military in combating insurgents and the separation of military operations from counter-forces and from stabilisation as opposed to reconstruction operations, as if they were two completely different phases of the war, operating with strategies that as well are heterogeneous; the first military, the second predominantly civil, yet performed in a conflict environment. Behind such a misunderstanding of the subversive war seems to be a old-fashioned vision, according to which strategy is something like the military ram of a political actor's power with collective expression, or as a method of organisation and application of power, implying nowadays other valences besides the military, but that lately is affected by the putative capacity of the use of military force. Thus, post-stabilisation phases of conflicts would be in some way post-conflict phases or residual conflict and, in a way, post-strategic (Fernandes, 2014).

However, rationalists of this sort are unaware of the nature of contemporary strategy and warfare, a test of non-military force, manifestations of hostile conflict that are not yet war (neither cold nor hot war), the prevalence of strategy in all azimuths and all time.

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² António Horta Fernandes refuted (2016) an article by Bruno Cardoso Reis, who then replied (Reis, 2016b). In turn, António Horta Fernandes responded (Fernandes, 2017). For a critical perspective on the relationship between war and strategy and terrorism, see (Fernandes, 2010).



The result has not always been the best, increasing, rather than decreasing, the entropy of the international scene, as shown by the cases of Iraq or Afghanistan. It is then necessary, once again, to focus on the essence of the meaning of subversive warfare.

1. The Nature of Subversive War

First, and since the article will focus on subversive war and the concomitant strategy of subversion and counter-subversion, it becomes necessary to know the phenomenon of subversive warfare. Subversive warfare can be defined as:

*The struggle within a given territory, by a part of its inhabitants, assisted and reinforced or not from abroad, against established or de facto authorities with the aim of withdrawing control of that territory or, at least, of paralysing its action (O Exército na Guerra Subversiva, 1966: Chap. I, p. 1).*³

In addition to the definition, it is still important to point out that, as a form of internal war, in theory supported or not abroad (a practice that has always been supported from the outside), subversive war evolved into a generic typology of war, a result of the strategic avatars of the Cold War. That is to say, in view of the impossibility of the global superpowers to use armed force against each other, because of the risk of a cataclysmic nuclear war, they had to develop alternative forms of warfare, which were in fact already *in nuce*. This development was essential for the creation of subversive war, since in it the fulcrum of the action does not become armed struggle.

In fact, we are talking about the creation of subversive war because the so-called small wars, irregular wars, popular wars and the struggles of different resistances during the Second World War were nothing but prolegomena to subversive war itself. On the other hand, so-called guerrilla warfare is only a combat method, based on small groups, ambushes, counter-ambushes, scourging and quick withdrawals, in short, intermittent contact, which was and is used in different types of war, including conventional warfare. What happens is that the subversive movements, in initial stages, had no armed capacity to do anything but guerrilla warfare; and of course, counter-subversion, if intelligent, which is confronted with the need to respond in the same measure.

The subversive fulcrum is not in armed struggle, it does not consist of defeating the military forces of subversion or counter-subversion; although, as war generated from an internal movement, its trigger must always be armed struggle, under penalty of subversives soon to be arrested, dominated by police forces and subject to the legal-constitutional framework in force for common times. Thus, both subversion and counter-subversion seek to win over the hearts and minds of the majority of the population where the revolt occurred. If it is possible, convince the direct military adversaries that the struggle does not make sense, incidentally but firmly, leading to the adverse forces being militarily comprised. In addition, it is essential to the diplomatic manoeuvring on the international stage, psycho-social, sanitation, developmental support, that is a set of

³ There are in Portuguese strategic doctrine small differences between subversive war and insurrectionary war, which, for the purposes of this article, will be left aside.



manoeuvres corresponding to general economic, communicational, psychological and cultural strategies that supports the military efforts. This comprehensive approach cannot be posterior to military combat, offensive and defensive operations, or subsequent stabilisation operations. The effort is a continuum where from the beginning, what we could designate as state-building responds to the yearnings and complaints that generated the revolt, is the main objective.

Through this theoretical framework one can better perceive what distinguishes subversive war from its historical embryos. What historically characterised the earlier proto-subversive actions, not least because war had not detached itself from the almost exclusive monopoly of armed struggle and military strategy, was the predominance of military vectors. The aim of these actions was to defeat or paralyse government military manoeuvres by means of an armed uprising of a fringe of a population, generally using irregular warfare. As one can see, this is not the aim of a subversive war. Take, the Second World War, for example, where the aim was not to win over the population through competing forces, but rather to resist the Germans through irregular operations, in order to inflict physical and moral damage on the occupants. In this way, it seeks to supplement the decisive, conventional axis of the manoeuvre carried out by the allied forces.

At heart, subversive war takes advantage of the elements thrown by total war, which extends the concept of war to other spheres other than the military.⁴ In practice, however, during the period of total war between the end of the Great War and the end of World War II, there was in fact a general but almost exclusive mobilisation in support of the military apparatus, which was the cause of this mobilisation. Only the duress of the atomic age and a greater acquaintance with the other modalities of war and strategy allowed the development of a war in all azimuths, including a war in which the central axis was not to defeat the adversary militarily.

However, caution must be exercised in this war on all azimuths. Because subversive war, although it has often descended into a kind of total war, a priori makes a reading of reality opposed to that of total war. Let us remember that total war is the utilisation, with maximum intensity, without temperance and simultaneously, of all the instruments at the disposal of a political actor. Total war reverses the strategic pyramid and virtually reduces the overall political objectives of a political entity to those related to hostility, those that fall under the purview of strategy (for example, the goal of unconditional surrender of the allied powers in the Second War). The post-war environment is very different: strategy regains its subordinate position in relation to politics, and from then on, it does not go back on the possibility of using all means. It is important to use these means in a balanced way, in accordance with the overall political objectives and not only with strictly strategic objectives, if not only according to the strategic objectives of the theatre at a given moment.

⁴ The concept of total war was introduced by the French politician and journalist Léon Daudet in 1918 and then was substantially developed and popularised by the German general Erich Ludendorff in 1935 in the work *The Total War* (*Der Totale Krieg*). Daudet defines total war as the "extension of the struggle in its most acute and chronic phases to political, economic, commercial, industrial, intellectual, legal and financial domains. It is not only the armies that clash, but traditions, customs, codes, spirits and especially the banks" (Daudet, 1918: 8). Ludendorff, on the other hand, refers to total warfare against the total and omnipresent reality of the relationship between states, concerning the struggle for the preservation of life (of a whole, of course) of a people (Ludendorff 1937: 22 et seq.).



It is necessary, however, to summarise the reasons why subversive war tends, during the Cold War (and continues to be), to descend into a total war; although this did not happen in the Portuguese colonial wars, and in particular for the Portuguese forces. The fact is that for a subversive strategy there were no fronts or rear lines and space had been greatly distended; on the limit, it could reach immense portions of the whole globe. Bringing war to the heart of the enemy was now to cause it to break, not by bombardment, but by highly subtle ways that would hardly allow the courage of the desperation that characterised the reaction to the bombing of cities during the Second World War. It was to lead the enemy to conclude that even the closest, including neighbours, friends and relatives, could not be with the enemy. But to simply depart was not easy either, since subversive war was equally played on the international scene, in international public opinion, and it might appear that under certain particularly negative conditions those who were not subversive in the distance were by no means judged with favour by new communities where they were trying to settle.

"With the designs of large-scale global subversion, one can understand the power of attraction, but also of repulsion and psychotic behaviour that such objectives and behaviours can originate" (Fernandes, 2007: 34).

The quotation reflects the historical association of subversive war to revolutionary war during the Cold War, but only subversive war itself was capable of originating such pathologies in the psycho-social domain. One cannot forget that subversive war tends to be a long-term war of saturation, because subversion cannot altogether defy counter-subversion in a classic confrontation in the initial stages of the conflict, and the population does not win in a flash.⁵

The great manoeuvre of the lassitude of subversion propitiates, which indeed has come to occur many times, is, as we have said, an extension of hostilities that surreptitiously introduces the vices of total war. If we note the duration that the war lasts, and if we read the conflict as a long-lasting snapshot, a perfectly legitimate reading of the inertial haemorrhage that counter-lassitude failed to stave off, or could only cut through, without breaking all structural ties and various temporal sequences, we are faced with simultaneous action of all forms of coercion, of all the general strategies available through integral strategy with maximum intensity. It is that the internal logic of the conflict itself, if it continues, must also be read in this way. The lassitude and the drag of time only materialise in success precisely in the condition of a unit of time.

⁵ The five stages or phases of the evolution of subversive action generally pointed out by the doctrine are as follows: 1st phase – subversion preparation; 2nd phase – creation of the subversive environment, a phase of agitation; 3rd phase – preparation and consolidation of subversive organisation, corresponding to the phase of surprise attacks, attacks and other guerrilla actions; 4th phase – creation of bases and pseudo-regular forces, a phase where there are areas that subversion controls by setting up a parallel state; 5th phase – general uprising, the final phase of a classic clash between forces (as happened in 1975 in Vietnam). Obviously, it will be easier for counter-subversion to combat subversion by containing it at its earliest stages (*O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, 1966: chap. I, p. 12).



2. The Portuguese case – a brief summary

In the Portuguese case, during the years of colonial wars in Africa (1961-1975), Portugal seems to have had an exemplary strategy of counter-subversion, not only from the point of view of its conceptual framework – the manual, *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva* (*The Army in Subversive War*), is probably the doctrinal document we know best done about subversive warfare and the best way to fight it – as well as on the ground. Subversive warfare operations in eastern Angola between 1967-1968 and 1973 are likely to use the differences between subversive movements (FBL-UPA, MPLA, UNITA) for their own benefit, manoeuvring to dictate the complex chess game, including the geopolitics of neighbouring states (use of Catangueses) and Zambians), which are the most modest ever implemented in the context of counter-subversion. Of course, there were limitations, such as an over-commitment of military forces in the so-called grid – a territorial coverage consisting of its division into zones of action and responsibility assigned to military units to control the terrain and populations – to security, replenishment, transport and maintenance of controlled areas, as well as (predominantly) carrying out psycho-social support actions, leaving little scope for effective action against insurgent forces (taking the creation of a reserve of intervention units released from that burden). However, the grid was essential to ensure the success of the struggle, being not the military defeat of the insurgents, but the conquest of the population, which would deny it the necessary logistical support and sources of recruitment. To dry and not necessarily to eliminate the enemy by means of its isolation was a fundamental, and much more effective, and with less destructive effects (collateral damage), as in Vietnam, so that the doctrine itself foresaw that even for the military forces the priority objective was the population, not the enemy itself (*O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, 1966: chap. II, 4-5).⁶ In this way, not only did the populations win, but, dialectically, subversion lost strength, faster than being only or mostly devastated by counter-guerrilla operations, if not by more far-reaching operations, since counter-guerrilla operations, although of counter-lassitude, are also wear-and-tear operations that require a long time; by their very nature the results are hardly structurally and strategically concentrated. Nonetheless, more men could have been mobilised for combat operations if there were enough civilian to replace them in some of the basic security or promotion activities within the territory. Unfortunately, this was not the case, because the greatest investment in the African

⁶ Where it is said that the military forces should represent only a small part of the means to be employed. In this field, the Portuguese military forces have always had to supply in excess the recurrent lack of civilian technicians. However, the manual also adds that in a strictly military context the armed forces should not be restricted to actions against the fighting forces of the population, but should collaborate in the struggle in other fields, even in the more advanced phrases of subversion. Moreover, when the military counter-subversion missions are detailed, the drafters of the manual conclude that missions whose effect is to conserve or regain the support of populations, that is psycho-social actions, may be of greater importance. They recognise that when a phase of implementation and consolidation of armed struggle is reached, the most important task of the armed forces is to combat the rebel forces. Nevertheless, they conclude by saying that "experience always demonstrates that the most effective measure to combat armed and guerrilla bands is to deny them the support of the people (information, food, medicines, recruitment, moral support, etc.), without which they cannot subsist" (*O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, 1966: chap. II, p.24). Therefore, before even fighting, first and foremost carrying the population itself is at the heart of action and not fighting insurgents on its own. Or put another way: fighting insurgents is strategically instrumental and depends on the conquest of the population; combat is useful insofar as it dialectically protects the population and makes them fall in good graces. While in other types of conflict the fight against the enemy, the armed adversary, is an end in itself in terms of the military strategy and one of the interactive aims of the integral strategy to be used by the superior political synthesis.



colonies comes precisely from the outbreak of colonial war and in response to emancipation movements. Once again, following in perfection is the doctrinal framework.

It seems that up until now we have only devalued military action, since if it is not the reason for subversive struggle, it is undeniable that without armed action the capacity for intimidation and seduction (subversive war articulates coercive actions, with actions of constraint and even of seduction and acceptance) of the population through subversion and the concomitant effort of counter-subversion would not progress. This is evident. However, what is at stake is that in subversive war strategy is more subtle and the use of military forces in combat actions, although indispensable, must be well considered, globally contained, taking into account the military strategy as a whole as well as different strategies, but at the same time resolute and steady when justified; otherwise, it is not only not remuneratory, but can also lead to the loss of the integral strategic effort and top political manoeuvres. Portuguese strategic action was generally very successful, as independent historians prove, like American historian John Cann (1998). The combination of operational strategy and structural and declaratory strategies was judicious, despite the relative international isolation of the country, which made a declaratory strategy proficient with different governments and international public opinion difficult.⁷

Nevertheless, in the end, Portugal would lose the war on several fronts: Angola, Mozambique, Guinea. This includes the most successful theatre of war, that of Angola, and that of intermediate success, that of Mozambique, as well as relative failure, that of Guinea. It is difficult, in the international context of that time, that Portugal could succeed, given the winds of history and the *Zeitgeist*. In any case, in addition to that, a policy that was not at the level of the strategy implemented contributed much to defeat. The particular blindness of the Portuguese political authorities did not allow integration of the strategic objectives that were being achieved in the basic political synthesis, which should have been dynamic and non-dogmatic, capable of accommodating strategic feedbacks. Portuguese policy should have better evaluated the evolution of opinion both of its own population and of the external board, knowing how to understand the *Zeitgeist*, to be able to give autonomy to the colonies in a stronger negotiating position, more favourable to the European populations in the territory, who had to be repatriated, and capable of starting a set of relations with the new states without complexes of guilt or distrust. This would have been useful not only for Portugal's material interests but also for its prestige and symbolic position in the world and in the future community of Portuguese-speaking countries.

However, we did not want to end without taking a global, and not only Portuguese, assessment of the subversive and revolutionary wars that occurred during the Cold War, almost always associated with decolonisation processes, including, therefore, a mark of self-determination inherent in a more or less incipient nationalism in African, which was more robust in Asian cases.

From a technical point of view, the long duration of a subversive war, which is essential to subversion if it is to succeed, as we alluded to and developed in other places, tends to

⁷ The four levels or forms of strategy, in the gap between integral strategy (termed the great strategy in Anglo-Saxon media, with little rigor) and the general strategies are the following, namely: operational strategy, which concerns the conduct and operation of means; genetic strategy, concerning the generation and creation of means; structural strategy, responding to the organisation and the articulation of means; declaratory strategy, having to do with the rhetorical effects of illocutionary acts of an expressive nature in their relation to the means, naturally in the face of the other, as in a demonstration of forces or to show the flag.



call itself the vices of total war and even to approach absolute war. The price to be paid for this intensity, which is often insidious, of violence, and long term, can be (and has been) very high. War, as a singular phenomenon, and insofar as it lasts, tends to brutalise societies due to the habitual absorption of violence. In subversive warfare, the intensity of material violence is not so obvious, but the usury of time associated with a psycho-social struggle is; without fronts or rears, institutes of common life are masked by war and war is hidden in peace, which does not fail to bring about a relative incapacity to build peace, showing much later the same psychotic behaviours. Moreover, in most cases we are talking about societies being founded if not created, materially fragile, institutionally fragile, still fragile in the ties that bind people, especially since we tried to divide and unite; and in each gesture of community service there seems to have always been a second intention, although not declared as such. It is clear that the same applies, albeit in a much less intense way to the social fabric where counter-subversion forces are based. But it seems clear to us that in this typology of war, frank success can only happen if counter-subversion immediately stifles subversion, or if, by luck or miracle, the authorities on the ground find it hard to give up right at the beginning. All else is a limited success.

Indeed, in the long run, the domain of international relations continued to reside in the great powers. Its ascendant was never structurally called into question by these small subversive and revolutionary powers, even when they succeeded and were a stimulus to others. Faced with the sophistication of insidious war they were developing, they responded to technologically advanced societies with more sophistication, keeping ascendant on the international stage, even in the face of recent clamorous defeats such as Iraq or Afghanistan. The depletion of human and material resources, which was very significant in the long term, only allowed short Pyrrhus' victories, leaving societies that embodied this subversion on the verge of exhaustion and in a precarious situation.⁸

In addition to the incipient results in comparative terms with respect to the powers with which the subversive movements were beaten, and which had as a consequence the maintenance of the ascendant more than a clear control of the international scene on the part of these same powers, all these subversive wars end up affecting the international balance, the prestige of the great powers and, consequently, their relative dominance. That is to say, we should check, regardless of the eventual victories of subversive forces in the immediate, or of their much more limited success in the medium and long term, if these struggles have brought substantive changes to the international scene and the balance of power, though different to what their protagonists thought they had achieved. I mean, did subversive wars help change the world, yes or no?

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⁸ This seems to be the lack of correspondence between the expansion of members of the UN General Assembly, with decolonisations, as well as their relevance. As decolonisations marked the high moment of the UN, they also marked their inflection point and downward direction (Mazower, 2017: 305) – we handled the Portuguese edition particularly clumsy regarding the translation and revision.



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LIBYA AND TURKEY'S EXPANSION POLICY IN AFRICA

Hüseyin Bağcı

bagci@metu.edu.tr

Professor at Middle East Technical University (Ankara, Turkey).

Serdar Erdurmaz

serdar.erdurmaz@hku.edu.tr

Associate Professor at Kalyoncu University (Gazi Antep, Turkey).

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes Turkey's need to make increased efforts to ameliorate relations with Libya in order to successfully advance the "African Evolution" initiatives. The study covers the AKP period since 2009, including the rebellion conducted by the Benghazi rebels up to the death of Gaddafi and the post-Gaddafi period up to now.

KEYWORDS

Turkey, Libya, Africa, Terrorism, Turkish foreign policy, Middle East, AKP

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LIBYA AND TURKEY'S EXPANSION POLICY IN AFRICA¹

Hüseyin Bağcı
Serdar Erdurmaz

1. Introduction

In November 1996, Necmettin Erbakan, former Prime Minister, paid a visit to Muammar Gaddafi in order to collect the high amount of debt owed to Turkish contractors that had not been paid for a long time. Gaddafi had an attitude that went beyond diplomatic convention and used disturbing expressions regarding the Turkish people while addressing the Turkish Prime Minister. This is the first impression that the Turkish people had of the Libyan leader, Gaddafi, seeing him as a disrespectful desert man rather than a diplomat (NTV 2009). This event was the first to attract the attention of the Turkish people. However, mutual relations had become better since 2009 thanks to the increasing commercial, financial and political relations up to the Benghazi uprising against Gaddafi within the wave of the Arab Spring early in 2011.

At the beginning of the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, Turkey supported Gaddafi, stating that Libya should deal with its own problem and that there was no need for any international intervention. Turkey's position regarding the rebellions made the opponents in Benghazi develop an adverse attitude towards the country. Consequently, due to the fact that Gaddafi had not changed his attitude, Turkey stopped contacts with him, which would later result in the opposition in Benghazi changing its negative attitude towards Turkey. During the civil war, thousands of Gaddafi's wounded opponents were brought to Turkish hospitals to be treated. Turkey has contributed millions of dollars to the rebellions and has hosted the transition council leaders in Turkey.

After the ouster and death of Gaddafi in late 2011, sharp divisions led to the emergence of two rival governments in the country, one based in Tobruk and the other in Tripoli, each with its own parliaments and military forces. This had a great impact on Turkish-Libya relations and because of that, Ankara backed "the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated General National Congress based in Tripoli"². In 2015, relations between Western-backed Tobruk and Ankara deteriorated. Ultimately, Libya decided to cease all relations with Turkey and expelled all Turkish firms from Libya (Kayalioglu 2016a).

In the past, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had initiated an "African Expansion" when he was Prime Minister to improve relations in political, economic and cultural fields. The Turkish government declared 2005 as "the Year of Africa" and the country was granted observer status by the Africa Union that same year. Erdogan also visited several countries

¹ Text reviewed by Carolina Peralta.

² Consulted online at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/turkey-libya-economic-interests-ankara-tripoli-embassy.html>



in both Sub-Sahara (Ethiopia, South Africa) and North Africa (Tunisia and Morocco). The number of Turkish embassies increased to 39 in 2015, while in 2009 there were just 12, and Turkey opened commercial consulates in 26 African capitals (MFA 2017b). In addition, trade and economic cooperation agreements were "signed with 38 African countries, in line with efforts to establish a sound basis for mutual economic relations"³.

It is this vast scenery of Turkey's effort in the whole African continent which forces Ankara to establish good and sound relations with Libya, since Libya is a country which opens a door from the Mediterranean Sea right to the interior of Africa, stretching from the north to the middle of the continent.

Turkey with its Justice and Development Party (AKP) government would like to establish good political, economic and cultural relations with countries in North and Sub-Saharan Africa.

When one studies the relations between Turkey and Libya, it is clear that there is no dispute between the two countries about mutual national interests. The dissension was brought about by the political disparities arising over support to the National Transition Government of Libya.

