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BRAZIL'S FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTRAFFIC IN THE BORDER WITH COLOMBIA. AN APPROACH TO THE RESTRAINS OF NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS OVER FOREIGN POLICY

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Abstract

In the post-Cold War international scenario, the non-traditional nature of security threats conditions the states' foreign policies. An example of the above is the policy employed by Brazil regarding the border shared with Colombia regarding the development that narcotraffic has been having since the end of the 20th century. Therefore, this article proposes a brief analysis around the influence exercised by the non-traditional nature of the drug traffic threat over the design of Brazilian foreign policy between 1999 and 2010.

Keywords:

Non-traditional threats; foreign policy; narcotraffic; Brazil; Colombian border

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BRAZIL'S FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTRAFFIC IN THE BORDER WITH COLOMBIA. AN APPROACH TO THE RESTRAINS OF NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS OVER FOREIGN POLICY

Emilse Calderón

Introduction

During the first years of the 21st century, narcotraffic consolidates its ascension in the security agenda of Latin American states and, specifically, those in South America. The inherent challenge of this threat lies in its non-traditional nature[1] and threatens the political and institutional stability countries from a perspective of democratic government.

The demonstration of the said non-traditional nature can by particularly seen in the states' border zones. These geographical areas are permanently made vulnerable by the development of different transnational activities connected with narcotraffic that, in turn, demonstrates the connection between public security situations of border countries through the networks of transnational crime. Thus, these patches of border are built as the symbolic territorial reference of a threat which essence is indisputably globalized and show the circumstance that drug trafficking concretely threatens the international security and not only the national security of an individually considered State.

The Colombian-Brazilian border does not escape from this reality and even is witness to a particular situation that aggravates the security scene, configured in function of the relationship made by narcotraffic groups and the illegal players of the armed conflict in Colombia since several decades.

According to this scenario, and from an interdomestic of International Relations (Putnam, 1988), according to which foreign policy is a product of systemic influences and of domestic variations, one can state that the non-traditional characteristics acquired by the security threats, such as narcotraffic, in the internal scope of the states, condition their foreign policies.

Consequently, this article approaches the measures and actions adopted by Brazilian governments for narcotraffic fight in the border zones shared with Colombia, between 1999 and 2010. In it, we aim to expose the conditioning relation that is made between the said threat and Brazilian foreign policy regarding Colombia.

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[1] The non-traditional nature of a threat to international lies in the fact that it is a non-military challenge and originates on the inside of a State, so it is brought forward by different players in it and which possess action with transnational reach.

Therefore, the article is structured in three parts. In the first one, it is performed a brief characterization of the situation in the Colombian-Brazilian border with the aim of clarifying the synergy that this geographical context establishes with narcotraffic. The second item organizes the fight measures and actions adopted by the governments of F. H. Cardoso and L. I. da Silva to detect traces of the influence that that illegal activity exerts over the design of the Brazilian foreign policy. Lastly, we reflect about the way in which the non-traditional nature of narcotraffic conditions the foreign policy that that country employs in the border zone with Colombia.

1. The Colombian-Brazilian border: contrasting realities and a single threat

Immerse in an international context in which exists a kind of non-traditional conflictuality, the Latin-American region is the recipient of the impact of different threats to security. Particularly, the region is intensively affected by drug trafficking that disseminated with and accentuated virulence since the beginning of the 1990s, along with the spreading of globalization, which enlarged the reach and transcendence of traffic networks.

Thus, the conjunction of the market's globalization, the fluidity of capitals through the global financial network, the quickness and ease of transportation and the revolution in communications concocted a reality prone to the accelerated development of drug trafficking as a business that already presented itself with important profit levels (Gramunt, 2006). Furthermore, the global projection of narcotraffic annulled the international division between the consumer countries in the North and the the producers of the South, the first installing themselves as providers of laboratory or designer drugs, such as ecstasy and methamphetamines, and increasing consumption in the latter in a most notorious way.

Then, broadly speaking, narcotraffic is an illegal productive-commercial circuit of drugs prohibited by the World Health Organization, inserted in transnational organized crime as a specialized kind of traffic, shared with smuggling, money laundering, corruption and violence as instruments from illegal and criminal action (Calderón, 2008). This circuit has the capacity to condition, debilitate and erode the State and its capacity to control the population and its territory and to exert the monopoly of strength. To a certain extent, the reason for this is that narcotraffic involves several social players with different involvement and profit degrees attached to the kind of activity performed. The said circuit is operated by organizations that range from the small band, through the networks that have a bigger quantity of contacts and operate as cells, up to Cartels that determine the market's characteristics and infiltrate in international networks. On the other hand, the drug business is connected with other illegal traffics, mainly gun traffic, increasing the risks for civil societies through the generation of violence and the degradation of democratic institutions due to the penetration of corruption in political structures.

Beyond the precisions that can we made about the characteristics that narcotraffic possesses in the region and how it has evolved as a threat, the most relevant data to take into account is that the strengthening of traffic networks and the generation of violence occurs in an economic and social context that favours the reproduction of the conditions needed for the illegal business to continue its rise. This reference is fundamental to analyse and evaluate the real range of the challenge implied by drug trafficking and the possibilities that certain public policies have to effectively confront it.

The increase of poverty and disparity and, in the end, of exclusion, are realities that explain and even internally entitle the option for illegal business. This implies the existence of a positive impact (Cockayne, 2007) of narcotraffic in the part of society, which, in a context of state absence, perceives a relative improvement of its economic situation and, furthermore, is connected to the sense of belonging generated through the inclusion of young people in criminal groups. The possibility of the occurrence and consolidation of the said positive impact is the greatest risk that threatens the State, since it affects and directly compromises government. A situation such as this challenges the materialization of the prerogatives that compose statesmanship and lead to the characterization of such threats as insidious (Williams, 1995).

Considering the described context, it is not difficult to understand why most of the Latin-American border fringes are an environment propitious to the installation of illegal traffic networks. These areas are characterised by being very underdeveloped, in many cases underpopulated and usually clad in a halo of oblivion by state action that, historically, has centred itself in rural areas rich in agricultural resources or in urban areas. A context such as this makes the reproduction of the conditions for poverty and exclusion as functional, these being necessary for drug trafficking, such as other illegal traffics, to prosper and to be perceived as a valid alternative to achieve survival.

In the specific case of the Colombian-Brazilian border, until the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new century, the scene is completed with the danger derived from the ongoing-armed conflict that Colombia is going through the relation of guerrilla groups and the self-defences with the narcotraffic groups. The said bond is developed under the form of financing of the irregular combat activities, especially since the beginning of the 1990s, making the threat of drug trafficking especially relevant and particularly serious in the country[2].

For the year 2000, the border of the Colombian side, that matches the Amazonas, Vaupés and Guainía departments, houses a population mainly concentrated in the capitals of the first two. Apart from the fact that 30% of the population is indigenous, settlers make up the border villages from the rest of the country and that are located near the borderline, at less than 500 km. These populations are the poorest of the total of the Colombian border and it is usually said that some are so poor they do not even have guerrilla (Sierra, 2003). The scarce regional economy is bond by the presence of the port in Leticia, the most relevant city and the articulation between the Vaupés and the Amazon through important rivers that can be navigated during 8 months of the year. The rest of the zone’s infrastructure is very precarious and does not allow one to speak of a system that connects the region with the national territory, with very few landing strips and small piers. There is also no service of water and energy networks. On the other hand, illegal activities are centred in in the informal mining in Guainía, especially the search for gold, generating transborder population movement from Brazil. Furthermore, this is one activity that is guaranteed by the Fuerças Armadas

[2] It is also important to mention that, as the years went on, the border zones of the Andean country have been transforming themselves in the area of strategic fall-back of armed groups from the instrumentalization of the military advancements under the scope of the Plan Colombia, such as the Plan Patriota and of the Plan Victoria, in 2003 and 2006, respectively (Isacson and Poe, 2009).

Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) (El Tiempo, 23/7/2001). The cocaine plantations in Gauinía and Vaupes have a very low density and are centred in the areas around the main river ways, whilst the traffic routes come from Colombia to Brazil and supplies, groceries and arms do the inverse route. The guerrilla, on its turn, also enters Brazilian territory to supply itself with all kinds of products, from groceries to chemical products from Manaus to make cocaine. Regardless, the only registered permanent present of armed groups is from the 1st and 16th FARC fronts (Rabasa, 2001). Finally, we have to say that Leticia possesses the only landing strip of average capacity, since it is the starting point of the border, in the South-North sense, concentrating the security and defence mechanism for the total of the border with Brazil, with a high concentration of troops and connected with other post only through plane. Therefore, it is the area's most important operation base, responsible for the control of the Amazon river in the Colombian territory (Fundación Seguridad & Democracia, 2009).

From the Brazilian side, one finds the Amazonas State and in the areas next to the border, the population is grouped in villages of around one-thousand people, with Tabatinga being the city with the largest demographic concentration and commercial centre. The border inhabitants are mainly indigenous people. The economy is relevant due to the river connection between villages and the most important activities are commerce, transportation through the Amazon river and low-scale agriculture and livestock breeding. The aerial infrastructure is also much superior to the Colombian side and is made up by a minimum of 6 aerodromes, an international one in Tabatinga and a national one in São Gabriel (Sierra, 2003). The energy infrastructure is incipient, but has an important generation source from different hydroelectric power plants, determining the communications great reach. The zone in which the border with Colombia is inserted is of high strategic value for Brazil due to the ecosystem's characteristics and its relevance as a hydric, mineral and wood reserve. This explains the State's will to strengthen its presence and to include this geographic area in the functioning of the rest of the country, connecting it through basic infrastructure works (El Tiempo, 10/8/2003).

As one can see, there is an accentuated contrast between the situations of both fringes of the border. From the Colombian side, this circumstance is a reflection of the state of retraction of the national government due to the clash of political violence that almost had Bogotá sieged in the year 2000. On the other hand, from the Brazilian side, the proactive behaviour from the government is based on the need to exert an effective control of the territory in the said areas, connected with two issues. One is the accomplishment of the national project that intends to physically integrate the border zone in the rest of the country due to its strategic importance. The other concerns the need that the Brazilian government has of spreading a positive image related with the state's capacity to run its own fate in a safe way for itself and its neighbours. Regardless of this difference between the actions of Colombia and Brazil, there is no doubt that the shared border zone has become a fertile environment for the development of narcotraffic. This threat open and consistently defies the states' public security, Colombian and Brazilian, in the border zone, since the said illegal activity establishes a very strong link between the domestic security situations of both countries.

Therefore, as one may see in the next section, the concepts of security and defence are no longer delimited with clarity in the border zone and to use them as a domestic and international reference, respectively, puts it in perspective and mixes it.

2. An approach to the measures that Brazil implements in its border with Colombia

Since the end of the 1990s, the Brazilian government expresses its will to cooperate with Colombia to fight drug trafficking, since the border zone is one of the most important traffic routes for the exit of cocaine to the United States and Europe, through Africa. Regarding this subject, one has to remember that 60% of cocaine consumed in the United States by them came from the well-known 'white triangle', region that encompasses the border areas of Brazil, Colombia and Peru. Thus, through river and, mainly, through plane, the drug flowed without control from the Colombian territory and enjoyed from the best infrastructure capacities from the Brazilian side. In this sense, it is important to clarify that, or the year 2000, according to the annual evaluation made by Washington, Brazil was recognized as the largest drug transit country and the biggest producer of chemical precursors. Nevertheless, and although it is not considered as a significant producer of drugs beyond having disperse cannabis plantations, it signalled that it can lead to the establishment of cocaine processing, due to the volume of the traffic of precursors that go through its territory (US Department of State, 2001). Furthermore, the Foreign Affairs Minister, Celso Lafer, stated then Brazil's will to

> *'... intensify the diplomatic actions and the also aid in the replacement of plantations. However, we also want to go further in the control and supervision of the air space and border movement.'* (Gosman, 18/4/2001).

However, facing the border scene presented in the previous section, the Brazilian governments immediately activate different actions and measures in agreement with the increase of the danger potential of the narcotraffic threat. The same are used regarding security and defence, as in the area concerning the economic and social border development and, in both cases, condition Brazilian foreign policy in two ways.

Firstly, the transnationality of the narcotraffic threat and its potential propitiates the action of the Brazilian Armed Forces in the border zones shared in the Andean country. The execution of the measures and actions proposed by the Brazilian government put the policy of public security in contact, in charge of the Brazilian Police, with the defence policy, embodied through the action of the Armed Forces and, furthermore, it is an integral part of the State's foreign policy scheme regarding the strategic-military plan. Secondly, the non-traditional characteristics of drug trafficking as a threat to security also help to the establishment of more fluid bonds between Brasília and Bogotá, aiming to achieve some degree of coordination in its fight.

Considering these two items as expressions of the conditioning exercised by the non-traditional nature of narcotraffic over the design of Brazil's foreign policy, we will know present a scheme of the main measures and actions adopted by the Cardoso and da Silva governments in their respective scope.

** The crossing between the security policy and the defence policy in the Colombian-Brazilian border zone.*

Regarding the point signalled as the first line of conditioning over the design of the Brazilian foreign policy, it is important to mention that the action of the Armed Forces in the implantation and execution of the measures and actions planed by the Brazilian Government has a central role given the imperative logic of national contention of the insecurity floods coming from the neighbouring country. This is seen even in the measures and actions thought to be implemented in the scope of the economic and social border development.

However, we will start with scope of security and defence. Bearing in mind the quickness with which the increment in the danger of the narcotraffic threat is dealt with, in the year 2000, the government of Fernando Enrique Cardoso launched two specific policies. In June, the National Plan of Public Security and, in September, the Operation COBRA, both destined to strengthen the surveillance and control of the Brazilian frontiers through the improvement of the coercive media of the security forces and of the Armed Forces, shown in their human, technical and logistic resources. Furthermore, in that same year, Operation Tabatinga was put in place to identify and detain drug traffickers. It is also important to say that, since 1997, the Amazon Surveillance System, known by the acronym SIVAM, had been starting to be built, with radars and information collection stations destined to process satellite images (El Tiempo, 13/12/2002).

The containment logic in the measures implemented by the Cardoso government is clear and is reiterated in the actions put forwards during the Luis Inácio da Silva government, condensing a greater amount of measures for the border fight of the narcotraffic threat. In this sense, one has to underline the activities performed by the Armed Forces and, among those, the execution of several joint training operations in the geographical area corresponding to the Comando Militar da Amazônia (CMA). Namely, operation Ajuricaba in 2003 and 2005; Timbo I, II, III, and IV in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006; Tucunaré and Jauru both in 2006; Solimões in 2007; Poraquê in 2008; and Ribeirez Amazónia and Amazonía, in 2010. To the exception of Jauru and Poraquê, those exercises had ends that can be associated with military containment of the Colombian violence through the extension and reinforcement of the Brazilian State in the border zone. It is important to underline that all operations report the need to optimize the planning and execution of combined operations; intensify the military presence on earth in the border through patrols, recognisance missions, protection of sensible installations, civic and social actions and logistic actions, to establish control and supervision in strategic points; to capacitate themselves to restore the territorial integrity in case it was affected, being able to recover installations and equipment under control of enemy sources, regular or not, in the jungle area.

As for the extension and reinforcement of the presence of the Brazilian state, one also has to mention that this is a goal that is enunciated as one of the points of the Army's Basic Structuring Plan, specifically in the north-western border, area under the CMA's responsibility, showing the need to enlarge dissuasive military capacity. Along with this, during 2006 is made the transfer and/or transformation to such end of different military organizations contained inside the CMA and, according to the revised official reports, is achieved in the creation of Special Border Platoons, another of the ends of the Basic Plan (Verde Oliva, 2006: number 189).

Returning to joint military exercises, it is no lesser data that from the 22 made between 2000 and 2010 in the entire country (Página Informativa Ministério de Defesa do Brasil, 30/10/2010; Página Informativa Força Aérea do Brasil, 26/02/2011), 12 had as theatre of operations the Amazon region and, in the end, were under the CMA's direction. This is indication of the strategic centrality of the Amazon area and of the perception of threat that Brasília has. One has to remember that the first exercise of this kin, the operation Querai, was performed in 1999, the year in which the strategic advancement of the Colombian guerrilla and the fears that its conflict surpassed the border began. Thus, we have to highlight that the CMA is unique amongst the 7 Area Military Commands in which the Brazilian army is organized, for having under its command 60% of the national territory and for having 3 kinds of differentiated military organizations (detachment, platoons and companies) (Verde Oliva, 2009: number 200). Furthermore, the Amazon region has a particular military doctrine, Gama, a product of the recognition that, on one hand, there are differences between conflict hypothesis according to the national environment in which it takes place; on the other hand, from a more general perspective that includes the total of the conflict scenes, one recognizes the changes in the operational needs of the Army as the root of the impact of technological advancement and of the non-traditional threats in the complexity of the conflict (Verde Oliva, 2006: number 187).

Coming to the scope of the economic and social frontier development, although Brazil has the Programa Calha Norte, with national reach, lots of publicity and activities with an indisputable social impact, that plan also implies the reinforcement of the medium and the police and military capacities to fortify the presence, surveillance and military control of the State.

Created in 1985 to contribute to the occupation and the ordered development of the Amazon region, the Programa Calha Norte was relaunched in 1997 and, after being subordinated to different bodies of the national government, it was put under the wing of the Ministry of Defence, with the aim of increasing the presence of the State contributing to the national defence and aiding populations. Therefore, its execution is in charge of the Armed Forces, as '... radiating poles of sustainable social and environmentally correct development.' (Programa Calha Norte 2005) and the resources flow to it directly or through agreements subscribed by the Ministry of Defence with the States and Municipal Prefectures. The resources are directed to projects of basic infrastructure or equipment acquisition; hence, the more than considerable reach in the most inhospitable region of the national territory. Regardless, the parallel function of the Program as a tool to ensure the jurisdiction of the Brazilian State and allow for the surveillance of the strategic interests is indisputable. Thus, although civil financing, for instance, between 2005 and 2009, is more than the double of the one given to the military sector, the latter is incremented from 2007 onwards, and, furthermore, it is constantly increased indirectly by the first, since all activities developed in the civil scope, or at least its majority, have a double function (Página Informativa Ministério de Defesa do Brasil, 18/11/2010).

**The bilateral cooperation bonds between the governments of Brazil and Colombia.*

Continuing with the border actions made effective by the Brazilian governments, the absence of situations of raids and tension with Colombia and the Brazilian will to allow for a more fluid and close bond allow a good development of the cooperation bilateral relations in the scope of security and defence. Thus, the measures and actions taken by Brazil do not only have a containment aim, but also, furthermore, intend to establish interstate cooperation bonds to benefit a common fight against the narcotraffic threat.

That said aim is expressed in the density of international compromises acquired and the mechanisms performed with Colombia during the da Silva terms. Therefore, in 2003, there was an Understanding Memorandum between the Ministries of Defence regarding Cooperation for Defence and, in 2008, this gave way to the Agreement about Cooperation Regarding Defence at the national governments level. Also in 2003, there was an Exchange Agreement for Diplomatic Notes to Create a Bilateral Work Group for the Repression of Criminality and Terrorism, establishing the creation of a Brazil-Colombia Work Group between the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Justice Ministries for the promotion of the cooperation and exchange of information aiming at the said repression. Furthermore, there is the first Round of Conversations between the General Staff of the Brazilian Defence and the Colombian Military Forces for the exchange and update of information and the coordinated work between the military forces in the border area aiming to fight transnational infractions. Along the same line of meetings, we find the Bilateral Conferences of the Chiefs of General Staff and, in 2004, the First Bilateral Meeting of Intelligence between the Air Forces. Furthermore, in 2008, the ministers of Defence Juan Manuel Santos and Nelson Jobim, agreed the joint surveillance of the air space beyond their countries borders (El Tiempo, 11/03/2009 and 12/03/2009). However, Santos ensured there would be no flights, but only monitoring through satellites and radars, while Jobim did not exclude the chance of physically passing borders although remembering that it would always be in perfect coordination with the Colombian authorities. Furthermore, Bogotá asked Brasília for authorisation to use some of its bases as a bridge to achieve the most distant Colombian strips.

The density in the bilateral bond is also expressed through the cooperation in the area of professional knowledge of the Armed Forces, with highlight for the joint exercises COLBRA I (2005), II (2007) and III (2009), that simulate the identification, interception and interdiction procedures of illicit airships in the common border space (Página Informativa Ministério de Defesa do Brasil, 7/7/2007). Furthermore, it is convenient to underline that both countries also cooperate in the area of public security forces and, in 2005, signed an Understanding Memorandum about Police Cooperation, creating a Bilateral Work Group for Police Affairs made up by, on the Brazilian side, the Ministry of Justice and the Departamento de Polícia Federal and, in Colombia, by the Ministry of Defence and the Dirección General de Policía Nacional.

To end, regarding narcotraffic, one must say that most of the agreements achieved correspond to the 1990s, clearly showing in Brazil the need to cooperate to fight it.[3]

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[3] Besides the Agreement for Joint Assistance for the Prevention, Control and Repression of the Use and Illegal Traffic of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, from 1981, we san state: the Agreement Over Judicial Cooperation as a complement to the Bilateral Agreement for the Prevention, Control and

Furthermore, the Understanding Memorandum between Colombia, Brazil and Peru to Fight Illicit Activities in the Border Rivers and/or Communes was signed in 2004[4] and, in 2008, the called for the first Trilateral Meeting Peru-Colombia-Brazil regarding Drugs for the second semester. Also in that year, Colombia and Brazil signed an Understanding Memorandum for the Cooperation regarding the Fight of the Manufacturing and Illicit Traffic of Firearms, Ammunition, Accessories, Explosives and other Related Materials, to combine efforts, harmonize policies and further actions aimed at the control of this scourge.

Now focusing to the scope of economic and social development in the border, the cooperation with Colombia testifies Brazil's political will to develop a more fluid and close bond. That is seen, for instance, regarding the reactivation, in 2003, of the Commission of Neighbourhood and Integration Colombia-Brazil (Understanding Memorandum between Brazil and Colombia, 26/11/1993) and with the regular and uninterrupted character of its meetings. The Commission's purpose, as well as of its sub commissions for border matters and economic and commercial matters, is to strengthen the bilateral relations in the common border zone, especially in Leticia and Tabatinga. Furthermore, these cities also have, since 2002, the Brazilian-Colombian Border Commission (Regulation of the Brazilian-Colombian Border Commission, 06/06/2002), that, presided by consuls to promote immediate solutions to border issues, has a flexible structure regarding meetings, which are scheduled according to the arising needs, with the participation of the public and private sector and with different government bodies, according to the subject matter.

Still, in 2008, Brazil and Colombia signed the Agreement for the Establishment of a Special Regime Border Zone for Leticia and Tabatinga (Colombian Senate, 19/09/2008) that is accompanied by several binational projects and programs. Finally, the Understanding Memorandum for the Establishment of the Bilateral Commission signed in 2009 (Página Informativa da Embaixada da Colômbia no Brasil, 24/11/2010), with its first meeting in June and the first Meeting of the Permanent Dialogue Mechanism for Higher Employees was held in October. Both mechanisms aim to strengthen the bilateral bond from a wider and integral point of view and through the identification of joint initiatives in several interest areas. However, beyond the steps taken to build a more fluid bilateral bond in the fringes of the border, there still are no tangible results worthy of note.

Repression of the Use and Illicit Traffic of Narcotics (1991); the Cooperation Agreement to Stop the Deviation of Precursors and Essential Chemical Substances (1997); the Agreement of Mutual Cooperation to Fight the Traffic of Airplanes Engaged in Transnational Illicit Activities (1997); the Agreement of Judicial Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Penal Matters (1997). There is also a Joint Commission Brazil-Colombia in Drug Matters that, in October of 2002, performed it's fifth meeting, the sixth in 2003 and the ninth in 2010 (Press release from the Ministério do Exterior do Brasil 1/09/2010). Half of the agreements made by Brazil and Colombia are before the year 2000 and are about fighting drugs under different perspectives (air traffic, predecessors, judicial assistance and control of drug trafficking in general). Of the ones made on the first decade of the 21st century, two are connected to the fight against narcotraffic (river traffic and air traffic), other to gun traffic and the other two are about general defence cooperation.

4 The Understanding Memorandum establishes several scopes for the cooperation: exchange of information, experiences and technical knowledge; performance of simultaneous operations and/or coordination between the river units of their Armed Forces; joint training and logistic support.

3. Some final reflexions about the conditioning of the non-traditional nature of narcotraffic over Brazilian foreign policy

Along this paper, we underlined that the non-traditional characteristics of the threat to security posed by drug trafficking conditions the design of Brazilian foreign policy. That was made evident through the revision of the range of measures and actions brought forward by the governments of this country for the 1999-2010 period, regarding the scenario in the border zone shared with Colombia.

Thus, on one hand, the action of the Armed Forces in the scope of security and defence and of the economic and social development in the border attested how the country's defence policy is bound to the agenda of public security and, therefore, the design of foreign policy suffers an impact in the strategic and military area. This is shown by the presence and functions performed by the Armed Forces, attesting the threat to security faced by Brazil in its borders and the type of actions the government is willing to put forward to face those threats. Therefore, it is affecting the conditions that set the bilateral relations with Colombia as Brazil's neighbour that involuntarily houses those challenges to Brazilian security and, thus, the design of the foreign policy regarding the said bond is being conditioned.

On the other hand, the international instruments and mechanisms generated by the Brazilian and Colombian states allowed for a view on how to increment the establishment of interstate fluid relations, tending to approach as a unit the narcotraffic challenge and, again, it is evident how it conditions Brazil's foreign policy.

The revision and ordering performed of the measures and actions adopted by the Brazilian Government also show that the understanding of the non-traditional nature implied by narcotraffic as a threat to security is important in the domestic scope as well as for the international area.

Regarding this, as for measures and actions corresponding to the internal context, we may conclude that the importance that the role of the Armed Forces derives from the understanding that drug trafficking is perpetuated by non-state players, in many ways coinciding with the players of the Colombian internal armed conflict and that possess resources, economic, logistic, human and in terms of weapons that greatly increase the danger potential of their actions. Furthermore, it is understood that the type of fight that should be developed against such an enemy is irregular, as is shown by the conflict hypotheses rehearsed in military exercises. Finally, it is also understood that there is a socio-economic base in the drug issue that favours the reproduction of certain stages of the narcotraffic production and commercial circuit and, therefore, the actions developed by the Armed Forces are also performed in the social and economic development area of the border zones.

Lastly, regarding the measures and actions with international context, we were able to see that the perception that Brazilian governments have of narcotraffic includes the understanding of one of its non-traditional characteristics: transnationality. It's the deep understanding of this particular trait that is the basis for the reason that motivates and explains, in fair measure, the will to establish bonds of coordination and cooperation with Colombia in the security and defence area and in the economic and social development of the border. In agreement with this, the design of Brazilian foreign policy is again being influenced and that occurs in a positive sense, since it is expressed in the execution of a more fluid bilateral bond between Brazil and Colombia, tending to achieve a certain level of joint work in the border area to fight narcotraffic. Thus, Brazilian governments seem to understand the complexity of the threat they face and the need to respond in a versatile way to the question that, since the 1990s, resounds in the government decision-making spaces, in the political spheres in general and in academic circles: how and with what media do we face non-traditional threats, among them, narcotraffic? As for the results obtained, that is a subject that deserves a separate investigation.

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THE STORMY WATERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: UNIVERSAL FIGHT AGAINST IMPUNITY OR LIBERAL UNIVERSALIZATION?[1]

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Abstract

The universalistic dimension of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) nature and function is clear. Yet, this dimension must be thoroughly defined. We must ask 'what universalism'? A rational approach to international social relations is different from an ethical one. While the rational approach may lead to universalization of localized specific moral models (*e.g.* the liberal Western model) promoting its hegemony, the ethical approach promotes diversity through considering non-reducible differences and common human phenomena in which only a minimal common ethics is universal. This paper argues that the answer to this structural question is crucial to understand if the ICC is essentially a hegemonic tool to expand the predominant Western liberal model or rather a mechanism to fight impunity acknowledging diversity and rooted on an ethical concern.

We contend that the ICC is immersed in troubled waters where it is not always possible to separate a universalizing Western liberal approach from an ethical universal approach. Nevertheless, we conclude that the Court, even if partially and at times serves as tool for hegemony, is essentially defined by the universalization of the fight against impunity through reference to a minimal common ethics.

Keywords:

International Criminal Court; Universalism; Ethics

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THE STORMY WATERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: UNIVERSAL FIGHT AGAINST IMPUNITY OR LIBERAL UNIVERSALIZATION?

Mateus Kowalski

1. Introduction

The Rome Statute which creates the International Criminal Court[2] starts with a very meaningful statement by which States Parties to the Statute[3] affirm that they are "conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and [are] concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time"[4]. The preamble to the Rome Statute also appeals to "the conscience of humanity" and to "the peace, security and well-being of the world"[5]. These lines evidence the universalistic perspective of an ethics common to all humanity which must be protected, disseminated and fostered. It is in this spirit that the President of the International Criminal Court, the South Korean judge Sang-Hyun Song, refers to the Court as a "moral imperative for humankind" (2013: 4).

