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Chipre: De *Conflito* Intra-estadual a *Problema* Diplomático Internacional

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Cinco décadas decorreram desde o espoletar do *conflito* cipriota. Apesar da ausência de episódios de violência, o como e o porquê de a reunificação não ser ainda uma realidade permanece o principal *problema* a resolver e a questão em torno da qual o debate prospectivo acerca de uma solução para a questão do Chipre se centra. *Conflito*, definido como estado de guerra aberta, não ocorre no Chipre desde 1974, no entanto subsiste no seu estado psicológico e sociológico, tendo vindo a constituir-se um importante *problema* para o qual a comunidade internacional procura solução. Porque os nacionalismos cipriotas não procuram a independência mas a união de território com a Grécia e a Turquia, o arranjo consociacionista de partilha de poder gerado aquando da independência veio inculcar o elemento étnico na estrutura política do país. O Chipre pós-colonial constitui-se um Estado mas não uma Nação. A guerra, por seu lado, institucionalizou a relação adversarial e de desconfiança entre comunidades, a qual se impregna no processo de paz enquanto as comunidades disputam apoio para a sua causa na esfera internacional. Iniciativas de mediação levadas, sobretudo, a cabo pelas Nações Unidas, mas também pelos Estados Unidos, têm evitado a re-escalada do conflito mas, no entretanto, a UNFICYP transforma-se numa das mais longas missões de paz e um acordo de paz continua sem existir. As comunidades que fundaram a República do Chipre em 1960 vivem hoje em total separação geográfica. A sul da “Green Line”, a República do Chipre permanece sob governação exclusiva dos cipriotas gregos desde 1963 e, a norte, os cipriotas turcos administram a auto-proclamada República Turca do Norte do Chipre (RTNC) desde 1983. O Chipre assumirá a presidência da UE no segundo semestre de 2012 quando, desde a recusa do “Annan Plan” em 2004, apenas o sul cipriota grego tem usufruído da condição de Estado-Membro. Entretanto, a adesão da Turquia e da RTNC assume-se como a questão central das negociações de paz, alongando o caminho para chegada a uma solução.

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Cyprus: From Intrastate *Conflict* to International Diplomatic *Problem*

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Abstract

The communities that founded the 1960 Republic of Cyprus live today in geographically separate territories. South of the “Green Line”, the Republic of Cyprus has been under Greek Cypriot administration since 1963, whereas Turkish Cypriots administer a self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) since 1983. Because Cypriot nationalisms did not aim at independence, but at union with Greece and Turkey, the power-sharing consociational arrangement for independence further entrenched the ethnic element into the political structure. Post-colonial Cyprus became a State but not a nation. Although *conflict*, defined as open fighting or war has not reoccurred in Cyprus since 1974, in a psychological and sociological sense it has prevailed and become a growing *problem* for the international community to solve. War institutionalized a mistrustful adversarial relationship that spilled over into the *peacemaking* process with the communities disputing support for their causes in the international sphere. Mainly United Nations’, but also United States’, mediation initiatives have avoided re-escalation, but while UNFICYP becomes one of the longest peacekeeping missions, a permanent settlement is yet to be agreed. Cyprus will assume EU presidency in the second half of 2012 when only Greek Cypriots have been enjoying full membership of the EU since the refusal of 2004 “Annan Plan” agreement. In the meantime, TRNC’s and Turkish EU full membership have become a pivotal issue in the peace negotiations further elongating the journey to resolution. Five decades have passed since the outbreak of conflict in Cyprus and, although violence is not longer a concern, how and why the reunification *problem* remains unsolved is still an object of debate and so are the prospects for resolution.

Introduction

The Cyprus conflict is one of the longest and most intractable and protracted intrastate conflicts of all times, where a physical security deterioration and negative reciprocal images of each other have antagonised the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and, together, perpetuated and solidified the conflict (Azar 1990), and one which has challenged the international communities' efforts for conflict management and peace establishment. Intrastate conflicts often do not remain circumscribed to a single state, but rather overlap state boundaries and become internationalized conflicts with consequences that affect the whole international system. Played in an intricate web of conflicting local, regional and international interests, the Cyprus conflict has become internationalized through two different processes. Largely transcending its intrastate dimension, the Cyprus conflict has been internationalized since its early stages and mediation initiatives have been taking place for almost half a century without a peace settlement being ever implemented or even fully agreed.

Although the Cyprus conflict has lasted for decades, times of conflict in terms of aggression or war have been relatively scarce. A *conflict*, in a physical sense, defined as a state of open fighting or war has not reoccurred in Cyprus since 1974. Although in a psychological and sociological sense the *conflict* has prevailed, especially at the Cypriot political leaderships' level, meaning the state of disharmony and opposition between the persons, ideas and interests that shape the communities' actions, the physical dimension has evaporated. With the absence of this dimension plus the continuous incapability of the parties to agree on a solution, despite numerous international mediation attempts to reunite the Cypriots, the Cyprus conflict has become increasingly referred to in the literature as a *problem*. The *conflict* is no longer staged on the ground but only at a diplomatic sphere, as a *question* or a situation to be considered, answered and solved, thus *problem* describes the current situation and the character of the dispute more accurately.