If Turkey wishes to be effective in North Africa, then Ankara cannot ignore Libya and must make all political and diplomatic attempts to establish a good relationship with the current Libyan government. This article analyzes Turkey's need to make increased efforts to ameliorate relations with Libya in order to successfully advance the "African Evolution" initiatives. The study covers the AKP period since 2009, including the rebellion conducted by the Benghazi rebels up to the death of Gaddafi and the post-Gaddafi period up to now

2. Relations between both countries in the AKP and Gaddafi Era

During the Gaddafi period, both sides put in efforts by common accord in order to keep Turkish-Libyan relations open to development. Minister of State Zafer Caglayan made a visit to Libya in early January 2009 during which the two countries reached an agreement regarding investment, construction, and trade.

The establishment and operation of free trade zones were on the top of the list of fields in which Turkey and Libya may enter into a partnership. A Libyan delegation visited Turkey in May 2010 under the presidency of Gamal Al Lamushe, Secretary of the Libyan Privatization and Investment Board, to discuss these matters with Turkish colleagues. An investment forum was held during the visit to bring together the companies from both countries willing to form an association. They aimed at making common investments in Africa in the fields of energy, small and medium-sized enterprises, technology, consultancy services, banking, water, transportation, tourism, education, advertising, culture, health, environment, agriculture, fishing, etc.

During the visit Prime Minister Erdogan made in 2009 November, 8 memorandums of understanding and agreements were signed regarding visa exemption, cooperation in agriculture and banking, co-investment in Africa, and transportation. Besides, during the visit of Mustafa Muhammad Abdul Jalil, the Libyan General People's Committee Secretary for Justice, Turkey and Libya signed a Judicial Cooperation Agreement. Both countries

³ Consulted online at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>



agreed to sign new agreements in the future, such as prevention of double taxation and economic partnership in order to reinforce their cooperation.

With regard to the economic cooperation agreement, 3 rounds of negotiations were completed, and it was decided that the fourth round would be held in May 2010 in Ankara. Likewise, negotiation processes were continued regarding cooperation agreements in education, culture, science, youth, sports, fishing, employment, illegal immigration, foundation of a joint chamber of trade, and cooperation between Red Crescents of the two countries.

The total number of projects that Turkish construction companies undertook in Libya in the 2009-2010 period was reported to be 124. Leading construction companies such as Dogus, Guris, Nurol, Metis, Tekfen and Yuksel Insaat were some of the companies working in Libya. The works undertaken in the 2009-2010 period include 1013 house projects in the Al Falah region of Tripoli by Tasyapı, the Burj Al Baher Commercial Centre, the Hotel and Housing Project by Summa Libya, and the construction of the Sirte-Huon energy transportation lines by Mitas. Besides, SEGA Insaat undertook all the infrastructure works in Gariat Sharkiya city, the Cevahir Group built the Benghazi Shopping Mall and Celtikoglu Insaat carried out the Wadi al Mejaneen Sewerage Construction Project in Tripoli. Teknik Yapı undertook a luxurious housing project worth 150 billion Euros on a 50 thousand square meters area in Tripoli which was declared a tourism area in Libya.

The trade volume between the two countries was 1.4 billion US dollars in 2008. This rate increased by 57% in 2009 and reached 2.2 billion US dollars. This number was expected to rise to 10 billion US dollars in the next five years. Before the rebellion, there were 120 registered Turkish companies in Libya during the Gaddafi period, working in various infrastructure and superstructure projects.

Considering the abovementioned issues, it is clear that during the Gaddafi rule, Turkey and Libya established a fairly good and close cooperation. Prime Minister Erdogan stated in regard to the rebellions intended to overthrow the Gaddafi regime, which came about with the Arab Spring, that the Libyan problem was a domestic problem which should be sorted out within the country. The good relations Turkey enjoyed with Libya was a reasonable ground for this statement. It is possible to think that, with such a statement, Turkey intended to maintain the existing balance with the Gaddafi regime.

However, this attitude changed given France's and the UK's demands for individual intervention. Opposing the NATO intervention initially, Turkey supported the intervention under the umbrella of NATO later on.

3. Turkey and the uprising

Turkey was involved in the Libyan issue from the start to solve the problem of evacuating its citizens who had been carrying out big investments there. While Turkey adopted the principle of securing the life and safety of Turkish citizens as its top priority, it was in continuous contact with Gaddafi to make him take into account demands of Libyans peacefully. These political developments led the opponents in Benghazi to develop an adverse attitude towards Turkey. There was no change in Gaddafi's attitude, thus Turkey stopped its contact with him.



Turkey's attitude changed the adverse mood in Benghazi in favor of Turkey. Additionally, Turkey's humanitarian rescue transporting Libyan patients to Turkey, and the aids of the Turkish Red Crescent and Ministry of Health in Benghazi and in the surrounding regions brought the Libyan people closer to Turkey. Turkey manifested an active policy despite all the plots of France. Turkey changed its initial attitude, and became active by taking a passive role in the air and at sea as part of NATO. Besides, Izmir Joint Air Headquarters played a part in the Operation Unified Protector.

Turkey opposed the rumors pointing to a solution implying elimination of the territorial integrity by separating the Eastern and Western part of Libya during the first days of the rebellion. It highlighted the need to respect the territorial integrity principle, insisted on the indivisibility of natural resources, and emphasized that such natural resources belonged to the Libyan people.

Turkey kept the relations with the National Transition Council (NTC) warm through the visits of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and of the Prime Minister and through monetary help. Thus, they kept the way open for cooperation with the future government. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu made two visits to Benghazi, one in July and the other in August.

Compared to European countries, Turkey was the country making the most concrete efforts to meet the basic needs urgently demanded by the NTC. Turkey's attempts to develop relations with the NTC included opening a line of credit for Libya, providing donations to the country, confiscating Gaddafi's assets in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions, and transferring the Arab Turkish Bank to a Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. In addition, Turkey contributed, together with Qatar, to the supply of oil to the opponents in Benghazi.

All the commercial activities conducted by Turkish companies on Libya territories were welcomed by the NTC. It was stated that more activities will be requested.

Besides, by hosting the Contact Group meetings held on 15 July, Turkey presented its active role and legitimized this role. At the end of September, Prime Minister Erdogan made a visit to Libya after Egypt and Tunisia. The visit and address he made to Libyans had great repercussions in the world.

The active stance demonstrated by Turkey from the first day of the outbreak has been carefully observed by European countries. In other words, Turkey is not an observing and monitoring country; quite the opposite, it is being observed as well as being determinant while influencing others.

Apart from this, Turkey granted monetary aid to the National Transitional Council (NTC). It was prescribed that Turkey would give 300 million dollars in total. Of this amount, 100 million dollars would be a donation, 100 million dollars would be in the form of credit in return for projects and 100 million dollars would be through cash credit. The cash was deposited into NTC's account opened in the Central Bank in Ankara. Ten million dollars out of the 100-million-dollar cash aid was sent on 27 July and the remaining 90 million dollars were delivered to the NTC authorities who came on 8, 10 and 21 August. These authorities took this money on a Libyan aircraft. In the explanation given by the National Transitional Council on 31 July 2011, it was said that the rebels were given 200 million dollars by Turkey (Hurriyet 2011).



In addition, Turkey was a country approved by Libya in terms of construction, zoning and settlement. Libya was one of the countries where Turkish companies were working very actively. The new government's recognition and acceptance of cooperation was left half-finished due to the start of the rebellions. Completion of such works will make it easier for Turkey to undertake new responsibilities in the reconstruction process. Thus, the NTC made demands regarding this issue, and relevant promises were made. After all, Turkey was ready to take the necessary role in Libya as a democratic Muslim country.

4. Libya After Gaddafi and Turkey

The most serious problem was the lack of security due to the failure to disarm and demobilize rebel militias after the war (Chivvis, Christopher S. Martini 2014).

In the aftermath of the revolution in 2012, the elected National General Council was an institution accepted by different segments of the society. In August 2012, the NTC transferred power to the General National Congress (GNC), an elected parliament which went on to select an interim president of state. And 2012 and 2013 were years when hopes and political expectations were high in the country. In this reconstruction period, Turkey's general approach was to support it and to respond to Libya's requests. However, Libya was undergoing a different cycle whereby violence was being used as a policy by General Khalifa Haftar, who had made a military coup in the beginning of 2014. As a result, eastern Libya was under the control of armed forces under the command of General Haftar, while independent armed groups were providing security in the western and southern regions. Ultimately, a crisis emerged with three different councils and governments claiming to be legitimate official organizations governing the country.

The Transition Government and the Parliament of National Council founded in Tripoli in 2011 constituted the most radical Islamist segment. On 25 June, this Parliament set up an election in which participation was 25 per cent, but this rate decreased to 15 per cent after the Elections Council cancelled the votes. After the unsuccessful election, another new government was established by General Khalifa Haftar in Tobruk, who declared that he would fight the radical Islamist terror.

Initially Ankara rejected to recognize the Tobruk Parliament and government, which was recognized by the UN Security Council, the U.S.A., the European Union, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates etc. as an official government of Libya. President Erdogan's reaction in 2014 was "Turkey could not accept the Libyan legislature's meeting in Tobruk" (Gmbwatch 2014) (Levent 2014). According to this announcement, "Western allies supported the UN-recognized government in Tobruk, while Ankara backed the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated General National Congress based in Tripoli"⁴. Immediately after this statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Libya claimed that it was "a blatant interference in Libyan internal affairs" and recalled its Ambassador (Gmbwatch 2014). In the aftermath of this dispute, the relations between the two countries deteriorated (Kayalioglu 2016). The Tobruk administration announced that Turkish citizens must leave Libya, and this meant the need to cease all diplomatic relations. Accordingly, in July, Ankara was forced to close its Embassy in Libya. In addition, the Libyan Prime Minister Thinni stated that Turkish contractors should lose

⁴ Consulted online at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/turkey-libya-economic-interests-ankara-tripoli-embassy.html>



their hopes as they were planning not to let Turkish companies work in Libya anymore, and they would be banned from the government's bids. This decision made Turkish companies actually unable to work in the country (Erdogan and Çelik 2015).

On 3 January 2014, though Libya showed signs of uncertainty, the Prime Minister of Libya, Ali Zeidan, paid a visit to Turkey and signed a common declaration to establish High Level Strategic Cooperation, and Ankara announced that it would continue to give support to political and economic reconciliation efforts in Libya (*The Tripoli Post* 2014). In this vein, Turkish companies returned to Libya, especially for construction businesses, but since there was a bipolar political structure, they were forced to withdraw tenders and get back to Turkey. Very few did business, at the cost of some 168 million US dollars (Ipek 2016).

On 17 December 2015, representatives from Tripoli and Tobruk signed a UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement based on four principles: *"ensuring the democratic rights of the Libyan people; a consensual government based on the principle of the separation of powers, oversight and balance; empowering state institutions to address the serious challenges ahead; and, respect for the Libyan judiciary and its independence"* (Apap 2016). On 15 February 2016, the UN-backed Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), with Fayez Al-Sarraj as Prime Minister, was nominated by Libya's Presidential Council (LPC). The GNA finally moved to Tripoli on 30 March 2016. Now there were three different structures claiming to have power and govern the country (Hall 2016), even though the Libyan Government of National Accord had the support of the United Nations and the European Union (Apap 2016). The GNA seemed to fill the power gap, and succeed in unifying the country's two rival groups and also in the fight against ISIL and other terrorist actions in future.

At the moment, Libya has three different power centers; the first is the UN-backed Presidential Council (PC) located in the Ebu Sittah navy base near Tripoli since 30 March 2016. The PC is headed by Fayez al-Sarraj according to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in December 2015 (Hall 2016). The PC presides over the Government of National Accord which should be endorsed by the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, it has not happened so far. The other is the Government of National Salvation, based in Tripoli and headed by Prime Minister Khalifa Ghwell, taking the authority from the General National Congress (GNC) as a result of the 2012 election. This formation used to be supported by Turkey. However, Ankara gave its support to the UN-brokered government at the meeting held in Rome in December 2015 (MFA 2015a). The latest center of power is based either in Tobruk or al Bayda, and has also been approved by the Government of National Accord. This power, headed by Abdullah al Thinni, is under the control of Egyptian-aligned, anti-Islamist general Khalifa Haftar, who leads the Libyan National Army (LNA) (Fitzgerald 2017).

Of these three power centers, the one controlled by Hkalifa Haftar (BBC Africa 2016) is the most powerful right now. The government in Tobruk-al Bayda has gained the support of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, France (BBC 2016), and Russia (Abdessadok 2017). Egypt is currently the most powerful ally of Libya. Tobruk and Egypt share the same political aims, which is to eradicate radical Islam and enhance the autonomy of eastern Libya. Arms delivery is also another important question for the two countries (Fitzgerald 2017). Turkey and Qatar do not have the same influence on the Tobruk government that Egypt and the UAE have on it, even though they think that have sufficient influence upon Libya (Fitzgerald 2017). Turkey and Qatar have been accused



of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood segment in Libya by the Khalifa Haftar side (Cafiero and Wagner 2015).

Since March 2016, the GNA has controlled ministries and government facilities in the capital. Recently, Libya's foreign minister announced at a news conference that Haftar will be appointed commander in chief of the Libyan army, on the condition that he accepts the GNA as the governing authority. Nevertheless, this has not happened (Abdessadok 2017).

Emrullah Isler, former vice prime minister, was nominated by President Erdogan as a special envoy and sent to Libya to visit both Tripoli and Tobruk for purposes of reconciliation between the two countries. Over the two days, Isler met the Presidency Council head Faiez Serraj, the PC member Abdelsalam Kajman, the acting defense minister Al-Mahdi Al-Barghathi, the State Council head Abdul Rahman Sewehli, the head of the new Presidential Guard Najmi Al-Nakua, and Misrata mayor Mohamed Eshtewi, among others (*Libya Herald* 2016). At this meeting, Isler explained that Ankara wanted to reopen the embassy, to resume Turkish Airlines flights to Libya and the construction work at the 640-MW power plant in Obari. Enka Engineering had started work on it before the revolution, but it was stopped in 2011. The work recommenced in October 2012 but was again suspended in September 2014 because of the security situation in the area (*Libya Herald* 2016). However, positive results could not be obtained from these efforts because of the instability of the Libyan political situation. Even though he said that Ankara was keen to negotiate with all sides, he was informed of the rumors that Ankara had backed the Islamist side, which created lack of confidence between the two countries (Hoog 2014).

Ankara participated at a meeting held in Rome/Italy and signed a "Joint Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting for Libya" on 13 December 2015. The main topic of the declaration was to support the GNA⁵.

*"We affirm our full support for the Libyan people in maintaining the unity of Libya and its institutions that function for the benefit of the whole Country. A **Government of National Accord** based in the capital Tripoli is urgently needed to provide Libya the means to maintain governance, promote stability and economic development. We stand with all Libyans who have demanded the swift formation of a Government of National Accord based upon the Skhirat Agreement, including representatives of the majority members of the House of Representatives and General National Congress, Independents, Municipalities, political parties, and civil society who convened in Tunis on 10-11 December. We welcome the announcement that the Libya political dialogue members will sign the political agreement in Skhirat on 16 December. We encourage all political actors to sign this final agreement on 16 December and call on all Libyans to unite behind the Libya Political Agreement and the Government of National Accord".*

⁵ Consulted online at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-communication-of-the-ministerial-meeting-for-libya_-13-december-2015_-rome_-italy.en.mfa



Together with all other countries, the USA, England, Germany, France, European Union, Ankara expressed its full support to the GNA to fight all kind of terrorist action, including the ISIL.

"A Government of National Accord is essential to address, in partnership with the international community, the country's critical humanitarian, economic, and security challenges, including ISIL and other extremist groups and criminal organizations engaged in all forms of smuggling and trafficking, including in human beings" (MFA 2015b).

"Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, attended the signing ceremony of the Libyan Political Agreement on 17 December 2015"⁶, and delivered a speech, as a concrete manifestation of our solidarity with the brotherly Libyan people. According to the press release:

*"We believe that the basis of national reconciliation will further broaden in the upcoming period and all the Libyan people will contribute to the success of a broad-based **Government of National Accord**, to be formed pursuant to the Agreement.*

*Turkey will contribute by any means to the efforts of the **Government of National Accord** to establish security and stability in the country during the transition process" (MFA 2015c).*

Turkey also signed the Ministerial Meeting for Libya Joint Communiqué held in Vienna on 16 May 2016, strongly supporting the GNA together with all other participant countries⁷;

"... We express our strong support for the Libyan people in maintaining the unity of Libya. We reaffirm our support for the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) of Skhirat, Morocco signed on 17 December 2015, and for the Government of National Accord (GNA) as the sole legitimate government of Libya, as stated in the Rome Communiqué of 13 December 2015, and endorsed in UN Security Council Resolution 2259. We urge all parties to work constructively towards the completion of the transitional institutional framework, particularly by enabling the House of Representatives to fully carry out its role as outlined in the LPA ..." (MFA 2016).

⁶ Consulted online at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-311_-18-december-2015_-press-release-regarding-the-signing-of-the-libyan-political-agreement.en.mfa

⁷ Ministerial Meeting for Libya Joint Communiqué, 16 May 2016, Vienna, Algeria, Chad, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Niger, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, United Nations, the League of Arab States, and the African Union.



On 30 May 2016, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Libya and said, after meeting his Libyan counterpart Mohammed Siyala and Prime Minister Fayez Seraj at the naval base, that Turkey is eager to be the first to re-open an embassy in Libya (Reuters 2016). Cavusoglu also pledged Turkish support for the government's efforts to restore stability and security to Libya, and reiterated the importance that Turkey hoped to have through its economic presence in the North African state. He stressed that Turkish companies are waiting with determination to continue their work and resume their activities in Libya in the sectors of transport and energy (Reuters 2016). To revive relations, both sides have been dwelling on the importance of economic and commercial cooperation as a leading reason (Kayalioglu 2016b).

As can be seen by the above efforts made by Ankara, Turkey has been trying all kinds of instruments to reestablish good relations with the UN and western backed-government (GNA) and is committed to give all support to the GNA to fight terrorism and extreme Islamist formations. Ankara has adopted a new policy approach to act together with the UN and other countries backing the GNA to provide stability and the dominance of the GNA government in Libya. Thus, Turkey refrains from diverging from other countries and to act against the will of Libyan people.

5. Turkey's Expansion Policy in Africa.

The relations with African countries begun to improve with Turkey's opening policy to Africa by means of the Action Plan adopted in 1998 (MFA 2017a). Five years later, a strategy document "on the Development of the Economic Relations with African Countries was prepared by the Under secretariat for Foreign Trade in 2003"⁸.

Subsequently, in 2005 mutual visits improved the economic relations between Turkey and African countries initiated by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (RTE), when he was prime minister, in the framework of the "African Expansion" plan (MFA 2017b). RTE was the first high level political figure who paid a visit to Sub-Saharan countries in the same year. RTE was the first non-African leader who visited Somalia in 20 years and he renewed his visit in 2013 and 2015, as President in the last one. Abdullah Gul has paid 4 visits to Africa in his presidency. These official visits by high level authorities were very important due to the fact that before 2005 there had not been a visit to this continent and no relations had been established.

Turkish-African Summit meetings have been held either in Turkey or African countries in order to determine the policies to improve mutual relations and ultimately, new cooperation and application programs have been accepted following these summits. As a result, Turkey was granted observer status by the African Union in 2005. In 2008, Ankara became a strategic partner of the African Union and a non-regional member of the Africa Development Bank in the same year (MFA 2017a).

Furthermore, on 18-21 August 2008, the "Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit" was held in Istanbul with the participation of 49 African countries. "The Istanbul Declaration on Turkey-Africa Partnership: Cooperation and Solidarity for a Common Future" and

⁸ Consulted online at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>



"Cooperation Framework for Turkey-Africa Partnership", which was adopted during the First Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit of 2008, established a follow-up mechanism.

Accordingly, the High-Level Officials Meeting was held on 15 December 2010. The Ministerial Level Reviewing Conference took place on 16 December 2011, in Istanbul. Within the framework of the said follow-up mechanism, the "Second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit" was held on 19-21 November 2014 in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea)⁹. Later on, Turkey organized twice the Istanbul Somalia Conferences within the UN framework, on 21-23 May 2010 and on 31 May-1 June 2012, respectively. Turkey also eagerly hosted the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries in Istanbul on 9-13 May 2011 and offered to host the Mid-Term Review Conference of the Istanbul Action Program in 2015. Lastly, Turkey hosted the High Level Partnership Forum for Somalia on 23-24 February 2016 in İstanbul (MFA 2017a).

The African Union Second Summit was held in Malabo, the capital of Equatorial Guinea, on 19-21 November 2014, on the theme "A New Model of Partnership for the Strengthening of Sustainable Development and Integration". The Summit started with the High-Level Officials Meeting on 19 November. It was followed by the Ministerial Meeting on 20 November. And on 21 November, the actual Summit was held. It adopted a Declaration and Joint Implementation Plan for the Period of 2015-2019. In accordance with the decision made at the Summit, the Third Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit will be held in Turkey in 2019 (MFA 2017a).

Turkey will remain committed to support the institutional capacities of the African Union and other regional organizations in achieving progress on the priority areas which will consolidate African ownership of African matters. Turkey has been making a financial contribution of 1 million US Dollars to the African Union since 2009. Turkey also contributes to regional organizations when the need arises (MFA 2017a).

While the number of Turkey's embassies in Africa was 12 in 2009, by 2015 this number had increased to 39. The same applied to embassies from African countries, which were initially 10 in Ankara and rose to 31 in 2015. As part of this expansion policy, the Turkish Air Ways organized more than 40 flights to 28 African countries.

Turkish contractors are amongst the major undertakers in the continent. The share of Turkish contractors in the overall international business volume in African countries is around 21 percent (the share of North Africa is 19%). So far, Turkish contractors have carried out over 1.150 projects worth 55 billion USD in Africa.

There are ever growing Turkish investments, many exemplary of their kind, in a number of African countries that employ local labor force, use home-produced resources and export final products to third countries. In this regard, total Turkish investment in Africa is estimated to be around 6,2 billion USD. According to a report published in October 2015 (*Financial Times*), Turkish investment in Africa creates the largest number of jobs in the continent (16.593 in 2014) compared to the other foreign direct investments there (MFA 2017a).