The universalistic dimension of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) nature and function is, therefore, clear. Yet, this dimension must be thoroughly defined. We must ask "what universalism"? A rational approach to international social relations is different from an ethical one. The rational approach is based on a unique rational process and its prioritization - a universal process which can be extended to all human beings. Therefore, it would be possible to identify a wide range of interests and objectives common to the global community and usually universal and self-evident when deriving from a correct deductive rational process which leads to unique and universal truths. An ethical approach, on the other hand, resorts to a more subjective analysis based on a minimum common ethical ground reached through dialog: diversity, plurality and locality are considered more relevant. While the rational approach may lead to universalization of localized specific moral models (*e.g.* the liberal Western model) promoting its hegemony, the ethical approach promotes diversity through considering non-reducible differences and common human phenomena in which only a minimal common ethics is universal. This explains the relevance of understanding which of these approaches is that of the ICC.

2 Formally it is designate Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998.
3 Currently, 122 States are Parties to the Rome Statute.
4 See paragraph 1 of the preamble of the Rome Statute.
5 See paragraphs 2 and 3 of the preamble of the Rome Statute.

This paper argues that the reply to this structural issue is crucial to understand if the ICC is essentially a hegemonic tool to expand the predominant Western liberal model or rather a mechanism to fight impunity regarding diversity and rooted on an axiological concern. If the former, the ICC must become irrelevant and we must be glad that it has been rarely successful[6]. If the latter, the ICC must be preserved and improved so as to make it one of the guardians of international criminal justice in the fight against impunity and in the protection and promotion of human being's fundamental rights.

Therefore, this paper will firstly analyze the two universalistic approaches - the rational and the ethical. Secondly, we aim to integrate the ICC in the analysis considering the Court's nature in the international legal order as well as some of the institution's features such as, possible selectivity, its relation with the United Nations Security Council, its legal-criminal design as well as its complementarity.

The universal fight against impunity does not imply universalization of a western liberal model and an artificial and hegemonic blurring of what is socially and axiologically different. The ICC is immersed in these stormy waters.

2. Which Universalism?

2.1. Rational Universalism and Universal Ethics

Any narrative on universalism will always include a universal ethical-legal dimension. Therefore, we may distinguish two lines of thinking on universalism: that of tradition, which affirms there is universal reasoning common to all human beings; that of post-positivism, which rejects the concept of universal reasoning and whose concept of universality is rather based on the acknowledgment of non-reducible differences from which it derives[7]. This means that universality cannot question these non-reducible differences but is rather guided by the following joint proportions: non-reducible differences and phenomena common to all humanity that require a collective and potentially universal response (*e.g.* climate change). The issue of knowing whether different social communities are forced to be part of a universal discourse is less

[6] In the past 12 years since the ICC was founded, it has only issued sentencing on the case *Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo* (case ICC-01/04-01/06) e Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (case ICC-01/04-01/07). At this time, both sentences are still subject to appeal.

[7] The debates on universalism - its defense, refusal or mitigation - derive from different epistemological attitudes. The differences are striking in positivist discourses (also defined as 'tradition' or 'orthodox') and in post-positivist ones, whose criticism to the predominant liberal approaches is at the bases of their narrative. 'Positivism' is the name given to the school of thought that advocates that knowledge of the world is based on experience, observation and verification - a method very similar to that of natural sciences - this providing theoretical thought focused on problem resolution, its bases being supposedly objective and justified by repeatedly registered facts. This is the predominant scientific approach today and the most appealing (because it deals with power at the proclaimed end of history) - in International Law and in International Relations as well - that post-positivists usually designate as 'positivism'. Positivism involves a cartesian separation between mind and matter, between subject and object. The positivist researchers aim that values and interests do not interfere in their observation, reading and analysis of empirical data - neutral objectivity - thus searching for the one solution - the 'truth' - deducted using reason supposedly universal.
On the other hand, post-positivism searches new models that overcome the shortcomings of the positivist approach. Positivists advocate a research model that acknowledges the gap between subject and object; post-positivists, on the other hand, claim that all knowledge is contextual and that subjectivity cannot and should not be banned. The post-positivist approach therefore refuses dichotomies' empiricism (true/false, good/bad, war/peace) and proposes a less naive and more sophisticated general approach, where there are no truths solely guided by reason. All this has led 'tradition' theories being questioned by post-positivist approaches, mainly through critical theory.

important than the debates on the nature of real dialog and its subjective scope (Linklater, 1998).

Universalism is, therefore, 'all that separates us and all that unites us'. The question is, then, 'universalism regarding what'? Tradition answers indicating truths found through reason. Critical theory, introducing the subjective element, advocates universalism based on moral principles that can be operationalized through human being's ability to communicate, including within the framework of an institutional architecture that may be universal. Reason, according to this perspective, is not the only human feature that influences human thought and action - others should be considered such as social, cultural, political and economic context as well as other personality-related features. Within the framework of post-positivist attitudes, critical theory uses deconstruction of hegemonic discourse, program and action. For this approach, reason-based universalistic perspective may kill diversity and foster hegemony. Therefore, this perspective is cautious in what concerns rules proclaimed as universal which may be nothing more than a means of imposing interests and domination by those more powerful. Universalism could, then, lead to an expanding hegemony based on a national hegemony established by those in power and that would become a pattern to be replicated by others. Cox, when discussing the economic aspect of production relations, defines hegemony as "an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production" (1993: 62). Such expansionism has less resistance from peripheral States as if it was a passive revolution.

As Hoffman (1988) indicates, critical theory resists universalism as means of hegemony and rather tries to find a path for a more representative type of universalism. The issue is, therefore, not universalism itself but in how the concept is used by power structures, in particular the ones based on the liberal Western model.

Yet, the issue can have a positive reading: that there is a true common ethical basis which must be acknowledged so that the limits of diversity can be identified and preserved. This common basis exists, therefore, in its own limits which cannot be hegemonically expanded beyond diversity and social plurality. However, plural reality does coexist with universalistic trends regarding the so-called minimal common ethics and cross-cutting issues to all humanity arising in the same historical time. In that regard, Küng states that "for today's pluralistic society, ethical consensus means the necessary agreement in fundamental, ethical standards which [...] can serve as the smallest possible basis for humans living and acting together" (1997: 97).

Linklater (1998) highly contributes to understanding this, as the author refers that non-ethical concept is only satisfactory if based on systematic exclusion of any member of the human community who can potentially become universal. Universality is neither the essence of Natural Law perspectives nor the teleology of speculative philosophies associated to the Enlightenment. Universality becomes a responsibility to address others, regardless of their race, nationality or other features, in an open dialog on matters regarding their well-being. In fact, there is moral discourse that is cross-culturally valid. Examples of this are the discourses against slavery, genocide or the prevalence of justice and environmental sustainability even in situations of conflict. We must also find procedures that tend to be universal and allow peaceful living.

A common ethics is visible in legal principles and rights that are present in cultural communities where they are accepted with the possible exception of an individual anomaly. Their denomination, their content, as well as their interpretation and application may vary. Yet these principles' legal and philosophical essence is shared. As Kartashkin declares, "*toutes les cultures et civilisations partagent, dans leurs traditions, coutumes, religions et croyances, un ensemble commun de valeurs traditionnelles qui appartiennent à l'humanité dans son ensemble*" (2011: 7). The fact that these ethical principles are crucial to communities justifies the need for those principles to originate at the local level, in a horizontal as well as a vertical bottom-up dialog.

Justice, in its legal and philosophical dimension, is one of the principles of common ethics. International Law aims to apply justice, though it may not do so. Thus, justice precedes Law. Rawls enthusiastically states that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought" (1999: 3). Yet, we must not confuse liberal precedence of the fair over the good (system of values) mentioned by Rawls with precedence of justice over Law. Fairness is defined based on a society's system of values in a given time. The dynamics of justice thus reflect the constant social and cultural development which is not fully reflected in Law - i.e. in legal regulation. Hence, justice is a determining factor in social change via International Law: its dynamics is transferred to the legal international *corpus juris*, which will only be perfect when in line with the moral or cultural social context it is supposed to protect. From a legal-philosophical point of view, justice corresponds to the demand and to the application of what is fair according to axiological regulatory principles of a specific society.

2.2. The International 'Moral Community'

The concept of an international community linked by universal ethics (not to be confused with an international society diplomatically disguised as international 'community') puts in practice the ethically based approach to universalism, what Linklater (1996) describes as 'moral community'. A community that, though subject to change, allows the individual to build his own history and to induce progress in the social system.

Within the context of an international order in a process of globalization, building a 'moral community' may serve as a means to affirm the ethical element in a universal International Law undergoing an institutionalization, socialization and humanization process (Carrillo Salcedo, 1984) and whose potential for change is huge. This process finds echo in the International Law regarding human beings and objectives referred to by Bedjaoui (1991), in Simma's Law of communitarian intention (1994) or in the Humanity Law suggested by Abi-Saab (1991). However, this process - potentially positive - should be carefully conducted and assessed so as to avoid "the return to anarchy under the disguise of community"[8] (Pureza, 2005: 1180).

Morality is the social glue and must be historically and socially translated in an axiological and legal understanding at a given moment. The issue here is how this can be done without there being a rupture with modernity. Critical theoreticians claim it can be done (Richmond, 2011); post-structuralists say it is not possible (Hawley, 2001).

[8] Translation from the original in Spanish "el regresso a la anarquía bajo el disfraz de la comunidade" (Pureza, 2005: 1180).

The concept of 'moral community' may help to solve the problem from a plural yet not sectarian perspective; in a rising (plural) perspective rather than from an imposing one (universalism without legitimacy). The issue lies also in determining how legitimacy is possible without a World State arising and simultaneously denying the particularistic perspective that legitimacy only derives from the State. Two possibilities immediately arise: either you trust reformed international organizations (although deep reforms are not feasible in the near future); or international society is kept loose, unstructured and thus legitimacy is given to ethnically and culturally based communities without a State system being again implemented. However, from another perspective, the plural multi-level system may provide yet other solutions.

Within this theoretical context, we must therefore understand what unites plural legal scenarios. Global issues cannot be contained and regulated within State borders. Thus, considering that issues related to shared assets are at stake, regional or global solution must be found. However, that solution may be expressed plurally or asymmetrically (for different starting points) and distributively. This suggests the need for a regulation through directives (principles and objectives). A multi-level approach could make sense here. Far from any World State idea, this would aim to join solidarity responses in one system, considering that the items in that system would meet in contexts of different needs, capacities and identities. Legitimacy must no longer be a prerogative exclusive to the sovereign State. Therefore, and using Habermas's (2008) ideas on this matter, supra-state institutions may provide legitimacy without resorting to the World State concept - which would otherwise be the only means of providing legitimacy at international level. On the other hand, this means accepting that plurality or opposition of legal regimes is the current legal and political platform. The biggest issue may be homogeneity of knowledge, perception and methodology regarding this plurality (Koskenniemi, 2005), which is exactly what critical theory approaches aim to overcome.

Ethical and legal plurality poses several challenges to contemporary International Law, considering that the latter imposes values to local communities which they do not share. The concept of a plural world contends that there are sets of different and unchangeable values; these values may conflict in certain circumstances; the response to these conflicts cannot be assessed as good or bad; at individual and collective levels there are different ways to act according to values and those actions may conflict. Thus, there is not one ideal means of social interaction. Thus a universal public order would become an imposition on the others (and would inevitably impose global values, currently mostly Western liberal values). While the liberal approach fosters respect for moral or religious convictions either through tolerance or by ignoring them, from a post-positivist perspective, respect for those convictions is carried out through compromise (Sandel, 2005). This means paying attention to them, listening to them and challenging them. Respect based on communication does not ensure (and does not aim to achieve) a consensus regarding those convictions. Rather, in the context of a plural society, it is an assumption that allows differences in terms of values, thought and legal regimes to coexist.

Plurality, though, should not mean the denial of universalism. Shaffer says that "the normative vision of legal pluralism rather aims to foster transnational and global legal order out of the plural"[9] (2012: 673). Universalism evidences the relevance of mechanisms being found to provide common answers regarding common issues. This may even imply the foundation of a universal public order, but only as an exception - better, as a complement - to plurality, which preserves non-reducible differences. As such, a multilevel legal system should be built which, within a plural framework, allows non-hierarchical dialog and non-hegemonic relations among several social contexts - the moral community. This plural universalistic approach organized in a multilevel system allows for a leveled approach - the opposite of a totalizing approach - dependent on the level of the need for common action. Sousa Santos's statement is here relevant: "global occurs locally. One must make local counter-hegemonic to occur globally as well" (2001: 79). The most difficult level is the global level because of the risk of universal dissemination of hegemonic power relations. In any case, there are global legal assets, (*e.g.* the environment, justice or peace), a (universal) common ethics, a (translocal) group ethics and a (local) cultural ethics, all sharing the global level ethics and many sharing translocal ethics. This assumption implies the need for communicative structures for emancipation that clear the risk of hegemony. Organizing pluralism does not imply imposing a homogeneous or even hegemonic universal public order but to provide conditions for political legitimacy to create order and respect pluralism (Delmas-Marty, 2009).

3. The ICC and the Universal Public Order

3.1. A Body of Universal Sovereignty

Building and developing a public and global legal order - nowadays dominant in the thinking on the global system - is based on a liberal perspective of universality founded on human reason. The subjective mental process led by the mind of each individual becomes the shared element on which universalism is based. Kant's (2009) ideals of a cosmopolitan Law and a world republic based on reason are at the starting point of universalistic thought regarding predominant public order and influence liberal thinking greatly. An element that characterizes modern universalistic concepts is, therefore, the existence of a universal reason that allows to see reality objectively and identify a single rational perception of the same facts.

Unlike what occurs with conservative and particularistic[10] views of International Law, schools focused on universalism claim that universal public order is possible and advisable, even if not built on reason (Dellavalle, 2010). These schools share a universal concept of public order with a legal core common to international actors and institutions towards collective actions for universal goals. According to Tomuschat, International Law is a "comprehensive blueprint for social life" (1999: 42).

The mechanisms used to organize global reality go far beyond State in its individual perspective. For universalism, International Law must, therefore, comprehensively regulate international society in terms of human actions within the jurisdiction of the

[9] Translation from the original in Portuguese "o global acontece localmente. É preciso fazer com que o local contra-hegemónico também aconteça globalmente" (Sousa Santos, 2001: 79).

[10] Particularistic concepts advocate that politics is nothing more than a struggle for power, a phenomenon different from and not subject to Law. Considering the need to link internal political process with globalization, particularistic concepts arose to refocus the State as a predominant actor in international space, thus denying the existence of true international order and preserving its sovereign self-sufficiency. On this matter, see, among others, Rabkin (2004), Kagan (2004) or Goldsmith and Posner (2005).

State and regarding its actors, namely, the individual. The development of International Law and consequently the reinforcement of universal public order are viewed as boosters of civilizations because it allows regulation of global phenomena depending on universal principles and values defined by reason.

Incorporating in global public order natural and inalienable rights of the individual is an example of this: an individual's situation is no longer viewed as limited to State jurisdiction but becomes relevant to the global community. The development of a human rights system represents the application of a classic principle in State constitution at global level - promotion and protection of fundamental rights of individuals within a community. Therefore, it is not a mere constitutionalization process of an international human rights system - and subsequent laying down of international constitutional rights - but this process also promotes global constitutionalism (Gardbaum, 2008), an apologetic version of rational objective universalism (Kowalski, 2012). This conclusion derives from the predominant liberal perspective on human rights focus on the universal individual. However, we must stress that other perspectives on human rights may not lead to the same conclusion, namely those who believe the individual can only be seen within his or her social and cultural context. Therefore, the approach that focuses on collective rights and peoples' rights questions the liberal assumption of human universal rights claiming that certain groups (among others, religious, social and ethnic groups) may invoke specific rights or specific interpretations of those rights, which then do not apply universally but to that group alone (Jones, 1999). On the other hand, other approaches question the validity of 'Western' universalized human rights in other social and cultural contexts (Freeman, 2011).

International judicialization is a feature of liberal approaches to universal legal order (Kingsbury, 2012). The ICC is evidently part of this universalistic liberal concept (Kowalski, 2011). In the context of universal public order, from an institutional point of view, 'sovereign bodies' tend to be created. The ICC criminal action illustrates it assuming typically State functions at the level of global governance. Criminal prosecution is a power typical of a State's sovereignty. The creation of the ICC represents a break: criminal prosecution can now be exercised in an order beyond the State when serious crimes that affect the international community as a whole are involved. This international criminal power does not require State authorization. The investigation, the arrest warrant or the trial may be initiated by a Court decision and they may even be against the will of those States that have primary jurisdiction on the case at hand. This occurs in situations where the ICC Prosecutor or the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to article 13 of the Rome Statute, have established jurisdiction; this may even imply taking on jurisdiction regarding States that are not Parties to the Statute.

The rational universalistic approach to universal public order is not without concerns or challenges. Zolo (1997) identifies in his thesis on 'legal cosmopolitanism' a set of assumptions that, according to the author, pose a series of difficulties and have several shortcomings: firstly, the definition of the primacy of International Law and of formal equality of States is only apparent because, in practical terms, the differences between rich and poor countries necessarily imply a hierarchy in international public order and inequality among individuals; secondly, trusting a centralized international jurisdictional system is not compatible with the fact that jurisdictional decisions are highly dependent on a small number of powerful States which have excluded themselves from international jurisdiction as in an absolutist system; thirdly, it rejects contemporary International Law ability to eradicate war; finally, the individual is a subject of International Law with limited capacity because there are no jurisdictional mechanisms at the international level that ensure them acknowledged human rights. These difficulties and shortcomings evidence the weaknesses of the liberal universalistic approach.

In fact, in the current framework of international social relations, the project of universal public order, present also in 'sovereignty bodies' such as the ICC, runs the risk of fostering power dynamics which already influence more or less institutionalized, more or less informal mechanisms in international social relations. In this case, the idea to limit power and create an international dynamics based on Law may be - more or less naively - coopted by other predominant power interactions unduly pursued in the name of justice. It would become a Leviathan under a veil of apparent legitimacy provided by International Law.

3.2. A Universalizing Liberal Discourse

Currently, hard criticism has been made against the ICC regarding its fundaments which to a certain extent reflects a concern regarding the imposition of 'Western' liberal ethical-normative solutions (Kowalski, 2011). Two major types of criticism are possible here: one regarding the selectivity of situations for assessment by the ICC, in which the 'liberal West' is always the prosecutor and never the defendant; another regarding the relation between the (prevailing) political and the legal domains.

In terms of the first type of criticism, a serious accusation heard mostly at political and diplomatic levels has given origin to some hostility by the African States towards the ICC, in what regards a factual aspect: up to the present all eight situations submitted for ICC assessment are related to Africa[11]. This evidences selectivity in the Court's action. The conclusion, based on undeniable facts, has fostered the accusation that the ICC is biased in establishing its jurisdiction, and has given rise to at least implicit accusations of neo-colonialism[12] [13]. The argument is that the accusation and the issuing of arrest warrants regarding African leaders poses greater threat to international peace and security, thus implicitly claiming this is a conflict between peace and justice.

The reasons behind this criticism are essentially political. Discourse based on liberal universalism responds through strict observance of the ICC Statute, which includes thirty-four African States, making this the most represented group. Thus, if the Court opened criminal procedures on the situations in those Africans States, that is due to

[11] Situations in Uganda, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the Central African Republic, in Sudan (Darfur), in Kenya, in Libya, in the Ivory Coast and in Mali.

[12] These accusations have been heard from several African States that, more or less united in a common claim, mostly through the African Union. For example, after an arrest warrant by the ICC against Omar Al Bashir there was harsh reaction against the Court's attempt to try African leaders, namely by States that are not Parties of the ICC Statute. Another example is the reaction by the African Union in 2011 after an arrest warrant was issued by the ICC against Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, which asked its Member-States to ignore the referred warrant.

[13] As if summarizing the concerns of several African States, the then President of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping, referred that the ICC discriminates because it is only concerned with crimes committed in Africa and ignores those committed by the "Western powers" in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan - see Associated Press "African Union calls on Member States to Disregard ICC Arrest Warrant Against Libya's Gadhafi", 2 July 2011.

either the States reporting the situation - which is the most common reason[14] - or because there was strong evidence of serious crimes of relevance to the international community as a whole and the States with primary jurisdiction did not want or could not able try the case. Thus, more than the relevance of the cases under assessment being related to situations in Africa, what is at stake here is rather the injustice regarding the fact that some situations remaining unpunished[15].

The second type of criticism focuses on the relation between jurisdictional action and politics, as a perversion of the function and independence of the ICC. Several non-governmental human rights organizations have denounced 'promiscuity' between jurisdictional action and politics with negative effects in international criminal justice (Bourdon, 2000). Criticism is evident on the fact that ICC action is excessively dependent on the Security Council and therefore that the attribution of jurisdiction it is largely determined by political criteria rather than legal criteria. This is a concern related to the Statute. In fact, the power of the Security Council on ICC action is laid down in the Court's Statute, namely in articles 13 and 16.

Article 13 b) lays down that the Security Council may submit a situation to the Prosecutor in which there is evidence of serious crimes having been committed and which are under the ICC competence. Therefore, of the eight situations under analysis, two were submitted by the Security Council[16]. This power awarded to the Security Council has received much criticism since the preparatory work on the ICC Statute: this includes criticism on the fact that the Court thus loses independence and credibility to those claiming that the Security Council has no competence in international criminal law under the Charter of the United Nations or even others stating that this leads to selectivity in establishing jurisdiction (Yee, 1999).

This criticism is based on the fact that submission of cases to the ICC is dependent on political decision criteria different than admission criteria typical of a jurisdictional body as the ICC. Moreover, of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council three are not Parties in the Rome Statute: China, the United States of America, and Russia. Considering that they have veto power[17], any situation that takes place within their territory or involves their nationals would certainly never be submitted to the Court via the Security Council. This reinforces the idea that the Court jurisdiction may be selective, and in accordance with the dynamics of the Security Council.

The power of the Security Council laid down in article 16 of the Statute is, however, the one that has been pointed out as representing the most serious political interference. According to that article, the Security Council may decide to suspend an ongoing ICC criminal inquiry or procedure for a renewable period of twelve months. The Security

[14] The situations in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, the Ivory Coast and Mali.

[15] The existence of armed conflict is a good indicator that serious internationally relevant crimes may occur. Therefore, in 2012 there were 32 armed conflicts, most of which in Africa, Asia and the Middle East; six of these 32 were war-like (over 1000 casualties a year). Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, Syria, Somalia and Sudan (Themnér e Wallensteen, 2013). Noteworthy is also the fact the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC is preliminarily analyzing the following situations: Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Honduras, North Korea and Nigeria. These situations under preliminary assessment include facts allegedly committed by official and pro-governmental forces, opposition forces and foreign forces (OTP, 2013). Moreover, of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council three are not Parties to the Rome Statute: China, the United States of America, and Russia. According to 2012 data, these three States are exactly those which have the highest annual expenditure on the military (Perlo-Freeman et al., 2012).

[16] The situations in Sudan (Darfur) and in Libya.

[17] *See* articles 27, n. º 3 of the Charter of the United Nations Charter and 13 b) of the ICC Statute.

Council has even approved resolutions awarding immunity to people involved in peace operations at the service of a State that is not a Party to the ICC Statute[18]. We may even argue that this is an amendment to the Rome Statue by the Security Council (Jain, 2005). This, on the one hand, clashes with the objective of the fight against impunity on serious international crimes and, on the other hand, it evidences the degree of interference that the Security Council is willing to undertake[19].

In the case of the crime of aggression, the role of the Security Council is even more relevant. The conference to revise the ICC Statute, which was held in Kampala in 2010, introduced the crime of aggression - not initially defined in the Statute – laying down that the Court's jurisdiction would depend on previous establishment by the Security Council that an act of aggression has been committed[20].

Underlying this criticism of the role of the Security Council towards the ICC is a concern with the performance of functions by an executive body that is focused on the restricted circle of its permanent members and which has no real political or jurisdictional control mechanisms (Kowalski, 2010). The liberal discourse does not provide any other argument for this concern except that the intervention of the Security Council in the ICC was the result of a necessary consensus to create the Court.

3.3. Elements of Pluralism

The Rome Statute reflects an understanding that, at least from a formalistic point of view, is one that puts at center the protection and promotion of a minimal common ethics for humanity. The mission to fight impunity and promote justice is awarded to the ICC by the Statute from an *ultima ratio* perspective and aiming to ensure diversity of legal systems and of participating social actors.

Firstly, there is a universal ethical and legal consensus on the crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, considered unacceptable according to any community's ethical code, genocide[21], crimes against humanity[22] and crimes of war[23] [24]. These are the crimes under ICC jurisdiction that the Rome Statute describes as “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”[25]. This is also why the Rome Statute rejects any immunity regime that prevents the ICC from exercising

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18 *See*, for example, Resolutions S/RES/1422, of 12 July 2002, and S/RES/1487, of 12 June 2003.

19 The ICC is analyzing the post-electoral violence in Kenya in 2007-2008 in which several crimes against humanity were allegedly committed. Among those accused are Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, President and Vice-President of Kenya, respectively. Kenya, upon a decision by the African Union, requested that the Security Council delayed any procedure by the ICC regarding the situation in Kenya for 12 months, under article 16 of the ICC Statute. In a meeting on 15 November 2013, the Security Council decided not to delay by one vote.

20 *See* UN Depository Notification C.N.651.2010.TREATIES-8, 29 November 2010. The Court may exercise jurisdiction if the Security Council does not pronounce any decision within six months after being informed by the Prosecutor of intention to open inquiry regarding an act of aggression.

21 This corresponds to the actions aimed at destroying, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group (article 6 of the Rome Statute).

22 This corresponds to the crimes committed within a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, which results in a violation of International Law on Human Rights (article 7 of the Rome Statute).

23 This corresponds to violations of Humanitarian International Law, in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large scale commission of such acts (article 8 of the Rome Statute).

24 Although the crime of aggression is included in article 5 of the Rome Statute, its definition and inclusion in the ICC jurisdiction has not been concluded. A definition and the jurisdiction criteria for the crime of aggression were reached in the 2010 Kampala conference to revise the Statute. Those amendments are not yet in force.

25 See paragraph 9 of the preamble to the Rome Statute.

jurisdiction regarding these crimes[26]. This is an exception (that is not unanimous) when compared to other international criminal immunity regimes[27].

The last legitimizing source of the legal criminal order must be searched in the social system, in its axiological order(s) (Figueiredo Dias, 1996). As Saraiva refers on the crimes typified in the Rome Statute, "violence and cruelty are universal and timeless" (2013: 48). The list of crimes under the ICC jurisdiction does, therefore, derive from consensus on minimal common ethics, allowing for identification of 'interests of the global community' which legitimize universal action to protect them[28] - dignity, fundamental rights and justice for the individual and his or her community.

Secondly, the Rome Statute claims the precedence of all States to exercise their criminal jurisdiction on those responsible for international crimes. This means that the ICC is a last resort court that only exercises jurisdiction subsidiarily.

Complementarity is thus a relevant principle of the ICC jurisdiction, which means that, pursuant to article 1 of the Rome Statute, the ICC complements national criminal jurisdictions - which have the main competence - and exercises its jurisdiction only when these choose not to or have no ability to try[29] [30]. This subsidiary position regarding national jurisdictions aims also to foster States to open criminal procedures in case of extremely serious crimes (Kleffner, 2008). Complementariness of the ICC ensures its subsidiarity to local jurisdictional systems and, therefore, its non-hegemonic position.

Thirdly, we must not neglect the fact that there is a concern regarding representation of different legal and judicial systems in the ICC. In fact, one of the criteria for electing the 18 Court judges is the need to ensure that the main legal systems in the world are represented there[31]. However, it is also true that this is a criminal jurisdictional system essentially accusatory, closer to the Anglo-Saxon judicial system. Other criteria, such as equitable geographic representation[32] and equitable representation of female and male judges[33] evidence the diversity in terms of perspectives within the Court.

Organizations and individuals have made a mark in the Court and contributed to the ICC more independent functioning concerning simplistic power considerations and State political interests. Referring to the creation of the ICC, it is noteworthy that in the diplomatic conference which adopted in 1998 the Rome Statute, two hundred and thirty-seven non-governmental organizations from all over the world were accredited[34]. Those organizations had a direct influence in the writing of some of the Statute preamble through their participation in the conference (Struett, 2008). Moreover, non-governmental organizations were always in close contact with serious human rights' violations, documenting and denouncing those situations. Their contribution may be decisive for reporting and investigating some cases (HRF, 2004).

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26 Article 27 of the Rome Statute.
27 For example, the regime laid down in the Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in Vienna, on 18 April 1961.
28 For example, the International Court of Justice, in its decision on the Reserves towards the Convention on Genocide, stated that the Convention on Genocide expressed community's common interest rather than States' individual interests (ICJ, 1951).
29 The principle of complementarity is opposed to the primacy that ad hoc courts for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda have towards national criminal jurisdictions.
30 We must also stress that "not being able to try" which can determine complementary intervention by the ICC includes cases in which the suspects have been covered by amnesty (Cassese, 2008).
31 Article 36, paragraph 8 i) of the Rome Statute.
32 Article 36, paragraph 8 ii) of the Rome Statute.
33 Article 36, paragraph 8 iii) of the Rome Statute.
34 *See* UN Document A/CONF.183/INF/3, 5 June 1998.