Internationalization of an intrastate conflict is broadly understood to happen when other actors, beside the original disputants between whom the conflict was initiated, become involved in that given conflict. The one generated by the entrance of third parties into the conflict, to lend support or fight alongside either the disputants, is referred to as the *internationalization through conflict*, while *internationalization through the peace process* is a product of the search for a solution by the international community and the entrance of actors into the conflict's environment to perform conflict management and resolution tasks (Raheem and Loganathan 2005, 2). Internationalized at birth, at the local level, the Cypriot conflict context is characterized by power, state resources access and demographic asymmetry between a majority of Greek Cypriots and a Turkish Cypriot minority, where ethnicity has provided the polarizing and segregating dividing line between the Cypriot communities to a *destructive* stage (Fisher and Keashly 1991, 35-36) of conflict escalation, of ethnic cleansing and total physical separation. Both disputants view conflict and the mediation initiatives as a zero-sum game and both search and count on external sympathies and allies to achieve their antithetical interests and aims and, consequently, to both parties' interests the involvement of an external actor who can support and strengthen their positions *vis-à-vis* their opponent's is seen as vital (Richmond 1998, 710-711). At the regional level, Greece and Turkey's historically difficult relations and deep mistrust spill over to the local level. The "motherlands" are stakeholders in the Cyprus dispute, having vested strategic interests on the island, legitimised by their connection to the local communities. At the international level, *internationalization through the peace process* has been provided by the United States' (US) and the United Nations' (UN) involvement. While the US becomes involved due to its interests in avoiding a Greco-Turkish war that could undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and in maintaining a western influence in the region, the UN's interest

in becoming involved stems from the realization that the explosive potential of the Cypriot dispute is regionally and internationally dangerous.

The Republic of Cyprus was founded on the 16th of August of 1960 when independence was granted to the island by Britain, its colonial ruler. At the time, 80% of the Cypriot population was of Greek origin and 18% of Turkish origin, whereas 2% of the population was comprised of smaller groups like the British, Armenian, Maronite or Latin communities (Plaza, 1965, 7). The Constitution of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus emerged from international treaties reached by the UK, the two “motherlands”, Greece and Turkey, and the two largest Cypriot communities, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot. The circumstances in which this Constitution was conceived and its consequent nature, can be traced back as the trigger of events that led to the first intercommunal fighting in 1963 that broke down the 3 year old young Republic and mark the beginning of the Cyprus conflict. Notably, the Cyprus conflict has had, since its birth, an international dimension due to UK, Greece and Turkey’s strategic interests on the island. However, it is only from 1964 onwards, with US and UN *peacemaking* and *peacekeeping* efforts, that the Cyprus conflict becomes fully internationalized, surpassing its original regional sphere, when considered a threat to international peace and security (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 210). More recently, a further internationalization process has taken place with Cyprus’ accession to the European Union (EU), which has placed the EU both as a main actor and the main stage where the diplomatic Cyprus problem takes place.

What this paper proposes to demonstrate is that the dynamics of internationalization have had a twofold impact in the Cyprus conflict: while the peace process has, on the one hand, provided for the “pacification” of the *conflict*, on the other hand, the array of actors involved has also provided for the intricacy and complexity of the current diplomatic *problem*. Why, then, did the internationalization process have a twofold impact in the Cyprus conflicts’ evolution, to what standpoint does this bring the conflict today and how can the prospects for resolution of the Cyprus conflict be ameliorated by such an understanding of the conflict’s dynamics? To provide an understanding on the impact of the internationalization processes on the Cyprus conflict’s evolution from intrastate conflict to the diplomatic “Rubik’s cube” (UN Secretary General 2003, paragraph 4) in which it currently exists, this paper will be divided into three parts. In the first part, the “odd” (Plaza 1975, paragraph 163) constitutional arrangement that created the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 and the emergence of intercommunal conflict in 1963 will demonstrate how the Cyprus conflict has come to be an internationalized dispute between two local Cypriot communities ever since the conflict’s embryonic stages. A second part will focus on the peace process that immediately followed the emergence of the Cyprus conflict to evaluate the impact of the internationalization process initiated by US and UN involvement in the conflict management efforts. In a third part, two subsequent changing moments in the Cyprus conflict’s context, the setting of a new conflict context and *status quo* with the Turkish military intervention of 1974 and the refusal of the “Annan Plan” and Cyprus’ “partial” accession to the European Union (EU), will be analysed as product of the internationalization through conflict dynamics and their impact on the peace process evaluated. By identifying and distinguishing the internationalization *through the conflict* and *through the peace process* dynamics at these striking four conflict moments, an understanding on the need and on how a process of de-internationalization in the Cyprus case will be provided.