Turkey removed visas for diplomatic passport holders from 17 African countries. African businessmen and tourists travelling with Turkish airlines and holding a valid Schengen, USA or UK visa, can obtain their entry visas to Turkey at the Ataturk Airport in Istanbul.

⁹ Consulted online at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>



The Yunus Emre Association has established a Turkish Cultural Center in Khartoum. The Association is planning to open new centers in Pretoria, Djibouti, the Gambia and Niger (MFA 2017a).

All these achievements have been realized by President Erdogan, who has visited 23 different countries between 2004-2017 (En Son Haber 2017), and signed 19 agreements, the latest with Tanzania and Eastern Africa (Toprak 2017).

"In line with the improvement in diplomatic relations, Turkey has opened commercial consulates in 26 African capitals. In addition, the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Council established business councils with 19 Sub-Saharan countries. Ankara has also signed trade and economic cooperation agreements with 38 African countries, in line with mutual beneficial economic relations"¹⁰.

The bilateral trade volume of Turkey with various countries in Africa has reached 17.5 billion USD in 2015. Trade volume with Sub-Saharan Africa was 6 billion USD in 2015. This indicates a drop in Turkey's trade with the continent, in line with the decrease in global trade. Despite this fact, Turkey's share in Africa's total trade has remained almost the same (DEIK 2016).

The economic relations between Turkey and African countries have gained particular importance since in 2011-2015, and have been the focus of a much more determined political strategy by Turkey. In this period, while total exports from Turkey to the African countries amounted to 64 billion US dollars, the foreign trade volume was 93.8 billion US dollars. In 2011-2015, Egypt came first with approximately 17 billion US dollar exports from Turkey. However, North African Countries have taken precedence in foreign trade. Algeria follows Egypt with approximately 10 billion US dollars, Libya with 9 billion 120 million US dollars, Morocco with some 6 billion US dollars and Tunisia with 4 billion 225 million US dollars, respectively (*Sabah Newspaper 2017*).

Obviously, all economic relations with Libya were ceased after the diplomatic conflict between the Tobruk government, under the leadership of Khalifa Haftar, and Ankara in 2014.

6. Conclusions

Ankara has realized that Libya is very important and that two main aims need to be fulfilled; first Turkey must restore its position to how it used to be in Gaddafi's time in order to ensure that Turkish companies receive the payments owed before the turmoil. Ankara can only have a position in Libya with its full political, economic and cultural assets. "This conciliatory approach towards Libya means that Ankara is abandoning its pro-Muslim Brotherhood stance in its regional policy and this is a good example to other African countries that suffer from extreme Islamic terrorist organizations either in North Africa or in the Sub-Saharan region¹¹". This approach would enable establishing a close

¹⁰ Consulted online at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

¹¹ Consulted online at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/turkey-libya-economic-interests-ankaratripoli-embassy.html>



relationship with those countries against the Muslim Brotherhood or similar groups. This new approach certainly would facilitate re-establishing mutual confidence between the two governments to improve political relations, to start with, with economic and other relations coming later. In this vein, Ankara should keep its sensitive and unbiased position towards any kind of formation that threatens the GNA government, just like other western and eastern countries. Turkey should also make all efforts to heal the relations with Egypt to suppress its ascendancy over Libya. Turkey's hostility towards President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's government plays to the advantage of Egypt's policy on Libya against Ankara. If this change, the hot potato, Ankara backed Muslim Brotherhood, would pass on to the hands of Egypt and there would be no excuse for Cairo to clearly support Khalfe Haftar. As a result, Ankara could contribute to establishing stability and security in Libya by giving its full support to the GNA government. This would be the best public diplomatic sign of opening towards the Libyan people, gaining their support again".

Second, the opening of the African strategy will not be successful if Libya remains out of this process. Turkey is the only Muslim country to try an opening, especially since 2000's. A new approach towards Libya will pave the way for other North African countries to strengthen relations with Ankara.

Above all, Libya is a main gate from the Mediterranean Sea to gain access to the oil rich interior African countries (i.e. Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan). For that reason, it has geo-strategic importance for all European countries due to its oil rich position. Ankara cannot enter the North Africa region if it neglects Libya, which is the reason why Libya is one of the most important priorities for Turkey in its Africa Opening Policy.

Turkey seems aware that it is important that Libya should be governed by a stable and democratic government and it should change its policy towards Libya and support the UN-backed regime from now on. This would guarantee that relations between the two countries would strengthen and that Ankara will be viewed favorably by Libyan politicians in the near future.

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BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION. A CASE OF STUDY OF THE ERASMUS MUNDUS PROGRAM AND ITS IMPACT ON MEXICAN STUDENTS

Isac Cruz Gutiérrez

isac10hil@hotmail.com

Instituto Politécnico Nacional, Escuela Superior de Comercio y Administración, Unidad Tepepan
Centro Universitario de Ciencias Económico Administrativas, Universidad de Guadalajara (Mexico)

José G. Vargas-Hernández

jvargas2006@gmail.com

M.B.A.; Ph.D.

Research Professor, Department of Administration
University Center for economic and Managerial Sciences, University of Guadalajara (Mexico)

Abstract

The aim of this research is to analyze if the implementation of the Erasmus Mundus program has created a positive impact on the bilateral relations between the United Mexican States and the European Union in the time frame that goes from 2009 to 2014. The hypothesis that this research is pursuing is if bilateral relations have created a positive impact by implementing the Erasmus Mundus program. This is a longitudinal quantitative and analytical research. Primary sources such as dictionaries, books and scientific journals and secondary sources such as articles and researches are used in order to obtain all the desired information. The source and data analysis are made by descriptive statistics that allow to create a good description of the particular objects. To represent the results obtained there are presented tables and graphics that show the quantity of Mexican applications in the period that goes from 2009 to 2014. 11% of Mexican applicants are accepted, this is a considerable percentage but there is still so much more to do in order to improve these programs because without any question academic exchange programs allow the progress of a better quality of life and for those who can expand their horizons it makes a better life, a better present and future.

Keywords

Bilateral relations, Erasmus Mundus, European Union, United Mexican States.

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BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION. A CASE OF STUDY OF THE ERASMUS MUNDUS PROGRAM AND ITS IMPACT ON MEXICAN STUDENTS¹

**Isac Cruz Gutiérrez
José G. Vargas-Hernández**

1. Background problem

The Economic Partnership, Political Cooperation and Cooperation Agreement (or just Global Agreement) was signed in Brussels on 8 December 1997 and its entry in force was on October the 1st, 2000; this agreement govern the bilateral relations between The United Mexican States and the European Union. Every two years summits are held to increase the political profile and several forums are opened to coordinate these relations. The VII summit took place in Brussels, Belgium the 12th June 2015; the importance of reinforcing the strategic partnership was highlighted and matters of vital importance took place such as: Instruments to facilitate mobility and academic cooperation (Delegation of the European Union to Mexico, 2015).

Education is a matter of interest in the United Mexican States and the European Union, since the beginning of their bilateral relations some academic exchange programs have been taking place. The Erasmus Mundus is one of the most recognized programs and an evaluation of the same is necessary to analyze the impact that Mexican students have had.

2. Problem statement

In order to improve development in nations, it is crucial to realize about the impact and the magnitude that bilateral relationships create, in this case, in the field of higher education. Erasmus Mundus is an exchange program that allow Mexican students to travel abroad and go studying in the European Union and other places in the world in order to create development and competitiveness. It is vital to realize about the impact that this program made in the United Mexican States in the lapse of 5 years, from 2009 to 2014 which is the time frame of the its second phase.

¹ Text reviewed by Carolina Peralta.



3. Justification

This research takes place because of the impetuous necessity of analyze the impact that bilateral relations have created in the United Mexican States specifically in the subject of higher education by allowing to Mexican students to travel abroad and go studying so as to generate more competitive people in this globalized world; without any question academic exchange programs allow the progress of a better quality of life in the present and time future.

Erasmus Mundus was conceived after the diplomatic relations between the United Mexican States and the European Union began; this research is not just about analyzing the impact that Erasmus Mundus has made in Mexican students, but it is also about realizing the impact that international relationships can create in human evolution.

Visiting another country with people who have a total different perception of life, moral, values and culture make not just more valuable knowledge when study takes place; for those who can expand their horizons it makes a better life, a better present and future. In the interest of this research one question is on the table: Does the implementation of the Erasmus Mundus program has created a positive impact on the bilateral relations between the United Mexican States and the European Union? And even another one question need to be answered in order to generate more valuable knowledge: Does the second phase of the Erasmus Mundus program has created a positive impact on relations of cooperation in higher education between the United Mexican States and the European Union in the time frame that goes from 2009 to 2014?

In order to answer these questions, the variables to consider are: Bilateral relations and the Erasmus Mundus program; and the indicators are: Relations of cooperation in higher education and the second phase of the Erasmus Mundus program.

After making an analysis of the results obtained owing to the bilateral relations, this research is pursuing to generate knowledge and to let people know that Erasmus Mundus is a good option and a great opportunity to take; in the past, this kind of opportunities were not as achievable as today. Bilateral relations create these golden opportunities.

Table No.1 Description of variables and indicators

Variable	Description	Indicators
X Bilateral relations	The condition in which two countries behave towards each other and work together in order to achieve something.	Relations of cooperation in higher education
Y Erasmus Mundus Program	A cooperation and mobility programme in the field of higher education that aims to enhance the quality of European higher education and to promote dialogue and understanding between people and cultures through cooperation with Third-Countries. (EACEA, 2015)	Second phase of Erasmus Mundus program

Source: Own creation



4. Hypothesis

Bilateral relations have created a positive impact by implementing the Erasmus Mundus program.

5. Overall objective

Analyze if the implementation of the Erasmus Mundus program has created a positive impact on the bilateral relations between the United Mexican States and the European Union in the time frame that goes from 2009 to 2014.

6. Specific hypothesis

The relations of cooperation in higher education have created a positive impact by implementing the second phase of the Erasmus Mundus program.

7. Specific objective

Analyze if the second phase of the Erasmus Mundus program has created a positive impact on relations of cooperation in higher education between the United Mexican States and the European Union in the time frame that goes from 2009 to 2014.

8. Conceptual framework

There are definitions that need to be considered in order to understand the context of this research; up next a table of concepts is presented. It goes from diplomacy, the activity that permits international relations, it is also explained what bilateral relations are and of course the definition of the Erasmus Mundus program itself.

Table No. 2 Definitions

Concept	Definition
Diplomacy	The art or practice of conducting international relations, as in negotiating alliances, treaties, and agreements (American Heritage dictionary, 2011, p.511).
Bilateral	Involving two groups of people or two countries (Oxford, 2005, p. 138).
Bilateral	Affecting or undertaken by two sides equally: binding on both parties (American Heritage dictionary, 2011, p.179).
Bilateral	Involving two parties, usually countries (Oxford, 2001, p. 164).
Bilateralism	A situation in which two countries or organizations have a trade agreement or work together to achieve something (Cambridge, 2016).
Relationship	The way in which two people, groups or countries behave towards each other or deal with each other (Oxford, 2005, p. 1277).
Relationship	The condition or fact of being related; connection or association (American Heritage dictionary, 2011, pp. 1482-1483).
Relationship	The way in which two or more concepts, objects, or people are connected/ The way in which two or more people or organizations regard and behave toward each other (Oxford, 2001, p. 1437).
Erasmus Mundus	A a cooperation and mobility programme in the field of higher education that aims to enhance the quality of European higher education and to promote dialogue and understanding between people and cultures through cooperation with Third-Countries (EACEA, 2015).

Source: Own creation



In order to have a better comprehension of the first variable, a personal definition is made.

Bilateral relation: The condition in which two countries behave towards each other and work together in order to achieve something.

9. Theoretical framework

Seven theories about international relations that permit the bilateral relations are now presented. Also, there are five learning theories that explain how individuals obtain knowledge and development.

Table 3. Theories of international relations

Theory	Description
Liberalism	It is argued that liberalism is an inside-out approach to international relations because the inner causes of domestic political arrangements determine the outer results of the world and the bigger opened relations, the better results are obtained. Economic success is more accepted than territorial conquests, also the creation of trades and liberal democracies increase a peaceful way of living. Liberal theories of international relations have increased since the end of the Cold War (Burchill, 1996).
Realism	"It seeks to describe reality, solve problems and understand the continuities of world politics". Realism emphasises that theoretical research is still vital. Important affairs like causes of war, and the conditions of peace, security and order are still guiding the teaching of International Relations and realism take these concerns and apply them on its international theory (Burchill, 1996).
Rationalism	Rationalism contributes to understand the relationship between human rights, sovereignty and intervention in politics. Rationalists have analysed issues of society that have not been studied so much by the realists. They have argued that the theory of international relations is "incomplete if it ignores claims that international society is fundamentally unjust". International order is something rationalism is principally concerned to study (Linklater, 1996).
Marxism	Marxism has always been distressed about capitalist globalisation and international inequality. Marxism contributes to the theory in the aspects of: The materialist conception of history, analysis of production and class. For Marxism "the global spread of capitalist modernity is the backdrop to the development of modern societies and the organisation of their international relations" (Linklater, 1996).
Critical Theory	Critical theory has made some contributions such as heightening awareness of the connection between knowledge and politics; also "analyses the changing ways in which boundaries of community are formed, maintained and transformed" (Devetak, 1996).
Postmodernism	Postmodernism has made many contributions to the study of international relations: 1. Through its genealogical method it seeks to expose the connection between knowledge, political power and authority. 2. Through the textual strategy of deconstruction it seeks to problematise all claims to epistemological and political totalisation. 3. Rethink the concept of the political without invoking assumptions of sovereignty and reterritorialisation (Devetak, 1996).
Constructivism	Has its origins in the United States of North America. Its rising proclaims an international relations scholarship more practice-oriented, historical and sociological. Constructivism reintroduced history as discipline of empirical investigation, also constructivists have reimagined the social as a constitutive domain, and emphasised the variability of political practice (Reus-Smith, 1996).

Source: Own Creation

**Table 4. Learning theories**

Social cognitive learning	The social cognitive theory explains how people acquire and maintain certain behavioral patterns, while also providing the basis for intervention strategies (University of Twente, 2016) Evaluating behavioral change depends on the factors environment, people and behavior. SCT provides a framework for designing, implementing and evaluating programs.
Observational learning	Observational learning explains learning as a continuous interaction between cognitive, behavioral and environmental influences (BPS, 2011).
Constructivism	Constructivism is a theory that asserts that knowledge can only exist within the human mind. Constructivists proclaim that persons construct their own knowledge and understanding of the world through experiencing things and reflecting on those experiences (Batthacharjee, 2015)
Control theory of motivation	Control Theory is the theory of motivation proposed by William Glasser and it contends that behavior is never caused by a response to an outside stimulus. Instead, the control theory states that behavior is inspired by what a person wants most at any given time (Funderstanding, 2011)
Behaviorism	Behaviorism is a theory that operates on a principle of stimulus and its response. All behavior is caused by external stimulation, so all behavior can be explained without the need to consider consciousness or internal mental states (Funderstanding, 2011).

Source: Own creation

After an evaluation of the theories above, one of international relations is taken and another of learning theory is also taken in order to continue the research and create the analysis. The first is liberalism and the second is the social cognitive theory.

10. Review of the empirical literature

Up next it is presented a table that gather all the information obtained about empirical literature created by other people interested on the issue of the Erasmus Mundus program.

Table 5. Review of the empirical literature

Article or research	Source/authors	Theory implemented	Instrument	Results/contributions
The european space of higher education and the promotion of academic cooperation mobility with Mexico (Translated from spanish).	Stockwell, Nathalie; Bengoetxea, Endika; Tauch, Christian.	The social cognitive theory is used. The reason is because environment, people and behavior take a great part of the equation when mobility programs take part. About international relations theories, liberalism is the one that comes trough; open borders create	Analytical-descriptive research made with information obtained with primary and secondary sources.	A great contribution is made by this article which just does not describe the rising of the cooperation relations between Mexico and the EU but it also describes how the Erasmus Mundus program was born as a successor of the succesful Erasmus program and it releases some statistics about Mexican students; for example: 342 mexican students were selected until 2010.



		more opportunities to exchange knowledge and culture.		40 academics participated until 2019 (Stockwell, Bengoetxea, Tauch, 2011).
Mobility program Erasmus: Intercultural competence acquisition motor (Translated from spanish).	Pozo-Vicente, Cristina; Aguaded-Gómez, José Ignacio.	Liberalism takes part because the internationalization introduces new aims, activities and actors. Social cognitive theory is used, other idiosyncrasies allow that environment and social behavior change the own behavior.	Analytical-descriptive research made with information obtained with primary and secondary sources.	This research provides significant information to the development of intercultural competiveness: Studying abroad involves a complex process of acquisition and also application of knowledge, abilities and attitudes (Pozo-Vicente, Aguaded-Gómez, 2012).
Higher education internationalization: The Erasmus-Mundus network added value.	Abdelaziz, Bouras; Nopasit, Chakpitak.	Liberalism and social cognitive theories take part in this investigation.	Analytical-descriptive research made with information obtained with primary and secondary sources.	Highlight a specific internationalization case study between Europe and South-East Asia. It is said that the Erasmus Mundus program leads to achieving new competences such as skills, knowledge, understanding and abilities (Bouras, Chakpitak, 2015).
The Erasmus Mundus programme – A non-typical education opportunity for analysts.	Kamila Klimaszewska, Ph.D., Eng	Liberalism and social cognitive theories interfere in this investigation.	Analytical-descriptive research made with information obtained with primary and secondary sources.	The Erasmus Mundus program allow to world citizens to fulfil their desires of meeting other cultures (Klimaszewska, 2010).

Source: Own creation

The first results found were

- 1) A course of study recognized by all universities participating in the consortium.
- 2) Criteria for setting goals and achievement of the same.
- 3) At the time of recruiting candidates there are transparent procedures.
- 4) Active participation of the consortium teachers.

11. Contextual framework

The European Union came to light after World War II and it meant a total change in the world. Its relations with other countries took place, but the strong bilateral relationship



with the United Mexican States was established in the late nineties when the Global Agreement was signed. This bilateral relationship have created more opportunities available for those who know how and when to take it. Education development is one of these opportunities, several training and exchange programs have been made in order to improve the acquisition of knowledge, programs such as Marie Curie, Jean Monnet, ALFA, the European Research Council, among others, create better opportunities for those who participate in it (Delegation of the European Union to Mexico, 2016).

The program that this research focuses on is the Erasmus Mundus. The Erasmus program initiated in 1987 and it was just for the European Union students; since then more than two million people have enjoyed studying abroad. In 2004 the European Union starting the international version of its successful program and it was called Erasmus Mundus. From 2004 to 2010, 342 Mexican students have been selected being the United Mexican States the sixth country with more participation just after India, China, Brazil, Ethiopia and Russia (Stockwell, Bengoetxea, Tauch, 2011).

Several cooperation relations have been taking place in order to facilitate and make a progress in education. The Bologna Policy Forum is one of them; reinforce the association between the European Union partner countries and their higher education institutions. Since 2010 there has been an EU-Mexico cooperation in education and training. "The dialogue aims to encourage more higher education cooperation and mobility between EU and Mexico" (European Comission, 2016).

The academic and mobility cooperation have got a double function, first of all to improve quality in education and the professional and personal development of the beneficiaries and second of all, it opens a better intercultural understanding and have opened more collaboration approaches between people far beyond institutions (Stockwell, Bengoetxea, Tauch, 2011).

12. Research methodology

This is a longitudinal and quantitative investigation for the reason that it analyzes the results obtained in the period of time that goes from 2009 to 2014 which is the second phase of the program.

Table 6. Methodology

Variables	Definition	Indicator	Instrument	Operationalization	Source/data analysis
Bilateral Relations	The condition in which two countries behave towards each other and work together in order to achieve something.	Relations of cooperation in higher education	Primary sources Secondary sources	Reading agreements between nation-states and information about their relations of cooperation.	Descriptive statistics
Erasmus Mundus program	A a cooperation and mobility programme in the field of higher education that aims to enhance the quality of European higher education and to promote dialogue and understanding between people and cultures through cooperation with Third-Countries (EACEA, 2015).	Second phase of the Erasmus Mundus program	Primary sources Secondary Sources	Reading information and statistics about the Erasmus Mundus program.	Descriptive statistics

Source: Own creation



It is also an analytical investigation, because it analyzes the cornerstone of bilateral relations between the United Mexican States and the European Union and other relations of cooperation over the last years.

Primary sources such as dictionaries, books and scientific journals and secondary sources such as articles and researches are used in order to obtain all the desired information. The source and data analysis are made by descriptive statistics that allow to create a good description of the particular objects that in this case are the bilateral relations and the Erasmus Mundus program emphasizing its second phase.

13. Analysis result

In order to analyze the results obtained, first of all it is going to be described the first variable which is bilateral relations and its indicator, relations of cooperation in higher education, and secondly the second variable, the Erasmus Mundus program and its indicator, the second phase of the Erasmus Mundus program, is being described.

About the bilateral relations and their relations of cooperation it is said that the Global Agreement signed in Brussels on December 1997 is the cornerestone of the bilateral relations between the United Mexican States and the European Union. This agreement has provided for both of them a reinforcement in trade issues, cooperation and political dialogue. The respect for human rights is a vital factor to take in count on this agreement and also it is based on democratic principles.

To enhance this agreement there are also a Joint Councils at Ministerial level every two years; Joint committees at a highlevel officials that take place once a year; a Joint parliamentary committee which gathers twice a year and also a EU-Mexico Civil Society Forum was established to encourage dialogue in civil society in order to have richer relations in political dialogue, cooperation and trade (Delegation of the European Union to Mexico, 2015).