4. Conclusion

Focusing on the organization ethics of international society necessarily implies criticizing and overcoming rational universalism. Building the universal based on a purely rational process is an epistemological error - it neglects the subjective dimension that is typical of any human phenomenon. This error easily leads to a dispute on who has the competence to define true axioms. A dispute that, in turn, is inevitably won by those (States, organizations, universities, individuals, companies, networks, etc.) with power to export their vision and impose their interests, more or less coercively. The term is 'hegemony'. Hegemony not only in ethical terms, but also as a moral divide which sees peripheries as the only pariahs and the developed center as the moral beacon which behaves in the correct manner.

Thus, basing concerted international action on minimal common ethics - a rather more complex and indeterminate process, not very immediate-solution-friendly (these being potentially simplistic solutions) frequently required in everyday life - is a counter-hegemonic antidote. The concept is based on two assumptions: non-reducible differences; common phenomena that require collective potentially universal response dependent on the scope of that phenomenon. Universalism respects a common ethics that may be operationalized through human communication ability, including within the framework of a multilevel architecture that includes a universal level. At its core it is an ethical pluralist system with pluralist traits regarding a common ethics - socially identified and not hegemonically imposed or disseminated - and phenomena common to all humanity at a given time: human being's spirit of cooperation and solidarity may imply, in certain circumstances, a universal common action. The fight against impunity when serious internationally relevant crimes are at stake, such as genocide, crimes against humanity or crimes of war, effectively requires criminal action at universal level. An action that is based on the acknowledgment that human dignity and justice are part of the minimal common ethics.

The ICC is immersed in stormy waters where it is not always possible to separate a universalizing liberal approach from an ethical universal approach. On the one hand, its quality as a *quasi* constitutional body that easily becomes part of the 'universal legal order', as well as its excessive dependency regarding the United Nations Security Council and other powers (whose cooperation it depends on) integrate the Court in a rational universal liberal approach. The still few successful cases have contributed to the distrust regarding the Court ever fulfilling its role or even to the idea that this was created as a means of soothing consciences but allowing gaps that ensure impunity of the most powerful. On the other hand, the order of fundamental and (apparently) universally shared values visible in the typified crimes, the fact that it is a last resort court or even the search for guaranteeing that diversification of legal traditions and actors is maintained, all include the ICC in an approach closer to ethical universalism.

Now, going back to our initial question, whether we can claim that the ICC - even if partially and at times serving as a tool for hegemony - is essentially defined by the universalization of the fight against impunity by reference to a minimal common ethics. Universal application of certain values and principles can be positive. However, for it to have legitimacy beyond a political and economic hegemony apparently ethical, it must be based on other paradigms. The ICC must be seen as a (good) path towards the defense and promotion of human dignity and justice, which will always require caution against its instrumentalization.

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UKRAINE, EU AND RUSSIA: SOFT POWER *VERSUS* REALPOLITIK?

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Abstract

The relationship between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine began in 1998 with the signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Afterwards, in 2003 Ukraine joined the European Neighbourhood Policy and in 2004 EU was already the major trade partner with Ukraine, bigger than Russia. Anticipating the approach of former soviet republics towards Euro Atlantic structures and the foreseen loss of influence in its near abroad, Putin's Russia launched in 2011 the Eurasian Economic Union, an economic bloc formed by some of the Russia's former satellite States - Belarus and Kazakhstan – and through a carrot and stick policy tried to attract also Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, in order to thwart the Chinese economic development and to impose itself in the regional and global markets. In November 2013, during the 3rd EU's Eastern Partnership Summit, in Vilnius, Lithuania, Ukraine's President, Viktor Yanukovych surprised the world refusing to sign the Commercial Agreement with EU, turning back to a EU possible integration. On the other hand, Russia offered to reduce the natural gas rates plus a fifteen billion dollars loan, throwing Ukraine in a *quasi* civil war, and leaving EU and Russia on opposite sides. Considering this situation what to expect from Ukraine? To continue being a Russian satellite or head towards the Euro Atlantic geopolitical space?

This paper intents to analyse the actual situation in Ukraine following Barry Buzan's approach of multidimensional security, focusing on the different postures assumed by each one of the actors - EU and Russia - which have been between complementarity and division. The scope of the analysis is to contribute to the academic debate about security dynamics between EU, Russia and Ukraine during the post-USSR period, arguing that in the geopolitical dispute for the post-soviet space where Ukraine is integrated, the Russian Realpolitik prevails the EU soft power.

Keywords:

Security; European Union; Eurasian Economic Union; Eastern Neighbouring Policy; Ukraine; Russia; *Realpolitik*

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Ukraine, EU and Russia: soft power versus *realpolitik?*
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UKRAINE, EU AND RUSSIA: SOFT POWER *VERSUS* REALPOLITIK?

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Introduction

After its Independence in 1991, Ukraine, a natural Russian ally, chose to adopt a foreign policy favouring the West. The signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1998 with the EU formalized Ukraine's approach towards the EU shared values, and underlined EU's strategy to promote the region's stabilization and the security of its economical, commercial, and most of all, energetic projects (Barata, 2013: 158). Thus, Russia saw its near abroad shrink; in a clear threat to the maintenance of its heartland and contributing to high tension relationship between the parts involved (Feire, 2011: 92). Post-USSR Russia tries at all cost to maintain the region's domination because it allows them to gain strategic depth and to access deep-water ports[1].

In this new organization of the international system, the internationalization of the capital flows and of the national economies reached its plenitude[2], and new threats beside military ones arose changing security approach to a broader multidimensional concept, peculiar of The Copenhagen School[3] led by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, where non military threats such as political, economical, environmental and societal are considered.

This paper aims to analyse EU, Russia and Ukraine relationship, considering Barry Buzan's multidimensional approach, observing the different postures they have been assuming, complementarity and division. The author argues that actual situation in Ukraine is due to the geopolitical dispute between EU's soft power and Russia's Realpolitik in its near abroad. Therefore, the following question will be answered: in which way will Russia and EU's actions in Ukraine shape the regional security dynamics?

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[1] Georgia and Ukraine's independence confined Russia's access to Novorossiysk port in the Black Sea. Besides that, the best ports are in Georgia - Batumi, Poti and Ochamchire and in Ukraine - Odessa and Sevastopol.

[2] In North America we have assisted to the appearance of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) led by United States of America; in Europe, unified Germany links East and West; in the Pacific Japan's centralizes a huge influence area (Office of the United States Trade Representative, S/D).

[3] According to Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen in The Evolution of International Security Studies, The Copenhagen School analyses threats and the objects of security, specially societal security, with particular attention to the regional level, focusing on securitization, i.e., in the social oriented process through which groups of people build something as a threat, increasing the security objects and therefore extending the security agenda (Buzan, B., Hansen, L., 2009: 36).

The paper is structured in the following parts: the first one analyses the situation in Ukraine since its Independence, focusing on its political and economical situation. The second part analyses EU's European Neighbourhood Policy, main goals and how it could be an option to Ukraine. After that, the opposing Russian project of establishing a Eurasian Economic Union will be analysed and how Moscow is trying to attract Ukraine towards this project. Finally, EU and Russia's relationship will be scrutinised in order to see if they can trigger or not stabilization to the current situation in Ukraine.

1. USSR breakup: *Quo Vadis* Ukraine?

The period after Ukraine's Independence in August 1991 brought the Ukraine identity assertion and the expectations of building a State model based on fundamental robust state institutions, on a market economy, far from the soviet model - i.e. legal power independence towards executive and judiciary power – on promoting the rule of law, freedom of press, free elections, and this way approaching the Western values heading to a sustainable development (Lutsevych, 2013: 2). However, reality showed to be slightly different, a real threat to political[4], economical and energetic security:

Between 1991 and 1994 Ukraine was ruled by the semi-authoritarian regime of Leonid Kravchuk, a highly structured power hierarchy, meaning a Russian alike planned economy which led to a 50 % fall of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Wilson, 2013: 1), triggering new elections in 1994 and Leonid Kushma's election, who led Ukraine until 2004. Kushma's ten years of governance meant the emerging of elites - government and opposition – and a clan based with economic and financial power oligarquic political system, sometimes possibly connected to organized crime, capable of influencing the Ukrainian policies, and hampering structural reforms implementation towards development (Matuszak, 2012: 13)[5]. The year of 2004 brought some changes, as the troubled period after the allegedly fraudulent elections showed clearly that people wanted to change and to participate in Ukraine's future, in what was known as the "Orange Revolution". The elections opposed the Pro West[6] Kushma's ex-prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko to the Pro Russia (and supported by) Viktor Yanukovych. The Revolution turned out to be less effective to reforms implement (Freire, 2008: 3). Yushchenko won, named Yulia Timoshenko as Prime-minister and opposing the Pro-Kremlin orientation the European option was still present in the Ukrainian foreign policy, in a bipolar *Janus*[7] posture, hard to conciliate and achieve between one Ukraine facing East and another facing West, and very often these postures provoked tensions. Yushchenko's governance meant political instability and power struggling between the

4 Barry Buzan considers that political threats are a constant threat to the State, and the most difficult to identify – such as different ideologies competition or Nation attacks – although Buzan distinguishes between intentional, provoked political threats from the ones that arise structurally on result of external alternatives to States freedom (Buzan, 1991: 120).

5 An example is Rinat Akhmetov, known as the richest main n Ukraine and main financial supporter of Viktor Yanukovych's regime was till know a member of the Ukrainian parliament, in 2014 his businesses assured about e 31% of the Ukrainian state businesses and controls about 50 parliament member, with the privileges one can imagine. Another example is the natural gas magnate Dmitry Firtash, who with the Vice-Prime Minister heads the "Firtash Group" which includes about 30 parliament members (Lutsevych, 2014). Finally, Yanukovych's son, Oleksander Yanukovych, during his father's presidency between 2010 and 2013 assured about 50% of all Ukrainian state contracts. In 2007 his fortune was estimated in 24 million dollars, and in November 2013 about 770 million dollars (Grey, 2014).

6 Although not turning back Moscow.

7 Roman God of doors and windows, beginnings and endings, represented by two faces looking to opposite directions.

political elites[8], and Tymoshenko's government fell in 2006, triggering new parliament elections, won by the Yushchenko-Yanukovych coalition, and the latter, for the rejoicing of Vladimir Putin, was appointed Prime-minister[9]. In 2007 after Yushchenko's call to new elections as a response to Yanukovych's attempt to diminish Prime-minister's powers and to resign Yushchenko, Ukraine fell in a new political crisis and Tymoshenko was re-elected.

The arrival of the global financial crisis to Ukraine in 2008 provoked a 14.8%[10] fall of the Ukrainian GDP to the already weak Ukrainian economy, which was followed in the first three months by a 49% decrease on the exports and increase of the unemployment rate to values above 9% (Wilson, 2013: 8). Compounded with the economical situation, Tymoshenko's return to the government didn't mean political stability, and using statements like "*The Ukrainian awake for the people and not for the politicians*"[11] or "*Ukrainian course towards the integration on the Euro Atlantic structures is not an alternative to the building of relations with the Russian Federation*" in its foreign policy did not contributed to improve relations between Ukraine and Russia (Ukraine Government Portal, 2014).

The pressures that Moscow applied to Ukraine, namely increasing the gas rates and stopping pumping natural gas, putting into risk the Ukrainian economic and energy security[12] paved the way to the end of Yushchenko's presidency, and in February 2010 Yanukovych was elected Ukraine's new President, in a new turning West of Ukraine.

Besides economic and political issues, the identity of the populations is another factor that must be considered when analysing the security framework in Ukraine. Facing the political instability situation, and taking into account the historical legacy, the independence processes were used by the nationalists to highlight ethnic and social differences and to hamper state building and the definition of new borders (Simão, 2011: 44). We talk about threats to societal security, which Barry Buzan defined as threats to society identity – traditions, costumes, religions, language (Buzan et al

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[8] When in 2008 Tymoshenko returned to the government and directed the state funding to her party supporters BYuT - Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, leaving out some of the enterprises belonging the Party of Regions oligarchs. Therefore part of the Party of Regions with financial connections to Rinat Akhmetov, had to politically negotiate with the BYuT in order to assure the access to some of that funds. As a result, in 2008 some of that negotiations were initiated, with a coalition between the two parties, the revision of the Constitution and some changes in the political system which included the appointment of the President after the approval of the Parliament (Matuszac, 2012: 33).

[9] "Putin congratulates Yushenko on ending stalemate". Disponível em: http://morigin.rferl.org/a/1070390.html, accessed in February, 7th 2014.

[10] World Bank in http://data.wo1rldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/UA?display=graph accessed on February, 7th 2014

[11] "Ukrainian breakthrough: for People, but not for Politicians" Available in http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article?art_id=106080712&cat_id=244315174. Accessed on February, 7th 2014

[12] Economic security of a State stands for the possibility to access to material, financial resources, as well as to different markets in order to ensure economic growth capable of financing state activities, and therefore it's population well being (Buzan, 1991: 445). Retarding development and budgeting financial dependence on foreign institutions like International Monetary Fund or World Bank may equal the incapability to provide basic well being needs to the populations (*Ibid*:446). Although energy doesn't appear in Barry Buzan's security approach it is a common issue to all the levels and dimensions - military, political, economic, societal – and therefore it's important to refer to it. Energy represents to States its guaranty to economic and sustainable vitality, and therefore, to its development allowing the States to use it as a political instrument. To this matter let us remember Barry Buzan's and Ole Weaver's words in "Region and Powers: the Structure of International Security "The main prize in the geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus is control of the transportation of oil and gas. For some is about energy, for others mostly about the economic implications, to others again it is mainly a way to gain influence and/or preventing others from doing so" (Buzan,B., Weaver, O., 2003: 422).

1991: 433). On the other hand, and quoting Svante Cornell, this ethnicity has a political component, that the author classifies as "ethnicity politicization", i.e., communities don't accept, even reveal some hostility in being ruled by people from another ethnicity, and this feeling as in its base the fear from consequences that might occur, so, triggering nationalisms and adding instability to the region which easily can pour out borders and become a global threat (Cornell, 2011: 40-41). As an example one can observe the on going crisis in Ukraine and what happened with Crimea, which ended with a military intervention by Russian military forces as an excuse to defend the Russian population, as Russia did in 2008 *vis-à-vis* the Georgian autonomous republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The result is well known; a referendum was voted on March 16th 2014 by allegedly 96% of its inhabitants deciding to be integrated in Russia, before the fumbled look of the international community[13].

2. EU, Ukraine, and the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy

The relationship between Ukraine and the EU was determined by the signature of the Eastern Partnership (ENP) in 1998[14] (EUR-Lex, 2014), whose objective was the political dialogue, the development of commercial and economical relationship, and the implementation of state reforms. To Ukraine, ENP means cooperation with the European institutions, the liberalization of the economy towards a market economy, stimulating foreign investment and a sustainable development[15]. Besides, Ukraine was the first of the fifteen NIS of the former URSS to increment such a partnership, in 2003 embraced the ENP and from 2004 onwards, EU was already Ukraine's largest comercial partner, including Russia (Freire, 2008: 17). The importante question is: will Ukraine be as relevant to the EU as the other states included in the ENP? Or it's historical legacy, the proximity with Russia and the security concerns, particularly energetic, make this country a prime actor in the EU's ENP? The answer is: Yes, Ukraine is a different partner. It is located in the main routes between Europe and Asia, it has frontiers with EU States but also NATO's – Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania - consequently, strategically Ukraine is an important actor in EU's security architecture.

EU looks eastwards as an area of opportunity to reinforce its economical and energetic securities, and implementing its politics of "softpower" tries to continue the cooperation at political, economical and secure levels, towards good administration, market economy and sustainable development. And, as a matter of fact, there are good reasons to do it. According to the European Commission, in 2012, EU represented the largest commercial partner to Ukraine – 33.7% of total imports and exports, followed by Russia with 21.6% (EC, 2013: 9). Regarding to the commercial flow inside the ENP, Ukraine was also the largest commercial partner to EU 58% of exports, followed by Belarus with 21% and 44% imports, next Azerbaijan with 39% (Eurostat, 2013).

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[13] In Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/16/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSBREA1Q1E820140316, accessed on April, 3rd 2014.

[14] Council and Commission Decision of 26 January 1998 on the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part Disponível em: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31998D0149, accessed on April 4th 2014.

[15] Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and Their member states, and Ukraine. Available in http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=659

Concerning energy security, it's important to consider that the disintegration of the USSR brought to the political and economical international agenda the dispute for the energy resources, particularly natural gas and crude oil, adding a new chapter to what had once been referred to as "The Great Game"[16] - the control of Eurasia (Barata, 2013: 18). EU has only 2% of the world's natural gas energetic reserves[17], depending on oil imports for as much as 53.8% and 60.8% of that is relative to natural gas. According to the "Statistical Pocketbook 2012", if the tendency keeps up as from 1990, the level of dependency of oil imports in the EU will continue to grow[18].

Russia exports to the EU, through Ukraine about 80% of its natural gas (Freire, 2008: 25). Natural gas delivery cuts to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 imposed by Russia for allegedly failing to comply to the financial compromises, and in an effort to increase the involvement of Gazprom in the Ukrainian Naftohaz, with unwanted implications in some European States, such as happened in Germany, is a clear evidence of the EU's security vulnerability, as well as the politicization[19] of energy by Russia, that considers its great energetic income a way to guarantee its economical and political stability[20]. This existing energetic interdependence between Ukraine and Russia, and between Russia and the EU has contributed to the energy securitization[21], adding additional uncertainties to that tripartite relation.

In March 2003, in the scope of the enlargement of the EU to twenty five, ENP was enforced (European Union Extended action Service, 2014), consolidating a new framework for the relations between the enlarged EU and the neighbouring Eastern countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia and Ukraine) and to the South (Algeria, Palestine Authority, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia), allowing a degree of economical integration and a deeper political relationship. Russia, though being a EU neighbour, is not part of the ENP countries[22],

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16 The term "Great Game" is linked to Arthur Conolly. British Army Officer, used this term to describe the dispute between the British Empire and the Russian Empire for the Central Asia in the beginning of the XIXth Century (907). The term was first written in one of the two volumes he wrote about his military campaigns called – Journey to the North of India. Overland from England, through Russia, Persia and Afghanistan (British Empire, 2014).

17 In 1997 223.2 tons of Oil Equivalent were pumped representing about 12% of world reserves. The major part of these reserves are in Netherlands and Great Britain (European Commission GREEN PAPER - Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply, 2000: 18).

18 In accordance with EU's report, since 2000 oil imports (in TOE) were the following: 532.76 in 2000, 600,37 in 2005 and 560,98 in 2010. Concerning natural gas the figures are the following: 192.53 in 2000, 257.29 in 2005 and 275,53 in 2010 (Statistical Pocketbook, 2012: 115).

19 An issue that is publically known and thus needs a governamental decision (Khrushcheva, 2011: 217).

20 Later in 2009, Tymoshenko renegotiated the possible agreement with Russia which Ukraine was obliged to import per year about 52 billion cubic meters, and Russia would pay a small fee by the fact of using the Ukrainian pipelines (Shumylo-Tapiola, 2012). Ukraine pays one of the highest natural gas prices - 400 dollars for 1000 cubic meters, when, for instance Belarus pays 160 dollars (Ibid).

21 The term securitization was introduced by the Copenhagen School and is based on the speech-act. It assumes that exists a threat, an agent and a security object, and can be observed as the way a state (or agent) socially, builds up publicly an existing (or not) threat to its security which forces an immediate action beyond daily and routine political measures (Buzan, et al,1998: 23-24).

22 In accordance with the Russian Vice-Prime-minister in 2004 Vladimir Chizhov*:* "this [the ENP] is an attempt to reduce to the least common denominator groups of countries and individual states that are entirely different in their level of development and that, in addition to this, have different objectives with respect to the EU itself – objectives that are oftentimes incompatible with one another., "Russia is a large self-sufficient country with its own views on European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In contrast to some smaller Eastern European or South Caucasus countries striving for EU-membership Russia is neither a subject nor an object of the European Neighbourhood Policy". That is to say that Russia felt offended when was compared with other minor states like, for example Moldova or Morocco, and insisted that the bilateral relations between them should take into account the equal treatment between the two regions towards the strategic partnership (Haukkala, 2009: 2-3).

and its relations belong in the framework of a Strategic Partnership[23] (Ministerio das Finanças, 2010).

ENP allowed these new partners to participate in various EU activities, through the cooperation at a political level, in security and also in economic and cultural events. The objectives of that policy are evidente in the Plans of Action and in the European Neighbourhood Accords established with each one of the neighbours, political documents that define the strategic objectives of the cooperation between neighbour countries and the EU and which contain a global list of priorities established in common grounds by each of the countries and the EU.

In 2009, during the Prague Summit, EU launched the initiative of Eastern Partnership[24] aiming to support Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia and Ukraine with their transition reforms and consolidation of democracy, promoting the gradual integration of the economy and concomitantly activating the citizens mobility, the political association and encouraging cooperation. This initiative is based on the principle "more for more – more support for more progress", and advocates as values the respect for human rights, the Rule of Law, democracy and the compromise to implement a market economy (European Council, 2013)[25].

In December 2012 EU defined as pre-requisites for the acceptance of the Agreement of Association with Ukraine, the implement of structural reforms, free elections according to the patterns of the West and the Independence of the three powers of the state: legislative, executive and judiciary. It was equally made clear that the fulfilment of this conditions gets Ukraine closer to a future possible integration, but does not imply, per se, full admission as a member of the European Union, (External Action Service, 2014c)[26]. It does mean the politic of the three M's money, markets and mobility, and more resources when Ukraine needs more and better State, although without a promise of integration - membership. However this type of cooperation with Ukraine is seen by Russia as a threat to its regional interests, for an eventual integration of some of the participating States in the Euro-Atlantic structures - as in the case of Ukraine or Georgia – would remove them from its sphere of influence, which is understood by Russia as a clear strategy of seclusion[27].

From EU's point of view, its politic of softpower has a goal, to keep active its politic of neighbourhood, fundamental instrument for the European security architecture- in every dimension – in order to stay as an actor in the region. The remoteness of the Ukraine, the instability encroached in the Southern Caucasus, and the slowdown of reforms in Moldavia, deflate the influence of the EU in the region, strengthening the influence of Putin's Russia (Osica, 2013: 47).

[23] "The EU has a coherent European Neighbourhood Policy to direct relations with its eastern and southern neighbours. A Strategic Partnership based on four Common Spaces is the framework for relations with Russia, which is not part of the ENP."(European Commission, 2014).

[24] The Eastern Partnership (EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (2014b)

[25] "Cimeira da Parceria Oriental prepara assinatura de acordos de associação", Available in: http://www.european-council.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/eastern-partnership-summit-prepares-signing-of-association-agreements?lang=en, accessed on February 13th 2014.

[26] Council Conclusions on Ukraine. Available in: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134136.pdf

[27] Zbigniew Brzezinski once said that Rússia without Ukraine is a Nation-State but with Ukraine is an Empire. Charles Tannok in "Ukraine's path not taken" (2013). Available in: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/charles-tannock-asks-why-ukraine-has-rejected-the-eu-and-considers-what-the-west-should-do-about-it#irTD40WiS0MjFLIw.99, accessed on April. 5th 2014.

On the 3rd Summit of the Eastern Partnership in Vilnius effected in 28-29th November 2013 the EU aimed to review the process of integration of some of its partners in the Association Agreements and in the Deep and Comprehension Free Trade Agreement[28] among them Georgia and Moldavian though maintaining the negotiations with Ukraine present on the table[29]. For that it was important to analyse if the pre-requisites defined in December 2012 had been complied, for they constitute condition *sine qua non* for the signing of the EU agreements. Facing the possibility of a postponement of the Commercial Agreement by Yanukovych one week before the beginning of the Vilnius Summit, the pro-Western voices initially pacific descended to the streets in Kiev attempting to press the Ukrainian President to rethink his decision and sign the agreement. However though shaken – Prime-minister Mykola Azarov resigned – Yanukovych resisted aligned with Russia and prays for this decision to guarantee a victory in the next presidential elections 2015 (Sarna, A., Wierzbowska-Miazga, A., 2013).

After two months of conflicts mainly centred in the capital, Kiev, and dozens of deaths, President Yanukovych and the opposition decided to negotiate a truce. At the moment the agreement mediated by EU's German and Polish Ministers of Foreign Affairs involved the formation of a government of national unity and the return to the 2004 Constitution; the reformulation of the powers of the President, Government and Parliaments; the summoning of presidential elections after the enforcement of the 2004 Constitution - never before December 2014 – the proceedings of an investigation to the acts of violence conducted by a team formed by the authorities, the opposition and the European Council; restraining violence by Ukrainian authorities and the opposition and, at last, the deliverance of every illegal weapons to the Minister of Internal Affairs (BBC, 2014).

In this triangle of relationship EU-Ukraine-Russia Ukraine lives internally pressed to take a decision about the line of integration that should be followed in a model, which is political and economically incompatible. Ethnical and political diversity[30] present between Russians (about 17.3%) pro-Eurasian Union, and Ukrainians (about 77.8%) pro-EU sets a challenge, which transcends economical and energy questions but should not be impeditive to achieve a cooperative solution to both ways – East and West.

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[28] This agreement is included in the European neighbourhood Policy and aims to enlarge commercial relations with some partner states on a holistic approach and allow an integration of South Caucasus in the EU markets – facilitate customs mechanisms, decrease transaction taxes, among other measures (European Commission, 2012). Azerbaijan was out of this initiative once it doesn't belong to the World Trade Organization, a condition imposed by the EU to integrate DFCTA.

[29] Armenia's President Serzh Sargsyan announced on September 3rd 2013 that integrating Eurasian Union was the option, what was considered by EU incompatible with the signature of the Association Agreements (European External Action Service, 2014d). In fact this position can be understood, Russia is its main economic trade partner and its security shield. Since May 1992 that Armenia member of the *Collective Security Treaty Organization* of CIS and since August 1997 that is linked to Russia through the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance – which foresees a Russian intervention in case of any attack to Armenia (Tamrazian, 2012). Referring to Azerbaijan, The ENP Vilnius Summit in November 2013 meant the signature of the facilitation visa agreement and EU underline that will pursuit towards the signature of the Association Agreements with Azerbaijan after its admission to the World trade Organization (Council of the European Union, 2013).

[30] Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Available in: http://ukrexport.gov.ua/eng/about_ukraine/population/ukr/179.html, accessed on April, 8th 2014.

3. The Eurasian Economic Union: towards Russian hegemony

In October 2011 during the presidential campaign, the yet Prime-minister Vladimir Putin proposed to create an economic bloc which would allow the regional integration of its member states, paving the way towards leadership in the global markets. To this bloc, based on the previous experiences acquired with the Community of Independent States (CIS), with the Eurasian Economic Community and with the Custom Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, Putin called the Eurasian Economic Union.

With this policy Russia intends to maintain control over the regional markets as well as to build a strong position in a region where its influence never ended. This build up has been possible through a close relationship with Belarus and Kazakhstan, and using Realpolitik[31] of carrot and stick policy with Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. In Belarus case approach began in 1997 through the Russia-Belarus Union – Union of States[32] after the year 2000. However, the fact that it doesn't have natural resources available to feed its industry, and therefore be dependent on Russian financing[33], leaving few alternatives to react to a possible Russian economy retraction, allowing its foreign policy to be controlled by Russia (Voloshin, 2012). Kyrgyzstan's case is different. Its energy reserves and strategic position linking Europe and Asia – right in the middle of Mackinder's Heartland[34] – allows Russia to promote its economic interests with the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, as well as to ensure its southern borders security. What about Ukraine?

Ukraine is a concern to Russia *vis-à-vis* Eurasian Economic Union's success. Its bipolar posture, divided between integrating Euro Atlantic structures and maintaining its linkage with Russia raises concerns to regional hegemony ambition from Moscow's government. In first place because since early ages of Empress Catherine II that Ukraine has an important Russian naval base in the Crimea Peninsula - Sevastopol – which allows Moscow to maintain its presence in the Black Sea and its southern borders security. This importance was clear when in 2010 Russia and Ukraine announced that they were negotiating renewal of the leasing contract signed in 1997 and which would expire in 2017. The main goal was to extend the contract for more twenty five years, until 2042, and on the other hand Ukraine's natural gas rates would be reduced to 30% of the market value, as Ukraine assumed to increase annually its gas imports from 2011 and ahead to 40 million cubic meters[35] (Martins, V., Conde, P., 2010). Maintaining Sevastopol's leasing Russia intended to block any aspiration towards a NATO membership, once NATO would not accept to have a member in the Alliance, which integrates, in its territory a Russian military base with the Black Sea Fleet. This issue was definitely solved (think so) when in last February 2014, on conclusion of three months of riots centred in Kiev pro-EU protesters and security forces, under the banner of Russian population protection, Russian troops entered Crimea and in a few

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31 Realpolitik it's a term that was coined in the XIXth century, revisited by Henry Kissinger in the XXth century and expresses the policy and diplomacy of the states based on power and practical aspects instead of moral, ethical and ideological aspects.

32 Available in: http://mfa.gov.by/en/courtiers/russia/, accessed in April, 4th 2014.

33 In Putin promised a 4 million dollars loan to the Belarusian government paving its economical dependence (Voloshin, 2012).