1. The International Creation of a State Without a Nation

Unlike “traditional” nationalist movements’ behavioural pattern of fighting for independence against colonial powers, in Cyprus the strongest political force against colonial power came from Greek Cypriot struggle for union with “motherland” Greece. Greek Cypriot opposition to occupation dates back to Ottoman rule when the Orthodox Church of Cyprus began to aspire union with Greece, or *enosis*, which had led to popular rising and a frustrated coup attempt in

1931 (The Republic of Cyprus 2000, 80). To this Hellenist nationalistic movement, led by Archbishop Makarios, supported by the AKEL communist wing and The EOKA armed resistance group, Turkish Cypriots were compatriots also experiencing an oppressing alien rule and, if they were not to joint in the efforts to end British occupation, they were only asked to not oppose to their struggle and to refrain from aligning with the British (Solsten 1991). However, fearing Greek Cypriot domination, Turkish Cypriots had began reacting to the growing *enosis* campaign with anti-union demonstrations that evolved to pursuing *taksim*, the Turkish word for “division” or “partition”, expressing their desire for the island to be divided between Greece and Turkey (Yilmaz 2005, 30).

When the British transfer the political and administrative power of the island to the Cypriot people, the two communities where already antagonized and holding adversarial enemy images that would provide for the politicization of their different identities in their future struggle for political power over Cyprus (Hadjipavloou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993, 343). The Zurich-London Agreements reached by the UK, Greece and Turkey, and accepted by the two Cypriot communities, dictated the Republic of Cyprus was to be a state in which executive, legislative and juridical power was to be shared. Apart from defining *ipsis verbis* the future Constitution of the independent Cyprus state, the Agreements also comprise three international treaties with constitutional force, the Treaty of Guarantee, of Establishment and of Alliance, all generated for the purpose guaranteeing the supremacy of the Constitution. In the Treaty of Guarantee, political or economic union with another country or the partitioning of the island are forbidden and the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey are invested “guarantor powers” of the “independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic” (art.2) compromising themselves to consult each other and to take concerted action if any of the provisions of the Constitution are breached.

Friction over interpretation of the provisions of the constitutional arrangements emerged shortly after the independent state was born. In 1963, now President of the Republic of Cyprus, Makarios, proposed a set of amendments to the constitution, which became known as the “13 points”¹ (Richmond 1998, 253). These proposed measures were set forward as necessary to achieve a good functioning and progress of the State and are generally measures that aim at unifying the existing separateness in political and public life but one that had been designed to protect Turkish Cypriot access to the political *apparatus*. Consequently, for Turkish Cypriots, the “13 points” were regarded as propaganda to blame the Constitution for the governmental crisis when, instead, in their perspective, the government never properly functioned due obstacles created by Greek Cypriots for their lack of truthful goodwill to fully implement the Constitution (Plaza 1965, 17) and an expression of Greek Cypriot determination to achieve *enosis*. In 1963, constitutional rule collapses as all Turkish Cypriot officials resign their offices and intercommunal fighting breaks out at Christmas time.

The events that lead to the creation of the short-lived 1960 Republic of Cyprus show that Cyprus’ transition to a post-colonial order based on the birth of the modern nation-states has been one of a peculiar kind. On the one hand, the solution found in the Zurich-London Agreements institutionalized the influence of Greece, Turkey and UK over Cyprus and, on the other, the differing ethnic characters of the two communities. Thereafter, both communities felt the settlement was imposed on them and that their representatives pressured to accept an unfavourable arrangement (The Republic of Cyprus 2000, 17; Yilmaz 2005, 30). On the other hand, the international arrangement that created the Republic did not suffice to turn the communities’ leaders away from their atypical nationalist aspirations and the people from their cultural and spiritual union with their “motherlands”. Furthermore, the constitutional framework did not provide for an evolution of circumstances that could make the rigid division

¹ “Makarios’ 13 points” (1963) among other proposals, suggested the abolition of separate majority voting in the House of Representatives for certain law-making, of the President and Vice-President veto power or the unification of justice administration, the unification of municipalities, the President and Vice-President of the House of Representatives to be elected by unified majority voting of the House or the abolition of the Greek Communal Chamber.

of powers obsolete, essentially failing to create the need for the two communities to work together (Vlanton and Alicia 1984, 6) in order to dispel deep-seated suspicions and stimulate good relationships that promote trust. Also, the international guarantee of the 1960 Constitution provided in the Zurich-London agreements, inclusively failed to preserve the “state of affairs” since Britain feared becoming entangled in its former colonies’ politics and a renewed armed conflict, whilst Greece or Turkey were incapable of neutrally intervening (Grant 2008, 53).

The power-sharing consociational political interaction (Sözen 2007, 38) designed for the Cypriot state did not remove identity from politics. Instead, it further entrenched the ethnic element into the political structure and failed to push loyalty away from the ethnic communities to the unified state and to produce one political community that would be able to integrate the society around a unified sense of citizenship, political belonging and territoriality. Cyprus had become a state but not a nation (Castleberry 1964, 124). On the other hand, the Cypriot “atypical” nationalisms coupled with the international agreements that create the Republic of Cyprus, entrench and legitimize the guarantor powers’ interests in Cyprus and their involvement in the Cypriot political context, providing for the internationalized character of the Cyprus conflict at birth.