Relations of cooperation in the matter of education are expressed by the implementation of the three principal educational programs held by both, the United Mexican States and the European Union, these programs are: The Erasmus Mundus program; this program give several scholarships for those who want to study a master or doctoral degree in the European Union and another parts of the world. 380 mexican people have been benefitted by this program during the period 2004-2011. The AIBan program which was finished in 2010 financed 592 mexican students. And the ALFA III program which had its final fase and its objective was to create development in the Latinamerican region (EEAS, 2011).

To analyze the second variable, the Erasmus Mundus program, and its indicator, its second phase, several number of tables and graphics are shown describing the number of mexican applications that had this program in its second fase of existing which goes from 2009 to 2014. There are two categories to consider in the Erasmus mundus program. The category A are for those people that haven't been living in the European Union for more than 12 months. The category B is for those who already spent 12 months living in the European Union (EACEA, 2013).

**Table 7. Mexican applications in category A**


Time frame 2009/14	Doctorates main list	Doctorates reserve list	Doctorates non- selected list	Masters courses main list	Masters courses reserve list	Masters courses non- selected list	Total
2009/10	13	9	2	89	171	198	482
2010/21	3	3	14	69	177	196	462
2011/12	10	6	18	63	247	642	986
2012/13	4	23	38	62	226	348	701
2013/14	7	10	42	55	233	331	678
Total	37	51	114	338	1054	1715	3309

Source: Own creation

Table 8. Mexican applications in category B

Time Frame	Doctorates main list	Doctorates reserve list	Doctorates non-selected list	Masters courses main list	Masters courses reserve list	Masters courses non- selected list	Total applications
2009/10							
2010/11	0	1	1	7	10	9	28
2011/12	0	4	4	3	7	72	90
2012/13	1	2	10	6	7	4	30
2013/14	1	4	5	4	11	6	31
Total	2	11	20	20	35	91	179

Source: Own creation

Figure 1. Category a vs. Category b

Source: Own Creation

The data of Figure 1 shows after making a total of 3488 applications, the expected contrast between category A and category B while there are 3309 (95 %) applications in A there are just 179 (5%) in B.

Table 9. Total mexican applications

Time frame 2009/14	Doctorates main list	Doctorates reserve list	Doctorates non- selected list	Masters courses main list	Masters courses reserve list	Masters courses non- selected list	Total applications
Total	39	62	134	358	1089	1806	3488

Source: Own creation

**Figure 2. Total Mexican applications**

Source: Own creation


Figure 2 shows the number of applications and their state on the list. The total Mexican applications are 3488. A great percentage of non-selected list is shown: 52%

To continue this research the number of non-accepted applications is not just taking the non-selected list, but also the numbers of the reserve list because their confirmation is just not given.

Table 10. Total of accepted and non-accepted students

	Accepted	Non-accepted	Total applications
Doctorates	39	196	235
Masters courses	358	2895	3253
Total	397	3091	3488

Source: Own creation


Figure 3. Percentage of accepted and non-accepted doctorates

Source: Own creation



Figure 3 shows that the 83% (196) of applications are non-accepted while just the 17% (39) are accepted.


Figure 4. Percentage of accepted and non-accepted master courses



Source: Own creation

It can be seen in Figure 4 that the 89% (2895) of applicants are non- accepted and just the 11% (358) are accepted.

Figure 5. Total of applications



Source: Own creation



Figure 5 shows that that in the time frame that goes from 2009 to 2014 just the 11% of applicants are accepted with the number of 397; while the 89% with 3091 aren't.

14. Conclusions

The current investigation has accumulated several information about the bilateral relations between the United Mexican States and the European Union; without these bilateral relations development in countries would not be as it is in the present and the United Mexican States is not the exception. Development in education has been made since the beginning of relations of cooperation between these nation-states. Academic exchange programs allow the development aforementioned in the moment that let other people go travel and study and acquire knowledge and experiences that would not be possible to acquire in their native countries.

In order to analyze the impact made by the Erasmus Mundus program in Mexico, there are presented tables and graphics that shown the quantity of Mexican applications in the period that goes from 2009 to 2014. 11% of Mexican applicants are accepted, that is a considerable number and it creates an impact; nevertheless, there are still so many things to do to decrease the number of non-accepted people in the next years. In order to do so, us as civilians can do something about it during the next Civil Society Forum.

15. Objectives fulfilment

The overall objective that is analyze if the implementation of the Erasmus Mundus program has created a positive impact on the bilateral relations between the United Mexican States and the European Union is accomplished in the moment that it is shown an active participation from Mexican students; this participation strengthen the bilateral relations and impulse cooperation between nation-states.

The specific objective that is analyze if the second phase of the Erasmus Mundus program has created a positive impact on relations of cooperation in higher education between the United Mexican States and the European Union in the years from 2009 to 2014 is also accomplished, from the moment a description about the program is given and then an active program is shown. This program creates a positive impact on relations of cooperation in higher education, it sustain that this kind of programs are a total success and other ones need to be developed in order to create more competitive people and knowledge.

16. Hypothesis confirmation

It is a fact that bilateral relations have created a positive impact by implementing the Erasmus Mundus program, it has created development in the field of education since its creation and it is a fact it will continue doing it as long as it lasts.

It is a fact that relations of cooperation in higher education have created a positive impact by implementing the second phase of the Erasmus Mundus program; relations of cooperation emanated by diplomacy create programs such as Erasmus Mundus and these



kinds of programs create a positive impact in society; a progress in knowledge gain is made without any question.

17. Hypothesis comparison

According to this research bilateral relations have created a positive impact by implementing the Erasmus Mundus program and the relations of cooperation in higher education have created a positive impact by implementing the second phase of the Erasmus Mundus program. There is a great likeness of these results with the other made by other persons and create a contribution for their conclusions; their results are described next: Studying abroad involves a complex process of acquisition and also application of knowledge, abilities and attitudes. The Erasmus Mundus program allow to world citizens to fulfil their desires of meeting other cultures.

18. Contributions

This research contributions are: knowledge by realizing the importance of bilateral relations and its impact on the United Mexican States, it releases statistics that could be used for other people who aim to research an issue similar to this one. More people will know about the Erasmus Mundus program and they will know that several civil forums are opened for those who want to create an implication in trade, political dialogue and relations of cooperation.

19. Implications

This research is helpful for those who want to know about the Erasmus Mundus program and its impact on society. It also creates a support for those who want to analyze the impact made by this program in its second phase. Several organizations and institutions can take the results of this investigation and take them and use them to make bigger researcher and of course, take this results as a matter of interest is necessary in order to realize that more opportunies to students have to be made.

20. Future research areas

Future research aeras are about diplomacy, innovation and technology, international business, interntional relations. For more specific information, the JEL classification codes to consider are: F230, F510 and O300.

21. Limitations

The existing limitations are first of all, the limited time to develop this research, actually ideas that could not been captured in this research will be made in next researches. Another limitation was the narrow scop of the information obtained



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PROMOTION OF LGBTI RIGHTS OVERSEAS: AN OVERVIEW OF EU AND US EXPERIENCES

Artem Patalakh

artem.patalakh@unimi.it

PhD candidate in Political Studies at Università degli Studi di Milano (Milan, Italy). His research interests include International Relations theory, Russian and EU foreign policies, soft power, promotion of ideas of values in International Relations. He holds BA and MA degrees in Regional Studies from MGIMO-University (Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

The essay problematizes the incorporation of LGBTI rights promotion into the US and EU foreign policies. First, the paper examines the two actors' key documents, speeches, and policies devoted to the promotion of LGBTI rights abroad, the similarities and differences between the two actors' approaches, attending to the tendencies of their evolution and the ongoing development. Second, the article discusses the internal conditions in target countries that are conducive to the success and failure of international support of LGBTI rights. Finally, the study makes a critical overview of the measures that are argued to be necessary to increase the efficiency of LGBTI rights promotion in countries with most negative current trends in and/or poorest records on LGBTI rights.

Key Words

EU foreign policy, human rights promotion, homonationalism, homophobia, LGBTI rights, same-sex marriage, US foreign policy.

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PROMOTION OF LGBTI RIGHTS OVERSEAS: AN OVERVIEW OF EU AND US EXPERIENCES¹

Artem Patalakh

Introduction²

"The Obama Administration defends the human rights of LGBTI people as part of our comprehensive human rights policy and as a priority of our foreign policy".

Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, June 12, 2011.

"Through dialogues with third countries, our work in multilateral fora, public statements, and through our support to civil society, the EU will continue to advocate measures to combat discrimination and violence against LGBTI persons, and to actively promote their rights".

Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, May 17, 2015.

If one took a retrospective look at human rights progress in the last 20-30 years, they would probably conclude that it is LGBTI rights that have been developing most dynamically. It would not even be an overstatement to argue that nowadays a country's "progressiveness" is, in a sense, determined by its government's attitude to LGBTI people, the degree of the recognition of their rights³, and the level of homophobia in everyday life. Analogously to the 20th century's battles for women's and black people's rights, LGBTI rights presently are at the front line of human rights debates; their standards vary dramatically from country to country, ranging from legalised same-sex marriages to death penalty for homosexuality.

A number of Western countries have incorporated the promotion of LGBTI rights into their foreign policy strategies. Among such "activists" are Australia, Brazil, Canada etc.; however, as evident from the above-cited quotes, the two main actors having established policies in this field are the US and the EU. Of note, certain peculiarities of LGBTI rights make their international furtherance harder than other human rights. To name but a few,

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³ This phenomenon, commonly referred to as "homonationalism", is conceptualized as "a facet of modernity and a historical shift marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by nation-states, a constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship between the state, capitalism, and sexuality" (Puar 2013: 337).



the very idea of LGBTI rights is so fervently contested and encounters such a bitter hostility in certain parts of the world that their propagation requires an especially high degree of caution and determination. Besides, as opposed to other minorities' rights, LGBTI rights protection does not directly rest on any universal legal documents, which gives their opponents a particularly strong argument for challenging their universality, allowing them to blame the West for imposing its own values on culturally divergent societies.

Unfortunately, the existent academic literature comparing EU and US human rights promotion (e.g. Wouters *et. al.* 2014, Heras 2015) tends to overlook such peculiarities. In attempt to fill this gap, this essay makes a survey of the EU and US experience of supporting LGBTI rights abroad. Aside from recent academic literature on international LGBTI rights promotion, this study largely rests on non-academic articles, experts' interviews, news agencies reports as well as documents and politicians' statements. The first part focuses on the distinctive features of the EU and US approaches in terms of their forms, methods, and legal frameworks. The second chapter discusses conditions in the target states which are propitious and, contrariwise, detrimental to international furtherance of LGBTI rights. The third part elaborates on possible ways to promote LGBTI rights in countries with the poorest record on and/or most negative ongoing trends in LGBTI rights.

EU and US Strategies: A Comparative Analysis

As stated above, human rights and democracy promotion in general is at the core of the EU and US foreign policies, with hardly any foreign policy speech of their officials not mentioning it. Nevertheless, there are features making the two actors distinct from each other; those features originate from the roles they play in the international system, their foreign policy decision making processes as well as differences in their historical development. At the level of the fundamental legal base for human rights support, an apparent distinction between them is that the EU is obliged to promote human rights abroad by its founding document, the Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version 2012: articles 3 (5), 21 (1) and 21 (3)). For the US, human rights promotion is a matter of image rather than obligation: since its foundation, the US has positioned itself as "the land of the free", with the promotion of freedom and democracy in its external and internal policies running through US politicians' rhetoric. The external component got a special significance after the Second World War and especially the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Act, when the universality of democracy and human rights was accepted as a fundamental standard of international conduct (Osiatyński 2013: 17-18). It provided a favorable environment for the US to portray its value-based foreign policy aims as protecting a universal order rather than its self-interests.

Moreover, the two actors have historically prioritized diverse aspects of promotion of values: while the US approach has focused on democracy, political parties, elections, and free media, the EU has paid more attention to socio-economic development, education, and NGOs. Otherwise stated, the EU has primarily emphasized human rights, whereas the US has mainly concentrated on democracy (Heras 2015). This difference seemingly reflects the two actors' strengths and weaknesses, particularly the fact that the US is deemed politically stronger than the EU: promoting democracy generally requires capability to exert pressure on elites, while furthering human rights mostly presupposes



supporting NGOs and bottom-up initiatives. Remarkably, the two approaches have drawn together in recent years. On the one hand, Obama separated democracy promotion from his predecessor's "war on terror" and connected it to development and human rights. Concurrently, the EU established European Endowment for Democracy which operates much more politically than the bloc's traditional instruments, bearing certain resemblance with the US National Endowment for Democracy known for considerably politicized activities (*ibid*).

Concerning the basic principles for the promotion of specifically LGBTI rights, both the EU and the US proceed from their universality and impossibility to use rhetoric of traditional values and national culture to disguise their violations (US Department of State 2011, Council of the EU 2013). Tellingly, both actors have been gradually extending the areas and deepening the activities in this sphere. First, they have included intersexuals in the policies that previously aimed solely at LGBT people⁴. Additionally, they have progressively increased the number of gay ambassadors: the US, for example, after appointing the first openly gay ambassador in 1999, gradually continued this practice, to have, as of August 2016, six gay ambassadors⁵ (Bier 2017). Finally, the two actors have expanded their activities from a purely legal area to social life in a wider sense, from promoting LGBTI rights in particular to fighting against homophobia in general. To exemplify, unlike the 2010 analogous document, the EU's current key document on LGBTI protection abroad, "Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of All Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons", mentions combating LGBTI-phobic violence as one of the priority areas of action (see Council of the EU 2010, 2013).

Both actors clearly exhibit a trend toward universalizing legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the foreseeable future, be it in the form of a union or marriage. In Europe, for example, the 2015 European Court on Human Rights' ruling obliging Italy to legalize same-sex unions may become a precedent for other member states of the Council of Europe (Delman 2015), which the EU may use as an argument in its foreign policy. Several European politicians have already announced intentions to "export" same-sex marriages abroad (among them is UK ex-Prime Minister David Cameron, see Hope 2013), or at least urge every EU member state to legalize same-sex marriage (among them is the vice-president of the European Commission Frans Timmermans, see Timmermans 2015). However, the former seems wishful thinking, for it appears too early to promote universality of same-sex marriages while this issue is still being hotly debated inside the EU and the US. It gives their opponents a valid argument to blame them for double standards, which eventually weakens both actors' norm-promoting capabilities. Moreover, EU/US leaders seem to underrate the limits of foreign policy for human rights promotion in general, forgetting that norms promotion has little chances to succeed in the absence of adequate rewards and/or corresponding internalized values of the target countries' governments and populations (e.g. see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 10-25). In this light, statements like Hillary Clinton's electoral promise to totally eradicate

⁴ To verify this, one can compare earlier and later documents and speeches on the same issue, e.g. Council of European Union (2010) and (2013), US Department of State (2014) and (2016) etc.

⁵ Yet, President Trump later dismissed five out of those six ambassadors (Duffy 2017) so that as of June 2017, the US had only one openly gay ambassador, namely Ted Osius in Vietnam; however, Trump promised to nominate open gay Richard Grenell to be the US ambassador to NATO (Butterworth 2017). Incidentally, in June 2014, the then State Secretary John Kerry announced intentions to appoint also lesbian, bisexual and transgender ambassadors; nonetheless, those plans remained unaccomplished (Bier 2017).



LGBTI discrimination abroad (Brydum 2015) could be considered a way to attract voters rather than genuinely achievable intentions.

Both powers tend to approach LGBTI rights in geopolitical terms, sometimes trading LGBTI issues for more important strategic interests, which, some believe, poses one more expression of double standards. To illustrate, in 2014, the US strongly condemned Uganda and Gambia for adopting anti-LGBTI laws, simultaneously expressing much softer criticism of Middle Eastern states - Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Yemen - arguably due to its strategic interests in that region related to oil and counter-terrorism (Peale 2015). The EU is also blamed for a *realpolitik* approach to LGBTI rights, tending to sacrifice them to achieve geopolitical ends. For instance, the bloc arguably shut its eyes to Ukraine's record on LGBTI rights in order to move the country to its side in its confrontation with Russia (Kozłowska 2014); the EU also conceded to Macedonian conservatives by dropping anti-discrimination against LGBTI out of the list of requirements for visa liberalization (Slootmaekers and Touquet 2016: 33-34). Furthermore, like the US, the EU is frequently blamed for homonationalism, using LGBTI rhetoric to advance its reputation rather than genuinely improve the life of LGBTI people. For example, one study on the Europeanization of Kosovo concludes that

[t]he EU does not really seem to be concerned about the rights of the LGBT communities... rather, it is concerned about policing the symbolic borders of the space of the EU, and utilizing its power (i.e., its rhetoric on democracy and rule of law) to construct and maintain an image of Europe as multicultural, tolerant, and secular (Rexhepo 2016: 49).

Generally, it appears reasonable that certain interests may be sacrificed to prevent more serious problems, especially under extreme conditions: to illustrate, few would blame the US and the UK for cooperation with the totalitarian Soviet Union during the Second World War. However, without such extreme conditions, a *realpolitik* approach to human rights tends to reduce the West's credibility in the eyes of minorities and activists in target countries (e.g. *Euractiv* 2008).

A clear difference between two actors' approaches concerns their evolution and continuity. The US approach appears to be rather substantially contingent on each President's personal views. During the Bush presidency, US LGBTI-related activities abroad mainly focused on combating HIV rather than struggling for tolerance (Bromley 2007). Obama's presidency, contrariwise, was characterized by an important role of LGBTI rights in foreign policy: Obama significantly increased his support to overseas NGOs promoting LGBTI rights (Romanovski 2015) and was the first leader in the world to appoint a special envoy on LGBTI rights abroad, Randy Berry, in April 2015. Albeit the envoy's activities are scarcely noticeable - his interviews show that he mostly represents the US on LGBTI issues rather than takes concrete actions (US Embassy in Kosovo 2015, DeBarros 2016) - the very fact that the State Department has a special person dealing specifically with LGBTI protection overseas is a serious step of Obama's foreign policy that even the EU has yet to take. Yet, Obama's LGBTI rights promotion encountered criticism for gaps between word and deed: one study found that while Obama's 2011 memorandum clearly linked US foreign aid allocation to LGBTI rights practices in recipient



countries (see Obama 2011), the US did not decrease its foreign aid to Uganda and Nigeria in 2011-2014 despite that they had significantly toughened anti-LGBTI laws (Comstock 2016). It remains to be seen what Trump's Presidency will bring for LGBTI rights' international promotion, but the first months of his presidency appear less conservative than most had presumed: despite that his cabinet largely consists of LGBTI opposers (see Morse 2016) and he has fired most gay ambassadors appointed by Obama, he has unexpectedly kept Randy Berry on his post and promised to nominate an open gay Richard Grenell to be the US ambassador to NATO (Butterworth 2017).

Against the US backdrop, the EU approach seems more systematic and less exposed to subjective changes. In particular, it does not appear significantly affected by the presiding state in the Council of the EU or the personality of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. To illustrate, the above-mentioned "Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of All Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons" were adopted in June 2013 during the presidency of Ireland. Any succeeding presiding states, even relatively conservative Lithuania or Latvia, although did not initiate any improvements on LGBTI rights, did not try to annul the "Guidelines" either. Two factors seem to contribute to this discrepancy between the two actors. First, a US system conferring wide powers to President is generally conducive to personalization of power (see Linz 1990), whereas collective decision-making in the European Council makes its President a figurehead rather than a real leader. Second, unlike US presidents elected for a four-year term, EU member states preside over the Council of the EU just for six months which is apparently insufficient to make substantial changes.

Another factors influencing the two actors' LGBTI rights promotion policies regard their positions in the IR system: the US more closely resembles a global power having interests across the globe, whereas the EU is mostly concerned with its neighbourhood. To exemplify, while the US keeps track of and issues annual reports on human rights practices around the world, the EU does so only in its candidate countries. The contents of their reports' sections devoted to LGBTI rights are also dissimilar: while the US tries to describe all the cases of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation and gender identity found in the news and NGOs' reports, EU reports are mostly made of general phrases as well as recommendations to national governments (for comparison, see US Department of State 2014: 35-36 and European Commission 2015a: 20, 23, 25). In fairness to the EU, while it does not conduct any full-scale monitoring of LGBTI rights observance beyond Europe, however, to improve such monitoring inside Europe, the bloc cooperates with regional organizations, such as ILGA-Europe, an NGO which issues detailed annual reports on the situation with LGBTI rights (e.g. ILGA-Europe 2016), and the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, whose quadrennial country reports on racism in intolerance in the member states of the Council of Europe have included LGBTI rights since 2015 (e.g. ECRI 2015).

Lastly, both actors equally apply "soft" methods of LGBTI rights promotion, such as supporting local activists and NGOs, advising foreign governments on reforms in this sphere etc. However, compared to the EU, the US seems far more prone to take punitive measures against the countries violating LGBTI rights. For example, in 2014, after Uganda adopted the Anti-Homosexuality Act, President Obama imposed sanctions on that country which included cutting or redirecting funds for particular programs, banning some Ugandan politicians from entering the US, cancelling plans to hold a military exercise etc



(Hayden 2014). The EU, in turn, decided not to impose any sanctions for the reason of Uganda's importance as a partner on South Sudan and Somalia (Atuhaire 2014), just the bloc's three-member states - Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden - cut or suspended their aid to the Ugandan government. This example, again, displays a gap among EU members in their attitudes to LGBTI rights⁶, which seemingly limits the range of methods disposable for the bloc, enfeebling its potential to promote LGBTI rights.