34 Halford Mackinder argued in The Geopolitical Pivot of History that heartland, where Eurasian continental masses meet is the fulcrum of all major geopolitical transformations that occurred in the World's Big Island. This geographic uniqueness gives political advantage; therefore, the one who rules the heartland would rule the World's Big Island, and the planet (Mackinder, 1904).

35 More than in 2009 and in 2010 (Chow, 2010).

days took control of government buildings, military bases and airports, and on March, 24th 2014 integrated Crimea in Russia. Secondly, because the Ukrainian energy market represents 46 million of potential consumers, and because Ukraine stands in most of the energy routes to Europe, as for historical reasons Poland and the Baltic States are out of the question regarding energy transportation[36] (Voloshin, 2012). Finally, it is important to underline that Russia is an Ukraine's economic partner: in 2012 represented about 26% of total exports and 33% of total imports (World Trade Organization, 2013), inside CIS Ukraine represents 38% of foreign Russian investment, and this geo-economics space represents 40% of total Ukrainian exports, therefore it shouldn't be wise to be hostile towards Ukraine (Fânzeres, 2013).

Ukraine's integration in the Eurasian Economic Union represents a one third reduction on natural gas rates, which will be reviewed by Moscow (i.e. Gazprom) each four months, and a 15 billion dollars loan to be paid in three years (Reuters, 2014). This means that when the West waves with money for reforms, Russia offers money expecting subduing and to endure a strong dependence (Sherr, 2013: 4).

4. UE-Rússia: division or ou complementarity?

Nowadays we assist to EU and Russia rivalry, and it is possible that this rivalry will increase in the following years, endangering twenty years of partnership existing since 1994[37], despising 500 million possible consumers market, and making believe that in the near future division will place complementarity, shaping regional's security architecture.

On one hand, because Russia will continue to influence Ukrainian political elites in order to keep away a possible Euro Atlantic structures membership, risking possible sanctions as a retaliation to some politics that would endanger its influence in its near abroad. The rest, Prime-minister Dmitry Medvedev made it clear to Mycola Azarov – Ukrainian Prime-minister - in the beginning of November 2013 that the chances to sign the Association Agreement with EU were null, because, otherwise Ukraine will have to begin paying in advance its natural gas supply. Besides that, Russia will demand the payment of all existing debts at the moment, and therefore, would be better to start financing its energy needs with the EU (Havlik, 2013). On the other hand, because Ukraine has a strong economic dependence on Russia, and besides that, Crimea's integration in Russia at the eyes of a disbelieving international community clearly, clearly showing power, deteriorated the already tense relations between EU and Ukraine. Meanwhile Putin acts in accordance to Colin Gray's statement: "the exercise of continuous influence or control requires the physical presence of armed people in the area at issue"

[36] Poland's territory suffered from Russia (with Prussia and Austria) three divisions during the XVIIIth Century (1772, 1793 e 1795). Later, in September 1939, at the beginning of World War Two, Russia invaded Poland again (Cienciala, 2004). Referring to the Baltic States, few states know Russia better, once during hundreds of years they were part of the Russian Empire, and subdued by the Soviet Union for 50 years (Economist, 2014).

[37] In was initiated the Cooperation Partnership Agreement (1994 Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA)).

(Kaplan, 2013: 33)[38], the international community, in particular the West answers with economic and diplomatic sanctions, which, at the moment, don't seem to be effective[39].

What can one expect from EU, turning back or proceed in order to achieve its strategic interests?

The decision would be to reinforce its presence in the East, and for that should ensure international financing to the in charge Ukrainian government, showing that it opposes to Russian politicization of the natural gas prices. At the same time EU should rethink its policies concerning democracy development, rule of law and security in order to achieve a stable and secure neighbourhood which will allow to, together with its partners, collect benefits from this common space (Dempsey, 2014). For that, time is on its side, and that was perfectly clear in Herman Van Rompuy's, President of the European Council, statement at the Security Conference last 1st of February in Munich: "Our biggest carrot is our way of life; our biggest stick: a closed door". (Conselho Europeu, 2014). For the EU will be important to maintain Ukraine's Association Agreement signature as a strategic goal which will allow the access to new markets where 46 million of consumers stand[40], as well as access to new resources, in particular energy ones, and a key geographic position towards Central Asia and Middle East. Therefore EU should look forward to be next to Ukraine, instead of trying to get answers to the reason why Ukraine didn't sign the agreement last November during the Vilnius Summit. The summit showed that EU should rethink its strategy towards the Eastern Partnership, including Russia, and promoting cooperation in areas such as trade and mobility (Popescu, 2014: 4).

Conclusions

Ukrainian's President decision of not signing the Association Agreement with the EU during the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius brought up the fragilities of Kiev's regime, and at the same time, showed Putin's intention to project power to the region maintaining the Russian influence on a geopolitical space that was always considered its near abroad.

Last February, 20th 2014 the signature of an agreement between Yanukovych, at the time the Ukrainian President, and the Ukrainian opposition brought to an end months of demonstrations and conflict, specially in Kiev, that arose in late November 2013. The completion of one and every point of the agreement, in particular those referring to the presidential elections will mark an important moment on Ukraine's future and on its relations either with Europe and Russia.

For Ukraine, government instability, deficient social policies, fragile and highly dependency on Russia economy, corruption indexes, and elite politicization - government and opposition – have been provoking divisions in the society, which have been spreading all over the eastern parts of Ukraine, specially in the regions with bigger Russian expression, such as Donetsk, Luhansk and, Karkhiv, showing the

[38] Colin S.Gray in Robert D. Kaplan "The Revenge of Geography".
[39] As a response to the economic sanctions Putin's Russia (GAZPROM) answered with a pike on the natural gas rates. During the week of 31st of March to 6th of April natural gas rates increased 40% (Reuters, 2014b).
[40] In accordance with the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, available in: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/, accessed in 6th of April 2014.

presence of non-military threats, such as political, economic, societal and energy threats.

Competition between EU and Russia for the post-soviet space where Ukraine lies has been shaping security dynamics in the region in its several dimensions, in what is already considered as The New Cold War after *Perestroika.* For EU, Ukraine, strategically located in the major trade and energy routes to Central Asia, is an important economic partner and constitutes a key player in EU's security architecture. However, EU's soft power has been quite ineffective. In face of the entrance of thousands of Russian militaries in Crimea, occupying governmental buildings, military bases and airports, EU in particular (the international community in general) answered with diplomacy and economic sanctions to Putin's Russia.

Russia is and it will continue to be an important economic partner to Ukraine, specially concerning energy security. Though it is probable that Russia will continue to pressure Ukraine to increase its flux trades eastwards in order to get lower gas rates, if not be prepared to suffer consequences - economic blockades or energy cuts – one should not neglect EU's pressures waving with more for more. As a way to block the Euro Atlantic intentions eastward, Russia promoted the Eurasian Economic Union, in a clear intention to expedite trade relations and free circulation and markets with its neighbours, in a quasi-empire trade policy of carrot and stick where each one of the participating States only approves the decisions already taken by Moscow. However it is paramount to this project that Russia be able to keep Ukraine on its influence sphere in order to definitely avoid an Ukrainian turning towards Europe, which will mean the regional game over to Russia in a clear threat to its interests in its preferential space of influence. Eurasian Economic Union implementation will allow Russia to aspire regional hegemony, twenty years after the falling of the Soviet Empire and will do everything to achieve it. Till this moment, Russian Realpolitik has been directed to energy securitization, but one should not neglect military securitization as well.

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CENTRAL ASIA: THE BENDS OF HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY

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Abstract

This article aims to highlight the major historical and geopolitical characteristics of Central Asia, a region that led authors like Brzezinski[1] to state that "whoever controls that space, will rule the planet", linking, on the other hand, the durability of American hegemony to Washington policy in the region. Why is Central Asia important in the international system? The central argument is that this is a region of major importance in the current economic arena as a result of its history, geography and strategic position as a link between East and West, a space of competition and reinforcement of the great powers.

Keywords:

Central Asia; history; geopolitics; post-Soviet space; Central Asian Republics

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[1] Brzezinski (1997: 30).

CENTRAL ASIA: THE BENDS OF HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY

Paulo Duarte

Introduction

This article aims to highlight the major historical and geopolitical features of Central Asia. The central argument is that this is a region of major importance in the current economic sphere as a result of its strategic position as a link between East and West, space of competition and reinforcement of the great powers.

Central Asia[2] is one of the pivot regions of the world. It is located in the nucleus of the Eurasian continental space and is a crucial link between several robust and dynamic economies, such as China, the European Union, India, Japan and Russia (Competitiveness Outlook, 2011). According to Khwaja, "Central Asia owes its importance to the vast economic potential and geostrategic location it has been endowed with, considering it is progressively turning into a world economic center" (2003: 7). In 1998, "[one] initial optimistic forecast", guessed that "the proven or recoverable amount of existing oil reserves in the Caspian region and Central Asia" was "200 billion barrels", although "most geologists accept the estimation of 40 to 60 billion barrels in the reserve base of the region" (U.S. Congressional Record 1998). About 15 years after the above prediction, a special report, prepared for the Caspian region and Central Asia, maintains virtually the same figures, i.e., "it is estimated that the total oil reserves of the region is more than 60 billion barrels, and some forecasts bring this number up to 200 billion barrels" (Global Business Reports, 2012: 1).

Under the new energy atlas, Central Asia is located in a strategic region, with strong ties to neighboring regions. Its development depends, firstly, on the access to the rest of the world. Central Asia is an important part of the political and economic world system, being "surrounded by some of the most dynamic economies in the world, including three of the so-called BRIC countries (Russia, India and China)" (Central Asia Competitiveness Outlook, 2011: 10). As Armando Marques Guedes stresses (2011), "Central Asia is, somehow, a hinge zone", which has "regained undoubtedly an extraordinary importance both structural and conjunctural". According to this expert, "if there were three major milestones of the 21st century, conflicts that had an effective impact on the reconstruction and creation of a new international order, these would be

[2] For relevant information on Central Asia and Post-Soviet studies we recommend consulting the research carried out by Marcos Farias Ferreira (Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas) and Licínia Simão (Universidade de Coimbra).

Afghanistan, Iraq and the invasion of Georgia by the Russian Federation" (Guedes, 2011). Interestingly, according to the author, "these three conflicts occurred in Central Asia" (Guedes, 2011). Note also that if there is "a conflict that humanity currently fears", this involves Iran, which is no other than "a southern extension of Central Asia" (Guedes, 2011). For centuries, Central Asia has been the crossroads of Eurasia, or, as noted by Jack Caravelli (2011), "the intersection between East and West", which makes, according to this author, the region "interesting". Indeed, it is the point of confluence of four civilizations that have both controlled and been controlled by Central Asian peoples (Asimov and Bosworth, 1998). Moreover, as noted by Xiaojie Xu, "the civilizations that dominate the region have been able to exert their influence in other parts of the world" (1999: 33).

The bends of history

Before the arrival of the Russians, Central Asia was an integrated entity at the cultural, linguistic and religious level (Dani and Masson, 1992). The colonization process, initiated by czarist Russia, was the starting point for the fragmentation of the region, and has been specially designed to support the power structure of the colonizer (Bacon, 1966). This logic of fragmentation was continued and strengthened by the Soviets (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). Fourniau explains that, from a historical point of view, "the region was either integrated into world-empires, during very short periods, either divided over long periods" (2006: para. 22). The various entities that make up Central Asia, often correspond to "successor states of these world-empires (as the sovereign states today are the successors of the Soviet Republics)" (Fourniau, 2006: para. 22).

According to Gleason, "the first inhabitants of Central Asia were nomads who traveled from the north and from east to west and south" (1997: 27). The regional names 'Transoxiana' or 'Ma Wara'un-Nahr', among other names for Central Asia have resulted from foreign invasions (Dani and Masson, 1992). The Samanid dynasty of Persia succeeded after the Arab governance during the 9th and 10th century (Esengul, 2009). The era of the Great Khan of the Mongols, Chingis Khan, began in the thirteenth century (Esengul, 2009). The empire of Chingis Khan left a legacy of Turkish languages which replaced Persian and Arabic (Carrere d' Encausse, 1967). The Mongols destroyed the main Persian and Arabic centers of learning and trade, which helped Turkish languages become dominant in the region (Dani and Masson, 1992). After the death of the Great Khan in 1227, his descendants divided Central Asia, and the region remained divided until the governance of Timur 'the lame', which united the small Turkish tribes in the middle of the fourteenth century (Dani and Masson, 1992). According to Hye Lee "the Russians had a first contact with Central Asia in 1715 when Peter the Great sent the first Russian military expedition into the Kazakh steppe, but the real effort to conquer the region took place in the nineteenth century, around 1860" (2012: para. 5). Since then, the valleys of Central Asia were divided into three khanates: Bukhara (the oasis of Zerafshan), Khiva (downstream of the Amur-Darya) and Khokand (Fergana Valley) (Gleason, 1997).

The foreign invasions were not limited to acts of conquest, to the extent that they generated a vast cultural interaction. Offering a fusion of cultures, languages, religions and people, they contributed in making the notion of identity in the region extremely complex (Dani and Masson, 1992). The main Central Asian informal institutions that have proven to stand the test of time were the tribes and clans (Esengul, 2009). It is not surprising, therefore, that more and more experts in Central Asian affairs highlight the importance of clan politics with regard to the control they exert on the economy and politics of the region (Collins, 2006). Among the Central Asians, loyalty to the family or village is the most important at the sub-ethnic level (Dani and Masson, 1992). This loyalty is based on the core of the political organization of society: the family (Dani and Masson, 1992).

From the historical point of view, Central Asia was called Turkestan, whose literal translation from the Persian means 'the land of the Turks' (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). The dominant linguistic group of Turkestan was formed by the Turkish languages such as Turkmen, Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Kazakh (Bruchis, 1984). Geographically, the territory of Turkistan extended from the east area of the Caspian Sea to the Altay Mountains, and from the borders of Persia and Afghanistan in the south, to the Russian lands in the north (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). It had been divided into two parts: Western Turkestan and Eastern Turkestan (Dani and Masson, 1992). The Russians occupied the three khanates, having, however, just attached the Khanate of Khokand, and attributed the status of protectorates to the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara (Rywkin, 1963). Thus, the Western Turkestan, which became part of the Russian Empire in 1867 and was known as Russian Turkestan, encompassed the most part of the lands inhabited by Turkic peoples (Turkmen, Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Kazakh), but did not officially comprise the protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva (Bacon, 1966). In turn, the Eastern Turkestan (also known as Chinese Turkestan) referred to the easternmost part of the region, encompassing lands in northwest China, i.e. the territory of the Autonomous Region of Xinjiang (Bacon, 1966).

From 1860 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Central Asia was under Russian rule for little more than a century (Rywkin, 1963). Mark Dickens suggests some factors that contributed to the conquest of Central Asia. Let's emphasize "an instinctive impulse aiming to fill the geopolitical gap created by the collapse of the Great Tatar Horde..."; "a historical spirit of re-conquest with regard to the territories conquered by the Horde..."; "a traditional anti-Turkish stance which easily turned into anti-Islamic attitudes"; and "the perception that the few people who inhabited the Asian areas of eastern and southwestern Russia... were an easy target for control and exploitation as the region was conquered" (1989: 2).

Under the Russian leadership which was essentially colonial, locals experienced important transformations (Bacon, 1966). Over time, the term 'Turkistan' had been replaced by the term 'Srednaya Azia' (from the Russian Inner Asia or Central Asia) (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). Daniel Pipes believes that "like other colonial masters, the czarist government believed in the overwhelming superiority of its culture", in fact "the Russians insisted on using their own language, despised local habits and culture, in particular Islam, and revealed attitudes characteristic of all European settlers in the Third World" (1983: 6).

The period of Russian dominance was not only marked by the political and economic transition, but, above all, by the dominance of Russian culture and language. In practice, the language of the 'colonial occupier' has become the lingua franca for the Central Asian people (Rywkin, 1963). The 'imposed' popularization of the Russian language was a key element in the grand scheme of social engineering designed by Moscow, which had been carried out at different levels, on the Soviet republics (the so-called *Russification* or *Russifikatsia*) (Bacon, 1966). It should be noted that later, the Soviets would develop a theory according to which as long as the socialist society moved forward toward true communism, nations would tend to get closer, at the same time a new Soviet culture would emerge (Dickens, 1989: 4). In this respect Bennigsen and Broxup explain that:

> *"A new human being 'the Soviet Man (Sovetskiy chelovek) will tend to emerge, released from the past, free and happy. There will be no spiritual, intellectual, or even physical differences between Uzbeks and Russians, Estonians and Kyrgyz; they will share the same culture, believe in the same Marxism- Leninism, eat the same food and worship the same leaders. The culture of the Soviet Man consists of an harmonious blend of the best elements of all other cultures"* (1983: 3).

Among the reasons that explain the end of czarist domain, let us stress the adverse socioeconomic conditions experienced throughout the empire, compounded by the realities and demands of the First World War (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). The insensitivity of the Russians to the needs of local people, their reluctance to adapt to the local culture, and their concern with personal gains gave rise to an atmosphere of constant hostility between indigenous peoples and the Russian colonizers (Bacon, 1966).

The Soviet Union was built on the remains of the Russian empire, and continued the same colonial way of his predecessor (Mandel, 1942). Therefore, the Soviet Union would strengthen and complete the processes started by Tsarist Russia, introducing at the same time, some new concepts and projects, characteristic of the communist doctrine (Silver, 1974). At the moment when Bolsheviks had won the Civil War, all the old Russian Empire, its protectorates and colonies were in an extremely difficult socioeconomic situation (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). The famine that followed the war caused the death of thousands of people. Such conditions were even more severe in Turkestan, which had been colonized by the Russian Empire (Wheeler, 1977). Given such circumstances, according to Chinara Esengul, "the strategy - more friendly and inclusive – of the Soviet authorities who sought to implement a process of *korenizatsia* ('assimilation') appeared to be promising" (2009: 47). According to the author, "the main objective of the *korenizatsia* policy was to incorporate local cadres along with the Russians, in the management process, as well as in other areas of production and industry" (2009: 47). This process was limited by the low level of literacy, even among the regional elites. The creation of the Republics, in 1924, was an attempt by Moscow to 'kill two birds with one stone' (Rywkin, 1963). In other words, this meant pacifying the masses and nationalist elites in Central Asia, giving them formal autonomy and independence, retaining at the same time, control over the politics and economics of the region (Rywkin, 1963). This delimitation was an extension of the principle 'divide to rule', previously adopted by Tsarist Russia regarding Turkestan (Mandel, 1942). The process of building new Republics was intended to prevent the Central Asians to unite into a single pan-Turkic or pan-Islamic entity (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013).

The Soviet period was characterized by an intensive process of 'state-building' ... the Soviet state (Anderson, 1997). At the same time, the nation-building was well planned by the center that assigned to the new states "formal languages and culture, and administrative structures" (Anderson 1997: 47). However, the process of creating an 'ethno- national' identity was limited by and subject to development-oriented policies of supranational identity: the 'Soviet people' (Mandel, 1942). The Soviet nationalities' policy advocates an eventual fusion with the Soviet culture (Carrere d'Encausse, 1978). According to Mark Dickens, "although the Sovietization and Russianization were, in theory, two different processes, in practice they often seemed to coincide" (1989: 5). The Russians perceived themselves as civilizing agents in Central Asia during the Tsarist era, and this self-perception would change little during the Soviet era (Wheeler, 1966). However , Dickens warns of "the importance of recognizing that the Soviets made quite remarkable achievements [in Central Asia]: they reduced illiteracy, higher education has become accessible to a larger percentage of the population, medical services have improved significantly, and agricultural and industrial production raised the standard of living compared to anywhere else in the Islamic world" (1989: 5).

From the outset, Islam had proved more sensitive regarding Moscow relations with locals, being perceived by the Soviets as incompatible with the Marxist doctrine (Thrower, 1987). Considerable efforts have been made to eradicate the cult of Islam (Mandel, 1942). After all, this was considered a potential unifying political force against the Russian governance, and seen, from then on, as a threat to the Soviet domination and to the communist doctrine (Rywkin, 1963). However, the destruction of mosques and the total ban of the cult in the late 20s did not produce the expected results (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). On the contrary, it forced people "to live a double life during the Soviet era; publicly pretending to revere their Communist leaders, while in private, nurturing their pre-communist culture" (Olcott, 2002: 7).

From an economic standpoint, the region, which had been transformed into a source of raw materials under the Tsarist leadership, remained as such in the Soviet era. The "white gold" (cotton) continued to capture the interest of the Soviets in terms of regional economy (Mandel, 1942). These were not particularly active in what concerns the development of industry in the region, as a matter of fact the Central Asian economies were totally dependent on donations from the center, as well as from other Republics regarding staple foods (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). Such an economic policy "seriously affected the environment of the region" (Anderson, 1997: 116). Indeed, the excessive use of fertilizers and water resources to improve the crops of cotton would result in an environmental disaster, as evidenced by the degradation of the Aral Sea (Regional report of the Central Asian States, 2000).

The last decades of Soviet rule were important for two reasons: a) the liberalization initiatives (1985-1991) of Mikhail Gorbachev, the *perestroika* and the *glasnost* established "the immediate political context and a catalyst for the early stages of regime transition in Asia Central [and other Soviet republics]" (Collins, 2006: 103), b) this period is characterized by "negotiating pacts between the main political forces in each Central Asian state" (Collins, 2006: 50). This had been a time of change in the power configuration.

It is interesting to note how the vision of Russian domination affected the writing of history during the Soviet era (Dani and Masson, 1992). Prior to 1930, "the official line was that the Russian conquest of the non-Russian areas had been 'an absolute evil' (*absoliutnoe zlo*)" (Dickens, 1989: 6). Thus, those who resisted Tsarist forces were considered patriotic heroes. During the 30s and 40s, "Russian expansion turned to be seen as a 'lesser evil' (*naimen'sheie zlo*), compared to what could have happened to the people if the Turks, the Persians, or the British had conquered them" (Dickens, 1989: 6). By 1950, "the official view was that the Russian conquest had been an 'absolute good' ", and those who had fought against it would now be condemned (Dickens, 1989: 6).

The post-Soviet era would show that the policy in Central Asia had nothing to do with ideology but with the control of economic resources by the major clans. One of the reasons for the discontent of most Central Asians is economic, in that "the Central Asian Republics were heavily subsidized by Moscow" (Esengul, 2009: 52). On the other hand, "there was not a strong nationalist sentiment (civic or ethnic)", which "conditioned the society's passivity in terms of political participation and social mobilization during the years 1990-1991" (Esengul, 2009: 52). Loyalty concerned the subnational identities linked to the clans and family (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). As for Islam, after the efforts of the Soviets in eradicating it, this would no longer be a political force susceptible to mobilize people (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). Let us now draw some brief considerations on the geography and geopolitics of the region in order to better understand its importance in the international system.

Geography and geopolitics

According to Olivier Roy, "Central Asia is an area of variable geometry, which can refer simply to the Transoxiana or to the cultural space defined by the Turkish-Persian civilizations, stretching from Istanbul to the Xinjiang" (2000: 1). Central Asia is bounded by the Caspian Sea, Siberia, Mongolia, Tibet and the Hindu Kush. It is, as Rafael Kandiyotti explains, "an interior region surrounded by a huge land mass that covers a vast territory of steppes, deserts and mountains, occupying more than the space of Western Europe and about half the area of the United States" (2008: 76). From a geographic perspective, Central Asia includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, while Central Eurasia groups the aforementioned countries plus the three states of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).

In the opinion of Doris Bradbury (2011), Central Asia is "a more stable region than Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East in general", although, as the author states, a large portion of people demonstrate "unawareness towards this region" that lies "between some of the major political powers". Among the several common features to the Central Asian republics, it must be said the fact that "they're all 'inner' states" (Fourniau, 2006: para.17). Moreover, as Vincent Fourniau stresses, "it is nonetheless interesting to note that Central Asia is the region of the world with more inner/isolated states (or landlocked, if we prefer), when added to the five states of post-Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan and Mongolia" (2006: para.17). Uzbekistan, for example, is "a double- isolated country" since "it is surrounded by states that are themselves isolated" (Fourniau, 2006: para. 18). The fact that the Central Asian Republics do not benefit from direct access to the ocean exerts a major influence on their economic development, this being therefore a topic of great interest. This does not mean that Central Asia is a 'dead end' in a globalized world. The region, which includes the "Great

Silk Road", is, as Levent Hekimoglu regards, "an intersection of global routes, coming essentially from all corners of the planet" (2005: 76).

Returning to Fourniau, this author stresses that "unlike the Indian, Chinese, Ottoman or Russian peoples, Central Asia is not the result of a major political construction, previous or current" (2006: para. 22). Indeed, this expert points out that "history has no record of a single Central Asian state" and, moreover, "the unification of the region was due to forces of conquest, mainly exogenous" (2006: para. 22). According to Abdul Hafeez Khan, "Central Asia has been, at various times, divided, fragmented and conquered, but rarely has served as a seat of power to any empire or influential state" (2011: 62). Therefore, this author believes that "the region has proved, above all, a battleground for outside powers, than actually a power in its own right" (Khan, 2011: 62).

Central Asia is a region that, stricto sensu, only began to be analyzed, from the geopolitical point of view, in terms of field research by Western scholars, since 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Banuazizi and Weiner, 1994; Ferdinand, 1994; Fuller, 1990; Mesbahi, 1994). The term *Central Asia* characterizes a vast historical set, built around several subunits, as well as an amalgamation of economic, political, cultural situations, of identity processes and ethnic communities. The fact of constituting an important meeting point for economic, geopolitical, religious and ethno-linguistic interests, makes Central Asia an area endowed with an extraordinary historical depth, in the heart of the major global challenges nowadays.

The territorial division and the administrative status of the units that compose the region, show certain heterogeneity. The current definition of Central Asia, which views it as being formed by the Republics that once made up the USSR (i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), was developed in the mid-twentieth century, in order to distinguish these five Central Asian Republics. Shortly after independence, specifically in 1993, "this definition has been officially recognized by the Central Asian Republics, as well as by the international community" (Malik, 1994: 4).

In turn, for UNESCO, the Central Asian groups "the five former Soviet Republics (Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan)", but also "Afghanistan, Mongolia, western China and several parts of Pakistan, Iran and India" (Asimov, 2001: para. 2). It should be noted, like Michael W. Cotter (2008), that despite the economic and political heterogeneity of the region, Central Asia is, for all purposes, considered a 'geopolitical entity'. Several post-Soviet studies continue to interpret Central Asia as being limited to five former Soviet Republics: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Menon, 2007). This design leaves thus outside the above areas, even if these are deeply intertwined geographically and historically (Naby, 1994). In the Soviet era, the region was called "*Sredniaia Azia*" (which, when translated, means Middle Asia), comprising "Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan", and leaving out Kazakhstan (Lewis and Wigen, 1997: 179).

It is interesting to note that while Western experts use the term 'Central Asia', the Russian authors, in turn, did not (yet) abandon the old expression 'Middle Asia', although, unlike the past, this includes today Kazakhstan (Ismailov and Papava, 2010). The fact that there are multiple interpretations of the concept of Central Asia, thus attests to the lack of consensus about this.

The old Soviet Past *vs* the promising future

The boundaries of the region were defined and delimited by the Soviets in 1924, at a time when the Central Asian nations were mentioned in Soviet documents as "a Muslim/Turkish issue" (Koichiev, 2003: 48). Such references were relatively frequent. In fact, according to Petra Steinberger, Islam was perceived as "a differentiating factor between the local population and the newly arrived foreigners, like the Russians, Ukrainians and other settlers during the tsarist and Soviet domination" (2003: 235). So with the arrival of the Russians into Central Asia, Islam became an ethno-religious category, because they considered all the peoples of Central Asia as Muslims. Before the arrival of the Russians, various ethnic groups of the region, such as the Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Uighurs, the Dungan, had coexisted in "khanates and multiethnic empires" (Lowe, 2003: 108). Such coexistence under these premodern supraethnic entities was only possible due to the loyalty shown by many people regarding the supraethnic identity, Islam.

According to Chinara Esengul, "for almost seven decades of Soviet rule, the Central Asian peoples were economically, politically and socially united as citizens of a single state (the *homo sovieticus*)" (2009: 3). However, in 1924, before the unification under the Soviet regime, they were divided by Moscow, into five Soviet Republics. On the one hand, as Chinara Esengul mentions, "this strategy - ambiguous - had created artificially, political units based on ethnicity"; on the other hand, "loyalty should belong to the supranational unity: the Soviet state" (2009: 3). Therefore, "none of these elements had been well developed; the existence of the Soviet supra-state suspended, for several decades, the process of nation building"; moreover, this policy of national delimitation had serious consequences, since "these states were 'artificially' created, rather than develop organically" (Esengul, 2009: 3).