2. Internationalization Through US and UN Involvement in the Peace Process

Pressured by the United Kingdom, the US was the first external actor to become involved in the Cyprus conflict management efforts through mediation initiatives. In the Cold War context, Cyprus had become strategically vital for the United Kingdom and its allies. The growing dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the withdrawal of troops from Palestine and the Suez Canal and the threat of Turkey aligning with the communist bloc signal the great UK and Western interests on maintaining influence over the island (Constandinos 2009, 15). Cyprus was a real opportunity for Russia’s influence expansion over the Mediterranean once Communist ideology was strongly supported in the island with AKEL being the largest political party. Concerned over the impact the growing tension in Cyprus could have on the historically tense Greco-Turkish relationship and, consequently, on NATO’s unity against a Soviet attack (Constandinos 2009, 14), US’ policy goals toward Cyprus were for it to achieve political stability in a democratic, pro-Western, government under the joint protection of Britain, Greece and Turkey, thus taking the “fuel and the flame” that could undermine NATO, as well as to secure US access to the military facilities on the island by maintaining UK sovereignty over them (Adams 1972, 98).

To achieve a mediated solution that could better serve its interests and policy goals, the US’ conflict management and resolution efforts are centred in brokering an agreement between Greece and Turkey and not between the Cypriot communities. When Turkey threatened to unilaterally intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee to protect Turkish Cypriots when the Cypriot state collapses in 1963, a NATO plan is conceived by the US and Britain for action to be taken in a way that would not upset Turkish and Western interests. This limited version of internationalization of the conflict would avoid a full-fledged internationalization with the UN involvement and USSR having a say in it through the Security Council. An independent Cyprus threatened Greco-Turkish relations and had hampered those of these states with the US, while disrupting NATO, straining the UN and strengthening the Soviet position in the Mediterranean. However, this NATO peacekeeping and peacemaking plan was opposed by Greece and Greek Cypriots, who saw in the UN a better tool for protecting their Cypriot sovereignty against a Turkish invasion, whereas NATO would probably negate their objectives (Coufoudakis 1976, 463).

With the refusal of the NATO plan Turkey takes action by performing air attacks on Cypriot soil and UN involvement becomes unavoidable. Under UN auspices, in a second attempt to

broker agreement between Greece and Turkey, the US proposes a “double *enosis*” solution in the Acheson Plan that satisfied both Greek and Turkish nationalistic goals of *enosis* and *taksim* to ease the ethnic tension, but Makarios would not permit the American intention of dissolving the Cypriot state to be realised (Brinkley 1988, 11, 13-14).

The NATO and Acheson plans are a classic exercise of US great power diplomacy and *realpolitik* (Brinkley 1988, 18). The US preferred to neglect the fact that Cyprus, although forged recently as state, had not been under control of either Greece or Turkey for decades or centuries and that these actors were not at the centre but at the periphery of the Cyprus conflict. In the midst of the Cold War, US mediation in Cyprus was devoted to preventing the conflict's internationalization through UN involvement that could facilitate Soviet progression into the eastern Mediterranean (Savvides 1998, 40). Even when it was no longer possible to maintain the UN at arm's length, the US continued the isolated pursuit of a settlement for the Cyprus conflict by marginalizing the organization's role in its own mediation initiative, as happened during the negotiations of the Acheson plan in Geneva (Savvides 1998, 42). Guided by its own interests and concentrated in the avoidance of a Greco-Turkish war, the US perceived the Cyprus conflict as a regional and international one and failed to recognise its existence at the local level, where in fact it had originated and from where its solution would need to emerge.

When the UN takes over the *peacemaking* efforts in the Cyprus conflict, the first UN mediator, Galo Plaza, approaches the conflict, not as an international problem but rather as a communal one and, from now on the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities would always be the central actors in the international mediation and negotiation efforts. With this change in approach, Greece and Turkey are no longer the central actors, nor are their interests. In the previous mediation led by the US, preventing a Turkish intervention was the mediation's main concern and objective that attributed a greater weight to Turkey's interests and their satisfaction. When the mediation initiative is taken over by the UN and executed by the organization alone through Plaza and the mediation target shifts from the “motherlands” to the communities, from searching for a solution to the problem in its international and regional dimensions to its local one, Turkey's interest automatically became less relevant and were less privileged in the proposed solution. The shift in the mediation approach ultimately led to Turkey's unacceptance of Plaza's proposals.

The shift from US to UN mediation, ultimately leads to the breakdown of the first and only UN mediation event, which will reduce the organization's mediatory capacity of the Cyprus crisis for years to come. Consequently, the organization will find itself limited to performing the least intrusive mediation strategies under the good offices of the Secretary General framework in order to remain an accepted third party to all parties. On the other hand, with the internationalization process provoked by UN entrance in the conflict's environment, the parties' international status and recognition has become an additional external source of power for the parties to enhance their positions in the negotiations process (Bercovitch and Houston 2000, 179). With the internationalization through the peace process, the two Cypriot parties expect the international community to exert pressure on their opponent. It is the search for this recognition that motivates Greek Cypriot refusal of US proposals and insistence on UN involvement, this perception that the UN as mediator would be more receptive and favourable to the Greek Cypriot position than the US as mediator had shown to be. The internationalization through the peace process through the involvement of the UN mediator mostly favoured Greek Cypriots who were ultimately successful in ceasing the gains by having their government recognized as the legitimate one in Cyprus by the UN Security Council in resolution 186, but for the Turkish Cypriots as well, the UN provided a forum to expose and find legitimacy for their cause and recognition for their administration. Accepted and recognized as a party in the UN mediation process of the Cyprus dispute, the UN is, for Turkish Cypriots, an agent of legitimization and recognition (Richmond 1998 711-712).