On the Success of Promotion: Conditions in the Target Countries

Despite the growing importance of LGBTI rights promotion in the US and EU foreign policies, the positive results achieved so far appear tangible, but still limited, because of both domestic conditions in the target countries and the mechanisms the two actors use to support LGBTI rights. One can single out two main groups of states which have shown progress in LGBTI rights in the last 10-15 years⁷. The first one embodies EU candidate countries and the participants of other EU-led initiatives (e.g. the Eastern Partnership). For those states, amelioration of their domestic LGBTI-related legislations is a prerequisite for an EU membership or a common free-trade area. For this reason, most of them have adopted regulations securing the EU's minimal requirements regarding LGBTI rights, namely decriminalising homosexuality, allowing gay prides, outlawing discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity etc. As case studies (e.g. Bilić 2016, Kalezić and Brković 2016, Rexhepi 2016, Vasilev 2016) show, those countries' elites undertake such measures primarily not because of their ideological predisposition in favour of LGBTI rights *per se*, but, rather, due to their identification with Europe as a modern and civilized entity and/or simply for instrumental reasons, in order to formally fulfil an EU requirement. Put theoretically, most of those states seem to have socialized, but not *internalized* LGBTI rights as a norm (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006: 3-5). Hence, their elites tend to treat LGBTI issues formally, mostly aiming to pass the EU's "checklist" rather than improve LGBTI people's life, to alter legal environment in particular rather than tackle homophobia in general. Furthermore, because those states' adherence to LGBTI rights chiefly originates not in their own values, but in the external environment, their LGBTI rights-related policies highly hinge on the EU's (instrumental or identity-based) attractiveness for them. A possible future decrease in the latter may be detrimental to former.

Incidentally, in a long-term perspective, EU directives seem to only serve as a sort of safely cushion providing a minimal level of LGBTI rights. Whether any deeper measures aiming to curb homophobia in general are taken appears to depend on the national governments' will and the strength of local advocacy groups. The experience of the 2004 acceding states shows that two scenarios are possible. In some cases, EU influence does appear to generate tolerance among ordinary citizens: the Czech Republic, for example, is nowadays one of the most tolerant EU countries toward LGBTI with the 80% acceptance of homosexuality (Pew Research Center 2013: 1). By contrast, in other states the situation seems to be even moving in the opposite direction: for instance, polls

⁶ This gap apparently also relates to differences in EU members' foreign policy interests, capabilities and identities (see Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 116-134).

⁷ Since disentangling the impact of international actors' LGBTI rights furtherance from the role of local activists and other factors is complicated and sometimes nearly impossible, this study assumes that any improvement in LGBTI rights in country A is to some degree affected by the EU/US if their promotion activities in country A have been tangible.



conducted in 2013 showed that only 35% of Lithuanians were accepting homosexuals in workplace, and the attitudes toward homosexuals had become more negative by 14% over the past five years (Valentinavičius 2013)⁸.

Another region, in which LGBTI rights promotion goes well, is Latin America, where progress in this area in the last decades has in large part taken place because local activists have been inspired by a similar process in Spain, receiving tactical and financial aid from there (Díez 2015: 127, Encarnación 2016b: 37-38). Encarnación (2016b: 49-74) notes several internal conditions that favoured the success of LGBTI rights promotion in that region. First, homophobic sentiments in Latin America were initially weak: unlike in Europe, homosexuality in Latin America was decriminalized in the 19th century, which laid the foundation for a decrease in homophobia in general. Second, Latin America has traditionally had strong human rights movements keeping good ties with European left-wing politicians and advocacy groups. Moreover, in Latin America, it is mostly local activists and not international actors who have promoted legalization of same-sex unions/marriages; for this reason, society has considered them as a real need of local LGBTI communities rather something imposed from abroad. Finally, auspicious for LGBTI rights has been Latin America's strong autonomous judiciary (especially in Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia) which has often ruled in favour of LGBTI community.

The movement toward liberalisation, demonstrated by both aforementioned groups of countries, especially sticks out against the backdrop of the states where LGBTI-related laws have been, conversely, tightened in the last years. Again, there are two main "poles" exhibiting this trend. The first one is Russia that has banned adoption of children to countries where same-sex marriage is legal, passed a law criminalizing homosexual "propaganda" and endeavoured to push a number of post-Soviet states to adopt similar laws⁹. The second pole is sub-Saharan Africa¹⁰, where three countries - the Gambia, Kenya and Nigeria - have significantly toughened criminal laws against homosexuality in the recent years, and there is a certain risk that the continent's other states, especially the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Uganda, will follow the path. Though the EU and the US have taken various measures to curb LGBTI discrimination, from sponsoring LGBTI projects and funding NGOs to raising their concern verbally to imposing economic sanctions, these measures have not achieved the intended goals for a number of reasons.

One factor that stands out is an initially strong social consensus on the unacceptability of homosexuality: in the above-mentioned states, tolerance toward LGBTI ranges from 1% of population in Nigeria to 16% in Russia (Pew Research Center 2013: 1). The exact roots of that consensus differ from case to case. In Africa, for instance, an important factor is religious opposition groups that receive material support from Western

⁸ Interestingly, given that Lithuania shows a growing pro-European sentiment (European Commission 2015b: 8), a rising homophobia in that country seems to contradict the theoretical argument that the stronger a state's identification with the EU, the higher the odds of the success of EU LGBT discourse there (see Vasilev 2016).

⁹ For instance, in Kyrgyzstan, a similar law is pending consideration in the Parliament as of June 2017; in Armenia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, governments proposed such laws, but later withdrew them. A similar law was passed in Moldova in 2013, but later abrogated under EU pressure; in Latvia and Lithuania, such laws were initiated by conservative groups, but never went as far as being discussed in the Parliaments.

¹⁰ One can add a third "pole" of this process, India, where the Delhi High Court recognized the then existing criminal punishment for homosexuality as unconstitutional in 2009, but the Supreme Court annulled that judgement in 2013. Nevertheless, later, in 2016, the Supreme Court agreed to review the ruling, positing that a further hearing of the issue should be carried out by the Constitutional bench. As of June 2017, it is hard to foresee if the situation with LGBTI rights in India is going to worsen or improve.



conservatives (Ibrahim 2015: 269-270). However, the factor that is common in all those countries is strong anti-Westernism, which in Africa is mostly a vestige of its colonial past and in Russia is a remnant of the Cold War. In both cases, anti-Westernism has been recently “activated” and inflamed by those countries’ autocratic leaders (Mole 2016: 114-116). Anti-Westernism induces those societies to conceive of anti-LGBTI laws in geopolitical terms, as a contribution to the fight against the West that allegedly foists its culture upon their traditional life (Encarnación 2016a: 220-221). For international promoters of LGBTI rights, such creates somewhat a stalemate: the more they criticize the laws, the more those laws are supported by the majority of those countries’ populations. In such circumstances, international furtherance of LGBTI rights only inflames aggression against local LGBTI communities who tend to be viewed as Western spies at home. Moreover, EU/US pressure leaves national elites cornered, since people are likely to perceive any mitigation of the anti-LGBTI laws as cowardice in front of the West (Downie 2014: 9-10). This raises a question of methods the EU and the US should apply for LGBTI rights promotion in “difficult” states (discussed in the next section). Yet, widespread homophobia hardly seems the only reason for those countries’ regression in LGBTI rights: in the end, South Africa, where only 32% of population found homosexuality acceptable in 2013 (Pew Research Center 2013: 1), legalized same-sex marriages eight years earlier, and Hungary, 53% of population deemed homosexuality as “morally wrong” in 2017 (Pew Research Center 2017), legalized same-sex partnerships as early as in 2009.

Another factor is that neither of those countries is a democracy, at least not a stable one¹¹. A democratic system is argued to conduce to LGBTI rights advancement in three ways, that is, enabling a sturdy civil society, making it possible to extend citizenship (understood as membership in society) to minorities and disadvantaged groups and guaranteeing judiciary independence (for details, see Encarnación 2014: 99-101). Indeed, partial judiciary makes defending human rights in the court practically impossible: for instance, a recent study on Russian LGBTI activists’ attempts to contest discrimination in court concluded that “[i]n the majority of cases concerning discrimination – either explicitly or implicitly – the courts did not analyse whether discrimination had occurred in any meaningful way” (Equal Rights Trust 2016: 133)¹². Moreover, those countries’ civil societies remain relatively weak, easily suppressible by the government and, as a result, they can hardly serve as reliable allies in EU and US LGBTI rights promotion: local LGBTI organizations are scanty and frangible and even most progressive political parties do not actively struggle for LGBTI rights, either due to their fear to lose supporters if they raise such an unpopular issue, or owing to their true conservatism concerning LGBTI rights. Illustrative of this is that, as of June 2017, neither of the leading liberal Russian parties - Civic Initiative, Democratic Choice, People’s Freedom Party, or Yabloko - has any provision in its program regarding LGBTI rights and freedoms (Civic Initiative 2015, Democratic Choice 2012, Parnas 2015, Yabloko 2012). Moreover, but for rare exceptions, their leaders show, at best, indifference to LGBTI issues and, at worst, somewhat homophobic views. For example, in June 2013, Sergei Mitrokhin, the then leader of Yabloko, said in an interview:

¹¹ Exemplary of this fact is that Freedom House (2017: 20-24) marks neither of these states “free”, as opposed to most of the aforementioned countries where LGBTI rights promotion has succeeded.

¹² Tellingly, all those states rank low in the global Rule of Law Index (World Justice Project 2016: 21).



I'm not an advocate of gay parades. The people who organize them are provocateurs. They are provoking a counter-wave in society, and these minorities which they are supposedly defending only have it worse (The Interpreter 2013).

A month later, Mitrokhin called same-sex marriages unacceptable, however, arguing that gay parades should not be banned, for they represent people's constitutional right to express their opinion peacefully (Baev 2013). Taking into cognizance that Yabloko is a member of the European ALDE Party, a strong proponent of LGBTI rights, this instance may be demonstrative of Russian democratic politicians' notable conservatism compared to their EU counterparts, their inconsistency on LGBTI issues and somewhat unimportance with which they treat them¹³.

Any Possibility of Improvement? A Critical Overview of Suggestions

Is this situation a complete deadlock, or is there a way for the EU and the US to further LGBTI rights in such states¹⁴? Intuitively, it seems possible to achieve internalization on the level of society in the long run through strengthening local advocacy groups. For this reason, it may be effective to redirect funds from the governments to human rights NGOs, like the US and three EU members did in Uganda (Downie 2014: 16). A long-term strategy requires educational programs debunking faulty statements on which anti-Westernism and homophobia rest (Onishi 2015). In particular, such programs may explain that human rights is not only a Western concept: African states and Russia are also vigilant to discrimination against black people and Russian language speakers respectively. Education can also help dissuade people from a false idea that homosexuality was historically unacceptable in their societies: historical evidence shows that homosexuality was well tolerated in pre-colonial Africa (Ibrahim 2015: 268-269) and medieval Russia (Kon 2006: 321-322).

However, providing aid to local activists for conducting educational programs is normally possible only in democracies, where national governments do not impede such activities. The problem with autocracies is that they tend to encumber human rights NGOs from receiving foreign aid: Russia, for instance, recently expelled USAID from the country and adopted a law that labels NGOs receiving foreign aid "foreign agents" which in Russian equals "spies". Therefore, some argue, LGBTI issues in autocracies can be tackled only after democratisation (e.g. Encarnación 2014: 101-103) that will create environment favorable for LGBTI activism. Yet, democracy does not seem to be a panacea for LGBTI discrimination. First, most people may favor the idea of marriage equality, but not consider it a priority when voting: seemingly for this reason, same-sex marriages are not legal in Australia as of June 2017, despite that opinion polls have shown that most Australians have been supportive of them since 2007 (Hutchens 2016). Second, in

¹³ Some note, however, that in recent years Russian liberals have been getting gradually more empathetic toward LGBT community against the backdrop of the rising anti-LGBTI oppressions (Healey 2014: 65-66). As an illustration of this, currently most influential Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny recently spoke in favour of gay marriage legalization (Navalny 2017) notwithstanding that most Russians share anti-LGBTI sentiments.

¹⁴ The following discussion holds not only for states where situation with LGBTI rights is currently worsening, but also other autocracies where society and political elite are mostly anti-Western and homophobic (e.g. Iran).



conservative societies, a democratic system is likely to help homophobic populists to come to power through elections: as Encarnación (2014: 97) puts it,

democracy is not an insurance policy against anti-gay discrimination, much less a guarantee that gay rights will be protected, even after these rights have been enshrined in law. Democracy can just as easily be used by foes of the gay community to undermine gay rights as it can by gay-rights advocates to advance them.

Another way to push for LGBTI rights from abroad is undertaking penalizing measures, such as shaming and economic sanctions, against the governments of countries discriminating against LGBTI communities. With regard to such measures, however, analysts and experts have three diverse opinions. Some favor them, contending that they are likely to work if the target country is economically dependent on the West (e.g. DeCataldo 2015): according to Jessica Stern, the executive director of the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Coalition, this logic impelled Uganda to abolish its anti-gay law in 2014 following US sanctions (Peale 2015). Yet, while academic studies on sanctions efficiency support this argument, they also show that economic sanctions work best under conditions which seem absent in the countries under research: when imposed on democracies, when approved by an international institution and not only a country, when at issue is a matter of low salience (for a literature review, see Drezner 2011: 99). Similarly, scientific research reveals that shaming is most effective against governments that care about their international reputation (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 2013), a condition which usually does not hold for anti-Western autocrats.

Another group of analysts (e.g. Downie 2014: 9-10, Onishi 2015) oppose shaming and economic sanctions, arguing that such measures aggravate anti-Westernism and anti-LGBTI aggression, thus playing into the hand of traditionalists who can use LGBTI people as scapegoats, blaming them for social and economic problems. Indeed, a number of academic papers (e.g. Wachman 2001) support the argument that inside the target state, international sanctions may produce anger rather than compliance. Yet, research also shows that punitive measures may have positive effects: even though economic sanctions may not improve human rights situation in the target country, they tend to fear the region's other countries and hence, reduce (actual or possible) human rights violations there (Carneiro 2014). Furthermore, punitive measures give psychological support to activists and victims of human rights violation in target countries (Kinzelbach and Wolf 2015) and show that the EU and the US treat their values not as mere declarations, but as principles by which they genuinely abide. Hence, the third approach calling for punitive measures to be applied only if/when local LGBTI activists request them (Godfrey 2014) appears most balanced and, as academic studies (e.g. Murdie and Davis 2012) show, especially efficient.

Several analysts believe that the EU and the US must not specially accentuate LGBTI rights so as not to create the impression that they prioritize certain rights over others. In this vein, Downie (2014: 13) points to the fact that the US imposed sanctions on Uganda over the Anti-Homosexuality Act, while when several presidential candidates were arrested in that country at a peaceful demonstration in 2011, the US confined itself



to soft criticism. In fairness to the US, nonetheless, its approach does not appear so unbalanced. First, one can see a correlation between the seriousness of human rights abuses and the degree of punitive measures introduced by the US: indeed, the above-mentioned arrested Ugandan candidates were released after several days, while the Anti-Homosexuality Act stipulated up to 14 years of imprisonment. Second, one can find certain reasonableness in other cases where US policies get blamed for double standards: to illustrate, the aforesaid tendency to strongly criticise anti-LGBTI laws in certain countries (Uganda, Gambia) while overlooking identical laws in other states (Iraq, Saudi Arabia) may mean that the US applies decisive measures only with respect to states stiffening such laws, censuring in a “softer” way countries, where anti-LGBTI legislation, even tough, has long been unchanged.

Finally, so as not to waste resources and not to deteriorate anti-LGBTI aggression, it seems reasonable for the EU and the US to give priority to promoting LGBTI rights in the countries where progress seems accomplishable rather than in the world’s most homophobic states, even if it may generate accusations of double standards. As Stern noted, “[w]e can’t only invest in the so-called ‘worst places on Earth’. The United States is capable of being most helpful where the U.S. Government record is not hotly contested... otherwise U.S. involvement can backfire on local communities” (Peale 2015). Unfortunately, it tends to remain intuitively unapprehended by policymakers who prefer allocating resources where aid is most needed: as Polish LGBTI activist Zofia Jablonska regrettably noticed, “when it comes to funding from American donors, Poland is not their main priority anymore, because now we are in the EU. For them this is an indicator that minority rights situation in Poland cannot be that bad off comparing, for example, with the Global South countries” (Romanovski 2015).

In Lieu of Conclusion

While the US and the EU, two main international relations actors supporting LGBTI rights abroad, agree on the basic principles of their promotion, their strategies and methods differ in technical terms. Those differences reflect their general approaches to foreign policy making, namely a stronger and more globally oriented stance of the US and a softer and more regionally aligned attitude of the EU. The fact that the two actors are strategic allies allows them to enjoy the strengths of each other’s approaches: the decisiveness of American foreign policy may help the EU in dealing with target states’ elites, while the US, in turn, can capitalize on EU experience of cooperating with NGOs and civil societies. However, both powers’ reputation as human rights promoters suffers from certain features steadily associated with them: the EU is notorious for being overly bureaucratized and treating human rights superficially and formally, while the US, in turn, is traditionally infamous for handling human rights in a politicized way.

So far, EU and US promotion of LGBTI rights has mainly been successful in the states that have formal commitments to respect LGBTI rights and/or in countries where initial domestic conditions were in favour of LGBTI activists. Conversely, in more conservative conditions, furtherance of LGBTI rights from abroad, especially when coupled when punitive measures against target countries’ governments, tends to backfire on local LGBTI activists. Perhaps ironically, it goes at odds with one of the basic principles of human rights promotion, namely “taking into account the local realities in which human rights defenders need to advance their struggle” (Council of the EU 2013). To date, it



seems that the two actors must cooperate and coordinate their activities to formulate a detailed and well-planned long-term strategy to effectively further LGBTI rights in the world.

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MEDIA, DIVERSITY AND GLOBALISATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE

Francisco Rui Cádima

frcadima@fcsb.unl.pt

Professor at Department of Communication Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (FCSH/NOVA, Portugal). Researcher in charge of CIC.Digital – Centre for Research in Communication, Information and Digital Culture. Coordinator of the PhD course in Communication Sciences and member of the Scientific Council of FCSH/NOVA.

Abstract

The issues of cultural diversity and the plurality of voices in the current digital and global environment are raising new challenges beyond those already identified in the context of migration from classical media to the internet galaxy. If, with traditional media, a closing logic under “the same” prevailed, with digital media we started to believe in the “apotheosis of the dream of diversity” (Curran, 2008). But the truth is that the elimination of the old filters of information and distribution does not seem to be happening. New “gatekeeping” surrounds human intervention, with current information dissemination systems having an algorithmic basis and artificial intelligence, biasing access to news and reducing space for cultural diversity or even censoring the plurality of voices and cultural expressions.

Key Words

Media, Culture, Diversity, Globalisation, Digital.

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MEDIA, DIVERSITY AND GLOBALISATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE¹

Francisco Rui Cádima

*The power we will gain in the twenty-first century
may well upgrade us into gods,
but we will be very dissatisfied gods.*

Yuval Noah Harari

Introduction

What does it mean today, at the height of the great digital platforms and the internet, to analyse the problem of diversity – cultural diversity, diversity of cultural expressions and pluralism – in the global context? At first it seems a contradiction, it seems to make little sense considering the mass of information circulating in the internet galaxy. However, in this age of reproducibility and automatism of algorithmic techniques, new problems emerge, including “fake news”, which had never been a cause of great concern in the media age.

On the other hand, post-media and the new and complex contexts of the digital age, when thought about globally – in all extensions of the concept – show, for example, the emergence of what we can call the “cybercitizen” – that is the cyberspace citizen, or at least a “produser” of the digital world, which is generally characterised by not being subject either to physical boundaries or to old, mitigated and reconverted models of production or distribution. This also happens to space and territory in an increasingly unrestricted manner, be it in economy and finance, in politics, in the context of climate, or even in the general (mis)information that spreads and short-circuits the mediation process, be it in traditional or digital media.

Our starting point has previous milestones: in two previous articles in the generic scope of this theme, we analysed, in a first approach (Cádima, 2010), cases demonstrating different fractures of a hypothetical global communication media model, namely in the television sphere, a model that, in terms of content itself, does not exist, especially since it is, in practice, fundamentally local or regional – in signal distribution, geopolitical and geostrategic logic. In other words, even when technological conditions allow it, political conditions, political pressure and interest groups preclude a clearly autonomous and independent local/global publishing strategy.

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In a second approach (Cádima, 2016), we thought more specifically about the European context and the dynamics of the European Union, demonstrating that the lack of cohesion of the European project, especially since the creation of Television without Frontiers Directive (1989), was largely based on the collapse of the spirit of law and the European strategic project and ideology, originally set out in the directive. From both the point of view of communication strategies and of public policies for the European audio-visual sector, in particular the policies and monitoring directed at public radio and television systems in Europe, it is evident – and we will try to prove it in this article – that Europe succumbed to its own (and apparently insurmountable) contradictions, being unable to claim in a space of excellence – the public service of media – its cultural heritage and its project of transboundary unity and cohesion for the diversity of its experiences and cultures.

In this research I have sought, in a complementary way to the previous works, to find answers to two issues: first, to know if a true alternative model to what is called the “mainstream” media – sometimes also referred to more critically as the “hegemonic media” – was found at a global level since the emergence of the internet, and more specifically, since the mid-90s; second, to understand the post-media phenomenon as a whole, also in the global context, and to think if this whole complex system of post-media communication – from local systems from the analogue age to global digital networks and platforms, including transcontinental broadcasting systems – has been compatible with this other idea/model of globalisation and cultural convergence that has, to a certain extent, reached everyone on this planet in the last decades.

Globalisation and regression

To contextualise the emergence of globalisation and its cultural contexts in history, let us turn to one of the founding texts of the 1980s and the debate by Fredric Jameson (1984). His proposal, a criticism of the trends of that time related to the crisis of the great narratives as a trend of postmodernism, led him to characterise the new concept as something that would have emerged in the context of a historicity crisis:

There no longer seems to be any organic relationship between the American history we learn from schoolbooks and the lived experience of the current, multinational, high-rise, stagflated city of the newspapers and of our own everyday life” (Jameson, 1984: 22).