On top of that, let us mention the fact that the region's infrastructure operates, from the economic point of view, under the strict control of Moscow, for the benefit of the centralized economy. There was little trade between Central Asian Republics themselves, and their economies were considerably subsidized by the central budget. In the early 90s, subsidies from the metropole, constituted "a fifth of gross domestic product (GDP) of Uzbekistan", and "one-seventh of the GDP of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan" (Sarygulov, 1999: 240). That said, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought to the Central Asian nations not only independence and freedom that they had never experienced, but above all, the end of subsidies, as well as "a widespread negative economic impact on the lives of most people in this vast region of the world" (Linn, 2004: 1). This was the moment when a series of political rifts emerged between the Central Asian states. Besides the democratization of the state structure (Tolipov, 2007), of the ethnic minorities and borders, and the collapse of the common security system, "one of the most pressing issues in the region is the issue of religious extremism and terrorism", analyzed among others, by Mariya Omelicheva (2010). The problem of drug trafficking is also urgent in the region, and well-illustrated, among others, by the study of Timothy Krambs (2013). Erika Marat stresses in this regard that "as is the case in other spheres of organized crime, the Central Asian Republics were not prepared to deal with the increase in drug trafficking, and with the problems associated with this" (2006: 45-46). In turn, the issue of water management ranks first among the economic and environmental problems of the region, since, as mentioned, for example, by Mañé Road and Campins Eritja, "Central Asia is a transnational region with a use of shared water, but with an asymmetric distribution of resources" (2012: 2).

Since the collapse of the USSR, the Central Asian Republics have been undermined by instability. With a history based, in large part, on the life of clans, a relatively new and inexperienced leadership, and an incalculable potential of energy resources, Central Asia has experienced, as Philip Shishkin notes, "significant problems of corruption, abuse of human rights, civil unrest and conflict" (2012: 4). Afraid of the historical divisions within each country, as the result of belonging to clans, and of the growth of Islamic fundamentalist movements in neighboring countries such as Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, the Central Asian leaders have become dictators under the pretext of maintaining stability at all costs (Diuk and Karatnycky, 1993). However, as already stated by the New York Times in a 1999 article, but very timely, "such artificial and temporary stability ends, often, in explosive action" (1999: para.1). Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have been particularly affected by internal conflicts, although as noted by Philip Shishkin, "of all the Central Asian republics, Tajikistan is the one that probably faces the most troubling set of threats regarding stability" (2012: 14).

Political regimes established in the Central Asian Republics are all authoritarian, even though levels of authoritarianism vary according to the countries in question. Following a more precise fashion and as Alexander Warkotsch regards, "Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are semi-authoritarian states, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are run by authoritarian - if not dictatorial - regimes" (2008: 62). Central Asia is indeed one of the most authoritarian and corrupt regions of the world, as evidenced by evaluations carried out, for example, by *Freedom House* and *Transparency International*. Indeed, *Freedom House* (2012) ranks Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as "non free" in what regards political rights and civil liberties. Moreover, these three countries occupy the last positions of the *Corruption Perception Index* of *Transparency International* (2012). The central and unifying feature of these states lies, in practice, on the patrimonial aspects of their regimes. In fact, the main political dynamic (albeit informal) is represented by the relation between the Heads of State and certain interest groups rather than by the rule of law, or the relationship between the government and its people. In other words, "the power of government results from the patronage of powerful networks, tycoons of the world business and regional groups" (Azarch, 2009: 65-66). Therefore, "maintaining the *status quo* in the region is in the fundamental interests of the Central Asian Governments", since "the transformation of political and social structures may inevitably lead to the loss of power of the current regimes" (Azarch, 2009: 66).

All these Republics that comprise the region share a relatively recent present (about two decades of independence) as autonomous States, although they differed on the direction of their policies, authoritarianism, development, and how to deal with the challenges resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Although located in the same regional space, the various units, in this case, the States that compose it, are far from forming a homogeneous whole susceptible, from the start, to facilitate the understanding of the processes and political, economic and cultural realities to any curious person throughout the region. Instead, they tend to confuse an unprepared and naive spirit that might want to envision similar realities and worldviews in States that followed different paths, after the end of the aggregator factor, i.e., the Soviet Union. On the other hand, and according to this order of ideas, it is stressed that "any general consideration on policy about Central Asia must take into account the nature of the regimes in power, as well as the specific interests of each of them" (Esengul, 2012). If, on the one hand, it is too obvious that the role of leadership is important, on the other, the personal relationship between each of the leaders is, also, fundamental.

In a space where nothing is defined and everything is played, there is still a certain general nostalgia, more or less evident, in the *Homo Sovieticus* (the result of a same culture and endowed with a singular personality) vis-à-vis the golden times when he didn't have to worry about anything, because the 'system' was in charge of everything. Contrary to the past, the 'emancipated' central Asians are, today, by themselves, children of Central Asia, a subregion devoid of ocean access, thanks to the 'goodwill' of cooperation of neighboring States, including Russia and China, to access the rest of the world. And, it is interesting to notice as they are aware of their position of dependence regarding this 'goodwill' from the others, as evidenced by the rant of Meruert Makhmatova (2011), Kazakh investigator: "we are not major players, but part of the game". However, an important *part*, also capable, paradoxically, to frustrate the ambitions of foreign powers, as a result of their functional power. We should draw our attention, for example, to the singularity of Uzbek policy, sometimes pro-Russian, other times against it, which makes Karimov an unpredictable partner, depending on the interests which best suit Uzbekistan.

In short, the Central Asian Republics are today, marked by different types of political, economic and social transformations, different paces and different concessions about the meaning of becoming history. They converge on the willingness to maximize the benefits of both great and small regional games, but demonstrate a lot of inability to establish common strategies and cooperate for the resolution of great and small regional problems.

The region has been, in recent years, attracting the attention of foreign investors due to the existence of large reserves of oil and gas in three states: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Babak, 2006; Kenisarin, 2004). In 2010, the oil production in the region was around 3 million bpd[3], of which about 2.5 million were exported (BP, 2011). Weiss *et al* report that these exports represent "an important part in the world's oil trade", equivalent to "about 10% of the total exports of liquid fuel" by the member states of OPEC (2012: 9). Oil production and exports from the Caspian tend to grow substantially, i.e. to more than double over the next 25 years, as stated by the International Energy Agency (2011). This will be possible with the expected increasing, in the coming years, of the oil production from the Kashagan field (located in the northern Caspian Sea), which is believed to be one of the most important [in terms of energy] discoveries of the world, in the last 30 years (The Astana Times, 2011; ENI, 2012). According to Robert M. Cutler, "the offshore Kashagan oil field is generally rated as the 5th or 6th largest in the world, and has the largest reserves of any oil field outside the Middle East" (2011: para. 2). Its reserves are estimated at "38 billion barrels", of which an estimated 11 to 13 billion are recoverable" (Cutler, 2011:

3 Bpd (from the English "barrels per day", also bbl/d).

para. 2). Initially scheduled to go into production in 2005, this date has been continually extended due to "technical difficulties related to on-site exploration issues", and because of "quarrels about the nature of KazMunaiGaz's participation" (Cutler, 2011: para. 2). According to the Global Business Reports, the Caspian region has "proven gas reserves of more than 6 trillion cubic feet", most of which held by Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (2012: 1). On the other hand, Russia is a key player with regard to the Central Asian gas industry, as "while importing this resource of the region, Moscow can delay its own (and more expensive) gas production in Yamal and in the Seas of Barents and Kara, without suffering loss in exports and consumption" (Azarch, 2009: 61). According to the Energy Information Administration, "Turkmenistan is currently positioned between the six countries holding the largest reserves of natural gas in the world, and among the 20 largest producers of gas in the world states", possessing "reserves of approximately 7 trillion cubic meters in 2012, a considerable increase from about 2 trillion cubic meters in 2009" (Country Analysis Briefs – Turkmenistan, 2012: 4). According to Vladimir Socor (2012), Turkmenistan produced 59.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in 2011 - a small fraction of a vast untapped potential – and the exporting numbers of Turkmen gas, in that year, were 10 bmc to Russia, another 10 bcm to Iran and 14 bcm to China.

Final remarks

The Central Asian Republics, with their considerable energy and human potential are, as Johannes Linn regards, confronted simultaneously with "a challenge and an opportunity", insofar as the "Eurasian economic space is an active part of a new phase of global integration" (2007: 5). In fact, Central Asia is, in the understanding of Guo Xuetang, "the region where the effects of geopolitics and the competition between the great powers have been the most salient compared to any other part of the world" (2006: 117). Indeed, according to this author, "ethnic and religious conflicts, energy competition, the strategic positioning of various actors and political unrest in the region, have proved a recurring feature in Central Asian regional context" (Guo Xuetang, 2006: 117-118).

According to the Consul Fernando Melo Antunes (2012), there are three fundamental reasons that explain "the importance of Central Asia to the great powers". Firstly, "[the area] has energy resources in relevant amounts in both oil and gas" (Antunes, 2012). In this respect, Zehra Akbar (2012: para. 14) states that "regional and transregional states are well aware of the importance of the energy potential of Central Asia". The region is, in fact, about to become "a major global supplier of energy" in particular" in the sectors of oil and gas" (Akbar, 2012: para. 14). Returning to Fernando M. Antunes (2012), the second reason for the importance of the region to the major powers, is due to the fact that their neighbors, "namely China, Russia, the Caucasus and Europe" encounter "transportation problems" (meaning logistic terms), likely to be resolved and/or mitigated by "the countries of Central Asia". Finally, the region is significant, since it is composed of countries which have gained independence about 20 years ago, "have a very significant potential of economic growth" (Antunes, 2012).

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MANGANESE COUNTRIES

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Abstract

Cheickna Bounajim Cissé wrote an article in Mars 2013 in the Journal *Les Afriques* N. º 237, suggesting a new acronym, MANGANESE, for the nine African countries: Morocco, Angola, Namibia, Ghana, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa and Ethiopia. According to Cissé, this group of African nations will be the fastest growing states in the region over the next few years. The purpose of this article is to test the pertinence of the acronym, discuss the credibility and reliability of the future prospects of these countries by comparing selected socioeconomic and sociopolitical indicators based on the latest global rankings and trends. Likewise, the potential of Cissé's claim will be assessed, especially in relationship to drug trafficking and terrorism that may put their recent sustainability in danger now and in the future.

Keywords:

Manganese; emergent economies; terrorism; drugs; trafficking

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MANGANESE COUNTRIES

Maria Sousa Galito

Introduction

In March 2013, Cheickna Bounajim Cissé wrote an article for the journal *Les Afriques*, N.º 237, suggesting a new acronym called MANGANESE for nine African States (Morocco, Angola, Namibia, Ghana, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa and Ethiopia). He justifies this monogram arguing that the rapid individual economic growth of each of these countries is noteworthy, and will continue into the near future.

It is my contention that this perspective is questionable and must be scrutinized. To accomplish this, this paper is divided into five sections. First, statistics about Africa are examined in order to compare the potential of the continent with other geoeconomic areas of interest. Secondly, the pertinence of the acronym and key socioeconomic indicators are investigated. Thirdly, main sociopolitical aspects are assessed on the view of economic sustainability and levels of political stability (stable, failing, or failed state). Finally, in the fourth and fifth sections, the article considers questions about security; taking into account the level of terrorist threat and its relationship to drug trafficking in these states.

Statistics from the Fund for Peace and the Institute for Economics and Peace, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and associated tables and maps are utilized, providing a fuller understanding and visualization of the countries in consideration.

Africa – Massive continent, larger challenges

The United Nations African group is constituted by 54 member states. Africa is the second largest continent in the world in both area and population comprising of about 20% of the total landmass on Earth. Table 1 allows us to compare some basic economic statistics for Africa and the rest of the world.

IMF offers data for a joint group formed by the Middle East and the North of Africa, which may create some bias in the data's interpretation. Nevertheless, the Growth Domestic Product at constant prices (GDP cp) for this region until 2010 was higher than the world's average; the growth rates are expected to lower a bit, but are predicted to continue above 3% in late 2013 and are likely to be 4.5% in 2015 *ceteris paribus*. The Gross Domestic Product based on purchasing-power-parity share of the world (GDP PPP % world) was 4.3% in 2000, increased to 5.3% in 2010 and is expected to grow to 5.2% in 2013 and 2015.

Table 1: Africa's Future Economic Potential

Country Group name	Subject descriptor	2000	2005	2010	2013*	2015*
World	GDP cp (%)	4,8	4,6	5,2	3,3	4,4
Euro area	GDP cp (%)	3,8	1,7	2,0	-0,3	1,4
Euro area	GDP PPP (% world)	18,3	16,5	14,5	13,2	12,5
European Union	GDP cp (%)	4,0	2,3	2,0	0,0	1,7
European Union	GDP PPP (% world)	24,9	23,0	20,4	18,7	17,8
Middle East and North Africa	GDP cp (%)	5,7	5,8	5,5	3,1	4,5
Middle East and North Africa	GDP PPP (% world)	4,3	4,9	5,3	5,2	5,2
Sub-Saharan Africa	GDP cp (%)	3,6	6,2	5,4	5,6	5,9
Sub-Saharan Africa	GDP PPP (% world)	2,0	2,2	2,4	2,6	2,7

Source: IMF (2013)
*(previsions)

Table 1 shows that growth rate for the GDP cp of sub-Saharan Africa was lower than the world's average in 2000. Nevertheless, in 2005 and 2010 the rate was above the global standard performance, and is expected to continue to grow in 2013 and 2015. However, Sub-Saharan countries represent a small percentage of world's business (2% in 2000, 2.2 in 2005, and 2.4 in 2010), yet there are expectations for gradual growth in 2013 and 2015.

This economic behavior is particularly interesting when compared with European growth rates. For instance, the Euro Area had a GDP cp of 3.8% in 2000, 1.7 in 2005, 2.0 in 2010 and expected negative growth in 2013 (-0,3%). This change represents a gradually decreasing proportion of the total GDP PPP share of the world (from 18.3 in 2000 to 13.2 in 2013.

While the European Union and specifically the Euro Area are slowly losing a share of the world market, the Middle East and North Africa, and particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, are gradually attracting a larger share of the world market according to the data in Table 1.

However, isn´t Africa too big to be analyzed as a whole: defiant and heterogeneous in nature, patterns and risks? In the 21st century, many African countries are facing diverse economic, political and social challenges, and the next quarter century will determine if the strongest African markets can live up to their full potential.

> *"The trend since independence in the 1960s has been for the continent to become more heterogeneous, and there is no doubt that this tendency will continue in the next 14 years. More countries will collapse under the devastating burden of civil strife, economic bankruptcy, and disease. However, there is also the prospect that some other countries will begin to consolidate their political order, engage in the global economy, and develop a comprehensive set of governance practices that will allow their citizens to prosper."* (Herbst and Mills, 2006: 2)

These "other countries" engaging in the global economy could be Morocco, Angola, Namibia, Ghana, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa and Ethiopia. That is precisely the argument of Cissé (2013) suggesting a new acronym for nine emerging economies (the MANGANESE) that may stand out in Africa in the future, based on present growth performances. He also proposes specific criteria based on comparative growth performance since the beginning of the millennium. Surprisingly, Cisse (2013), as a reputed economist, presented his argument in *Les Afriques.* Les Afriques, founded in 2007, claims to be the first pan-African financial newspaper. It is a non-scientific journal, a weekly financial newspaper in a format of a tabloid.

Therefore, is this argument a form of "firework journalism" designed for an easy sell? Despite the venue, is there merit to these propositions? Indeed, Cissé's (2013) ideas, clearly original an insightful, must be tested in a more systematic way. "Are we heading toward an upended world?" (Cissé, 2013: 40) He posits that the traditional economic powers are facing social and economic shortfalls, magnified by the recent economic crisis while Africa is flourishing after several decades of negative growth. The main purpose of this monograph is to analyze this possibility and assess if the logic behind the MANGANESE contention is, in fact, enduring.

The Manganese acronym and associated socioeconomic indicators

Cissé (2013) coined the anonym, MANGANESE, to group nine African countries: Morocco, Angola, Namibia, Ghana, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa and Ethiopia. Why was this ACRONYM used when it is also a name for a critical global resource? Are these countries the biggest producers of manganese ore? Do they have the largest global reserves of this resource? According to the latest known deposits, in table 2, the answer is clearly indicated.

Table 2: Manganese's World Mine Production and Reserves

Country	Reserves	Mine production	
		2011	2012
South Africa	150.000	3.400	3.500
Ukraine	140.000	330	310
Brazil	110.000	1.210	1.100
Australia	97.000	3.200	3.400
Burma	NA	234	230
Gabon	27.000	1.860	2.000
India	49.000	895	810
Kazakhstan	5.000	390	390
Malaysia	NA	225	230
Mexico	5.000	171	170
Other Countries	Small	1.740	1.700
World Total	630.000	16.000	16.000

Source: Corathers (2013)

As the twelfth most profuse component of the earth's crust, manganese reserves are not widely dispersed throughout the world or regionally in Africa. (Virga *et al*., 2012, p. 11) About 75% of known reserves are held by South Africa, the only country on the list proposed by Cissé (2013). The relationship between the acronym and resource is reasonable for South Africa but not the other eight countries identified. If the resource of manganese is not abundantly present in the other eight countries grouped by Cissé (2013), why was it chosen? Perhaps the answer lies in the analysis of key socioeconomic indicators.

Table 3 shows some indicators like the percentage change of Growth Domestic Product at constant prices (GDP cp), the Growth Domestic Product Based on Purchasing-Power-Parity (GDP PPP) per capita GDP, and Population for the nine selected African countries: Morocco, Angola, Namibia, Ghana, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa and Ethiopia. Based on data, their markets are clearly growing.

According to the IMF's predictions (in Table 3), the economic growth of both Algeria and Morocco continue to be high. In the past decade, Morocco stabilized prices, improved its position internationally and launched an ambitious program of structural reforms, but must accelerate economic growth and expand job creation to avoid widespread economic and social inequality. In Algeria, state involvement in the economy increased, and parastatals control the oil and gas sector (just under half of total GDP), banking and telecommunications, and heavy industry.

Nigeria has the largest population of the MANGANESE group of countries. National revenues are derived mostly from the oil sector, public, and energy sectors, which employs much of the labor force. As Africa's second-largest economy, it has been one of the continent's consistent performers in recent years, with annual gross domestic product increases of between 5% (2005) and 7.2% (2013). Most of the economic expansion is due to trade and agriculture. The short-term macroeconomic outlook is strong overall, with probable lower inflation, reserve accumulation and continued growth (an expected 6.7% in 2018).

Since the end of civil war in 2002, Angola has experienced substantial economic expansion. The oil industry is dominant and sustains macroeconomic stability, but high levels of corruption, tariff, and non-tariff barriers to international trade act to constrain a market that is facing slower growth rates. Yet, if growth, peace, and social stability continue, Angola is poised to become a strong regional economic power. A clear indication of Angola's new found prominence was best demonstrated by its invitation to the March 2013 meeting of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in Durban, South Africa.

Namibia and South Africa are two countries with the biggest GDP PPP per capita GDP in Africa. Namibia's prospects for the medium-term remain favorable with GDP growth projected to continue driven by manufacturing, crop farming, construction and livestock. However, a weak demand for minerals (uranium, diamonds, zinc, silver, lead and tungsten) from the global economy may limit continued growth.

Table 3: Socioeconomic Indicators

Country	Subject Descriptor	2000	2005	2010	2013*	2018*
	GDP cp %	3,8	5,9	3,6	3,3	3,9
	GDP PPP (per capita GDP)	4438,8	6068,0	7059,6	7736,9	9541,4
Algeria	Population	30,5	32,9	35,4	37,0	39,9
	GDP cp %	3,0	20,6	3,4	6,2	6,0
	GDP PPP (per capita GDP)	2243,9	3328,6	5.748.9	6650,3	8481,6
Angola	Population	14,4	16,6	19,1	20,8	24,1
	GDP cp %	5,4	4,5	5,1	2,0	6,5
	GDP PPP (per capita GDP)	3912,1	4762,1	6343,9	6652,9	8748,0
Egypt	Population	63,3	70,0	78,7	84,2	93,8
	GDP cp %	5,9	12,6	8,0	6,5	6,5
	GDP PPP (per capita GDP)	474,7	636,1	1041,5	1258,6	1713,4
Ethiopia	Population	65,6	74,3	82,9	88,9	99,1
	GDP cp %	4,2	6,0	8,0	6,9	5,8
	GDP PPP (per capita GDP)	1443,0	2030,0	2732,6	3501,5	4603,9
Ghana	Population	18,4	20,9	23,7	25,6	29,0
	GDP cp %	1,6	3,0	3,6	4,5	5,8
	GDP PPP (per capita GDP)	2667,1	3585,1	4782,7	5537,5	7582,2
Morocco	Population	28,5	30,2	31,9	32,9	34,5
	GDP cp %	4,1	2,5	6,6	4,2	4,3
	GDP PPP (per capita GDP)	4064,4	5532,2	6967,9	8159,9	10683,8
Namibia	Population	1,8	2,0	2,1	2,2	2,3
	GDP cp %	5,3	5,4	8,0	7,2	6,7
	GDP PPP (per capita GDP)	1129,8	1795,5	2419,8	2883,4	3908,1
Nigeria	Population	119,0	136,3	156,1	169,3	193,9
	GDP cp %	4,2	5,3	3,1	2,8	3,1
	GDP PPP (per capita GDP)	6643,1	8653,7	10562,6	11750,4	14393,7
South Africa	Population	44,5	46,9	50,0	51,8	55,0

Source: IMF Database
Population (millions)   * (previsions)
GDP PPP (Current international dollar).

South Africa has the lowest GDP cp growth rates of the group but has the highest GDP PPP per capita GDP in the group. It is also a BRICS member. Its lucrative mining industry has recently been hit by a series of deadly riots over wages, hurting its export markets and alienating foreign investors. There is also high unemployment and income inequality.

Ghana was the first country in colonial Africa to reach independence and, since 1992, a stable democracy. It is rich in natural resources like diamonds, manganese ore, and cocoa, gold and petroleum. Its industrial sector is arguably one of the most developed of the group. The Ghanaian economy is expected to maintain growth based on international credibility of a stable business environment and a commodity boom supported by solid democratic institutions.

Egypt is facing a transition period since the so-called Arab Spring of 2011, which resulted in a regime change. The resulting political instability impacted currency volatility, capital outflows and a caused a decline of the overall fiscal outlook contributing to an economic slowdown. The Egyptian economy has been experiencing an extended period of instability and uncertainty, due to the challenging political and economic turbulence. As political reforms are being postponed and in the absence of a serious macroeconomic stabilization programs, the GDP will continue to deteriorate gradually, with low growth and increasing unemployment and inflation.

Ethiopia, the second most populous nation on the MANGANESE list, with almost ninety million inhabitants, is currently Africa's fourth-largest economy and East Africa's largest. Recent growth is based on the public sector with freshly improved services in education, health, utilities, and agriculture. These improvements are promoting development besides economic growth, which is very significant for the population.

Nonetheless, are these recent efforts enough? Some argue, "Poor countries with high population growth only have a chance for development if growth slows down and if birth rates decline." (Sippel, Kiziak, Woellert and Klingholz, 2011: 4) MANGANESE countries register strong economic growth rates and, in general, have natural resources to attract global interest. Likewise, they all have demographic challenges and African demographic growth rates, especially in sub-Saharan countries, are high, requiring more advancement in education, health and family planning (Sippel, Kiziak, Woellert and Klingholz, 2011: 5) to promote development and stability.

As shown, within the MANGANESE construct, South Africa has the highest GDP PPP per capita GDP of the group, holds sustainable GDP cp percentage growth, and has a large consumer market with 51,8 million people (as of 2013). It is still too early to assess if the rest of the states will maintain sustainable development, but for the sake of consistency throughout the article and validity of the argument, the use of the acronym will be continued.

Sociopolitical indicators

The MANGANESE countries, as designated, are located in various geographic regions throughout Africa, rather than grouped in the North or South (typical areas of reference). They have disputed natural resources and register notable economic growth rates, but although these are desired foundations for prosperity and stability, they are not sufficient. Outside the main cities, large-scale economic growth is minimal and the large rural populations are frequently poor. Besides food insecurity and disputes over natural resources, high unemployment and lack of hope cause pressing social problems. Foreign investment in these countries is increasing but due to internal challenges, progress in slow. But what are these internal challenges? In considering this question, it is important to know if MANGANESE countries are stable, structured and democratic; or if there is a tendency for state weakness, volatility and erosion of public goods within a fragile system plagued with a history of violence.

The absolute intensity of violence does not define a "failed state." Rather, it has to do with the enduring character of that violence (as in Angola, Burundi, and Sudan) and the quantity of hostility against the existing government or regime. Additionally, the vigorous character of the political or geographical demands for shared power or autonomy that rationalizes or justifies that violence must be assessed. Furthermore, the concept of "failed state" is not consensual[1], yet the Fund for Peace publishes an annual index that can aid research in reference to this important matter.

The Failed States Index (FSI) for 2012 ranks countries from 1º (the worst-case scenario) to 177º (the best-case scenario). The MANGANESE countries are listed in Table 4. The index is led by Somalia (1º), Democratic Republic of Congo (2º) and North Sudan (3º). The first fourteen countries are considered the most failed states in the world. There is a second "highly problematic" group from positions 15º (Guinea Bissau) to 33º (Congo Republic) and a third "challenging" group from positions 34º to 67º.

Table 4: Failed States Index 2012 for Manganese Countries

Ranking	Country	Total
14º	Nigéria	101,1
17º	Ethiopia	97,9
31º	Egypt	90,4
48º	Angola	85,1
77º	Algeria	78,1
87º	Morocco	76,1
106º	Namibia	71,0
112º	Ghana	67,5
115º	South Africa	66,8

Source: The Fund for Peace (2012)

Table 4 shows only the ranking of the MANGANESE countries. Nigeria belongs to the first group, Ethiopia and Egypt to the second group, Angola to the third.

Angola, Ethiopia and South Africa were reported as "failed states" in the final decades of the 20th century, but since the end of apartheid in South Africa and the peace agreements promulgated by Angola (2002) and Ethiopia (2000), these states are currently more stable and less vulnerable. Of the three, South Africa is clearly committed to the rule of law and good governance. It is a pluralistic democracy with a robust free press and an independent judiciary.

Still, South Africa borders Zimbabwe, ruled by President Robert Mugabe (after ambiguous elections results), a country with many structural problems likely caused by mismanagement and corruption. Likewise, Angola borders the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where ongoing conflict, suffering, and lack of development since DRC independence in 1960 justify a recurring UN peacekeeping presence. Similarly, unsustainable countries like Somalia, North Sudan and South Sudan border Ethiopia, and relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea are tense. Therefore, the future of emergent economies like Angola, South Africa and Ethiopia is tenuous if "boil over" from their respective neighbors occurs.

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[1] "The concept of failed states has attracted the attention of many analysts, and there are three mains poles of opinion. Some scholars uncritically accept the concept as a paradigm change in international politics with fundamental implications for how we should think about and address insecurity. According to this, 'weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for international order'. Secondly, other analysts are skeptical of the analytical value of the concept on epistemological grounds, arguing that it is difficult to objectively define, identify and analyze failed states with methodological rigor. Finally, a further argument in the literature rejects the idea of failed states as a politicized, ethnocentric, hegemonic concept with interventionist connotations" (Newman, 2009: 421).

In contrast, Namibia is located between Angola and South Africa. It is uranium-rich. Namibia's elite is accused of overspending the country's resources in a class-based society. The government has made some reforms, but the lack of an independent judiciary weakens the rule of law. Likewise, greater economic freedom has been stifled, and the economy underperforms in many significant fields.

Ghana´s economy is generally open to foreign investors except in key sectors, but the overall investment regime lacks efficiency and transparency. Ghana also has a positive track record of promoting human rights and good governance and is slowly becoming a role model country in Africa.

Angola is at peace since 2002 after 27 years of civil war, one of the longest African conflicts of the 20th century. However, the distribution system of national income is not transparent. It is based on power struggles, influences and ambiguous rules.

> *"Angola lacks four important ones (components), namely: a determined elite guided by a modernising vision for the whole nation; state autonomy from the interests of powerful cliques; a competent economic bureaucracy insulated from special interests; the capacity for effective management of private economic interests. Angola does, however, possess (...) a weak and subordinated civil society; and an uneasy mix of repression, poor human rights and legitimacy."* (Sogge, 2009: 24)

Ethiopia has strong border issues with neighboring countries. Following the war with Eritrea in the 1990s, a U.N. peacekeeping mission was established on the border. The mission ended in 2008, but relations between the two countries remain strained. Terrorist attacks are a major problem.

Algeria as the world's fourth-largest exporter of natural gas, has the eighth-largest natural gas reserves, and the 16th-largest oil reserves. After the "Arab Spring" protests in neighboring Tunisia and Libya, the government incentivized some political reforms in the country, but institutional weaknesses continue to undermine prospects for sustained long-term economic development.

Morocco is a constitutional monarchy lead by King Mohammed VI that, like Algeria, made institutional reforms after the 2011 "Arab Spring" to pacify popular movements and promote social stability in the country. The king proposed a new constitution that grants more independence to the Prime Minister, the legislature, and the judiciary.

Egypt is one of the top ten countries that worsened by rank between 2011/12, rising from 45º to the 31º positions after regime change. Egypt's first-ever democratically elected president is a major historical milestone for the country, but since his removal, Egypt faces serious, immediate and long-term challenges based on political/social tension.

In Nigeria, the rule of law is weak, and increasing social tensions among rival ethnic, political, and religious groups threaten stability and sustainability. These tensions may easily turn into conflicts if the violence escalates. Based on the experiences of the last century, tensions must diminish in Nigeria (and in Africa in general) in order to avoid drastic outcomes.