The unsuccessful attempts of the British and the US to mediate a solution and avoid Turkish military action began the process of internationalization, but the containment of this internationalization process through NATO is rejected by the Greek flank. The UN alternative

is preferred and UNFICYP is established and is successful in protecting the cease-fire and establishing the necessary peace for *peacemaking* activities to occur. However, with UN involvement, the Cypriot parties become aware of the gains a full internationalization of the conflict through the UN can offer their positions, namely making their case internationally and gaining international support for their cause. UN's involvement in the Cyprus conflict is taken by the Cypriot communities as an opportunity to achieve acceptance, recognition and legitimization for their causes internationally and UN mediation disregarded as a path to finding a solution cooperatively (Richmond a1998, 712, 716-721). Making use of increasingly mediation styles, the UN will be able, to this day, to pressure the parties into repeatedly coming back to the negotiations table and to be cooperative with the mediation process, a capacity that stemmed from the organizations' international status and reputation and the consequent need of the parties to project a cooperative image internationally. However, the fact that the UN became limited in its *peacemaking* capacity at the outset of its involvement, due to the impact of the shift from US approach to Plaza's approach, it became incapable of countering the two Cypriot parties' focus on trying to capitalize on internationalization gains the UN itself could offer and resist settlement (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 21 and Richmond a1998, 10, 37-39, 714).

3. The Internationalized Intrastate Conflict's Growing Intractability

With US and UN involvement in the Cyprus conflict's management new actors and interests are added to the Cyprus conflict bowl and the internationalization of the Cypriot intrastate conflict, in its twofold dynamics, is fully realized. The US and the UN have been, ever since, involved in managing the Cyprus conflict, the US being more present and active in the first decade of conflict and the UN relentlessly ever since, performing various tasks within the conflict management and resolution spectrum, most importantly, *peacekeeping*, *peacebuilding* and mediation activities. However, the Cyprus peace process, especially the *peacemaking* efforts, have been derailed not only due to the rigid and adversarial positions held by the Cypriot communities throughout the peace negotiations but, most importantly, to the changing circumstances in the conflict itself, which disrupt, stalemate and setback the breakthroughs and partial agreements found, and which also feed into the disputants' mistrustful relations.

The 1974 *status quo* generated by Turkish military presence on the island and the accession to the EU are two turning points in the Cyprus conflict that demonstrate how the internationalization through conflict dynamics have impacted on the Cyprus peace process. If Turkish military presence and the consequent partition of the Cyprus island's territory reduced Turkish Cypriot security concerns and empowered their position *vis-à-vis* the Greek Cypriots, thereby reducing the minority-majority asymmetry that existed between the Cypriot parties until then, with the refusal of the Annan Plan and Cyprus' accession to the EU as a partitioned state affected the conflict's dynamics and balance of power, this time, by empowering Greek Cypriots *vis-à-vis* the Turkish flank. Both the 1974 and the 2004 events have contributed to the growing intractability and protractedness of the Cyprus conflict and constant setbacks in the *peacemaking* efforts, have fed into the Cypriot parties' lack of will to compromise on a solution with each other.

3.1 The 1974 "Status Quo"

Until 1967, an uneasy peace had prevailed with the presence of the UNFICYP in Cyprus. In April that year, the civil government of Papandreou in Greece was overthrown by a military junta. A split between Athens and the Greek Cypriot Government began to take place as Makarios became weary of merging Cyprus with the dictatorship. Baked up by the new regime in Greece, who saw him as the best man to replace Makarios, General Grivas, leader of the Cypriot National Guard, starts pressuring Turkey by sending heavily armed troops to patrol the

Turkish Cypriot enclaves and tension rises sparking intercommunal fighting (Solsten 1991). In 1967, the Turkish Cypriot leadership announces the formation of a “Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration” to, presumably, transitionally govern the community until the 1960 Constitution is fully re-established, a provisional administration readily interpreted by Greek Cypriots as a step towards partition (Solsten 1991).

On the 15th of July, the Greek junta undertakes its coup d'état against Makarios and replaces him with Nikos Sampson (Anderson 2008, 12). Turkey promptly demanded that Greece remove Sampson from the Cypriot Presidency, that Greek officers are withdrawn from the National Guard and a guarantee be given that Cyprus would remain independent thereafter (Solsten 1991). Greece and Sampson refused to comply with Turkish demands and Britain to take part in the requested intervention. Since the coup was undertaken by Greece, Turkey understood that the Treaty of Guarantee had been breached and decided to intervene unilaterally and an all-out war began in Cyprus that shapes reality on the island to this day.

The Turkish forces were able to progress quickly on the ground and seize 37 percent of the island's territory, setting their predetermined “Attila line” from Morphou Bay, in the north shore, to Famagusta, in the southeast. Thousands of people were dead and wounded, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, and migration took place on a large pace, as Greek Cypriots were fleeing their homes in the north to escape Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriot combatants and Turkish Cypriots in the south were running for protection in the north (Anderson 2008, 13). The number of refugees quickly amounted on both sides of the barricade. The right of return of these people and their property rights will become a sensitive issue of contention between the two communities in the future course of peace negotiations.