The question for him was paradoxical and somewhat ambivalent, that is he considered cultural evolution in the framework of “late capitalism” as both catastrophe and progress. This is a duality that reappears in other texts of his approximately twenty years later,² now approaching the theme of political resistance to globalisation and its analysis in its economic, political and technological interdependencies, warning about the dilution of the cultural in the economic, or by summoning this “historical dissociation” between two

² See especially Fredric Jameson (2000). “Globalization and Political Strategy”. *New Left Review* 4, July-August 2000; and (2004) “The Politics of Utopia. *New Left Review* 25, January-February 2004.



distinct worlds: one that exposes what it considers to be the “social disintegration”, and the other, the one of the societies of abundance, largely fuelled by technology.

The consequences of an open market, especially for employment and democracy, were already identified at the end of the last century by several authors, such as Schumann and Martin (1998). It was obvious then that global markets were generating more and more unemployment, leaving serious doubts about the type of economic development generated. In a sense, for the first time in the history of capitalism, employment was not being generated, thus appearing the first human costs of globalisation. In this free trade logic, economic-financial systems arose, but the distribution of wealth of the global economic machine left out the new disowned of the land. In addition, faced with the crisis of the old social structures and with the crisis of solidarity, waves of aversion against foreigners and the economically weak emerged. It was just a short step from this point to the emergence of protectionism and nationalism. The European project seeks to rebuild itself from this first clash in the post-Brexit era. For this reason, it would be useful to recall Bourdieu, remembered by Schumann and Martin (1998: 241):

We can only effectively combat technocracy if we challenge it in its field of choice, the economic sciences, and if we put up knowledge that respects the people and the reality they face against the mutilated thinking technocracy resorts to.

In this context, it was obvious that the transformation of the globalisation of injustice into a process of mutual compensation, thus seeking to achieve efficiency gains for all citizens, could also aim to legitimise the advantages of the open market. The problem is that on top of this wave of late capitalism there was a new technological dynamic, whose impacts were not completely recognised in the beginning.

For Vidal-Beneyto, the association between wealth creation and the increase of inequality is also a consequence of a deregulated technological development and, above all, the evident economic dysfunctions and structural determinations of the global system in the emergence of the new century. In any case, according to Beneyto, transnational citizens' movements and citizenship initiatives, which, in a global context, constitute spaces with some autonomy – spaces of interaction and promotion of solidarity – emerge as a new perception in this global world of fragile and precarious equilibria, forming what he calls a “global civil society” (2004: 22). Vidal-Beneyto considers, however, that it is through the new globalised systems of mediation that this global civil society can be strengthened and consolidated in the context of policies de-legitimised by the “markets” and faced with an unregulated globalisation process.

Appadurai (2004) presents a point of view that is different from that of Jameson or Beneyto, considering, in his anthropological perspective, that taking into account the new contexts of globalisation and the complex interactions between global, national and local contexts, cultural homogenisation is not necessarily established; nor can it be considered that through the new mediation processes (electronic or digital), any type of hegemonic media is configured, and therefore the globalisation of culture is mainly determined by the “cannibalisation” of similarity and difference, which interact reciprocally, and by the deterritorialisation of cultural identities, which is not exactly the same as the



homogenisation of global flows. It is obvious, for Appadurai, that although nation-states still offer some resistance in seeking to maintain unified and continuous identities in their territorial spaces, the truth is that this reality is now surpassed either by intercontinental migratory dynamics or new technological systems of intermediation, or even by digital platforms. Thus, basically we are mainly in the face of communicational transversalities and hybrid identities, being that, in the digital context, identity traits of communities that reconfigure and recycle themselves do not have a precise territorial belonging. Neil Barrett (1997) saw this in his work on "cybernation", in which he proposed precisely that the "old" modern specificity of the nation-state would irreparably be confronted with its own limits in the age of the internet.

The updating of the problem of globalisation made by Appadurai in a text entitled *Une fatigue de la démocratie* (Appadurai et al., 2017) reinstates the question of the loss of economic and/or political sovereignty by modern states, reconverted again into a principle of exclusion and a strategy for conquering an "ethnonational" sovereignty, asphyxiating internal, intellectual and cultural dissent. In the same work, Zygmunt Bauman considers, however, that the sphere of culture tends to progressively become a definitive character as a "cultural heterogeneity" without this meaning the end of the exclusion or social regression of this age of uncertainty. Other proposals in this reference work of these agitated times, from Krastev to Van Reybrouck, from Streeck to Nancy Fraser, among others, refer fundamentally to what seems to be a preliminary refusal of the global market model instituted, given the populist reversal that has been established, the refusal of the "other", of the foreigner, refusal of the participation in electoral processes by a public that is increasingly victimised by its own cultural, religious, demographic and labour fears, which in a way has been transforming the vote into a kind of weapon against democracy. Thus, new hegemonies of the old majorities are consolidated in new contexts, whether resulting from "democratic fatigue syndrome" or those that are reconfigured in the "post-truth" era and in political fraud, which already subsume this hegemony as a "post-democratic" age, in the words of Wolfgang Streeck. New data from the recent *World Values Survey*³ make this scenario a bit more chilling: less than half of young Europeans do not consider it essential to live in a democracy . . . to deconstruct this globalisation, considering the evident ongoing crisis of the European project and the current context of "post-truth" and "global regression". But the great question of uncertainty, that is to know if radicalisms and populisms are in fact a new trend that is already questioning the continuity of liberal democracy as we have known it since the eighteenth century.

Diversity in the digital age

Our perspective in this research is to assess, above all, the dimension of the communicational and cultural diversity of globalisation – not losing sight of the dimensions of cultural and post-media pluralism – and to understand the context that is essentially marked by the new digital age and its impacts. First, let us look at how this complex impasse in the domain of pluralism and diversity cultures arose during digital emergence, trying to establish the model of globalisation based on what we might call the "algorithmic turn" – big data, AI, machine learning, etc., with very complex

³ WVS, Wave 6 (2010-2014). <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>



implications at different levels of society, but especially in the spheres of economy/employment and science/knowledge and information.

First, let us consider the question of the genealogy of pluralism and diversity in the European context, particularly in the context of the mission and practices of public television services, which are responsible for making a difference in view of what general television offers. The culture of duality or “tension” verses economy/commerce (Lowe & Bardoel, 2007; Cádima, 2007; Novak, 2014) has always been onerous in the European audio-visual experience and has been highly critical, especially for the developing countries. The recognition of diversity has never risen to the dignity of either “common heritage of humanity” or of European cultural heritage in the audio-visual context of the EU. In general, even in the community context, cultural and media diversity have always been relatively quite, subject to the laws of free trade and not so much to identities, values and senses; in other words, they have rarely been able to promote effectively a diversity of cultural expressions, including in the public media systems. In fact, and according to Mattelart (2006: 16),

[Unesco’s] views of culture, identity and cultural heteronomies challenge the conservative and patrimonial vision of “European values” that marked the construction of the single market.

Therefore, cultural and media policies cannot be separated because the basic principle of both still is the diversity of sources of information, of media ownership and of the independence of public service.

Will digital media be different from classic media regarding cultural diversity (using the concept in a broad sense) on the cultural, socio-economic and political spectrum? More specifically, in the context of the diversity of voices in the network, of political diversity and “polarisation”, of the degree of concentration of news platforms on digital media, and in what is already strictly digital, but which seriously interferes with the issues of freedom and human dignity, in the issue of tracking, in the control of the digital footprint and finally in the (un)protection of personal data.

In summary, it could be said that in terms of the diversity of voices, thinking first and foremost of the social movements of the “indignant” and the Arab revolutions, we agree with Castells (2012) that the fundamental thing is to recognise the social and historical nature of these movements and their impacts; that is in our perspective, to realise the extent to which we can speak of “liberated voices” or of openness to the plurality and diversity of voices of the communities of citizens in these new contexts. In networks, there will always be an imperfect form of representativeness, if not for the fact that we are faced with platforms filtered by algorithms. And, therefore, they are still “conditioned voices”. As mentioned (Cádima, 2015), they are conditioned by access – the digital divide, on the issue of net neutrality, but also because they are monitored by tracking systems, bots, analytical information devices and because they intersect fake profiles, fake news, censorship, etc., making these voices more quickly trapped in virtual control than free in the internet galaxy.

Also regarding the concentration of ownership of media companies and digital platforms on the internet, the first known data was not at all favourable. Hindman (2009: 18)



referred to the existence of “powerful hierarchies” that shaped the digital media, not only its barriers and who can enter, but also economic concentration and content, traffic, search engines, software, etc. Therefore, he concluded, “news and media consumption is more concentrated online than off-line” (2009: 96). Still in terms of concentration, and given the known data, it can be said that the diversity of media and content in the context of migration to new media, together with the consolidation of a broad and autonomous “inclusive” public sphere and the issue of citizen participation and collaboration in the context of an “open” internet, which is framed by the principles of “net neutrality”, are topics that still are not completely assimilated by current network practices.

It should also be pointed out that net vigilance and other intrusive forms of virtual control have increased dramatically in recent years, exposing, sometimes publicly, the private information of citizens, thus denouncing mainly the weaknesses of democratic societies (Mattelart, 2010) that were shattered when faced with the new global security logics and their links to interest groups and to less transparent political and economic powers. Thus, new data capture and control logic converts the user, the cybercitizens of the world, into a kind of amorphous “internet of things” terminal, that is a dehumanised physical receptacle exposed to a complex and invisible system of control. The consequences of this reconversion of the “human” into a statistical subject in the age of big data is therefore extremely critical.

Dataism and polarisation

Today, at the global level and regarding media, digital platforms and information, we discuss and try to understand the impacts of fake news, distorted information as well as bots and the consequences of social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, but also Google and Microsoft, who effectively have a responsibility for formatting and “editing” current public discourse and its impact on the political and electoral sphere. In any case, despite the siege imposed by the new speeches encapsulated in the “post-truth” age, according to scholars such as Jonhattan Zittrain, we are still in time to rethink what is truly at stake and, so to speak, in time to take a step back:

There are thoughtful proposals to reseed the media landscape of genuine and diverse voices, and we would do well to experiment widely with them as the clickbait architecture collapses on its own accord (Zittrain, 2017).

Computing, information, biotechnology, data and artificial intelligence are dramatically recomposing human landscape and geopolitics, leading scientists such as Stephen Hawking⁴ to dramatically shorten their predictions of humanity’s “life expectancy” in this new context. The estimate for the next hundred years is that the planet will go through difficult trials, namely dangers caused by climate change, overpopulation, epidemics, underemployment, possible nuclear wars and even asteroid strikes on earth. This is the reason why the colonisation of other planets is fundamental to ensure the survival of the

⁴ See: “Stephen Hawking now says humanity has only about 100 years to escape Earth”. Chicago Tribune, May 5, 2017. <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/science/ct-stephen-hawking-escape-earth-20170505-story.html>



species. This is one of the revisions of the story by Hawking, although his predictions have been quite different in the recent past. In 2017, in a documentary for the BBC series *Tomorrow's World – Expedition New Earth*, he says that he believes that humankind has already created enough technology to destroy the planet, but not to escape it.

The same happens in the field of computing: technology, algorithms and machine learning progressively make their way without any real regulation or clear guarantees that this path is ever closed to the “creator” or at least that humankind can rest easy and comfortable in the face of any unforeseen event. In fact, this is already happening in areas as important as information, especially when we think of news rankings that the feeds of digital platforms, news aggregators or search engines organised according to the profile of each user. “Dataism” will be a new legitimization narrative in the post-truth age (Harari, 2017), a comprehensive and “sacrosanct” fiction that, according to the author of *Homo Deus* (2017a), will have as a discursive clutch the “non-conscious algorithms”: “If you leave it to market forces to choose between intelligence and consciousness, the market will choose intelligence”. These “unconscious” algorithms, or at least “market-conscious” algorithms, are a subject for reflection and, above all, of concern, since they are configuring what some authors call the “algorithmic turn” in science and knowledge; in other words, a “physics of culture” (Slavin, 2011) that can range from entertainment to finance, from retail to journalism.

The term “dataism” was first coined by an American analyst, David Brooks (2013). It was Steve Lohr, of the *New York Times*, who published a book on the subject in 2015. Based on case studies and not neglecting a reflexive assumption – which constitutes a critique, though veiled, of the big data phenomenon – Lohr essentially describes this new age in which vast data sets are used by science or markets, enhancing forecasting and decision-making in virtually every field, analysing the challenges, hazards and impacts that dataism contains. In an already fully digital context, this extension or “remediation” of computational information announces a new level of algorithmic inflexion that means that the power of computing in the management of large masses of biometric data is no longer dependent on human being in such sensitive matters as electoral processes, financial flows, or in the management of news information, that is human “processing” of such databases is progressively becoming a mirage:

Nobody understands the global economy, nobody knows how political power functions today, and nobody can predict what the job market or human society would look like in 50 years. (Harari, 2017a).

It is precisely this shift, this tension between the creator and his Frankenstein, between computing and its algorithms, that today must deserve the full attention of science and of the legal-political system in general, preventing dramatic consequences – which would result from the loss of that control – for the whole of humanity. This is because technology gurus and Silicon Valley prophets are creating a “universal narrative”, or even a “creed”, which has legitimised big data’s intrinsic logic:



Just as free-market capitalists believe in the invisible hand of the market, so Dataists believe in the invisible hand of dataflow (Harari, 2016).

One of the most dramatic current effects of dataism regards what is called the polarisation in the sphere of politics and civic participation, the antithesis of diversity in politics. Thus, thinking about politics today means starting with the consequences of new online communication strategies that have come to use so-called “filter bubbles”, opinion filters, “echo chambers”, etc., as well as the entire toxic field of fake news, whose sources are very diverse. The new North American political landscape (such as Brexit or the presidential election in France in 2017) is thus involved in this complex whirlwind of (mis)information, in which social networks, search engines, information aggregators and online platforms in general are clearly involved.

These echo chambers of social networks are a very strong point of attraction for users that end up corresponding naturally to the algorithms that reorganise information according to profiles, interests and beliefs of those users. This means that there is a strong tendency for users to fundamentally promote and redistribute their favourite narratives and thus form polarised groups through what may be called the continuous creation of polarised or thematic “information cascades”. And once inside the “bubble” it will be very difficult to get out of it. In research conducted by IMT’s Advanced Studies Group in Lucca (Bessi, 2016) that analysed the behaviour of 12 million Facebook and YouTube users between 2010 and 2014, the research team followed the “likes”, shares and comments on YouTube videos, which were incorporated into 413 different Facebook pages. There were fundamentally two types of categories: “conspiracy” and “science”, and in general almost all users became highly polarised; that is more than 95% of the comments, shares and likes were in a single category of content, in an ideological echo chamber, and once polarised, users became even more polarised; that is the user no longer has any adverse opinions or any kind of discussion about the issues at stake that may bring other perspectives.

We can identify various types of asymmetries in information and news in the context of the initial convergence of traditional media and in the digital age. Basically, we speak of the various profiles and mutations that the “spiral of silence” of the media age presents in its eternal struggle with the open forms of freedom of expression and information, with pluralism, diversity of contents and voices as well as censorship. From false news and counter-information to fait-divers, sensationalism and “alternative facts”, all these themes of the classical media age reappear in the digital age, and it is now largely through social media that false news is validated. This is a new fact, which is shifting from the classical “source” to the origin of sharing – that is the original source of news seems to be increasingly subordinated to the author, to “popularity” and to the number of online shares (AAVV, 2017). Even more interesting is that, in general, at the time of confirming and sharing, people do not distinguish between known and unknown sources, or worse, invented ones. For example, some studies about diversity in the context of traditional news information point to a decrease in pluralism and diversity when supply has grown exponentially, especially after the massification of the internet in the late 1990s. This is the case of a study on newspapers in Flanders, Belgium (Walgrave et al., 2017). Based on an analysis of the longitudinal content of nine Flemish newspapers at four periods, it



has been verified that, over time, similar newspapers or newspapers belonging to the same media groups have become less diversified regarding the news they cover.

The problem of diversity and pluralism is dramatically re-emerging in the current context of the new asymmetries of the digital age, in which social networks and digital “gatekeepers” are replacing old press editors, reorganising information through the logic of “clickbait”. It is also problematic that 51% of internet users prefer social networks to access the news, usually via mobile phones, to the detriment of traditional media, according to a study by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (Newman, et al., 2016), University of Oxford, based on more than 50,000 interviews in 26 countries, where Facebook is the most used platform in news consumption since many users prefer the selection of news made by algorithms.

In the case of the polarisation of information, which is more specific to electoral periods, it generally ends up existing throughout the whole news production/reception cycle. And in the case of media, particularly in its relationship with new digital intermediaries, access to information by the user/reader acquires new complexity, although the polarisation here is the same determined by the algorithms of the same platforms, now transformed, therefore, into news “gatekeepers”. This intermediation entails new risks for the democratic system, not only in the political or electoral sphere, as we saw before, but in the informational daily life of the population in general.

Nielsen and Ganter (2017) point specifically to traditional media relations with digital intermediaries, noting that the information cycle is increasingly dependent on platforms, and therefore these intermediaries, such as Facebook and Google, given the power they currently have in this domain, have increased responsibilities. In their study, it was concluded that the relationships between media companies and platforms are generally characterised by a tension between short-term operational opportunities and long-term strategic concerns, but more specifically marked by a balance of forces and an asymmetry that highlight the risk of the mainstream media becoming secondary to digital intermediaries.

Conclusion

Misinformation, polarisation, disorientation and uncertainty are some of the recurring concepts that are characterising the present times, the “ethnic landscapes” of the present, as referred to by Appadurai (2004). If this is the configuration of the politics of the age, in terms of culture and information, we see, on the one hand, the issue of diversity and plurality of voices being indexed to algorithmic logics, filtered and tracked by complex internet control systems and/or network operators, which mainly determine a censorship of the voices and not freedom of expression. On the other hand, the old agenda-setting model, due to the recycling and realignment of informative material by digital platforms, spread according to the profile of each user, appears to be a process with an increasingly limited impact in the context of global information flows.

In terms of information, the strong penetration of the internet on a global level and the exponential growth of news websites and digital platforms since the late 1990s ended up not being an alternative communication model to the traditional media discourse since the evolution established began by indexing the information according to the model of “winner takes it all” (Hindman, 2009), passing through the model of “filter bubbles”



(Pariser, 2010) to end with the gatekeeping of algorithms of big platforms such as Google and Facebook (Bessi, 2016).

On the side, reception by publics, and in particular by younger audiences, especially in more developed countries, there has been a gradual shift towards digitalisation and not only a decrease in politicisation (Prior, 2007), but also a critical trend of greater political polarisation. This is even more serious in the younger age groups, especially among adolescents and young adults, where there is another problematic trend: attributing greater credibility to friends on social networks and largely shared posts than to credible sources of information.

Cosmopolitanism and global interconnectivity (Woodward, 2008), coupled with the experience of citizenship and its physical and virtual networks also expose other digital fractures, for example, at the individual level, in the peripheral community or in geographically isolated cultures (Norris, 2008), through forms of identification, behaviours and belongings that transcend borders, by cultural rupture or convergence between local and global contexts, and especially by large groups of threats to some of the opportunities discussed in the course of this reflection.

Although the media and digital landscape is full of black clouds on the horizon, the truth is that the potential of the digital age must be considered as strategic for global citizenship. Threats are a fact, but there are also some "opportunities", some interstices of freedom, precisely in the field of cultural diversity, so that different communities come to know each other and interact in a global context. It is important not to overlook this potential for the permanent safeguarding of cultural diversity, tolerance and intercultural citizenship (Zayani, 2011) at this critical stage of globalisation. It may still be utopian, considering the dystopias of the globalisation and the digital age, now recovered from Orwell or Huxley, but if, as Jameson (1984) says, there is still a social function for this peculiar entity which is utopia, it is so that the historical dissociation between two distinct worlds – the duality of catastrophe/progress – which globalisation may have accentuated, may also have its inflection. The truth is that, by the "archaeology" known up to now, this inflection will certainly be in an individual or local context, it will hardly be global.

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, ICT AND SOCIAL CHANGE ACCORDING TO THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY

Belén Casas-Mas

bcasas@ucm.es

Doctor in Social Communication at Complutense University of Madrid (UCM, Spain). Research Fellow at the UCM supported by the FPU National Plan of the Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (2013-2017). She received her BSC in Business and Touristic Activities (2002) from UNED, and her BSC in Advertisement and Public Relations (2011) from University Rey Juan Carlos, in which she earned the extraordinary end-of-course prize in 2011. MSc in Social Communication (2013) from the UCM, she is currently a member of the Research Group "Social Identities and Communication" (UCM).

Abstract

The rapid spread of the information and communication technologies (ICTs) has changed the way social movements use Public Communication and will do so again in the future. This paper provides an analysis of the academic literature related to the influence of the ICT transformations on social movements and its consequences for social consent. The study is based on one of the dimensions of the R&D: "Social Production of Communication and Social Reproduction in the Globalization Era". This is done through a content analysis of the representations offered by scientific institutions that mediate the social reproduction of meaning. Within the theoretical framework of the Social Production of Communication, the implemented analysis includes a corpus of 180 future scenarios from scientific and technical literature in this field. The findings suggest that the ICTs promote agreement between various social groups, but this might simultaneously trigger conflicts with other institutions or governments.

Keywords

New technologies; social reproduction; social transformation; political movements; NGO; Public Communication.

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, ICT AND SOCIAL CHANGE ACCORDING TO THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY¹

Belén Casas-Mas

Introduction

The revolution of the new technologies has been around since more than two decades and worldwide social movements' organizers have incorporated these new digital communication tools in all their actions. Web pages, online petitions, mailing lists, one-to-one emails, etc., have accelerated communication progresses, succeeding in producing an agreement amongst different social groups in order to aim a common objective. The contribution of ICT strongly determines the achievement of the intergroup consensus, since it contributes to a higher visibility of social movements, an increase in the capacity to mobilize people, a broader impact and a rise of the interactions between members.