> *"Conflict must not be allowed to be a driver on the continent. The bloody 1990s taught African countries two lessons. Firstly, conflict in countries takes a devastating toll on those immediately affected by combat and countries in the surrounding region. (...) Secondly, African countries can only rely on themselves to end wars. The international community is fickle when deciding to get involved in African conflicts and not committed enough to see these difficult political questions through to satisfactory conclusions."* (Herbst and Mills, 2006: 5)

Consequently, MANGANESE nations are very heterogeneous as a group. They are fragile states that face many unresolved border problems, domestic tensions, and social problems that, in a worst-case scenario, could undermine their future stability and sustainability.

Manganese countries and terrorism

Up to this point, the argument this article proposes is that the acronym MANGANESE as an identifier of specific African nations exemplifying economic strength and future potential is questionable according to several indicators, namely, socioeconomic and sociopolitical. When this is taken further, the evaluation from a security standpoint is even more complex.

Table 5 lists the MANGANESE countries according to the Global Terrorism Index 2011. Nigeria is the first of the group of nine countries. Additionally, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia and Morocco cross into the Orange zone. Angola lists as number 65º. The three remaining countries (South Africa, Namibia and Ghana) have residual or no record of terrorist attacks, which is positive.

Table 5: Global Terrorism Index 2011 for Manganese Countries

Ranking	Country	Total
7º	Nigeria	7,242
15º	Algeria	5,831
27º	Egypt	4,576
37º	Ethipia	3,732
40º	Morocco	3,599
65º	Angola	1,696
111º	South Africa	0,054
116º	Namibia	0,000
116º	Ghana	0,000

Source: The Institute for Economics & Peace (2012)

The transnational network of terrorism (including of Al-Qaeda and its associate, AQIM) infiltrates the MANGANESE countries of Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia and Morocco and uses them to spread extremism and terrorism with an overall intention of establishing a new caliphate.

> *"There is no doubt that North Africa remains a critical area for radical Islam's (Salafi jihadism) expansion, which affects each North African country both idiosyncratically and transnationally. Over the past 20 years, the threat of terrorism has been reinforced by the emergence of organizational and institutional networking of nationally-based, radical Islamist movements with European and Middle East outreach, in particular its most active group in North Africa, Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)."* (Roussellier, Jacques: 4)

Initially, the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia) was the frontline in the global war on terrorism in Africa. The US government operated to dismantle Al Qaeda's activities in the region. At the same time, other areas of the African continent, like Nigeria and South Africa, were considered less critical. As the network seeks new territory, this idea may be changing based on necessity. (Lyman and Morrison, 2004: 75-76)

In the case of Egypt, a base for Islamist militancy has been incubating for as long as can be remembered. Al Qaeda's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is Egyptian. When he was still President, Hosni Mubarak continually faced militant violence including an armed Islamist insurrection. Since his overthrow in 2011, Egyptian security has declined markedly. Islamists and rebels are expanding into the Sinai Peninsula. Militancy has been less apparent in the Nile Delta, where most of Egyptians live and vigilance is somewhat higher.

Morocco largely occupies a considerable desert territory in northwest Africa named Western Sahara. In this territory, the state continues a 37-year conflict with self-determination groups such as the Polisario Front that declared the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on 27 February 1976. The Polisario announced its first government a week later; a claim not recognized by Morocco, which in turn, accused the Polisario Front of perpetrating terrorist attacks. Relations between Morocco and Algeria remain tense since Algiers continues to show considerable support for the rebels in favor of self-determination in Africa. Besides this, there is also the problem of radicalism amongst Moroccan expatriates:

> *"The monarchy long asserted that the legitimacy from its claimed descent from the Prophet Mohammed was a Shield against Islamist militancy. This belief has been challenged over the past decade, as expatriate Moroccans have been implicated in terrorism abroad and Morocco has suffered from terrorism at home. (…) Numerous small, isolated, tactically limited, extremist cells, which adhere to the Salafiya Jihadiya (Reformist Holy War/Jihadist) ideology, are*

> *viewed as the main threat to Morocco's domestic security."* (Arieff, 2012: 5-6)

Additionally, the countries bordering the so-called Arc of Instability across Africa's Sahara/Sahel are vulnerable to Al Qaeda-linked terrorists and militants, including AQIM. The Atlas Mountains of Algeria are poor areas just across the Tunisian border were police and soldiers have been searching for Islamic radicals and terrorists, but AQIM comprises of several brigades that operate in different regions of the country. In other words, if the main cell of the group is operating in the center of Algeria, other cells extend across the desert and less occupied areas of the Sahel (Mauritania, Mali and Niger). They have indigenous leadership and spread fear by committing suicide attacks.

> *"Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, established in January 2007, is the latest in a long line of Algerian jihadi groups. Like many terrorist organizations, AQIM enjoys global media exposure on activist Internet sites, but unlike other al-Qaeda franchises, it has managed to maintain its indigenous leadership. The group has become known for fearsome suicide attacks, which were previously unheard of in Algeria, but has failed to incorporate the jihadi outfits from neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. AQIM has therefore focused on the northern Sahara, carving out safe havens and threatening weak government forces (…)"* (Filiu, 2009: 1)

As for Nigeria, terrorism is increasingly problematic. It resisters regular casualties around oil claims, but many of the kidnappings and murders are more and more attributed to Islamic groups of rebels like Boko Haram.

> *"The number of fatalities in Nigeria has steadily increased over the last decade, and has seen a dramatic increase in 2011 with 165 lives lost as opposed to 57 in 2010. Until recently, most of the terrorist activity was associated with the dispute in the Niger Delta over oil extraction and claims of exploitation. The most active group in that period was the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. In recent years, Boko Haram, an Islamic terrorist group has operated in the north/north east of the country where it has carried out a wave of attacks against local Christians, churches and schools.»* (Institute For Economics & Peace, 2012: 19)

Despite the brutal violence of their attacks, Boko Haram is not officially considered a terrorist group. Nevertheless, at times simple criminals or even "freedom fighters" in the name of religion justify violence and terrorism. They seem to be keen, using all means, including armed assault and bombs to implement Sharia law in the country.

In the case of Angola, terrorism is rarely discussed. After years of colonial war (1961/1975) and civil war after independence (1975/2002), the country has maintained peace. However, the province of Cabinda, rich in oil, has been the center of conflict between the fighters for self-determination and the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). The *Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda* (FLEC) and other militia groups in the region were accused of carrying out terrorist attacks threatening the state's security. The January 8, 2010 attacks on Togo's football team were claimed by FLEC and "They were charged with 'terroristic crimes against the security of the state' indictment" (Ojakorotu, 2011: 103-104). Since 2010, there have been no major attacks.

Map 1 depicts terrorist activities as discussed in this paper, based on data of the Global Terrorism Index for the period of 2002/11. Redness refers to terrorist attacks.

Map 1: Africa – Global Terrorism Index 2002/2011



Source: The Institute for Economics & Peace (2012)

The distribution of red points on the map confirm the argument that MANGANESE countries, though different in number and intensity of terrorist attacks, live with this type of threat in their territory or neighboring countries. Red is mostly noticeable on the map in the north of Algeria, Ethiopia and all parts of Nigeria.

Terrorism and drug trafficking

The attack on the Amenas' gas plant in southern Algeria near the Libyan border killing many Algerian and foreign workers over a four-day attack in January 2013, highlight the nexus between organized crime and terrorism in West Africa. This has major implications for the international community and requires greater international support to the West African governments in the region. It is important to note that the terrorist threat in Africa mixes political, religious and ideological extremism with organized crime while historical and cultural differences and norms can thwart efforts to solve the problem.

Some rebels fight for religious reasons, others for political causes, but most of them have economical/financial interests in common, using smuggling, trafficking, and money laundering from natural resources and local production centers. Why? Terrorist groups need to finance their highly lucrative drug trafficking activities. "Illicit drug trafficking, one of the major activities of organized crime worldwide, benefits from insufficient international cooperation, regulatory inconsistencies, political obstacles and lack of governance over the global financial markets." (European Commission, 2011: 11)

Map 2: Main Cocaine Trafficking Routes



Source: EMCDDA and EUROPOL (2013)

The rise in drug trafficking, drug production and consumption, is fast becoming a major challenge in the pursuit of peace, stability and security in Africa. Drug trafficking is among the primary activities of organized criminal groups in MANGANESE countries.

The best-known routes from Latin America through Africa to Europe are the cocaine routes as depicted in Map 2.

Map 2 refers to different Cocaine Trafficking Routes, some of them maritime (dark blue), others by air (red and yellow) and land (light blue). Regardless of the route, one thing is clear; that cocaine is transited through West Africa and then through the Sahel region by land to Europe, or through South Africa using North/South routes.

Map 3: Terrorism and Drugs Trafficking



Source: Yonah Alexander (2011)

Map 3 portrays terrorist areas of operation with cocaine routes that occupy West Africa and the Sahel region. It traces the path of illegal trafficking perpetrated by terrorists like Al-Qaeda and African affiliates like AQIM. On these routes, profits from illegal drugs are used to purchase arms for regional conflicts. Because of this market, the Sahel represents a direct influence on the extensive "Arc of Instability" from North Africa to Somalia.

> *"AQIM's potential involvement with the cocaine trade flowing into Western Europe from Latin America via West Africa is another critical factor. If such a trend is confirmed, AQIM's expanding operational capabilities, combined with prolonged unrest and a volatile security situation in the Maghreb, could deepen instability in the whole region."* (Roussellier, 2011: 8)

Regionally, the current Mali conflict has expanded the Tuareg struggle over the desert areas of Mali, Niger, south Algeria and south Libya, but the arc continues through Chad, North and South Sudan, Ethiopia and ends in Somalia. This "Arc" crosses over two countries included in the MANGANESE anonym, Algeria and Ethiopia.

Besides the problems of terrorist operations and drug trafficking, the direct effect of drug-related corruption and money laundering exacerbate the chronic poverty and disrupt effective governance in many West African states. Meanwhile, rebel groups and powerful crime syndicates are illicitly trafficking narcotics across West Africa and trans-shipment of illicit narcotics from Latin America through Africa to Europe, making small fortunes. But extremists are not the only ones taking part in drug trafficking. In regions where youth unemployment and poverty are high, the prospect of earning big money in short periods of time beguiles young Africans into drug trafficking.

Countries supposedly wealthier in natural resources or even emergent economies like the MANGANESE nations are not safe from corruption and crime crossing their territory. Map 4 illustrates the overall situation in Africa, especially delineating the southern drugs trafficking routes.

Map 4: Drugs Trafficking in Africa



Source: Riccardo Pravettoni (2010)

Map 4 shows that MANGANESE countries of Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa, Angola and Namibia are at the heart of drug trafficking activity. In 2007, there were sizable seizures of hashish and cocaine in Morocco and Algeria, and hashish in

Egypt. Marijuana is smuggled through Nigeria and South Africa, but also in Namibia and Angola. There have been cocaine seizures in Angola and Nigeria. Additionally, heroin and opiates have been seized in Nigeria.

Conclusion

In 2013, Cissé wrote an article about the MANGANESE countries, an acronym identifying nine states in Africa based on the recent emergence of their economies. Even though these countries are clearly demonstrating positive growth, the contention of this article is to consider other areas of possible convergence by analyzing these countries together as a whole in order to assess the strength of the acronym. This article argues that even though there are socioeconomic and sociopolitical successes, there are radical problems that call the credibility of the acronym into question over the long run. Other variables must be considered besides current and predicted economic growth rates, like demographic growth rates, failed states index, terrorism and drugs trafficking to assess the future reliability of the so-called MANGANESE countries.

Algeria and Morocco, according to the IMF's previsions, may continue having significant economic growth rates, but international drug trafficking and terrorism routes cross their unsecured frontiers, which adds uncertainty to continued economic growth. Algeria and Ethiopia are within the Arc of Instability in the Sahel. Angola and South Africa are stable but have experienced violent episodes possibly classified as terrorist attacks in recent years.

Ghana and Namibia are the least vulnerable of the nine MANGANESE countries in a global evaluation that considers economic growth, demographic growth, failed state index, terrorism and drug trafficking. Meanwhile, South Africa and Angola will possibly gain more political and regional power in Africa if Nigeria disintegrates internally.

In general, when developmental policies fail to focus on health, family planning, and education, demographic growth can be a major threat to stability and sustainability of economic growth rates. At the same time, terrorism and drug trafficking create an insidious cultural cancer that seduce and bully starving, unemployed, and hopeless populations. Likewise, agendas of political/religious/ethnic rebel groups threaten the normal function of the rule of law, especially in states like Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Ethiopia. Corruption and violence are variables capable of undermining security in these territories and their borders; the type of environment that weakens the confidence of foreign investors and negatively affects progress of the markets, governments, and populations.

Therefore, this assessment concludes that a bright economic future is not guaranteed for, perhaps, all of the nine countries selected for analysis by Cissé (2013). Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria, are especially high in FSI scores undercutting their future potential despite past economic advances. South Africa probably comes closest to a definition of a MANGANESE country, but even this state faces socioeconomic and sociopolitical challenges that must not be taken lightly. On the other hand, Angola, Ghana, and Namibia are flourishing after several decades of conflict. They are hopeful prospects in the "upended world", where the main global powers are facing social and economic constraints pressured by the international economic crisis. Taking all of the African challenges into account, the final appraisal is that the MANGANESE counties need to make considerable strides in security, development, rule of law, and good governance to guarantee the kind of stable economic future that Cissé (2013) foresees. They are not there yet.

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A STRATEGY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARAB SPRING TO STRENGTHEN PORTUGUESE ENERGY SECURITY REGARDING IMPORT OF HYDROCARBON FROM ALGERIA

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Abstract

Energy plays a crucial role in the survival of the current civilizational model and the dispute regarding its control present a constant challenge to State security.

Portugal is highly dependent on other countries in terms of energy supply. Moreover, Algeria was the sixth biggest Oil exporting country in 2011 and is the second biggest exporter of Natural Gas to Portugal. Considering this and the effects of the Arab Spring in northern Africa, the situation requires assessment so as to determine strategies to reduce the risk for Portugal.

This paper is divided into 4 parts: introduction and 3 chapters. After making evident the relevance of the discussed theme, we present the concepts of security and energy safety and analyze the current situation in Portugal and in Algeria. In the final chapter, we propose a strategy for Portugal to contribute to the stabilization of Algeria and face the situation of Algerian supply of Oil and Natural Gas being reduced/interrupted; we suggest three Strategic Actions to strengthen the energy safety in Portugal regarding importation of hydrocarbons from Algeria within the context of the Arab Spring.

So that Portugal can maintain energy safety regarding Algerian hydrocarbon supply, a critical approach should be used to influence Algeria towards progress, greater democracy and stability and a neo-realistic approach based on a more diverse hydrocarbon supply source, enhancement of renewable endogenous resources, maintenance and development of strategic reserves and planning alternatives of energy supply.

Thus, three Strategic Actions (LAE) are identified: LAE 1 - Support the Algerian development and improve the Portuguese trade balance; LAE 2 - Invest in endogenous resources for energy production; LAE 3 – Widen the options for importing Natural Gas. The best option for the Portuguese situation is an integrated approach by means of adopting policies that allow for the three LAES simultaneously.

Keywords:

Energy saving; hydrocarbons; Algeria; Portugal; Arab Spring

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A STRATEGY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARAB SPRING TO STRENGTHEN PORTUGUESE ENERGY SECURITY REGARDING IMPORT OF HYDROCARBON FROM ALGERIA

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Introduction

Energy plays a crucial role in the survival of the current civilizational model and the dispute regarding its control present a constant challenge to State security.

"Arab Spring" was the name given to a series of popular uprisings that took place in 2011 in Northern Africa and the Middle East, whose catalyst was Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in Tunisia on 17 December 2010. He became the symbol of the population's revolt against poverty, unemployment, dictatorship and corruption in the country (general catalyst). As a result of these events, the dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and their leaders, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi were overthrown. These Arab, popular rebellions spread to other countries such as Yemen and Syria and gave origins to uprisings in the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.

Currently, the new authorities struggle to create new organizations and define strategies for the future, with no guaranteed success. Those countries where the Arab rebellions were successful suffered such impact that it will take them several years to achieve a balance. In the case of Libya, the situation is extremely unstable, at the risk of becoming a failed State and contributing to instability in the Maghreb.

Considering that from 2000 to 2011, Libya was the fifth largest exporter of Oil for Portugal (7.3%) and that because of the civil was there were no exports to Portugal from that country in 2011 (DGEG, 2012), the impact these popular uprisings may have on Portuguese energy supply is thus made evident.

As far as Portugal is concerned, since it is highly dependent on external energy supply (according to provisional 2011 statistics: 77.1%) and in 2011 Algeria was the sixth biggest exporter of Oil (9.6%) and second biggest exporter of Natural Gas (36.9%) for Portugal (DGEG, 2012), the need to better understand the situation is obvious so as to identify strategies to reduce possible risk for Portugal.

The concepts of Security and Energy Safety

The first references to the term "security" were made in the United States of America and were linked to the years following World War II. As all complex concepts, this one has more than one meaning, which requires that its scope be limited though not forgetting its wider dimension.

During the Cold War (1945 to 1989) there were three basic concepts of security: the predominant one, which we could describe as "state-military security"; the "alternative security" approach, critical towards the predominant idea, and the so-called "third world security", developed by authors who were not from North America, Western Europe or "developed" Asia. The predominant, realistic concept focused on the State and on its military security, essentially in its military and nuclear issues. The alternative security school was essentially critical of the realistic thought, considering that this derives from international insecurity and that social justice, democracy and disarmament, among others, are needed to increase the level of world security. Finally, the third world security perspective appeared as critical of the other two, stating that they were only focused on East-West analysis and ignored other world actors and the relevance of economic stability and development to security (Fernandes, 2011: 195 a 199).

With the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War (which began in 1989 with the end of the Berlin wall), world polarity ended. Due to the new international scenario, security became a hard to define reality.

In the last decade of the 20th century, the concepts of security are now divided into three main groups: The neo-realistic trend, which continues the state perspective of security though applied to new dimensions; the realistic-civilizational trend, based on the security of civilizations; and the critical multicultural and humanitarian trends, which share the post-positivist ideal of the individual's security and that of the groups that make civil society (Fernandes, 2011: 200).

After the Cold War, the neo-realistic approach to security is mainly due to Barry Buzan, who widened the military scope to individual, state, regional and systemic perspective, integrated in the political, economic, social and environmental realms. However, the State remained the main actor in international scenario and the object of security (Fernandes, 2011: 201 a 203).

Regarding the realistic-civilizational approach, we may state that this derives from the ideas presented in *The Clash of Civilizations. Remaking of World Order* (1996) by Samuel Huntington. This concept of anti-personalistic and anti-universalistic security advocates that the wishful universalism of Human Rights leads the Western world to intervene in the matters of other civilizations and thus promote world instability. For Huntington, the political, military and cultural dimensions, together with the economic dimension, are crucial for conflict to arise. (Fernandes, 2011: 203 a 204)

The critical concepts, multicultural and humanitarian, of many authors and schools (united due to their critical position towards the traditional realistic approach), may be divided into two main groups: the multicultural approach, based on humanitarian ideals; and that of critical studies on security. The first approach advocates a new concern with security of people, peace, sustained development and democratization, with environmental, social and citizenship concerns. The second approach: Critical studies on security are inspired by the School of Frankfurt, Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Habermas, and advocated by Ken Booth; the State becomes an actor in international scenario, analysis becomes wider in scope and more complex and individuals, groups in civil society and external and internal components of States are the focus (Fernandes, 2011: 205 a 207).

Considering the presented theoretical models to analyze the concept of Security in IR and the modernity of Ken Booth's thought, the adopted model will be that of "*critical theory of security"* in his "*Theory of World Security"* (Booth, 2007). This option is inspired by Karl Marx's statement that "the philosophers simply read the world in different ways and the most important is to change the world". Therefore, this is a critical paper as a means of contributing to change towards sustainable growth.

Energy security is also a concept that gathers no consensus. According to Daniel Yergin (Yergin, 2011: 264 a 283), it may be defined in a simple way as "reliable supply at reasonable prices"; yet, due to the complexity needed to achieve this, the following dimensions should be considered:

1. **Physical security** - protection of assets, infrastructures, supply networks, routes and the maintenance of reserves for crisis situations;
2. **Energy availability** - the capacity to physically, contractually and commercially guarantee access to energy;
3. **Energy safety system** - includes national policies and international institutions coordinated to maintain continuous supply and respond to emergencies;
4. **Investment** - without which adequate supply and available infrastructure at the right moment cannot be guaranteed, for which policies are required as well as adequate business environment that leads to long term return on investment.

The following **key principles** should also be listed required to create an emergency system and that allow energy safety to be fully increased:

1. **Diversification of supply sources** - use several supply sources and energy sources, thus reducing the impact of disruption and providing alternatives, accounting for the interests of consumers and producers through long term stability;
2. **Resilience** - through maintenance of excess in production, strategic reserves and adequate and spare stock maintenance along the supply chain, as well as a crisis resolution plan;
3. **Integration** - there is only one, complex, world market for Oil, 90 million barrels are traded every day. A disruption in supply in a given place impacts globally, thus, safety depends on market stability as a whole;
4. **Information** - crucial for the functioning of the markets, builds trust and allows for continuous investment. The International Energy Agency (IEA) and the International Energy Forum (IEF) contribute decisively to this;

5. **Markets** - if large, flexible and functioning adequately, they contribute to safety by absorbing impact and allowing that supply and demand respond more rapidly and with maximum ingenuity within a controlled system. Markets respond more often with efficiency and efficacy than centralized management.

Another noteworthy fact are **cyber-attacks**, especially those on electrical infrastructures and currently managed by computer systems susceptible to hacker interference. Additionally, energy safety must still be widened to respond to the changes in the infrastructures of information technology and of world economy, and should be addressed as both energy supply and **throughout the whole supply chain**, from generation to end user.

Considering this, energy safety contributes to security in the broader sense of the word. Any interruption in the supply of energy to a country harms its economy directly, as well as the well-being of its citizens and consequences in political and social stability. In the 21st century, a huge part of humanity is dependent on energy, both as fuel for vehicles, as well as electricity that puts in motion all type of equipment used in daily life. Industry, transportation and the State should also be considered as they are the biggest energy consumers. Therefore, satisfactory and continuous energy supply is a pre-condition for economic growth and for legitimizing a political entity and social progress.

Currently, the predominant idea of security is still based on the ability States and societies have of maintaining their independence and integrity, i.e., being able to deter threats to those societies' values, which allow them to live. Thus, the uncertainty regarding availability and possible use of primary energy sources compromises security as it places those values at risk.

Describing the situation

Portugal does not produce Coal, Oil and Natural Gas, and does not produce electricity from nuclear plants. The country's primary energy sources are hydroelectric, wind, solar and biomass energy, energy production based on waves is just starting. However, oil products are refined, stored and distributed and Natural Gas is stored, gasified and distributed in Portugal.

According to DGEG (DGEG, 2012), Primary Energy consumption in Portugal has been decreasing approximately 3% a year from 2005 to 2010; in the same period, the consumption of Crude Oil has decreased 7% a year. Concerning Natural Gas, there was a 4% yearly increase in consumption between 2001 and 2010, together with a 3% yearly increase in the consumption of renewable sources. This change was due, on the one hand, to the production of electrical energy using Natural Gas and, on the other hand, to the policy on investment in renewable energies in order to take advantage of national energy resources and reduce dependency on external energy sources.

In terms of consumption of energy products, a shift in the paradigm was visible in the last decade, consumption of Natural Gas increased (100%), of oil for heating (45%) and LPG (25%), and consumption of oil (85% less), fuel (80% less), 98 gas (75% less) and Coal, butane, propane gas and colored diesel decreased. Consumption of IO 95 gas and diesel slightly increased, its peak having occurred in 2004 and 2005, and has remained stable ever since. We may state that there was an increase in the use of diesel vehicles, an increase in the number of vehicles but together with higher motor efficiency and consequent decrease in consumption, which allowed for the slight increase in consumption of most common fuels. LPG-run vehicles are now more common because of the fact that they are economical (especially due to tax on LPG) and oil for heating is also more usual because of the increase in the purchasing power of the Portuguese in the first decade of the 21st century.

As to the origin of Crude Oil, the main 5 countries from which Portugal imported Crude Oil between 2000 and 2011 were Nigeria (18.1%), Saudi Arabia (12.2%), Brazil (8.7%) **Algeria** (8.3%) and Libya (7.3), a total of 54.6% of import from 24 different countries. Meanwhile, the only countries that continuously supplied Oil to Portugal were Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. Brazil has been a supplier since 2001 and Algeria and Kazakhstan since 2004. In 2011, the 5 main suppliers of Crude Oil to Portugal were Angola (20.0%), Saudi Arabia (14%), Brazil (13.2%), Kazakhstan (13.1%) and Nigeria (11.7%), a total of 72.0% of all imports from 12 countries. **Algeria** is next, with 9.6% (the other 6 countries were Azerbaijan, Cameroons, Equatorial Guinea, Mexico, Norway and Russia). Noteworthy is that this year no Oil was imported from Libya, a country which accounted for 13.82% of imported Oil to Portugal in 2010. This change was due to the conflicts that broke out that year in Libya; Portugal adapted its imports by increasing imports from Angola (34.6% more), Saudi Arabia (23.3% more), Brazil (20.3% more), **Algeria** (48.4% more) and Russia (76.5% more). We may then state that there is a high probability that Portugal continues to import Crude Oil from Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Algeria and Kazakhstan if these countries offer the same conditions as in the last decade.

Regarding Natural Gas, from 2001 to 2011 the countries which Portugal had imported the most from were: **Algeria** (54.6%) and Nigeria (41.6%), totaling 96.2% of imports from 6 different countries. During this time these were the countries that supplied Natural Gas to Portugal without any interruptions. In 2011 the two major suppliers of Natural Gas to Portugal were Nigeria (54.9%) and **Algeria** (36.6%), totaling 91.5% of imports. When we compare the number of Oil suppliers with the number of Gas suppliers, **it is obvious that Gas suppliers must be diversified and new countries should become part of this group**.

Since 2005, consumption of Primary Energy has been decreasing, together with an increase in home production based on primary renewable energy sources and a gradual fall of external dependency (from 88.8% in 2005 to **77.1% in 2011**). Considering that non-renewable, economically viable primary energy sources do not exist in Portugal and that, therefore, the country is dependent on other countries for energy supply, we can state that energy partners are essential for the State to maintain the citizens' living conditions and for the nation's economic growth.

Portugal's vulnerabilities regarding Algeria within the scope of its energy supply safety result from the fact that Portugal does not have Oil or Natural Gas and depends highly on import of Natural Gas from Algeria. This dependency is heightened by the current trend to increase consumption of Natural Gas for producing electricity[1], for industry and private consumption. Continuous interruption of that primary energy supply will imply the search for alternatives, whether through the Iberian Peninsula pipeline network or through the LNG-terminal in Sines.

The most relevant threats to the stability in hydrocarbon supply from Algeria are the terrorist attacks to energy infrastructures; the appearance of new hydrocarbon extraction technologies which decrease the competitiveness of Algerian Oil and Natural Gas; the continuous falling of the price of Oil and Natural Gas ; the increase in political tensions between Maghreb States deriving from the eventual collapse of Libyan State, or with Morocco due to border conflict or to Western Sahara conflict; and the political instability dues to divisions in the leading elite on succession of Abdelaziz Bouteflica.

Interruption of supply due to terrorist attacks may initially lead to use of reserves and, in case this interruption lasts, to search of alternatives. The appearance of new "unconventional" extraction technologies may give origin to alternatives to hydrocarbon import due to use of endogenous resources or of resources from stable and nearer countries. Both the reduction in the demand of Algerian hydrocarbons and the continuous fall in the price of hydrocarbons will lead to Algerian government's diminished capacity to maintain its status through oppression of uprisings, increase in public expenses, of public servants' salaries, of subsidies to staple goods and to access to preferential loans to young people, which has negative effects on the country's economic and social balance and, consequently, lead to increased risk for Portugal.

The increase in political tension among the Maghreb States regarding the situation in Libya or with Morocco concerning Western Sahara may force Algeria to change its attitude towards cooperation in security and defense and to non-interference in other States' internal affairs, participating in coalition forces among Maghreb States and/or European forces to fight terrorist groups outside their borders and lead to resources being allocated to this objective rather than to the country's development.

The possible internal instability regarding succession, among others, may have the following consequences: a president being appointed and status quo being thus maintained; the rise of an alternative leader, able to reform the country's politics and economy; or the collapse of the State with unpredictable consequences (very unlikely due to the hegemony of the military in the power structure).

Despite all these events, the consequences of the Arab Spring have not yet reached Algeria and the main reasons for that general rebellion not having reached Algeria are the financial resources resulting from the abundance of hydrocarbons, aversion to becoming involved in another civil war and the possibility of an increase in radical Islam. In practice, the high ability and experience of security forces in controlling uprisings without casualties and the lack of organization and common objectives among the insurgents, together with the increase in public expenses, subsidies to staple goods and easier access to preferential credit for young people have been crucial factors to pacify the Algerian people.

In terms of external politics, the current conflict levels in Mali and Libya should not be ignored because of their possible impact on the relations among the Maghreb States

[1] In 2013, the amount of rain and wind led to increase in energy production from renewable sources, thus the combined-cycle power plants (which use natural gas) had a small production; yet, in the long run, the increase in consumption remains.

and because of the support they may provide to terrorist groups by offering staff, shelter, training and armament.