To separate the opposing forces, UNFICYP established ceasefire lines and a buffer zone. The “Green Line”, as it came to be known, has become vital ever since in the prevention of the reoccurrence of fighting, with UN troops supervising land and air throughout the whole extension of the buffer zone (UNFICYP 2011). In 1974, the northern flank of the Green Line became under total control and occupation of the Turkish army. In February 1975 Turkey annexes the area to its territory, proclaiming it the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which will remain so until 1983.

Since the Turkish intervention of 1974, despite sporadic events of aggression between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot individuals, there have been no outbursts of violence. From then on, the Cyprus conflict enters a new phase of consecutive peace talks and mediation attempts. However, the intractability of the internationalized conflict, the antagonistic objectives, the hidden agendas and the overwhelming mistrust the two communities developed towards each other will carry its toll on the *peacemaking* efforts to finding a longstanding solution. From 1974 onwards, Cyprus ceases to be a *conflict*, in a physical aggression perspective, to become a growing *problem* for the international community to solve.

3.2 Renewed Conflict Internationalization with EU Accession

Greek Cypriot application to the EC and the consequent refusal of the Annan settlement Plan in 2004 is another identifiable changing moment in the Cyprus conflict. On the 1st of May of 2004, 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots approved the Annan Plan, while 76 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected it (UN Secretary General 2003, paragraph 72), only the Republic of Cyprus became a EU member-state and the island remains divided and militarized to the present day. On the Greek Cypriot side of the dividing line created in the 1974 events, the Republic of Cyprus has continued to exist as it had been since the Turkish Cypriots left the government in 1963, governed solely by Greek Cypriots under the very same Constitution of 1960. Economically, the Republic of Cyprus has exponentially flourished. The tourist industry has greatly contributed to the modernisation and economic success of the Republic. With a per capita income superior to that of Greece or Portugal and one of the lowest unemployment rates in the EU, the Republic became a member of the European Union in 2004 and a member of the Monetary Union in 2008. Having an European integrated economy, Greek Cypriots enjoy,

today, a western European standard of living and life style (Solsten 1991). North of the Green Line, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was unilaterally proclaimed an independent state on the 15th of November of 1983, being immediately declared illegal by the Security Council in resolution 541 and not being internationally recognized by any state, except from Turkey, to this day. A parliamentary democracy was established with its own Constitution approved by the Turkish Cypriot electorate in 1985. Faced with an international embargo imposed by the Republic of Cyprus, the TRNC was isolated and became greatly dependent on subsidies from Turkey and enjoys a limited autonomy, the police are controlled by the Turkish army and the local government costs are entirely covered by Ankara (Solsten 1991).

When Cyprus became a EU member in a package of ten European countries, mainly eastern European, a solution to the Cyprus problem was supposed to have been accomplished under the auspices of Secretary General Kofi Annan but the “no” from the Greek Cypriot community in the referendum of the “Annan Plan” prevented the country from being reunified prior to the date set for EU ascension. An important enlargement to the east was underway and with the threat of Greece vetoing the whole enlargement process if Cyprus was not guaranteed accession, the EU did not wish to prevent nine other countries from entering due to the stalemate in Cyprus (Keith 1997, 31). The EU conferred membership to the whole island, and therefore did not *a priori* exclude the Turkish Cypriot side from being part of the Union, however, since it only recognizes the government of the Republic of Cyprus as legitimate, only the Greek Cypriot side has been enjoying full membership since 2004.

Although the EU acceptance of Cyprus accession aimed at accelerating the conflict resolution process, it became a third party to the conflict when it relinquished the necessity of the conflict's resolution prior to Cyprus' admission as a member-state and one who, in the end, has supported the Greek Cypriot side. For Greek Cypriots, instead of representing an opportunity for peace and prosperity and for a new collaborative relationship to develop among the two communities, the Annan Plan referendum was viewed as an opportunity to protect their identity and reinforce their sovereignty under the EU umbrella (Michael 2007, 597). The Annan Plan is, in fact, a product of decades of mediated negotiations and exhaustive discussions on each issue and that during the Annan Plan negotiations none of the content of the negotiations were new to the parties nor were they issues on which they had not previously debated or even agreed on.

The Annan mediation was, in the end, a victim of EU's inability to pursue a consistent Cyprus policy and to persist requiring a unification solution as the condition for accession and, consequently, the EU was viewed by the Greek Cypriot leadership a larger international arena where the conflict could continue to be played out (Michael 2007, 599) and in which Greek Cypriots would be empowered and gain advantage not only over Turkish Cypriots but, more importantly to them, over Turkey by gaining a vote on Turkey's own accession to the EU. Once again, instead of focusing in finding a solution for their conflict, the Cypriot parties, in this case the Greek Cypriots, bet on the gains provided by the continued internationalization of the Cyprus problem and choose to gain advantage over the Turkish Cypriot in order to achieve a more favourable agreement for themselves in the future instead of settling and ending the dispute at that given moment (Richmond 1998 714).