Every social movement fights to achieve different purposes that, in general terms, can be considered as the steps needed to promote a real social change. Nevertheless, one wonders if the introduction of new digital technologies in the everyday life of social movements not only generates agreements, but can also bring socio-historical transformations or, on the contrary, social reproduction.

This paper is placed in the field of the studies about social movements and social change, when both phenomena are related to consensus/conflict dynamics and scientific-technical innovations, in particular to the social application of ICTs.

The main objective of the study is as follows: To know how certain "sociohistorical changes" related to the use of ICTs by social movements are being conceived in the scientific and academic fields.

"Sociohistorical changes" are those transformations with an irreversible character in the history of humankind. For instance, the digitalization will be irreversible as well as it was with the use of print. Related and specialised literature may offer various representations of the mentioned sociohistorical changes taking place within the scientific-academic community. In this study, a sample of those resources has been selected in order to analyse the texts in which the authors describe the scenarios that anticipate possible changes derived from the use that social movements are making of ICT. They are "future scenarios" which involve social consensus and conflict dynamics (Bernete and Velarde, 2014:93).

¹ Text reviewed by Carolina Peralta.



Literature Review

Former contributions of scientific research from different approaches have linked social movements with protests, riots and protesters fighting against governments and corporations. Media, throughout the history of democracy, have grabbed the impact of these disruptive events, making it the centre of attention in most of the studies (Tilly, 2009). When referring to protests that go beyond national boundaries, Della Porta and Tarrow (2004) do not use the term "social movements", in which the state is at the core of the concept, preferring "transnational activism".

On the contrary, when explaining the social movement's phenomena, some authors (Polleta, 2002; Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008) consider that taking into account only the state involves ignoring the complete structure of these organisations. This structure cannot be separated from culture and identity, which means other non-political relationships. Armstrong and Bernstein (2008: 74) argue that the conception of formal public-claims-making targeting the state "is too narrow to encompass the diversity of contemporary change efforts" and marginalizes some social movements.

According to Gillan (2017: 271), "the first half of this decade has seen a tremendous wave of protest". There has been a shift in the nature of these disruptive events: from the social movement theory of the sixties that framed the studies on change (mobilizations of students, workers, farmers and women who claimed right to governments) (McAdam, 1988), to the growth of identity activism. It seems that what all the studies share is an "interest in contestation and collective mobilization processes" (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2017: 282). Cornelissen and Werner (2014) also point at an interest in the collective action and the capacity of activists to enlist members and gain acceptance and support. This capacity is based on modes of representation that motivate actors because they are grounded in wider cultural-belief systems (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014: 199)

To make collective action possible, activists need at least to succeed at creative identity framing. The development of a social movement will depend, therefore, on the establishing of a clear link between the issue they want to change, and "one or more highly salient identities, thereby conferring ownership of the issue to those groups" (McAdam, 2017: 200).

Since the First Industrial Revolution, different sociologists have analysed the relationship between social movements and the state or private institutions, and its impact on civil society. These thinkers often link the issue with dynamics of conflict and consensus (Coser, 1956; Galtung, 1969; Curle and Dugan, 1981, Freedman, 2014). How these dynamics play out since 1970 to 2011 is the focal question that unites the academic literature in this paper. As De Bakk et al. (2013: 288) assess, "groups seeking change often mobilize collectively outside established institutions to assert new logics and disrupt taken-for-granted arrangements". As it will be shown below, the disruptive logics involve consent within the groups that collide with the stabilised order.



Theoretical framework: Theory of Social Communication

This paper is based on a study that analyses the relationships between the transformations in the Communication System that affect social movements and their links with social changes. In particular, it is focused on whether those communicative transformations result in the creation of consensus dynamics, conflict dynamics, or both at the same time. For the analysis, consideration has been also given to other dynamics affecting the whole society.

The study's theoretical framework is the Theory of Social Communication developed by Manuel Martín Serrano (Martín Serrano, 1986). This theory interprets the relationships among social formations (SS) and communication institutional systems (CS) as an interdependence between two systems, which are autonomous but affect each other.

The theoretical reflections on this link appear in the 16th century. Since then, the social uses of communication and information technologies have been frequently considered the main procedures to transform institutional and interpersonal relationships. Humanists, Illuminists and Positivists have shared this sociohistorical view, which helped them to foresee the change in pre-industrial societies (Martín Serrano, 2014).

From the time of the appearance of the electronic media, those technologies have been considered the foundation for the development of the "mass society". Since Gabriel Tarde (2011, 1890), the massive use of mediated communications has been seen as inseparable from the industrial revolutions. Apart from Cultural Theorists, Functionalist and Structural-Functionalist authors are the key scientists who linked those social uses of ICT with human progress. It should be pointed out that, after the Second World War, the "optimistic and progressive view" about historical changes based on scientific and economic development was not as shared as it was before. Frankfurt School authors and others from other stances have shown that "Social Communication" had had a lot to do with the world order established after the war conflict and with new social control mechanisms.

Based on the Marxists postulates, the author of *Social Production of Communication* (Martín Serrano, 1986) uses a perspective from the analysis of communication and society. This approach is based on a homology/difference criterion between the levels (CS) and (SS), since in both cases the same levels exist: infrastructure, structure and superstructure.

The "Theory of Social Communication" was developed when it was not possible to imagine the features and output of the digital network. Therefore, sociohistorical changes related to those new ICTs were left out of the social movements' analysis. This paper tries to offer such an analysis including the ICTs.

Methodological framework: Social production of communication and social reproduction

The same methodology implemented before in a Research and Innovation project has been used in this study. This project called "*Social production of communication and*



*social reproduction in the age of globalisation*² comprised a content analysis of the scientific discourses in specialized literature. These discourses are related to existing interdependences between the transformations of communication and social changes in the globalisation age. Of the total examined resources (70 books, 10 book chapters and 33 papers in scientific journals, dating from 1970 to 2011), a corpus of 2300 sentences was created and included in the R&D database. A "sentence" is defined as follows:

[...] is the transcription of an argument onto a well-formed narrative, following a design that makes that reasoning comparable to alternative ones (Bernete and Velarde, 2014: 95).

In this case, what it is analysed is scientific narrative. The localization and transcriptions of these arguments come from a previous design³ based on the application of structural and discriminative techniques, which allows the construction of equivalent measurable and quantifiable analysis units. The following table shows the protocol with the list of references taken into account by analysts in the R&D data collection:

Table 1. Protocol for Source Selection

I. Transformations In Communication that are Reflected in Public Communication [Scp]. ^A Transformations that Transcend (Or Will Transcend) to Other, Non-Communicational Systems [Ss]- [Sr]
Reference types:
• Transformations of public communication systems • Transformations of public communication processes • Transformations of public communication mediations
And, correlatively:
II. CHANGES IN NON-COMMUNICATIONAL SYSTEMS [SS]- [SR], that are (or will be) related to transformations in public communication systems [SCP].
Reference types:
• Changes in social system organization and components • Changes in social processes • Changes in social mediations • References to groups involved in social changes
↓
III. Insofar as Those Relationships are Related (Or May Become So) to Social Reproduction in the Age of Globalization
Reference types:
• Reproduction or transformation of the states, dynamics, of globalized society.
^a "Public communication" uses communication systems that are not privative and do not have access restrictions (by definition).

Source: Bernete and Velarde, 2014:100.

In this study, a broad and inclusive perspective of the issue has been used to select the sample. The selection of the semantic field is based on some of the topics proposed by the *Journal of Social Movement Studies*⁴: contributions dealing with different types of movements, including gender, race, indigenous peoples' rights, ecology, youth, religion, disability, and others. It also includes all forms of representation and communication linked with social change, such as cyber cultures, hackers, etc. Networks supporting

² R&D project with reference: CS020010-22104-C03-01. From: 01/2011 to 12/2013. Hereinafter mentioned as <R&D>.

³ For an in-depth description of Design and Testing of Models for the Analysis of Future Scenarios, see Bernete and Velarde, 2014: 94).

⁴ See: <http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&journalCode=csms20>



broad “ways of life” associated with alternative social systems, ‘identities and the construction of collective identities”, theoretical reflections on the space’s context (“local, regional, national, international and global socio-economic, and cultural movements”) and theoretical approaches “on the significance of social movements and protest”.

From the abovementioned database, a criterion based on searching parameters has been set up in order to get information related to the communicative transformations that affect collectives, such as social and politic movements and NGOs. The result of this searching has yielded a sample of 180 sentences, whose content is described and analysed below in this paper.

Dynamics related to social movements, social consensus and conflict

In the sample selected for this study, there is information about the diverse social consensus and conflict dynamics that are taking place in a society where the ICTs play a major role in the social changes these collectives are involved in. Therefore, the purpose of this analysis is to contribute to the knowledge of these kinds of dynamics and to determine the different forms they can take. Amongst these dynamics, the following stand out: social agreement regarding collective awareness, political commitment, moral issues or public affairs participation; and social conflicts leading to group protests or civil resistance, among many others. The analysis is organised according to the following phases:

First phase: affected collectives

This phase focuses on the study of the affected organizations and collectives. They are as follows:

- NGOs
- Social movements, which include feminist groups, hackers and trade unions.
- Political movements in general and those including liberation movements (such as the EZLN – the Zapatista Army for National Liberation -).
- Civil society in general, which can set up diverse social movements when affected by public communication.

It should be specified that there are sentences that refer to public communication used by institutions in general, including: NGOs, social movements and political movements.

Table 2. Affected social collectives

NGOs	Social movements	Political movements	Civil society
31%	90 %	27%	17%

Source: author’s own.



The results reported in the above table show that the vast majority of the sentences refer to communicational transformations affecting social movements. Just one third of the sentences talks about NGOs, followed by those that do it about political movements. Lastly, barely one quarter of the sentences relate to communicational transformations that provoke social mobilisations of various kinds.

Second phase: consensus and social conflict dynamics

The social consensus//conflict dynamics generated by the transformations of the communicational system are specifically analysed in this phase, according to the following protocol⁵:

Table 3. Social Consensus/Conflict Dynamics related to ICT uses by Social Movements

<i>Referred exclusively to social consensus, when they foster:</i> - Social development. - The end of poverty and social exclusion. - Meeting social demands. - Solidarity. - Regional integration. - Social and economic balance worldwide. - Social equality - Fair distribution of the wealth. - Democratization - Freedom of expression. - Development of a multicultural society. - Liberation of peoples and groups. -
<i>Referred exclusively to social conflict, when they contribute to:</i> - A decrease in the State control of the population or other private institutions. - A deterioration or rupture of social or institutional relationships. - Identity conflicts. - Criminal activities. - An increase of aggressiveness. - Chaos and social fragmentation.
<i>Referred to consensus and, eventually, to conflict, when they simultaneously:</i> - Boost the agreement of anti-globalisation groups and the conflict with the institutions that underpin the globalised system. - Facilitate the mobilisation of the groups against government action (wars, laws, etc.). - Allow the sharing of interest, which may reinforce pathological or destructive behaviours. - Make it possible the transfer of the collective action towards ICT, which generate drastic and radical changes (in society, family, relationships, etc.).

Source: author's own.

⁵ The protocol is based on the categories used in the Doctoral Thesis of Casas-Mas, B. (2017). Public Communication Transformations in the Globalisation Era and its Influence on Social Consensus and Conflict. Complutense University of Madrid (Spain).



The results of the second phase of the study are shown in the table below:

Table 4. Number of sentences included in each consensus//conflict dynamic

Dynamic	Percentage of Sentences
Referring exclusively to social consensus	16.
Referring exclusively to social conflict	5.
Referring to consensus and, eventually, to conflict	79.

Source: author's own.

Taking into account these results, the following is considered:

- Communicational transformations generate social consensus when all the sectors of the society, both public and private, benefit from them. A quarter of sentences is exclusively related to social consensus. For instance:

"The introduction of the ICTs makes possible new ways of communication for community work, (a communicational transformation that depends on), the development of inclusive policies for all the sectors of society, politicians, NGO officials, representatives of local communities, and private sector leaders, which allows economic and social growth" (ID⁶. 1626, R&D database).

- Communicational transformations can also lead to consensus among different social groups but, at the same time, can trigger disagreement with other groups or institutions holding different positions or interests. This category "consensus/ conflict" comprises almost all of the sentences where the communicational transformation affects social movements, NGOs and other political movements. This is because this kind of institutions generally aim at the social change or the transformation of the established order, which contradicts the interests of other private institutions, governments, etc. For example:

"New communication and media strategies make new ways of accessing the public space, which enables social and political movements to fight the rest of political actors on an equal basis". (RD 96, R&D database).

⁶ ID. Sentence Identifier in the R&D database.



There is a substantial difference between the above sentence and the previous one: in sentence 96 the agreement of groups of citizens makes it possible “to fight” against other groups.

- It is remarkable that only almost one in ten sentences of the sample refers exclusively to social conflict. It seems to be a meagre result as the social movement analysis has been historically linked to protests, riots and fight between groups. In the example below, the conflict is about social movements struggling to have access to technological innovations in some countries around the world and not an interest’s conflict with an institution.


“The digital divide (the near absence of communications structures) causes obstacles that hinder development for social groups in Latin America and Africa”. (ID 743, R&D database).

Third phase: other social dynamics

The methodological design of the abovementioned R&D considered a categorization of the set sentences according to nine social dynamics affected by communicational transformations (Cf. Bernete and Velarde, 2014). The same categorization has been used for this analysis in order to establish the relationships with social consensus and conflict.

The graph below shows the sentences distribution on every social dynamic. On some occasions, the same sentence can be simultaneously related to various dynamics.

Figure 1. Sentences distribution related to social dynamics



Source: author’s own.



Social dynamic 1: "Power centralization // De-centralization"

Most of the analysed sentences describe technological innovations involving power de-centralization as follows: a decrease in political and economic power, a decline in power of some institutions, horizontality of power, participation, democratization, or delegitimation of the current system and its institutions.

With regard to the texts referring exclusively to social consensus, an issue appears in the majority of cases: *Virtual assembly boots the participation of NGOs* (Zhao and Hackett, 2005) and *social movements* (López, Roig and Sádaba, 2003). These organizations allow its members to work together (Klein, 2001), ensuring the success in mass mobilizations (Surman and Reilly, 2005; Tilly, 2009). Furthermore, virtual communication fosters a legitimation of NGOs' and other volunteer organizations' activities (Surman and Reilly, 2005).

From a sociological perspective, Coser (1956: 204) pointed out that those legitimation processes benefit even governments because this kind of groups act as "safety valves", avoiding potential conflicts.

Han (2014a: 23) takes a more critical point of view, arguing that the consensus among the members of social movements is ephemeral and breeds no future, precisely due to the digital communication speed.

With regard to the texts referring to consensus and, eventually, to conflict, there are quite a few sentences related to the following issues:

- a) *Cyberdemocracy may alter the conventional patterns of power* (Curran, 2005), *which could affect co-responsibility of the members of virtual communities* (Willson, 1997). Melucci (1980) warned about the risk of discontinuity and fragmentation of social movements due to this trend towards power horizontality.
- b) *The agreement for social mobilization weakens the power of States and governments.*

The Internet facilitates the mobilization, the identification of global interlocutors and makes the comprehension of social demands possible, involving more segments of civil society (Tilly, 2009). Besides, the Internet encourages negotiations with the political power, as well as limiting the scope for action of the State and the development of a military order (Valencia, 2003). This goes along the thinking of Manuel Castells (2009, in Freedman, 2014), who points to the contradiction that "in spite of the growing concentration of power, capital and production in the global communication system, the actual content and format of communication practises are increasingly diversified" (Freedman, 2014: 56). Similarly, the number of sentences where the role of the ICTs is to provide freedom of expression is remarkable. This freedom lets people disclose their political opinion, which stops the privilege and immunity of states (Sreberny 2005).

The analyzed texts sometimes describe social networks as the tool for mobilization, which overthrows dictatorial regimes (e.g. Gergen, 2008). Nevertheless, Morozov (2011:183) recalls the following: "Before policymakers embrace digital activism as an effective way of pushing against authoritarian governments, they are well-advised to fully investigate its impact both on its practitioners and on the overall tempo of democratization".



- c) *ICT fosters consensus among social movements that fight to change the socio-economic order supported by the media.* For instance, women demanding greater gender equality to governments (Giddens, 2000), technological communication movements requiring more freedom of speech (Wolton, 2002), etc. Sometimes the texts highlight the questioning of the global order (Muñoz, 2005; Martín Serrano, 1994). For example, movements about de-legitimization of the neoliberal system, the globalization paradigm (Amat et al., 2002; Fuch, 2008; López, Roig and Sádaba, 2003) or the modernization paradigm (Miller, 2011).

Social dynamic 2: "Enlightenment // Obscurantism"

This is the second dynamic that includes a larger number of sentences. It refers to communicational transformations that lead to autonomy of thought, of actions, critical awareness, capacity to convene political and/or citizen mobilizations. It is also related exclusively to social consensus or to social consensus and, at the same time, to conflict.

Concerning the texts that refer exclusively to social consensus, the mentioned issue is *changes of women representations in the media that strengthen feminist movements* (Curran, 2005). Laube (2010: 15) notes that traditional social movements approaches also analysed the mobilisation of these marginalized groups and the political opportunities than enable them "to gain access to mainstream institutions". In the sample, the *creation of popular media that allows non-elite groups to gain greater attention*, which benefits movements for democracy is also pointed out. With regard to this, Teun A. van Dijk suggests: "An Internet-based social network of oppressed people who are engaged in cognitive discourse in their exchange of ideas, beliefs, values, judgements and values" (van Dijk, 1995:244).

Concerning the texts that refer to consensus and, eventually, to conflict, the recurrent issue is the following: *The critical capacity of globalisation generates social resistance against the globalised system.* The analysed literature indicates the social agreement of "antiglobalisation" groups, "protesters", "resistance" or "emancipatory" groups. They promote a global awareness to change the current social order (Cheney, Ganesh and Zoller, 2005, Petrilli and Ponzio, 2000, Cavallo, 2005, etc.). In addition, this change triggers the conflict with the interests of power. The interests in detecting manipulating mechanisms by North American governments and international corporations led scholars to analyse the progressive empowerment of these movements at the beginning of the globalisation. Subsequently, digital technologies made the agreement among the members of the "global resistance movement" (Amat et al., 2002) easier, such as the Anti-Globalisation Movement, which has been analysed by different authors (Ramonet, 2000; Chomsky, 1992; Žižek, 2002 and many others). Castells (2002a:86) points out that the main merit of this movement is to have brought to the top of the political-social debate what was presented as the only and indisputable path towards the progress of humanity.

Social dynamic 3: "Information // Misinformation"

This is the third dynamic of the study embracing a greater number of sentences. They are related to concepts such as the increase of information flows and the rise in virtual interactions between members of organizations and their followers. In these texts, only



consensus is mentioned. For example, *interaction and telematics links make it possible to coordinate actions and work groups through screens, which facilitates the increase of social and political movements* (López, Roig and Sábada, 2003); or *the guarantee of a universal service of instant communication will make possible a global conversation through social movements, which will help to foster democratic institutions* (Mattelart, 2002).

In this dynamic, the communicational transformation involves an inter-group consensus or a general social consensus. It is remarkable that, as Des Freedman (2014: 109) notes, in spite of "the opportunities for distributed communication that connect independent members of the public pleasure, politics or education, there are all too often new choke points that mediate the process". It seems to be, therefore, a contradiction between the free flow of information and the proliferation of gatekeepers, and the phenomena of the "hypermediation" (Morozov, 2011) that has made new communication forms (e.g. blogging) so widespread.

Social dynamic 4: "Control // Autonomy"

Communicational transformations affecting liberalization and/or autonomy of social movements have been included within this social dynamic, which is largely linked to consensus. There are two main issues mentioned in these texts:

- a) *ICT increases the autonomy of vulnerable groups.* This autonomy is possible when ICTs improve communications strategies, expanding campaigns and, in general terms, when the technological re-appropriation enhances efficiency. All this autonomy involves less control, repression or constrain exerted by other institutions of power with conflicting interests. Indeed, talking about the autonomy of the social movements, Mhlanga and Mpofu, 2014: 130) argue that:

"In today's networked world, groups faced with challenges in accessing information and participation in political processes and those living in societies where laws, policies and the political environment hinder free communication have found platforms presented by new media opportunities to create their own autonomous spaces".

Liberation of this groups may be linked with the abovementioned "freedom of speech" process (Vizer, 2011) thanks to ICT, because the communication for development is disseminated through them. Thus, it enables the liberation of oppressed peoples (Gerace, 2008). Authors such as Enzensberger (1971) anticipated this approach. He stressed the potential of new electronic media of the industry as a pacifying element for development. Nevertheless, other researchers such as Lipset (in Habermas, 1984-1968) questioned McLuhan's and Enzensberger's technological uthopianism. This author studied the social movements' struggle and their lack of understanding of the technological development as a factor of individuals' freedom. People could never relinquish their possessions, and get away from labour alienation and social status pressure.



- b) *The collective identity of group reference.* Public communication throughout the media contributes to the acquisition of a symbolic capital. It reinforces group identity and strengthens the sense of belonging to a group (Sgroi, 2004, Chaparro, 2004; Álvarez, 2005; Curran, 2005). These symbols may also foster the action of social movements (Duarte, 1998; Marí, 2004) or spread national pride (Sampedro, Burnhurst and Cordeiro 2003, Zhao and Hackett, 2005). The growth of nationalisms has also been analysed by Giddens (2000), Mattelart (A. & M.) and Delacourt (1984) and by Arendt (2006), but they consider it as a potential source of conflict.