A strategy for Portugal

In the medium and in the long run, to improve the living conditions of Algerians and decrease internal conflict, the Algerian State must invest in the technical training of its citizens, especially of its youth and in the following fields: hydrocarbon extraction, processing, transport and distribution; iron ore, phosphate, uranium, lead and zinc extraction, processing, transport and distribution; agricultural product extraction, processing and distribution; construction and building activities (construction materials, infrastructures and buildings), tourism, education and training, health, industry and services; **diversify its economy**, essentially in the already mentioned fields in terms of technical training, resorting to external support by always including Algerians because of its potential for multiplier effects; and **deepen its democracy**, effectively separating executive, legislative and judicial powers, reducing military influence on politics, making politicians accountable and increasing public participation in politics. All these measures must be synchronized so that diversification of economy is made using national human resources (who need technical training) and that deepening of democracy is gradual and based on the increased availability of human resources who are adequate training and education for political positions, and an improvement of living conditions of Algerians. An effective deepening of democracy is only possible once the living conditions of Algerians is attained and unemployment decreases, as these are determining factors to reduce radical Islam's room for subversive activities.

Therefore, we propose two different approaches for Portugal to safeguard its energy safety regarding Algerian supply of hydrocarbons:

- A **critical approach**, focused on influencing Algeria towards progress, deepening its democracy and stability, contributing to the security of its citizens through economic, political and social development so that, in the medium and in the long run, they may achieve equality in terms of political, economic and social rights (become emancipated) and, at the same time, the physical safety of the supply chain is ensured as well as the reinforcement of investment in energy infrastructures, allowing for continuous flow in the supply of Oil and Natural Gas to Portugal and to other importing countries;
- A **neo-realistic approach**, based on diversifying hydrocarbon supply sources, increasing the use of renewable national resources, maintaining and developing strategic reserves and previewing solutions for crises by planning alternatives to energy supply to Portugal.

Thus, three Strategic Actions (LAE) are made evident to safeguard Portugal's energy safety regarding possible impact of Arab uprisings in Algeria which may have consequences in hydrocarbon supply to Portugal; the first Strategic Action is within the scope of the critical approach, the other two within the scope of the neo-realistic approach

LAE 1: Support the Algerian development and improve the Portuguese trade balance:

Good diplomatic relations between Portugal and Algeria, the fact that Portugal is in the European Union (EU), together with new European programs being launched on economic and social development in Maghreb, make the flow of people and goods easier and allow Portugal to deepen the cooperation with Algeria within the EU. Within this framework, Portugal may allow for easier relations between the EU and Algeria, deepen the interdependence between the two countries and improve the trade balance through promotion of increase in export of goods and services, simultaneously contributing to the Algerian economic development through diversifying its economic activity in the agricultural, industrial and service areas. Portugal may also offer support in technical training, thereby generating employment and improving Algerians' living conditions. In the medium run, this type of measures may contribute to narrow the room for terrorist groups to work in Algeria and the potential negative effects for Algerian economy of a decrease in price of hydrocarbons.

Considering Portuguese energy companies' policy of internationalization and the interest of the Algerian government in establishing partnerships with Portuguese companies, further involvement of PARTEX and the involvement of GALP in Algerian upstream may be advantageous for the Portuguese trade balance and for the energy companies. Similarly, due to the situation the construction activity is currently facing, there is opportunity for the Portuguese construction and building industry to internationalize and contribute to the improvement of Algerians' living conditions through building infrastructures, housing and industrial buildings and thus foster the country's social stability.

Another aspect to be explored and which can be beneficial for both countries is Portuguese experience in renewable energy through exporting and assembling of photovoltaic panels and aerogenerators and diversifying the Algerian energy sources and improving the environmental sustainability of the country and the world.

In view of the current economic and financial scenario and the limited financial resources in Portugal regarding structuring investment and Algeria's financial resources, this is an opportunity to jointly explore the aspect referred above, for example to finance the enhancement of energy producing technology using renewable sources would be beneficial to both countries.

LAE 2: Invest in endogenous resources for energy production:

Due to lack of non-renewable primary sources of energy, Portugal is highly dependent on other countries for energy supply; however, since 2005, consumption has gradually decreased. As consumption of Primary Energy has been decreasing, together with an increase in home production based on primary renewable energy sources, a gradual fall of external dependency is visible, from 88.8% in 2005 to 77.1% in 2011.

Investment policy in renewable energy sources, water, wind, solar or biomass, has been crucial to reduce energy dependency and has been a good investment in the medium and long run. According to Direção Geral de Energia e Geologia (DGEG h), 2012; 12), in 2011 Portugal was third in renewable energy sources for the production of electrical energy in Europe (45.3%) right behind Sweden (57.2%) and Austria

(56.3%). Considering that the average in the EU 15 was 21.7%, and that, at global level, only New Zealand (73.3%) and Canada (63.7%) evidence higher contributions from renewable energies, Portugal is at the forefront of renewable energy sources for sustainable production of electrical energy.

Given the present economic and financial crisis, Portugal does not have financial resources to make structuring investments in energy systems. However, the 'decarbonization' of the economy, due to the increased energy efficiency in transport, housing and industry, and due to the investment in renewable sources, is the safest path because, though it requires investment, in the long run it will lead to higher energy efficiency and renewable sources are more sustainable economically and environmentally, decisively contributing to the decrease in energy dependency from abroad and to environmental protection.

In terms of hydrocarbon prospection, though no economically viable sources have been found in Portugal, the country should continue to foster its search in its onshore and offshore.

LAE 3: Widen the options for importing Natural Gas:

In terms of the need to replace Algerian hydrocarbons in the Portuguese energy mix, Portugal must bridge the gap by importing Oil and Natural Gas from other countries. In the case of Oil, it is easy to solve, considering that in 2011 Portugal imported only 9.6% From Algeria, the country imports this primary source of energy from several countries and recently evidenced (during the civil war in Libya) that it is flexible enough to adapt and search supply from other exporting countries. In terms of Natural Gas supply, the solution is more complex considering that, up to now, Algeria has been Portugal's biggest supplier, this, the need to search for alternatives.

Upon the implementation of the trans-European energy networks proposed by the European Commission, the LNG-terminal in Sines, together with the oil product refining, storage and distribution systems and Natural Gas storage and distribution systems in Portugal may be an alternative to hydrocarbon entry pipelines in central Europe, and Portugal may use that network to import hydrocarbons from northern Europe. Additionally, Portugal should increase its LNG imports in the spot market to Portuguese-speaking countries such as **Brazil** and **Mozambique**, to other Atlantic countries such as **Venezuela** and the **USA**, and to Middle Eastern countries, such as **Qatar** and **Saudi Arabia**, considering the conditions offered by these suppliers.

The most favorable option for the Portuguese situation is an integrated approach through adopting policies that allow for implementing the three identified LAE, the main effort being on the critical approach so as to contribute to decreasing conflict and improving world order.

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THE WEIGHT OF 'TRADITION' IN MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE ARGENTINIAN CASE DURING THE DOHA ROUND

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Abstract

The article studies the impact of 'tradition' as a variable inside the analyses of foreign policy. For that end, it considers a particular case, the participation of Argentina in multilateral commercial negotiations. The central argument signals that, for Argentina, the negotiating tradition has had an important role as a guidance in foreign policy actions regarding multilateral commercial negotiations, especially in the moments of crisis. In addition, that, within this tradition, the main variable in the configuration of Argentinian options has been the development strategy.

Keywords:

Tradition; Foreign Policy; Commercial Negotiations; WTO; Argentina

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THE WEIGHT OF 'TRADITION' IN MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE ARGENTINIAN CASE DURING THE DOHA ROUND

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The liberal and neoliberal theories of international relations put an emphasis on how domestic conditionings are important when it comes to define States' foreign policies. In the study of the positions and strategies in international negotiations such as commercial ones, the economic conditionings have been the most widely developed within the set of specific domestic variables of such foreign policy (Rodrik 1995; Milner 1999; Frieden y Martin, 2001; Moravcsik 1997). Regardless of other elements, less tangible, they have also contributed to decision-making, and allow explaining State conducts, especially in the initial instances of negotiation processes.

From the analysis of the Argentinian case, in this article we aim to see how one of these intangible elements, the negotiating 'tradition', made up by imageries, ideas and the weight of History, have guided the policy makers decisions in one of the most important negotiations from the start of the 21st century, the Doha Round in the World Trade Organization (WTO).

This negotiation is relevant, not only due to the ambitions agenda that it presents commercially, but also as a distinctive process of the changes made during the first decade of the 21st century regarding international commercial relations. It allows us to see the reconfiguration of power relations among developed and emerging countries, as well as between the latter and the rest of the developing countries. Furthermore, it illustrates how the variations in prices of commodities and in the ways of production and commercialisation ended contributing for the configuration of the agenda in sensible subjects, priority or excluded.

Argentina is a medium-resources country that had a late incorporation in the multilateral trade regime, but, from the 1980s onwards, increased its negotiating activism in the different 'rounds'. For this country, the Doha negotiation in the star was mainly agricultural and could imply a growth of up to 20% of exports, and 5% of Gross Domestic Product (MRECIC, 2003). Regardless, due to the domestic crisis that had its epicentre in December 2001, the resources and technical, political and economic instruments for the negotiation were limited. Consequently, Argentina started the Doha Round with a high chance for having an active participation and with high levels of uncertainty.

Our hypotheses are that, for Argentina, the negotiating tradition has had an important guidance role in foreign policy actions regarding multilateral commercial negotiations, especially in the moments of crisis. Moreover, that, within this tradition, the main variable in the configuration of Argentinian options has been the development strategy.

The following points expose some theoretical and methodological considerations regarding the 'tradition' as a variable for the analysis; after it, its confirmation throughout Argentinian negotiating history and, finally, we analyse the role it had in the primary definitions of the Argentinian position and negotiating strategy in the initial moments of the Doha Round, of the WTO.

1. The 'negotiation tradition' in the analyses of foreign policy

The question about how to configure the foreign policy of a country is the central interrogation from the perspective of foreign policy analyses. These started to develop with greatest intensity since the 1970s and 1980s, even beginning to become a 'sub-field' within the subject (Hudson, 2005). They are characterized by its actor-specific focus, as an opposition to the system (Hudson, 2005) and are the bases for all international and transnational relations that are based in human decisions, individually or as a group. Thus, this makes us consider that, for the understanding of the State's conduct, those who make such decisions, which are the decision-makers, national and international that have weight over them, and how their implementation takes place.

One of the variables that incorporates in these analyses gives us a throwback to *historical, cultural and social factors,* and to the role these have in the configuration of a *tradition* that will influence policy makers. According to authors such as Van Klaveren (1992) 'the values can generate demands of action by restricting the options available for the decision-making players'. In fact, these intangible elements are made up in mental maps for the actions, affecting the selection of results before multiple options, constitute institutions and, conform identities (Goldstein and Keohane, 1999). In a last stage, these elements come together in the notion of identity, regarding the self-perception that the players have regarding their place in the world and the expectations of action deriving from it. Merke agrees that 'all foreign policy needs to give a sense to the situation and build its most relevant objects. For this, foreign policy resorts to a range of identity attributes that serve to make some actions possible and restrain others. [In as much,] identity appears, simultaneously, as a precondition of the action and as reproduced by that same action' (Merke 2009: 75). Therefore, this tends to endure in time and be a more or less constant guidance of the policy.

When these elements are reiterated in the change of diplomatic actions that then conform to a 'tradition', in our case, a negotiation tradition, that will have a guidance function. We agree with him in the idea that political identity is made up as reference with a temporal system, articulated with the accumulation of experiences and interpretations of past actions, projecting to the future, giving it the meaning of the action (Aboy Carlés, 2001 in Pereyra Doval, 2013: 88).

On their part, values and history also configure in elements of the United States soft power, contributing to the perception that other States have of their own action regarding foreign policy, particularly in negotiations. As Bruening states (2007), the United States soft power is based in the continuity of the values that guide the government's actions, in the domestic plan, in the international organizations and in foreign policy.

Within the commercial policies, the relevance of this kind of studies that focalize in intangible variables has been placed in evidence by Krueger's work, accounting for the variation of ideas regarding trade and the economic development as an explaining entity of the changes in the commercial policies in the latest years (Milner, 1999). Tussie (2009) and Botto (2007) also developed the link of the ideas and knowledge in the formulation of foreign commercial policies, facing the negotiations. Furthermore, Odell (1988) has underlined the importance of the ideas and budgets prevailing among the decision-makers at the time of explaining the selection of a certain position and negotiation strategy. In a broadest sense, Pereyra Doval (2013) analysed the weight of this variable, tradition, in case analysis, such as in the one of Brazilian foreign policy.

This, in this literature one identifies a certain line of continuity by considering the role of this intangible variable in the foreign commercial policy analyses, and/or participation in international negotiations. One also sees a connection between the way in which this tradition, identity and material bases, from the role played by the ideas or ideologies around the model or development strategy. In fact, the model or development strategy is a key for the understanding of the negotiation participation of a State. The same establishes a definition regarding which position to adopt in the international environment, how to gain advantages in it and, at the same time, how to reduce the vulnerability with which the State is exposed faced with the impacts of globalization (Stiglitz, 1998). This way, the set of historical experiences linked in the articulation between the development model and negotiation participation, configures an imaginary of 'tradition' that results as the ordering of the mental maps of negotiation agents in the individual plan.

In the following section, we expose how it has been like that in the Argentinian case, in multilateral commercial negotiations.

2. Methodology design for the analysis of the negotiation tradition in the Argentinian case

As one can see from the theoretical arguments presented above, the negotiation tradition as an investigation object constitutes a complex element, difficult to operate. This consists in the identification and reconstruction, in a reference historical period (first, the negotiations during the GATT and, afterwards, the Doha Round), of the set of values, identity perceptions and predominating ideas that the negotiators and policy makers have sustained around the development model, the insertion strategy and the role assigned to the commercial negotiations in the said articulation. For that, it was necessary to adopt a unique case study approach (Gundermann Koll, 2001), that allowed to deeply research the knowledge of the Argentinian case.

The methodology applied for this work was, therefore, qualitative in nature. We resorted to several bibliographical, documental and statistical character, which are referenced throughout the following sections. Furthermore, semi-structured interviews were performed with Argentinian staff involved in the Uruguay Round and in the Doha Round[1]. The analysis technique implemented in all cases was the content analysis,

[1] We interviewed Taiana (Foreign Affairs, International and Cult Trade of Argentina, 2005-2010), Dumont (Argentinian Representative before the International Bodies in Geneva, 1999-2010), Chiaradia (Representative before the International Bodies in Geneva and the WTO, 2002-2010), Taboada (Permanent mission of the Argentinian Republic before the International Bodies in Geneva, 2002-2008) and Petri (responsible for the Unit of Agricultural and Animal Raising Policies in the Ministry of Economy, 2004-2008). The interviews were performed between September and November of 2012.

oriented to the development of the wide description of the phenomenon in question (Dey, 1993: 30).

3. The sources of the Argentinian in the multilateral negotiation of GATT trade and the identification of the 'negotiation tradition'

Before the launch of the Doha Round, Argentina had already developed a certain real participation[2] in multilateral commercial negotiations. In literature, we particularly underline the conduct performed by this country in the Uruguay Round (Tussie, 1993; Miller, 2000). Regardless, it is possible to identify a relevant presence of the country since almost 40 years earlier. Such experiences would configure the negotiation tradition, in which many of the diplomats responsible for the process of the Doha Round subscribed themselves.

As was previously stated, in the configuration of this tradition, elements of the debate around the development strategies have been conditioning the decisions throughout the years. In Argentina, the development model has been a volatile variable, subject to the country's macroeconomic variations signed by decades by the cycle of 'stop and go' (Gerchunoff, 2006). Historically, the development of the industrial and agricultural sector had been fighting, expressing the fluctuations of the type of exchange an in the external restriction, the distribution dilemma central to the country's economy. As a result, there has been a pendulum movement between liberal and development, which had found an echo as much as in the predominant political parties, peronism and radicalism, as in the military sector, that in several occasions throughout the 20th century assumed the command of the nation's executive power[3]. The most active participation in the multilateral negotiations has been more close to the liberal option, forming he negotiation tradition to study.

Besides having participated in the Havana Conference, Argentina was not a founding member of the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (GATT) although it was converted in contracting party of the recent said agreement in the 11th of October 1967, under the government of Onganía[4].

As Russell states, 'In the name of the economic independence the Perón government 'totally abstained' from voting the final document of the extensive United Nations Conference about Trade and Employment, held in Havana from the 21st of November, 1947, up to the 24th of March, 1948, that proposed the creation of an International Trade Organization' (Russell, 2001: 128). Behind the said abstention there were political reasons - the author defends that, for peronism, the GATT was 'a project made to measure of North-American interests' (Russell, 2001: 128) -, as well as economic –

[2] This concept of Peña (1968) refers to the contents, the activism and the efficiency achieved in the international plan in the development of the negotiating conduct: it refers to tools and actions (such as the presence in key instances, the presentation of documents, the formation of pressure groups, etc.) that tend to try to influence the adoption of decisions referring to the principles, norms, rules and procedures of a certain regime, according to the aims of the negotiator (or negotiation position).

[3] Cf. Romero (2001)

[4] Argentina participated in the Havana Conference, and the preparation talks in which it had forced an alternative resolution project. In total, it presented 'more than ninety changes to a total of 42 articles'. However, the evolution of the negotiations resulted against the 'national government's economic policy', that motivated the reason why the country ended by not joining the agreement (Lanús, 1984: 348-351).

fundamentally due to the early exclusion of the negotiations of the approach of food produce[5].

From 1945 to 1990, the Argentinian economic policy (and foreign economic policy) balanced between an economic model based in the replacement of imports and another pointing towards open liberal experiments. It was in the scope of one of those 'liberal' rounds that Argentina joined multilateral financial institutions (International Monetary Fund and World Bank[6]), during the so-called "Liberating Revolution". Later, during another 'revolution', the 'Argentina' under the Onganía government, produced the above-mentioned subscription at GATT[7].

According to Russell (2001) 'The steps taken by the Onganía government to a greater commercial opening, within the scope of the economic plan conducted by the minister of Economy, Adalbert Krieger Vasena, that included a general and programmed reduction of rights, made Argentina naturally join formally to the agreement in 1967'. To this 'domestic' factor, authors such as Baldinelli (1997) aggregate foreign and interdomestic elements: (i) the distancing of bilateral trade and payment covenants [8], (ii) the insistence of the Brazilian government so that Argentina joined the agreement and (iii) the interest in being able to take advantage of an access quote for the sale of bovine meat to the European Economic Community, which maintained a preferential treatment regarding its ex-colonies[9].

Thus, Argentina joined the GATT during the Kennedy Round. By then, Argentinian exports achieved 1,464.5 million dollars (Rapoport 2010, 2084), representing around 0.8% of world trade (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, 1962). Initially, the Argentinian negotiating profile inside the forum was a lot more reactive, due to the secondary role that international commercial relations had for the country (Makuc and Ablin, 1994), to the little will to concede sovereignty over the rules applied in foreign commercial policy and to the voluntary character that the characterized the multilateral trade regime.

This little relative relevance assigned to these negotiations inside the agenda of Argentinian foreign policy was compensated, in fact, by the place they took in other international forums, such as that of the United Nations Conference about Trade and

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5 During the GATT, agricultural themes were systematically excluded from the negotiations, under the pretense that they were considered a special sector. Even if, during the negotiation of lists by lists, by specific products, some agricultural themes were included in the agenda, in the Dillon Round (1960-62) they appeared for the first time, systematically, reducing rights in soy, cotton, vegetables and preserve fruits. Regardless of these advancements, in the fourth round, the United States gained a waiver to apply quantitative restrictions over this sector, effectively leaving a great part of the agricultural question outside of the GATT. Early in the Uruguay Round, agricultural themes were approached integrally, deriving in the Agreement about Agriculture.

6 On August 31, 1956, through decree-law 15.970.

7 The Membership protocol was signed on September 11, 1967, and made internal on June 28, 1968, through Law No. 17799.

8 Such as Baldinelli (1997) signals, these agreements originated in the 1930s, where it favored the 'interchange with border countries through the downsizing of rights non-extensible to third parties'. Agreements were also subscribed with European countries and non-border American countries. After the Second World War, these agreements were incremented with specific payment covenants, through which the central banks developed an exchange control between reciprocal exports and imports.

9 The weight of the agricultural export lobby over foreign policy during the Onganía government was very strong. Amongst others, this can be appreciated in the final years of the military regime, when, according to Rapoport 'foreign policy took a turn by abandoning the idea of ideological borders' - which characterized Ongania's management -, establishing relations with Popular China and Cuba and sign a commercial agreement with Soviet Union'. This author sustains that 'Among the factors that fuelled these changes, one can mention the agro exporting interests, affected by the restrictions they found in the world markets.' (Rapoport, 2009: 37).

Development (UNCTAD) and the debates regarding the 'new international economic order' (NOEI), where Argentina played a more active role. Especially in the UNCTAD, Argentina found a space for the development of an activist foreign policy. Therefore, 'Argentina led and participated in the international debates regarding the transformation of international economic relations from moderate positions that were in agreement with its status of a country placed in the middle of the world's hierarchy and high in the region' (Russell 2010, 252). As an example and like the quoted author regarding the importance of Argentina as a regionally relevant country, one can underline the signature of the High Grace Chart, in the summit done in the country before the UNCTAD's own conference, within the scope of the Special Commission of Coordination for Latin America (CECLA). That meeting in the country had a high-profile role regarding the organization and the debates that were discussed. In its analysis, Simonoff underlines that 'Signing the act of High Grace in March 1964 was an important element of this government's multilateral policy. It was a demand of the continent's Southern countries that intended 'a rectification at the level of countries that dominated international trade' and not 'an outside help' (Zavala Ortiz, 1976: 22)' (Simonoff, 2007: 80).

This preference by other forums it was not, in fact, an obstacle. Such as Makuc and Ablin signalled 'Paradoxically, the participation of the Argentinian representatives in the GATT was always prominent, probably exceeding the priority given to the body by the authorities of Buenos Aires'[10] (Makuc and Ablin 1994: 2). Coinciding with this observation, one can find in Tussie (1993), references to the Argentinian presence within the coalition of less developed countries within the GATT for 1963, when the country had not yet achieved its full subscription to the agreement[11].

During the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), Argentinian participation centred in the approach of the exceptions that, inside the GATT, were applied to the agricultural sector. It also participated in the search for an exception for developing countries, seen in the end of the round in the Enabling Clause.

During this period, there were important changes in Argentinian domestic policy - and foreign - with the passage, first of the governments of Cámpora and Perón of the Isabel one, after his death. E soon with the eruption of the military junta, during the years from 1976 to 1983. These changes brought a closeness to economic orthodoxy. The imaginary that ruled from then was the one of the 'Argentine 'open to the world' of the agricultural export age, that the 1880 generation had built' (Rapoport, 2009: 39). Other deep trait of transformation was the liberalization of the financial sector, that incremented the debt process. Gradually, it began to adopt a perspective more close to the (neo) liberal ideology, consolidated with Carlos Menem's neoliberal government. This political and ideological turn would signify a break in foreign policy and would lead to, such as Makuc and Ablin signalled (1994: 4) 'the evolution of Argentinian economic

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[10] They aggregate 'Effectively, further beyond the representativeness exercised by the Argentinian successive delegations in the life of the body, the definitions and contents of the Argentinian foreign trade policy continued conditioned, during the first decade of performance in the GATT, by the dominant economic model in the country; that is, the industrialization as substitute od imports in its stage of decadence of crisis' (Makuc and Ablin, 1994 - own underline).

[11] Within the scope of the reformation process of the GATT centered in the findings of the Harberler Report, Tussie underlines Argentinian participation, in 1963, inside 'a group of 21 Medium-developed countries [that] adopted a less radical line (...). Instead of reforming this rule, this group asked for the extension of the existing rules to some excluded products. It proposed an action program, that incited the contracted developed parties to adopt measures about exports of less developed countries' (Tussie, 1993: 41)

policy, and especially its openness to the exterior, coincides for the first time, conceptually and factually with the guiding philosophy of the multilateral system'. Such accordance in economic thought allowed generating permissiveness for the action in the final instances of the Uruguay Round.

In the external front, the 1980s signalled by the crisis incremented the country's interest in the forum and thus, facing the Uruguay Round, the GATT started to occupy ever-increasing relevant places in the agenda of foreign economic policy.[12]. In particular, the implementation of growing policies of grants to agricultural policies from developed countries, such as the United Stated and the European Community, motivated a more active participation in such negotiations. It is good to remember that, for that moment, due to internal constraints of the development model, the growth of Argentinian economy depended of the liquidity that agricultural exports could give, which meant the removal of the measures mentioned was an element of vital importance.

Therefore, during the Uruguay Round, Argentina started from having an opposing and peripheral posture to develop a highlighted participation within the negotiation process, especially centring in the approach of the agricultural area. Such as Carina Miller's research regarding the Round, the country's goals were broad: 'include agriculture in the negotiations and submit it to strict commercial rules, to gain opportunities so that its agricultural and animal products have a better access to foreign markets, prohibit or restrict domestic policies that increased disloyal competition with its exports, *etc*. (Miller 2000: 140).

To reach these goals, Argentina armed itself with strategies such as negotiating in coalitions and participate in key groups (such as the Morges group, the Eight Group, the informal group of the 36 and, the most known of all, the Cairns Group, all linked to the drive of agricultural negotiations). Furthermore, Argentina resorted to declarations to position itself inside the negotiations[13]; and the making of technical reports; and the presentation of proposals and documents for the negotiations. It also resorted to the threat of blockages (for instance, not to vote anything until there was an agreement in the agricultural area), as a way to generate power (Croome 1998; Miller 2000; Tussie 1993; Tettamanti, 1990).

Therefore, during the Punta de Este Conference, Argentina was the author of one of the three documents in discussion as proposals of Ministry Declaration. Furthermore, throughout the eight years that the negotiations lasted, it developed a protagonist participation inside the coalitions mentioned above and, in cases such as the Montreal meeting, it was able to have an influence in the negotiating conduct of other developing countries, generating pressures over the leaders of the negotiation process so there were advancements in the agricultural and textile subject of the negotiations and for that, that a balanced look of global trade was preserved[14].

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[12] One has to stress, firstly, that Argentina had opposed the launch of a new round, but in fact, when the agricultural and textile subjects were included in the agenda, the country's position turned to an active interest in the negotiations.

[13] Even during the crisis of negotiations of 1992, President Carlos Menem sent a message to President Clinton, from the United States of America, to the presidents of the European Council and Japan's Prime-Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, on behalf of the De la Paix Group, with the aim of soliciting to these three the exercise of a more decisive leadership in favor of the end of negotiations (Croome, 1998: 301).

[14] In an interview published in 1990, by the Revista América Latina/Internacional of FLACSO Argentina, Ambassador Tettamanti, the Argentinian representative before the International Bodies in Geneve, relate

During this period, Argentina also took part of two cases within the problem-solving mechanism of the GATT, connected with the Falklands. In 1982 and in 1983, with the European Economic Union, due to the embargo to the Islands, and the application of article XXI. It gave rise that, during the negotiations of the Uruguay Round, there was a strife to revise the article relating to exceptions relating to security[15].

These experiences produced results that were considered as positive in light of the country's initial goals (Miller, 2000) and, as a whole, served as a process of learning for the next negotiations that the country would face on the next decade.

4. The 'negotiating tradition': Argentina at the start of the Doha Round

As we saw in the previous section, during the Uruguay Round, Argentinian negotiating tradition in international trade relations suffered an important turn. Changing the negotiating conduct that was imperative until then, the country adopted an active participation, based on a solid technical base, and with negotiation strategies that assumed the risks of exercising veto options, giving priority to convergence actions in negotiation coalitions.

Thus, when the Doha Round started, Argentina held a certain leadership inherited from the Uruguay Round, which collided with the economic, political and social crisis that was conditioning the country. In fact, since several months, Argentina was immerse in a crisis that went through all of the State's dimensions and even limited the country's foreign agenda. Negotiating foreign debt was the government's central aim. As such, the announced fourth Ministry Conference of the WTO was not priority for the management of the then president De la Rúa, other than beyond the weight that this negotiation could have for the country and the leadership that Argentina could develop in it.

In fact, in November 2001, the Argentinian Presidency engaged on a mission to Germany and sent the Chancellor to that meeting instead of the Doha Conference. Therefore, the Argentinian delegation before the WTO was in charge of second-grade staff and lost the possibility to exercise the vice-presidency that had been gained months earlier in the negotiations before Doha. While the then Vice-Chancellor Horacio Chighizola presided the delegation, along with the Agriculture, Livestock Breeding and Fishing Secretary, Regúnaga, it was ambassador Néstor Stancanelli the one in charge of defending the Argentinian position. That decision reduced Argentinian participation and depreciated the importance of the delegation as a whole when it came to seats in commissions exclusive to ministers[16].

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the centrality of the agricultural theme given for the country to these negotiations, and describe the 'pragmatic' perspective with which it has decided to move the negotiations forward, which enabled to move a negotiating conduct regarding other developing countries, giving rise to punctual initiatives in the agenda's several subjects and not being afraid to 'deny support' to the negotiated set if the results did not offer an acceptable minimum to national ambitions.