The refusal of the Annan Plan and the consequent “atypical” EU accession is an event that will again change the conflict's *status quo* and, therefore, the mediation's dynamics once the parties' power balance is shifted to Greek Cypriots favour, disempowering the Turkish flank and rendering Turkish Cypriots a weaker position in the new asymmetrical relationship (Nicolet 1999, 99). For the Turkish Cypriots it has become vital to enjoy full membership of the EU and put an end to decades of isolation that have deterred its development and increased the economic gap between the two Cypriot Communities. TRNC's and Turkish EU full membership has become a pivotal issue in the peace negotiations, one that has been played by both sides, altering the stakes, the strategies and positions and further elongating the journey to resolution. In this context, Turkey's accession also becomes entangled in the Cyprus problem with the Greek Cypriot side blocking its entry to strengthen its position at the negotiations

table with the Turkish Cypriots and, thus, the EU becomes both the main setting and one of the main actors in the Cyprus conflict (Michael 2007, 603).

Cyprus' membership of the EU was not properly used as a "carrot and sticks" strategy, and could have been decisive if used correctly, but did not do so because the EU failed to hold it as such for both of the Cypriot parties and was a third party biased towards the Greek Cypriots. The rejection of the Annan Plan is the indirect consequence of the change in the conflict's context, which leads to the current impasse and deadlock. With the failure of an "United Republic of Cyprus" to have acceded to the EU, Cyprus has become the crucial issue in Turkey's relations with the EU, who has held penalizing discourse towards Turkey as the invader of an EU member-state (Güney 2004, 38). The EU's involvement in the Cyprus problem has contributed to the internationalization through conflict process but, since the conflict is now only played at the diplomatic level, the events generated by the internationalization through conflict dynamics impact, not on the conflict itself (since it is inexistent), but on the peace process dynamics by making the parties less willing to cooperate on a joint settlement.

Conclusion

The Cyprus conflict has an international character from the start due to the de-colonization international process that created the Republic of Cyprus. It can also be considered that the birth of the Cypriot state itself was internationalized as it was a product of international conferences and an international agreement (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 208). Due to the specific character of the Cypriot nationalistic aspirations of union with the "motherlands" coupled with Greece and Turkey's vested strategic interests on the island, these two actors are drawn into the conflict at its early stages. When the first mediation attempts occur in the Cyprus conflict, the conflict has already been internationalized through Greece and Turkey's involvement to support the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot factions. Internationalization already existed in the conflicts' context but it increased with the transition to a peace process, when more international actors, the US and the UN, became involved (Raheem and Loganathan 2005, 3). The Cyprus conflict becomes internationalized through the peace process when it is sensed and recognized by the international community as being a problem that merits its intervention.

The search for the fulfilment of their mutually exclusive interests and objectives has provided the Cypriot communities the perception of the dispute as a zero-sum game, where one side's gain corresponds to the other side's loss (UN Secretary General 2003, paragraph 143). Trapped in their opposing positions, the Cypriot parties have looked, through the internationalization processes, for outside parties that could transform their win-lose game. The search for the involvement of an outside party to support their positions and maximize the potential of realization of their interests in detriment of those of the other has been the pattern of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot behaviour in the Cyprus conflict and one that maintained the "motherlands", Greece and Turkey, at the epicentre of the dispute (Richmond 1998 XV).

Internationalization can be the key to explaining the longevity and intractability of the Cyprus conflict, however it is the existence of multiple actors and interests in the conflict's context itself that complexify the conflict. *Internationalization through the conflict* sets the conditions for protractedness in the Cyprus conflict and, although the internationalization through the peace process multiplied the panoply of actors involved, it is not in this process that the reasons for the conflict's durability are found. Internationalization through conflict, rather than internationalization through the peace process, has rendered the Cyprus conflict intractable and protracted. The 1974 events, with the opposing interventions from Greece and Turkey, and EU accession process are the two main events prolonging the Cyprus conflict. These events exacerbated the conflict and increased its duration because they transformed the conflict's context and altered the balance of powers between the deeply antagonized Cypriot communities

who, empowered by the internationalization gains at the conflict level, become resistant entering agreement with one-another. Because aggression has been relatively infrequent and the numerous attempts at resolution have unavoidably ended in failure, the Cyprus “conflict” has become less of a *conflict* and increasingly a lengthy and protracted *problem* for the parties involved and for the international community to solve.