Social dynamic 5: "Appearance // Disappearance of monopolistic-global capitalism"

Most sentences in this category mention consensus and conflict dynamics simultaneously. They are about technological innovations affecting anti-globalisation movements, which is the main group that fights against the monopolistic-global capitalism system⁷. As Echart, López and Orozco (2005:20) point out, the anti-globalisation movement arises out of the questioning of "neoliberal globalisation, its characteristics and its impacts". ICT are said to boost social agreement of groups rather than confront the neoliberal globalisation (Amat et al., 2002). These networks try to drive cooperation among countries (Muñoz, 2005); they are cyber activists' platforms that promote the renovation of the informational capitalism's structures (Fuchs, 2008).

In the analysed literature, digital platforms are suggested to assemble people physically and eventually triggering confrontations with the police and military forces under the authority of capitalist institutions. However, even if this questioning of Capitalism is channelized through active fighting, it does not involve the end of the system, but only - and not always -, the visibility and resistance of groups like the counter-globalisation movement. The sentences clearly reflect the consequences of these groups' agreements, because they generally lead to a conflict with the currently economic order (Sábada and Roig, 2004; Sreberny, 2005).

That means that those social movements might cause some inconveniences to capitalist institutions but, in any case, the use of ICT would provoke the disappearance of the monopolistic capitalism. Among other things, because "social media do not seem to result in democratic networked organization structures, but are embedded into hierarchies, internal power structures and the formation of elites within social movements" (Gerbaudo, 2012, in Fuchs and Sandoval, 2015). Treré and Cargnelutti (2014: 183-203) emphasize that the new Internet economy is far from democracy, as it is linked to "neoliberal surveillance issues, corporative control and immaterial labour exploitation of the users".

Social dynamic 6: "Change // Stabilization of labour organization"

This dynamic includes sentences of consensus, in which the communicational transformation generates new forms of networking, changes of the internal communications within the organizations, new ways of administration and coordination,

⁷ The concept of "monopolistic capitalism" refers to the last quarter of the ninetieth century, when the society presented the features of what non-Marxists sociologists named as "mass consumer society", "welfare society", post-industrial society" (Cf. Martín Serrano, 1986; 2008: 41).



new strategies, etc. That is to say, changes in the labour organization that have been previously agreed by these organizations and that lead to greater effectivity in the achievement of objectives, either an increase of the visibility of the actions, or the capacity for mobilization and participation.

A big issue has been identified: *The globalisation of communications increases the ability of bringing citizens together*. ICTs make the "reticular structure" of these organisations more effective (Juris, 2004), for example, by reducing bureaucracy (León, Burch and Tamayo, 1995), or improving message penetration in the citizens' awareness (López, Roig and Sábada, 2003, Sreberny, 2005).

In this respect, Melucci (1980:219-220) asserted that the control of information by the State and other powered institutions bestows social movements the nature of individual deviant behaviours. In the globalisation age, new social movements do not focus on the politic system, but they search for autonomy and independence from the State. They are characterised by "solidarity" and demands of "identity". However, this author also warned about the danger of "fragmentation" and "discontinuity" within those groups, because they reject any kind of representation (Melucci, 1980:220-221). The analysis of Mattelart (A. and M.) and Delacourt (1984) focused more on the influence of globalised communication on group cohesion than on fragmentation.

Social dynamic 7: "Socio-historical transformations // Reproduction"

Nearly all the sentences within this dynamic relate communicational transformations to social changes, socio-historical/structural transformations.

Regarding the texts where the social use of ICT contributes to the unity of society, *new media increase all forms of global integration of social movements, third-sector organisations, communities and global citizen networks* (Cavallo, 2006; Lash, 2005; Del Gizzo and Rozengardt, 2005; Tilly, 2009).

Nevertheless, Jan Van Dijk questions the effects of the new media on modern society and states that "changes will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary and that the network society will not be an altogether different type of society" (Van Dijk, 2012:277).

Bourdieu and Passeron (1981) provided an additional theoretical perspective. They considered that the integration of a group lies in identity ("total or partial") of the "inculcated habitus" by different socializing institutions (school, media, family...). These authors considered the social philosophies of consensus "naïve", arguing that they reduce the integration of a group to the possession of a common repertoire of representations (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1981: 76).

Regarding the texts where the social use of ICT contributes to consensus and at the same time conflict, *activism is said to go against the reproduction of the current social order. In this dynamic, the "established order" is generically mentioned*, without specifying which kind of order they fight. For instance, consensus among members of these organizations, thanks to the activism of minority media, may be quite effective to change the established order (Curran, 2005).

From Žižek's (2008) point of view, this agreement between members of emancipatory groups pretending to change the social order presents a contradiction: the system they



want to overthrow is exactly the one that provide the tools they need for mobilization. Thus, this author openly questions global movements' efficiency for a real social change.

Social dynamic 8: "Humanization // De-humanization"

There are few sentences included in this dynamic. They are clauses that exclusively hint at ICTs promoting network solidarity. These communicational transformations can produce solidarity within the whole society (which involves social consensus), or solidarity towards specific collectives or social causes (which may simultaneously involve social consensus and conflict). For example, an exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries might affect collective action through the social net to protect their human rights, and this could put in a difficult situation those governments with anti-immigration policies.

Normally, the effectiveness of communication in those cases comes from both, instrumental and symbolic terms that facilitate collective identity and solidarity of social groups. But other scholars like Rupp and Taylor (1987) or Melucci (1996) (in Diani, 2000), consider that it is "the feeling of mutual identification and solidarity which bond movement actors together and secure the persistence of movements even when specific campaigns are not taking place. (Diani, 2000: 387).

Some authors such as Melucci (1980) or Castells (2002a) have linked the growth of cooperative culture thanks to the digital communication, to the appearance and proliferation of movements driven by solidarity. On the contrary, Han (2014b) considers that in the digital age, when a universal cooperation to overturn the neoliberal system may exist, there is a great contradiction: "there is no cooperative, interconnected multitude to rise up in global protest and revolution" (Han, 2014b: Paragraph 15). Žižek (2008, 20-22) goes further, asserting that the Internet does not promote even the meaning of "universal sharing". He notes that the net power belongs to what he calls "liberal communists", who are legitimated by the whole society. They represent the new power of the modern Capitalism (formerly banking) and they do not aim at economic wealth, only want to change the world, even though in this goal they increase profit.

Social dynamic 9: "Creativity // Routinization"

A scarce number of sentences have been found within this dynamic, all of them referring to communicational transformations involving routinization or commercialization of culture, arts, education, media, Internet, etc. These texts also include those transformations that produce cultural autonomy or dependence and other phenomena like the disappearance of cultures, of languages, transculturation, cultural uniformity, etc. As mentioned before, these transformations might be related to consensus and social conflict. The most common issue is the following: *New media generate consensus of groups that reject cultural homogenization*. For instance, the introduction of horizontal communication of new media to avoid homogenization (Gerace, 2008). It is also a better access for cosmopolitan groups, consumers, fundamentalists and, in general terms, movements reacting to that cultural unification. (Murdock, 2006).

Digital transmission and storage technologies or social networks such as Indymedia, may change people's mentalities, values, beliefs and worldviews (VV.AA., 2000). However, as López (2006) points out, cultural cohesion of new movements that pursue a radical



transformation of the established transnational order is the key to the clash between those groups and power institutions.

Theoretical reflections

The analysis of logical sentences provides an overview of future scenarios about the role played by the ICTs as a tool for diverse social movements in the reproduction or the social change in an age of globalisation. The scientific and technical literature about the issue makes a record of the social consensus promoted by social movements and, to a lesser extent, by NGOs and other political movements. This consensus is sometimes connected to conflicts with institutions and organizations, whose interests antagonise. In other words, technological innovations that affect social movements might be linked to the perspective of conflict being a driving force for social change. Marxism and social Darwinism have supported this approach, as well as sociologists worldwide who assert that conflict is essential and positive for social relationships (González Seara, 1971:138-227).

Eventually, communicational transformations that affect NGOs result in humanization social dynamics (as they promote solidarity actions). This may be in line with the consensus theory proposed by Comte and Durkheim, for whom it is crucial to have social harmony based on a general agreement among individuals and groups. (Cf. Campbell, 2002: 138-227).

The vast majority of the analysed sentences point to communicational transformations that affect social movements and, at the same time, are related to: firstly, an increase in democratic participation and a decrease in political and economic power. Secondly, the rise in the critical thought, in the ability to convene citizens and mobilize people for political purposes. Thirdly, the growth of the information flows and the virtual interactions between members of social movements, which would be able (or not) to give rise to more face-to-face interactions.

This perspective goes in line with some scholars who claim that contemporary revolutions are linked with networked protests of connective action and social media movements (Castells, 2012), whereas other scholars consider it as techno-determinism and see in social media tools of governments and capitalist institutions (Fuchs, 2015). Noam Chomsky (1999) has long referred to the technological determinism that links ICTs with more participatory democracy.

Along the same lines, around the 1970s, Armand and Michèle Mattelart (2000:162) proposed that the growing importance of the media and communications systems and their internationalization was crucial for citizens as they assumed certain values and worldviews. This view is at odds with the idea of technological innovations providing social movements with a greater exercise of critical reflexivity. Both authors denounce the use of communication by certain established powers (either governments or corporative organizations) to maintain the *status quo*. Additionally, even though in the analysed texts of this study there are many sentences about the so-called horizontality (the decrease in governments' power), it does not seem to affect all private institutions the social movements have conflicting interests with. It cannot be omitted that, in the globalisation era, the most powerful technological moguls are offering these innovations "for free" to social movements and many other users.



Regarding the increase of information flows and interactions that affect social movements, the analysed literature has to do with the concept of "Network Society". This term (primarily coined by François Lyotard) has been used by authors, such as Castells (2004) and Melucci (1980) with their interpretation of the New Social Movements within the space of the New ICT. Specifically, in the realm of social nets, Melucci (2001) stands that the new social movements are characterized by two factors: a constant negotiation of collective identity, and its simultaneous unification and fragmentation.

New social movements might be understood as reactive forms of collective action facing a pre-existing conflict. They search for solutions to give answers to the lack of assessment during the post-materialism period. Candon (2010) amplifies this argument and points out that ICTs, and specially the Internet, have produced a flow of connections and information, disrupting the structures of activism, participation and political association.

Conclusions

In the analysed scientific and academic literature, for every text related to consensus, there are five addressing consensus and conflict together. That means that even though virtual interactions are considered to increase citizens' participation and the democratization of societies, *according to academics and scientists, the use of ICT by social movements contributes to the outburst of conflicts between socio-political systems and civil organisations.*

There are positive expectations about the setting-up of social movements and the achievement of their goals thanks to the use of ICT. This leads to the following conclusion:

There are new technologies that encourage the exchange of knowledge and social interactions among individuals and their networks. These technological innovations work collectively in real time and blocking them up is quite intricate. In this context, it is assessed that by using ICT, social movements might help the power transference from the State to the Civil Society.

It should be pointed out that these consensual dynamics are the result of conflicts (usually of a political nature) or may have been their source. Anyhow, they might lead to an institutional power crisis.

In most cases, "taking part in a protest through the Internet" is regarded an "action" that may well lead to social change. In such cases, the differentiation between executive and expressive acts is fairly blurred. The difference between "to do" and "what needs to be done" is very often confused.

In the light of this analysis, it is worth mentioning the boundaries of this study and of any other based on representation analysis. Those representations could be comparable to previous ones, expressed throughout the history of the ideas. This article has tried to provide an evaluation of differences and equivalences when the results of the study made it possible. Nevertheless, it is not possible to foresee the changes linked to the use of ICT by social movements that will take place in the future, based on nothing more than prospective approaches included in the analysed scientific-academic literature. That would be a transgression of level.



We can, however, validate or refute a representation of sociohistorical changes. Although in order to achieve such purpose, one has to wait for the necessary length of time for this prediction to be verified. Thus, verifying whether social movements will be able to transfer the power from the State to the civil society thanks to the use of ICT is an interesting possible research to conduct in the future.

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Notes

COMMUNICATION FOR EDUCATION. FROM TEACHER TO FACILITATOR IN LEARNING AND DISCOVER PROCESSES ¹

Stefania Capogna

s.capogna@unilink.it

Researcher at Link Campus University (Italy), Professor of Sociology of Communication and Public and Organizational Communication; Professor at the Department of Education Sciences, University of Rome Three. Her research fields are public policy research with regard to education and Life Long Learning in relation to digital technologies. Among her most recent publications: *School, University, E-learning: sociological analysis*, Armando, Rome, 2014; *E-learning quality standards. The case study of an online University* (with Albert Sangrà), in *Democratic School*, 3/2016; *Schools 2.0: experiences and expertise. Digital teachers wanted*, in *JISE*, 2016, V. 8: 2.

Communication for education

The way in which teachers manage their interactions (environment, methodology, encouragement, respect, trust etc.) produces different kinds of learning and behaviour models. There has always been a close interdependence between communication and education, because the act to educate is, first of all, a relational and communicative one. For this reason, the essay focuses on emerging competences which can describe a **facilitator of learning and discovery process**.

To communicate means to educate

Didactical pedagogical research shows us that the way in which teachers manage their interactions (environment, methodology, encouragement, respect, trust, students' discovery process, etc.) produces different kinds of learning and behaviour models. For this reason, we need to focus on the way through which we can analyse the relevance of communicative competences, social and leadership skills and methodological approach. The question is: *what kind of communicative skills activated by educators can favour the learning and discovery process?*

Didactical activities and cooperative learning are based on verbal communication, accompanied by an intense non-verbal communication and management of proxemics

¹ Text reviewed by Carolina Peralta.



space. For this reason, the observation of what happens in the “black box” of the classroom is considered a communication research. Through communication, we can observe specific characteristics of interaction in learning contexts: the asymmetry of the relationship; the specific routines that regulate the interactions among teacher and learners (the lesson, the transaction, the trade off, the explanation, the interrogation, the assessment, the feedback etc.); and the peculiarities assumed by the hidden curriculum in the interaction between teacher and students. In an educational environment, we can distinguish three different kind of interactions: learners-learners; learners-contents and resources or experiences; learners-educators. So, when we consider risk factors connected to interaction, we have to observe quality and quantity modes: types of interactions, domains of interactions (cognitive, affective), frequencies of interaction, gender-specific interactions, cultural-specific interactions; but also collaborative interaction typical of a *community of practice*; and the emotional dimension of learning with regard to psychodynamic or affective aspects which can favour or prevent learning. For these reasons, we will reflect about elements that favour a positive learning process, analysing the correlation between communication and education.

The social research about the observation of the classroom interactions can adopt different perspectives. The first one is the *socio linguistic approach* that studies the use of the language in different learning contexts. The second one is the *ethnographic approach* that examines what happens in the classroom daily, paying attention to the process of knowledge construction. The third one is the *psycho-social approach* that investigates behaviours and communication styles in the classroom through climate classroom observation. These are issues that we try to explore, briefly, in next lines, underlining their relevance in learning and discovery processes. This way, we can observe the relevance of teachers’ communicative competences. *Communicative competences* include many skills that speakers require for effective communication and appropriate speech, such as *linguistic competence*, which is the ability to understand and produce correct forms in phonological, morphosyntactic and lexical terms; *metalinguistic competence*, which refers to the ability to reflect a linguistic phenomena; *sociolinguistic competence*, referring to the selection of linguistic forms and registers, which have to be appropriate to the socio-cultural context in which the communicative event takes place, suited to the status and role of all participants; *strategic competence*, or ability, to use the language to achieve the goals of the communication; *textual and discursive competences* to understand the production, identification and classification of texts, communicative genres and discursive sequences; *paralinguistic competence*, referring to the hidden items, i.e. intonation, pauses, tone, speed, and volume of discourse; *extra-linguistic competences*, commonly defined as the ability to use nonverbal codes properly and effectively, together with the language, or in place of it, and the different skills that are part of it (kinesics competence, proxemics and vestemics); the ability to recognize and use *different communication tools*; the *cultural competence* concerning the socio-cultural norms, values, customs, behaviours of all participants, and the *cross-cultural skills*, which highlight the cultural variability and the need to respect different symbolic heritages in a global context, which also includes online learning². In online interactions, several of these elements change profoundly, i.e. the *paralinguistic and extralinguistic competences*. We can highlight seven elements that influence effective communication:

² With the development of ICT we have also to consider the issues of media literacy, digital literacy and media competences.



issuer, receiving, cooperation, quantity, quality, relation and mode (Grice, 1975). Also on the bases of this element, we can distinguish different styles of communication that is always an instrument to build an intentional interaction to meet the others and generate sense making and learning, common rules and a sense of community. For this reason, to become facilitators in learning and discovery processes, both face to face and online, we have to improve communication skills, but also social skills, emotional intelligence (that is relevant for an assertive communication style), and methodological skills. To be a good communicator requires a high level of self-awareness. Social psychology studies can be very useful to decline social skills for observing the space in which the didactical relation takes shape. We can consider four mean dimensions of social skills: *interpersonal communication skills* (related to the ability to *manage a message* remembering different levels of *interpersonal communication*); *leadership skills* (the sum of individual skills that allow individuals to *manage a group*); *problem solving* and *problem setting* (the sum of individual skills that allow to define a problem and understand the situation); *positive and constructive management of the conflict and decision making*.


Continuing this reflection, we can consider *what kind of social and leadership skills should characterize a good communicator*. The emotional studies (Ashkanasy, Humphrey, 2011) have illustrated that we can observe emotion at five different levels: within a person; between persons, at interpersonal level; among groups and team and at organization wide level. In our case, we consider emotion within groups and teams with regard to the problem of: leadership (direct influence and emotional contagion); group affect (affective team member exchange and group emotional intelligence) and group behaviour and performance. For this reason, the concept of *emotional intelligence* becomes relevant. Goleman (2011) identified four important dimensions to study this concept: **self-awareness; self-management; social awareness** and **relationship management**. We can recognise two different ways through which positive and negative emotions influence the learning cycle. In the first one, a positive emotions cycle (that develops from anxiety through uncertainty, risk acceptance and fight), leads the person through her/his intuition promoting learning and the discovery process; while, in the second one, the negative emotions cycle arises from anxiety (such as those of escape or fight; refusal or avoidance, defence or resistance) conducting the learner to the acceptance of her/his prevent ignorance (Illeris, 2003). Learners move up through the "emotional spiral" (Kort, et. al. 2001), cycle after cycle, becoming more competent and acquiring more domain knowledge. It is a travel through learning and empowering. In each stage, the teacher has to combine different sets of communication and methodologies competences to accompany learners throughout their discovery. In this sense, a teacher should look more like a facilitator than a content expert both in face to face and in online education processes, where it is impossible to imagine a close knowledge system detained by teachers. Thinking of teachers' core competences in a digital era means identifying the process by which technologies can be included in teaching practises.

Puentedura created the SAMR model that identifies four stages of increasing complexity to which different methods and strategic skills correspond. The first one is characterized by *replacement*, which consists in the exploration of ICT capabilities alongside traditional media. This discovery phase aims to support the brainstorming process, useful both to stimulate creative, lateral and divergent thinking and accompany students to explore new connections, hypotheses and research questions. At this stage, first of all, the



teacher should act as a coach, able to activate latent and untapped students' potential resources. She/he should support their motivation and participation; favouring the team building process, providing support and direction in building the knowledge path to starting. The second one is the *enlargement phase* in which, through the variety of media offered by the ICT, students can expand their knowledge bases and opportunities, thanks to a conscious use of open educational resources, documents and official sources, magazines, databases, etc. At this stage, students have to analyse the topic and the problem chosen. The teacher should lead the group in searching and selecting sources to analyse and investigate the theme to develop meaningful insights. The teacher should act as a facilitator, to continue to ensure adequate motivational support, to guide and supervise the process in terms of resources and group management, flows and workload. The third one is the *experimentation phase*, in which students are engaged in developing new contents or knowledge products, even in a collaborative way. At this stage, the teacher should guide students towards the logical and coherent organization of their knowledge, supporting a solid argumentative process, through the testing of hypotheses and research questions that guide their work. At this stage, it is important to keep attention to tasks and objectives, to enable monitoring and evaluation measures, not only in learning results, but also with respect to the learning process, to ensure the appropriate redesign of educational activities. The last one consists in the *development* of new tools, projects and knowledge products, choosing multimedia technologies more appropriate to the identified knowledge goal and target, because each medium has its own and distinctive communication code. This last phase is characterized by the critical reflection of the experience and knowledge acquired, and its systematization within wider knowledge systems.

Fig. 1 Core Competences teaching





Therefore, the teacher should drive the meta-evaluation, the enhancement and dissemination process, aimed at sharing the results achieved, and help students to recognize (and appropriate themselves of) the progresses reached. On the bases of these reflections, we can say that each stage corresponds to a different style that we might call "situational". A style that must be capable of acting upon different skills, referring to the learning goal we have to lead by means of new technologies. Three are styles that we can synthesize as follows: the motivational style in the start-up phase; the steering style in the investigation phase; the supportive style in the experimental stage and a constructive feedback in the systematization phase.

2. Conclusions

All this involves a radical alteration of the traditional educational setting. To educate in the digital era requires a new educational pact among school, society, families and students. We watch the disintegration of educational relationships which are changing the power connection between teacher and student, within a class that appears more and more "liquid" because it loses the usual space and time boundaries. In conclusion, to promote learning and discovering processes in our learners, we need to assure training through which teachers can improve appropriate soft skills (social-emotional, communicative and methodological skills), to become facilitators. This reflection shows that efficient interpersonal relations among group members, induce proper collaboration, oriented towards a good group climate and able to stimulate individual responsibility. The quality of interactions and communication ensure the quality of the teaching-learning process. Generally, we say that the communication is based on three channels of perception (visual, auditory, kinaesthetic), forgetting that there is the emotional channel, which builds a bridge between us and the others. It is based on the universal language of emotions that science explains through the "mirror neurons". If communication means to educate, education in communication also involves educating the recognition both of emotions and the symbolic heritage that confronts the intercultural encounter with others, and their respect.

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