15 See Croome, 1998 p. 82 and p. 187

16 In fact, diplomatic hierarchy is an important element in the negotiations. Without a minister, there is no entering in the Green Room', sustained Taiana in an interview performed during the investigation. The ministry figure is the one that has the capacity to compromise the country's position and strike the deal, being this the basis of the said hierarchy. In fact, of the 153 countries that took part in the Doha negotiations, only 19 state delegations were not headed by Ministers (Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Dominica, Fiji Islands, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Jamaica, Kuwait, Madagascar, Moldavia, Niger, Paraguay,

The next months, when five Presidents succeeded, were impregnated with the uncertainty derived for the institutional instability in which the country was immerse. On the other hand, those were the central months for the construction and first placement of the negotiating positions in the multilateral plan. In addition, it was there that 'tradition' played a relevant role, in the definitions of the priorities that Argentina would adopt and in the selection of the strategies undertaken.

Thus, in the negotiations Argentina first guarded itself in the negotiating practices and positioning that it had previously developed. Moreover, the negotiators, based in such tradition and prestigious past, were able to exercise a certain influence, reducing the impact of the domestic crisis in the international plan.

Particularly, the negotiation tradition identified was shaped in conducts such as the belonging to the Cairns group, a coalition of competitive agricultural export countries that do not give subventions to their exports, as well as the precedence of the reclamation for the access to markets and the liberalization of agricultural trade, over other goods. This is fully illustrated by the full adhesion to the Vision Statement document pronounced by this coalition in 1998, as well as in the identification of Australia and New Zealand as key partners in this initial stage of the negotiation process.

Other instruments, such as the activism through the presentation of technical documents, was influenced by that negotiating tradition observed above. Within it, it is worthy to mention that Argentina was the author, individually or collectively, of 20% of the total of documents discussed in the agricultural commission in the period from March, 2000, to November, 2001: about benefits for exports, non-trade legitimate concerns and a general declaration regarding the negotiation process; four proposals with the Cairns group and two joint proposals within the scope of MERCOSUR: one about State trading companies and other referring to disciplines to the credits of exports of agricultural and animal products (one proposed by Brazil, the other by Argentina).

Through these actions, the intention was to undertake a technical diplomacy, based on the bases of the negotiation tradition. By making it possible, through such documents, an interpretation of the effects of each of the measures that were being included in the negotiations, this diplomacy helped to exert a certain influence over other countries, especially the ones in development. That was only possible due to the technical human resources with which it counter, supported in the previously formed tradition; as well as the soft power that this negotiation generated as prestige for the negotiators that pressed forward such documents in the multilateral plans or in the coalitions.

If, at a later stage, the country analysed enriched its participation in the negotiations, with the incorporation of new elements, such as the interest in industrial issues and the participation in other kinds of coalitions (for instance, NAMA-11), we believe that in the moments of greatest crisis, such as the one felt in 2001, when tradition served as a guide for the action, placing the bases for later actions.

In fact, since 2003, as far as the country was recovering itself in its economic and political bases, it increased its management capacity over the foreign agenda, specified

Peru, Romania, Santa Lucia, Salomon Islands and Trinidad and Tobago). However, in spite of that situation, Argentinian staff had an experience since the Uruguay Round.

its positioning and the participations in the different stages of negotiations became more frequent and intensive. Consequently, with the advancement of the Doha Round, it was possible to observe an increase in the participation in miniministry meetings and green rooms, as well as in the presentation of documents and proposals and in the participation in coalitions. In that, the agricultural issues and the strategic elements identified above were always the central pillar of Argentina at WTO.

5. Final thoughts

Thus, it is evident that the ‘negotiation tradition’ has played a relevant role in the guidance of the actions within foreign trade negotiations. This variable, that has not been profoundly studied, such as others, shows it can come up with plausible explanations about states’ conduct regarding foreign policy, as well of its resources of power by considering itself a source of soft power.

In the case of Argentina, the image of the country as ‘the world’s granary’, belonging to the model of liberal development, has been present in each one of the country’s participations in the multilateral plan, still guiding diplomatic actions in the Doha Round. The negotiation tradition has, *in crescendo,* strengthened a pattern of actions that identify the country as an active player in the negotiations, with a great technical background, as well as the guidance through agricultural negotiation coalitions. Identity that, in the end, persists in spite of the instabilities the country faces, yet again.

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APPLICATION OF "THEMATIC ANALYSIS" TO A SET OF BUSINESSES SUCCESS STORIES IN THE INTERNATIONALIZATION PROCESS

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Abstract

This current work is an example of applying the methodology of "thematic analysis" to a set of business success stories in the process of internationalization. It is assumed that these cases, as a hypothesis, constitute discourses obtained appropriately allowing synthesizing and relating some of the basic features inherent in the internationalization of companies. Results showed the prevalence of stimuli intrinsic to the company, to the detriment of extrinsic stimuli, and lower incidence that companies expose their barriers to internationalization. In the area of internationalization of firms, it confirms the association of entrepreneurial characteristics and the fundamental export nature of Portuguese business companies.

Keywords:

Internationalization; Entrepreneurship; Export; Innovation

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APPLICATION OF "THEMATIC ANALYSIS" TO A SET OF BUSINESSES SUCCESS STORIES IN THE INTERNATIONALIZATION PROCESS

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Introduction

Currently, it is observed in various sectors of the national economy, widespread appeal for the internationalization of the Portuguese business structure. If such a plan aims at the international market, internally, the appeal to entrepreneurship will develop. Can such appeals remain complementary? One must realize, beyond the general character of the internationalization process (incentives, barriers and forms of international presence), if indeed, there are entrepreneurial characteristics in companies that engage in the process of internationalization.

This study can be described as an example of applying the methodology of "thematic analysis" to a set of successful Portuguese companies. It is assumed that these cases consist of dialogues appropriately obtained to allow synthesis and conveyance of some of the essential characteristics inherent to their internationalization. Using thematic analysis, we evaluated the impact of various indicators of latent variables of a set of business success cases in the area of internationalisation[1] (AICEP, 2011).

This analysis is limited to a small number of companies. Because of this and the possible content bias of the successful cases, a failure of usual methodologies of “quantitative paradigm”, constitutes the main limitations of this review.

The work is composed of three parts that complement each other. In the first section, a literature review is performed describing the concepts of internationalization and entrepreneurship, which shall determine the composition of indicators (or observable variables) of latent variables. In the second part, with the objective to systematize the investigation, the methodological aspects of the research are described. The last section presents the outcome and assesses the results. The most important findings of the research shall be described in the conclusion.

[1] The document can be found online: http://www.portugalglobal.pt/PT/PortugalNews/Documents/Revistas_PDFs/Portugalglobal_n36.pdf

Biographic review

As in so many other concepts, there is no academic consensus with respect to the concept of internationalization. The definition of internationalization that seems to be consistently accepted is proposed by Beamish (1990: 78): *"Internationalization is the process by which companies become susceptible to direct and indirect influence that international transactions have on their future and, in this sense, how they establish and conduct transactions with other countries."* The growth of international trade of the last three decades justifies this academic effort with the aim of decoding the reasons that lead companies to embark on a journey of internationalization. Of note, there are several studies of this nature (Albaum, Duerr, & Stransdskov, 2005; Altinay, 2005; Anderson, 1993; Cavusgil, 1980; J. H. Dunning, 1980; Erramilli, 1990, among other authors).

The stimulus that motivates the ambition to internationalize may be intrinsic or extrinsic to the business. With respect to the intrinsic stimuli, they reside in the approach of the company toward the internationalisation process (Freeman & Cavusgil, 2007). In this regard, Simões (1998) sets out a series of motivational factors, intrinsic to the company, to help classify their attitude to the internationalization process: (i) the need for company growth, (ii) utilization of available productive capacity, (iii) achievement of economies of scale, (iv) development of skills/technologies and (v) diversification of risks.

As for extrinsic reasons, companies frequently identify the increase of competition, integration and liberalization of markets, and the associated financial risk (Croue, 1994; Douglas, Craig, & Sleuwaegen, 1992; Viana & Hortinha, 2005). Other factors, such as the costs of labor, the supply chain (suppliers) and the potential of the market, in the case of favorable conditions in the country of destination, may constitute stimuli to internationalization (Calof & Beamish, 1995; Disdier & Mayer, 2004).

Likewise, Dunning (1994) focuses on a set of reasons that, according to the author, lead companies to start their process of internationalization, namely: (i) demand for resources, (ii) demand for markets, (iii) demand for efficiency, and (iv) strategic demand.

Just like incentives, the barriers to internationalization may be intrinsic or extrinsic to the company. Diverse barriers to internationalization may deter companies from a legitimate business claim to internationalization. In fact, numerous authors list organizational barriers to internal and external order.

The barriers to external order often addressed relate to the insufficiency of financial incentives, and with the lack of external policies amplified because of shortfalls in internal order, result in the lack of capacity to act in an external market. The satisfaction vis-à-vis the results in the source market, financial challenges to trigger commercial actions (trading), and difficulties of negotiation are also noted (Bilkey & Tesar, 1977; Cavusgil & at, 1981; Poliwoda & Thomas, 1998). Dichtl, Koeglmayr, & Mueller (1990) suggest that the main obstacles to the process of internationalization reside within the company (ignorance of the internationalization process, perception of risk, cultural remoteness), and cause the external barriers. By this reasoning, also the peripheral countries, by their proximity, and by the effect that stems from a psychological distance (Benito & Gripsrud, 1992), may be motivated to internationalization (Johanson & Wiedersheimpaul, 1975).

In contrast, Teixeira & Diz (2005) emphasize the obstacles of an external nature as being very relevant as barriers to internationalization. They argue that political, financial (Lu & Beamish, 2001; Rothaermel, Kotha, & Steensma, 2006), economic, and cultural differences lead to less control over the performances of competitors and interaction with different monetary systems.

In summary, as argued by Shaw & Darroch (2004), barriers to internationalization can be categorized into five major areas: financial barriers, barriers to management, barriers to market (internal and external), and specific barriers for industry and business. In regards to the specific national market, Raposo (1994), Simoes & Castro (1999) and Simões (1997), discuss the following barriers to access in international markets: lack of coverage for international risk, lack of support for internationalization, intensity of foreign competition, and shortcomings in pricing policy. Additionally, scarcity of market knowledge and the cultural differences between nations are two barriers to internationalization pointed out by Barkema (1996) and Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt (2000). These two reasons, according to Insch & Steensma (2006), drive many companies, which intend to internationalize, to form alliances or partnerships in order to substantially reduce the effect of these barriers. In this vein, the forms of entry into the international market are of particular importance for the company (Yip, Loewe, & Yoshino, 1988) and can have an impact on its external competitiveness[2], and, hence, on their performance (Green, Barclay, & Ryans, 1995).

Table 1 – Forms of Internationalization

Exportation	➢ Indirect (via distributors) ➢ Direct (within internal distribution channels)
Contractual	➢ Licensing ➢ *Franchising* ➢ Subcontracting ➢ Joint-ventures ➢ Alliances (Consortiums)
Foreign Direct Investment	➢ Acquisitions ➢ Greenfield Investments

Source: Adapted from Teixeira & Diz (2005)

Root (1994) states that the forms of entry into international markets can be classified into three base groups (as seen in Table 1). The first group fits the export model in which the production occurs outside of the target country and then transported and distributed. The second group falls within contractual entries in which, as the name implies, the company joins the other by contractual means, sharing existing know-how, techniques and resources. Finally, the third group arises from foreign direct investment (FDI) in which the company has full control over their resources, whose transfer to the target country is aimed at local production and sale.

The export is taken as the most recurrent form of entry in international markets (Teixeira & says, 2005), as well as involving smaller risks and costs (Root, 1994; Terpstra & Sarathy, 1994). Following the assumptions of the Uppsala Model, this is seen by the business sector as the first alternative of entrance into a external market

[2] Among other authors, Caves & Porter (1977) argue that, as a rule, the first ones to enter a particular market acquire and exploit competitive advantages over other competitors.

(Root, 1994). It can be performed in a direct way, when the company sells directly to the end customer or a distributor located in a foreign country, or in an indirect way, when the sale takes place through domestic intermediaries (domestic import-export agencies, trading companies, export intermediaries or piggybacking[3]), i.e., when "the products are shipped overseas by others" (Viana & Hortinha, 2005: 228).

Alternatively for exports, it is possible to establish some contractual forms in the approach to external markets: "license agreements, franchising, management contracts, contracts for the supply of infrastructure, technical assistance contracts, contracts for the provision of engineering services, alliances, manufacturing under contract and subcontracting" (Root, 1994: 26).

Finally, according to Chesnais (1996: 55), the FDI "designates an investment that aims to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise whose development takes place in another country other than the investor, with the goal of the latter influence effectively in the management of the company in question."[4] The FDI can take two distinct forms: Greenfield investment[5] (the creation of a new company in the international market) or by purchasing via investment (when the FDI has as its object the partial or total acquisition of one or more companies abroad).

In brief, by interpreting Figure 1 and its primary meaning, one can say that the export, in contrast to the FDI, is the form of internationalization that assumes the lowest commitment (low cost, few resources, less investment), less potential risk (arising from reduced involvement) and that less control over the process of internationalization (control is reduced by the partial control that agents, traders, intermediaries or distributors assume in the process). Contractual forms, since they assume cooperation and collaboration between at least two entities, are located in an intermediate position between the export and FDI, due to the sharing of risk sharing, control and commitment.

Figure 1: Entry into international markets



Source: Adapted from Nickels & Wood (1997)

The growing international trend of economies and the effort of the business sector in this field may be indicative of an entrepreneurial attitude (Knight, 2000; Lu & Beamish,

[3] A situation in which companies undertake reciprocal acquisition and distribution of each others products from their country of origin (Simões, 1997)

[4] The Bank of Portugal in Annex VI of Instruction no. 1/96 adopts a similar concept: "the FDI ... has as its aim the achievement of lasting and stable economic ties which would result in, directly or indirectly, the existence of effective decision-making power on the part of the direct investor...."

[5] In Anglo-Saxon terminology this is designated as Greenfield.

2001). Within the epicenter in the work of McDougall & Oviatt (2000), emerges the concept of international entrepreneurship, which establishes a direct relationship between the two themes through the combination of innovation, proactivity and risk inherent in the process of internationalization. Subsequently, McDougall & Oviatt (2005) define international entrepreneurship as the process of discovery, evaluation and utilization of opportunities in external markets with a view to the future implementation of goods and services.

Emerging, and increasingly recurrent, the concept of entrepreneurship, by its transversality, heterogeneity and subjectivity (Davidson, 2006), is similar to the concept of internationalization, yet far from engendering academic consensus (Berglann, Moen, Røed, & Skogstrøm, 2011; Martin, Most Reverend Fr. Luis Picazo, & Navarro, 2010). Although a divergence exists academically, there seems to be some consensus, in line with the Schumpeterian view, that entrepreneurship is manifested through demand dynamics of business opportunities by way of innovation and creativity (Mr. Leo Bjørnskov & Foss, 2008).

Methodology of research

Prior Review

Any considerable perspective, as in the institutional point of view of the Portuguese business sector in the field of internationalisation, the basic assumption is that the discourses certified by AICEP were obtained in an appropriate manner and suitable for the purpose of this article.

In consideration of other types of important qualitative research, as in a case study and ethnographic research, a survey was conducted (with documentary texts selected in relation to the connection to the theme of internationalisation and entrepreneurship) with recourse to two complementary methods: thematic analysis (by encoding of themes and categories) and content analysis (in search of meanings, objective perception, and incisive analysis of the object of the text).

With regard to the implementation of this work, through the use of thematic analysis and in line, partially, with what is advocated by Bardin (2009), the research was executed in the following stages: (i) reading of the analysis documents, (ii) identification and underscoring the repeated concepts or expressions, (iii) in light of the theoretical framework, defining the grouping of concepts or repeated expressions in categories (iv), and tallying the number of times the concept or expression was repeated. As stated, a pre-analysis was performed (with the selection of the analyzed documents), the material explored (through the encoding operation) and the results interpreted.

It should be noted that the "qualitative research" is generally used as an umbrella for a set of approaches in the field of social science research (Flick, 2002), since it can be understood as a process that focuses on the meaning and interpretations of unknown social phenomenon (Sale, 2008). This line of reasoning, in order to systematize the meaning of information of a qualitative nature, the document object of analysis, through content analysis seeking to extract quantitative information, is qualitative data, allowing measurement of the latent content of communication (Ceci & Iubatti, 2012).

Under the methods suggested by Henry & Moscovici (1968), the method of content analysis used is classified as a closed proceeding, to the extent that the codification of latent variables is performed prior to analysis.

Regarding the classification of content analysis, in accordance with the procedures defined by Grawitz (1993), it can be defined as exploratory, essentially quantitative, and direct. However, despite the prominence of the quantitative analysis, the relevance of the theme in question leads us to inferences of a qualitative nature, especially in the section titled "Discussion."

Generically, we can enumerate the essential stages of the methodology of research:

1. Identification of categories and definition of latent variables;

2. Application of the categories of the latent variables previously defined;

3. Reading the results obtained in a quantitative perspective;

4. Interpretation of results qualitatively observed.

Subjects and Instrument

The analysis focused on 18 successful cases of national companies during the process of internationalization (AICEP, 2011). To breakdown, interpret and segment the information Maxqda software (demo version) was used. For a better visualization of the data, the work, performed by means of Maxqda software (demo version), enables the building of graphs, in relative and absolute terms, which are presented to showcase the results.

Procedures and data analysis

Based on the literature review and with the clear objective of interpreting in an integrative manner (Hambrick, 2007), a thematic analysis of the Portuguese companies experiences of internationalization was used for the coding of themes and variables.

A1 Incentives for Internationalization

- A1.1 Extrinsic
  - A1.1.1 integration/liberalization of markets (4)
  - A1.1.2 lowest cost of factors of production (0)
  - A1.1.3 internal market saturation (3)
  - A1.1.4 potentiality of the external market (15)
  - A1.1.5 features of external market (0)
- A1.2 Intrinsic
  - A1.2.1 diversification (4)
  - A1.2.2 psychological proximity (6)
  - A1.2.3 harnessing of know-how (4)
  - A1.2.4 reduction of risk (2)

A1.2.5 development of skills/technology (14)

A1.2.6 economies of scale (2)

A1.2.7 available productive capacity (2)

A1.2.8 company growth (7)

A2 Barriers to internationalization

A2.1 Extrinsic

A2.1.1 cultural differences (1)

A2.1.2 distance compared to the target market (1)

A2.1.3 specific barriers for industry (2)

A2.1.4 market barriers (4)

A2.1.5 management model differences (0)

A2.1.6 financial support (0)

A2.2 Intrinsic

A2.2.1 inappropriate organizational structure (1)

A2.2.2 financial structure of the company (0)

A2.2.3 difficulties of negotiation (0)

A2.2.4 perception of risk (0)

A2.2.5 insufficient international information (0)

A3 Types of international presence

A3.1 Direct Foreign Investment (6)

A3.2 Contractual Forms (13)

A3.3 Exports (24)

A4 Entrepreneurship

A4.1 Dynamism (18)

A4.2 Opportunity (8)

A4.3 Creativity (10)

A4.4 Assumption of Risk (1)

A4.5 Innovation (35)

The number of times that the indicators were identified from the cases analyzed corresponds to the value between the brackets so it is possible to have an effective notion of categories most referenced.

Results

In the first analysis of Chart no. 1 and no. 2, overall results show that the latent variables most referenced in the analyzed case studies were "entrepreneurship" (with 72 citations) and "incentives to internationalization" (with 63 citations). With lower incidence, and ,therefore, fewer references in texts, we can, likewise, observe "types of international presence" (with 43 citations) and "barriers to internationalization" (with 9 citations).

Chart nº. 1: Incidence of the number of citations in case studies - absolute data



Source: Original compilation

Chart nº. 2: Incidence of the number of citations in case studies - absolute data



Source: Original compilation.

With regard to "incentives to internalization" 63 references were identified in all cases of investigation. This highlights the fact that compared to extrinsic stimuli; intrinsic stimuli are cited more in these cases.

Chart nº. 3: Incentives to internationalization



Source: Original compilation.

Regarding intrinsic stimuli, by its itemization into observable indicators, it is observed that in the case studies examined, the development of skills and technology is the main reason that drives the internationalization of companies. On a different level, it is identified that the company's growth and psychological proximity are additional stimuli with considerable impact on the internationalization process of companies.

Chart nº. 4: Intrinsic stimuli to the company



Source: Original compilation.

As for the extrinsic stimuli, it is possible to check that the potentiality of the external market, which is clearly the impetus most cited by companies on the journey toward internationalization.

Chart nº. 5: External stimuli to the company



Source: Original compilation.

The residual impact of " barriers to internationalization" in the examined cases makes any conclusion that can be inferred from the numbers incipient, so it was decided to omit this latent variable. In regards to the forms of international presence, through the interpretation of graphs six and seven, the observation is that exportation stands out clearly as a preferred modality in relation with the external market. The contractual forms, such as the creation of partnerships between companies, are another of the modalities of internationalization often referenced by companies. FDI is the form of international presence least acknowledged by companies participating in AICEP (2011).

Chart nº. 6: Types of international presence – absolute data



Source: Original compilation

Chart nº. 7: Types of international presence – absolute data



Source: Original compilation.

Regarding entrepreneurship underlying the process of internationalization, the data in Chart eight indicates that innovation and dynamism stand out from the other observed variables. Also, the creativity of the evaluated companies is one of the characteristics with relatively important impact on entrepreneurial activity within the process of internationalization.

Chart nº. 8: Decomposition of the latent variable "entrepreneurship" - absolute data



Source: Original compilation.

Discussion

It is affirmed that the investigated cases, by verification, are revealing with respect to entrepreneurial traits prevailing in the internationalization process and, likewise, to the stimuli inherent in the process. The fact that the intrinsic stimuli are identified in a greater number than the extrinsic stimuli in the internationalization process, denotes, on the part of the companies in question, that the managers recognize internal advantages/potentialities in their approach to the external market.

Of all the latent variables observed, the variable "barriers to internationalization" demonstrates the least occurrences, possibly due to the fact that the main focus of analysis was to assess cases of success, as a visible and proactive view of the internationalization process.

Regarding the forms of international presence, the fact that exports constitute the preferred modality in the approach to the external market confirms the export nature of Portuguese business in the internationalization process and, in theory, the fact that the export is a form of international presence regularly used by the entrepreneurial sector (Teixeira & says, 2005). Hence, it can be inferred that a large part of the company's object of analysis does not have a high degree of involvement or commitment toward the external market.

For its part, the data relating to entrepreneurship echoes the Schumpeterian view, as "innovation" and "dynamism" are the variables that stand out in this context. Likewise, it is confirmed, in an objective manner, the entrepreneurial attitude of companies during the internationalization process (Knight, 2000; Lu & Beamish, 2001).

Conclusion

In summary, content analysis, as an empirical process, through reading and interpretation, enables a thorough understanding of the analyzed documents. Diving into less clear areas that constitute the said "context of production" of content analysis, since this technique seeks to give meaning to the subjectivity of a document, is an asset that enables the researcher a more active position in the research process. In this context, it is possible to detect some generic trends of companies in their internationalization process.

As for the stimulus for internationalization, the document ofAICEP (2011) gives more visibility to intrinsic incentives for companies. In particular, the use of one´s own skills/technology as the main motivation is inherent in the process of internationalization. The potentialities of the external market are, for the business object of analysis, the main extrinsic stimulus for the journey to internationalization.

There is clearly a preference for the modality of export as a form of international presence by the analyzed firms. This is symptomatic of a desire for the lowest involvement of costs, resources and commitment toward the external market. The analyzed data allows one to conclude that there is, in the companies analyzed, a clear predominance of entrepreneurial traits in their internationalization process.

This finding is consistent with some of the theoretical currents cited concerning the association of the two concepts, internationalization and entrepreneurship. In this way, innovation assumes a major role in the process of internationalization.

Despite the conclusions advanced, the number of successful cases analyzed (18 companies) is limited, so the analysis performed is subject to the companies referenced. Another limitation of this study relates to the analyzed document. Is the information from the case studies crafted by AICEP elusive, and is bias in content possible? In future work, as a way to overcome this shortcoming, the inclusion of interviews with representatives of the companies present in the international market may confer greater credibility to the study performed.

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Critical review

Gulbenkian Think Tank on Water and the Future of Humanity (2014). *Water and the Future of Humanity. Revisiting Water Security*. New York: Springer: 241 pp. ISBN: 978-3-319-01456-2; ISBN eBook: 978-3-319-01457-9; DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-01457-9

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> *“Improved water supply and sanitation contributes to human dignity, health, education, and economic development"* (Foreword, pp v)

Within the framework of the International Decade for "Water as source of life" (2005-15)[1], the Think Tank of Foundation Calouste Gulbenkian (FCG) on Water and the Future of Humanity, published (joint edition by FCG and Springer) the book "Water and the Future of Humanity *Revisiting Water Security*" in early 2014. This book gathers the

[1] For more information, see http://www.un.org/spanish/waterforlifedecade/ (retrieved online on 10.04.2014)

work and debate of eleven internationally acknowledged experts[2] whose work has focuses on water resource management and community water policy.

The analysis presented in the book's 241 pages focuses on identifying the seven large world regions that evidence differences in terms of global demand for drinking water. More than continental areas, the seven regions are identified based on their main features[3], namely: *Rural*; *Villages*; *Urban*; *Metropolis*; *Large Cities*; *Towns*; e *Secondary Cities*. These differences are made manifest by a set of imbalances, among which demographic growth, economic and technological trends and the increase in agricultural production, the use of natural resources, the relative importance of the urban areas, which directly influence urban culture, the distribution and availability of income.

Considering that water is a vital resource that is unequally distributed and available worldwide, concerns regarding its sustainability are obvious since its unplanned use has impacts that require control and regulation. Complementarily, water resources are considered the basis for social, economic and environmental development. However, because always lacking or at risk of degrading, they become restrictions to the change process and have even worse consequences for poor and vulnerable populations. Thus, they represent added social, economic, environmental and political risk, even at international level.

The main sectors dependent on water, which require especial attention and which, because of that, pose (national, regional and international) challenges are: food security, health, energy, biodiversity, maintenance of ecosystems, production of consumption goods, including processed goods, and climate change.

Throughout the book, possible future scenarios are presented for each of the thematic sections, along with an explanation of the trends. The history of consumption of water resources is considered, as well as water (un)availability and its impact.

From a methodological point of view, and since this is a work by all the eleven experts involved in the debate and in the discussions, regardless of the geographical area where they have been working, the text proposes a joint approach focused on shared resources.

Water is presented as being a common resource, whose scarcity, stress and availability crisis are felt globally and which requires adopting and complying with negotiated actions in search of what is called "sustainable prosperity". This concern is especially evidenced by the concept of globalization, especially in economic terms, which influences and conditions maintenance of water resources and implies that, in certain areas of the World, alternatives have to be identified and implemented (as is the case of water desalination.

The concept of Water Governance is amply described, its analysis being based on a series of features previously presented by the OECD[4]that influence relations among countries, especially when shared resources are at stake, as is the case of most river

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[2] The eleven experts who participated in the discussion coe from different geographical areas, namely from: Austria; Brazil; Canada; China; the United States of America; the Netherlands; India; Morocco; Portugal; Sweden; and Sri Lanka.

[3] Though the typologies are defined, examples will be given throughout the text on the analyzed themes.

[4] OECD (2011). *Water Governance in OECD countries. A multi-level approach. OECD Studies on water*. Paris: OECD

basins. Among these features are legitimacy, transparency, responsibility, inclusiveness, justice, integration, individual and community ability to manage water and adaptability. These implicit criteria to "Water Governance", together with a more global criterion, linked the four dimensions deemed crucial:

a) the **social dimension**, which implies fair, and just, management and use of water resources at world level, both in terms of the amount available and its quality, regardless of the fact that these are rural or urban areas,

b) the **economic dimension**, which is clearly presented considering the concepts of efficacy and efficiency in promoting economic growth and in fostering economies at world level based on water availability and use,

c) the **environmental dimension**, focused on sustainability, in ecosystem integrity, in preserving areas and species in their natural habitat, focused on life that depends on water resources,

d) the **political dimension**, which implies assigning and acknowledging opportunities to citizens and different actors interested in directly and indirectly influencing decision making.

The book is divided into nine main chapters, each including an introductory note, a preface, a prologue and a message on water and the future of humanity, which discuss the main issue in water management, namely:

1. Our Water; Our Future

2. Drivers of Water Demand, Course Changes, and Outcomes

3. Water Management in a Variable and Changing Climate

4. Water for a Healthy Environment

5. Integrated Urban Water Resources Management

6. Water and Food Security: Growing Uncertainties and New opportunities

7. Water and Energy

8. Water Projections ans Scenarios: Thinking About Our Future

9. Our Water Future: leadership and Individual Responsibility

As this book presents results of two years' research developed by an international interdisciplinary team, a book that includes relevant theoretical concepts, statistical data that evidence developments and trends, as well as diversified computer graphics such as maps, charts, schematics and images, ***Water and the Future of Humanity. Revisiting Water Security*** is very interesting work, especially for further academic and scientific studies. The publication's interest is not limited to its approach to water resources and its management. In fact, the complementary themes under discussion are varied and scientifically relevant.

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