It cannot be ignored that the conflicts’ internationalization through the peace process contributed to the Cypriot parties’ continuing to view the conflict through an “adversarial lens” (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993, 347) by offering new opportunities for the ethnic-antagonized parties with zero-sum perceptions of their conflicting issues to maximize their positions *vis-à-vis* the other. The Cypriot parties utilized the internationalization of the conflict through the UN as a means to publicizing their positions and gaining international support for their causes and with this trying to alter unfavourable *status quos* (Coufoudakis 1976, 466). However, these interests held by the Cypriot parties allowed for the UN to mediate the dispute and for the needed level of pacification to exist in the conflicts’ context that can ultimately allow for a solution to be found. To devise a settlement between two highly antagonized ethnic groups is a hard, complex and time-consuming endeavour, however, UN and US mediating assistance has been crucial to the Cyprus conflict becoming less critical, dangerous and deadly. It has impacted on the parties’ demands and preferences and the improved their previously violence-prone relationship and made them flexibilize their positions and demands by who abandoning their *enosis* and *taksim* demands for less-exclusive and more compatible goals, into to the demand of an united state to that of a federal solution even though differing interpretations have lead to other incompatibilities (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993, 347-348). The Cyprus peace process is often referred to as a failed one but, although a solution is yet to be arrived at and the mediation process itself could have been more expedite in fully capitalizing on ripe moments, it cannot be said that it has accomplished nothing since it has generated the necessary environment for *peacebuilding* tasks to take place, such as reconstruction and intercommunal activities and the continuation and diversification of these tasks is increasingly more important to maintain and continue to stimulate intercommunal contact.

Internationalization through the peace process is, despite the negative impact it can have on highly antagonized disputants who are unwilling to settle, a motivation for the parties to choose peace and stop fighting. Internationalization through the peace process allows for international funds to be allocated for post-conflict relief and reconstruction and for economical and societal recovery to begin (Raheem and Loganathan 2005, 4).

The fact that internationalization has, on the one hand, provided for pacification of the Cyprus conflict while, on the other, for the intricacy of the diplomatic problem that exists today, is a product of the two different internationalization dynamics that have been taking place in the conflict’s context ever since its embryonic stages. Internationalization through conflict and the involvement of third parties who lend their support to either the parties, whether actively or tacitly (as was the case for the EU) has contributed to exacerbate the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot antagonism, originating events that shift the balance of power between two ethnically-antagonized parties who resist entering agreement with one-another, which has limited the conflict resolution achievements in the peace process. Internationalization through the peace process, even given its shortcomings, has had the capacity to prevent violence and to mitigate physical conflict and, even though this process does provide incentives for the Cypriot communities not to settle and, instead, to continue to look for new allies and supporters in the international arena, it is in the changing circumstances of the conflict’s context, provoked by its internationalized character, that contribute to the protractedness of the diplomatic imbroglio, once the conflict is no longer set on the ground,

Future Prospects and the Dynamics of De-Internationalization

The most recent round of Cyprus talks have been started in 2008 after a four-year stand-off following the demise of the Annan Plan. A solution continues to be sought, now in a “Cypriot-led and Cypriot owned” (UN Secretary General 2010, paragraph 27), negotiation on the creation of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation where the two federated states would enjoy political equality, but the core unagreeable issues have historically remained the same: those of governance and power-sharing, the issue of return or compensation of lost property provoked by the migration movements of 1974, the demarcation of the territory to belong to each of the two federated states and the security and guaranties for the new *state of affairs*, which revolves on the dismissal or maintenance of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance (UN Secretary General 2010, paragraphs 17-33).

The “EU-ization” (Michael 2007, 601) of the Cyprus problem has, nonetheless, had a positive impact by providing economic and security incentives that have facilitated coexistence and opened up interaction on the island allowing for the opening up of the crossing points. This has also the positive effect at the grassroots level by making Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot citizens less susceptible to their political leaderships’ political preferences while, at the same time, the EU offers them an alternative source of identity either then their ethno-nationalistic ones. However, even if not part of the EU, it was important that the Turkish Cypriot community would still be represented in the EU institutions as a part of the Cyprus delegation. This would be an important step that would be able to capitalize on an opportunity for the two communities’ reaproachment and, also, a political interaction experience (Michael 2007, 601) and is, perhaps, a solution that must be hastened and found before the Cypriot presidency comes into being in 2012. However, as success prospects of present negotiations remain dim, the Cyprus problem seems destined to continue entangled in Turkey’s accession and continue stalemated for much longer. In the meantime, Turkey continues to leverage the Cyprus issue to attain EU membership while not fully implementing the needed democratization, rule of law and minority and human rights respect and protection to meet the EU criteria, while the EU follows a ambiguous policy of continuously accepting to restart Turkey’s accession negotiations without ever demanding that Turkey terminates what it regards as an illegal occupation of its territory in Cyprus nor demanding that the Turkish recognize the Republic of Cyprus (Stavridis 2006, 89).

Common interests and mutual benefits from a settlement still exist and can be shared by the two communities but, towards its attainment, the change in the external/regional environment is key to the Cyprus problem, that is, changing the relationship between Greece and Turkey in order for a positive congruence of the internal and external dimensions of the Cyprus problem to exist and allow relaxation in the communities relationship and generate a proactive negotiations process (Michael 2007, 590). In communal terms, the conflict appears to no longer exist or to not having the potential to be as pervasive as it once was, that is why the Cyprus problem is also not a conflict anymore as it seems to no longer exist in the daily-lives of the Cypriot communities, except for the existence of the Green Line, but one that increasingly does not make sense to two differently but growingly “europeanized” communities. The Cyprus conflict appears today as being one carried by political leadership, one that is executed by the foreign policies of all intervenient and that has the EU as its major stage and conflicting issues source.

Central to the resolution of internationalized intrastate conflicts is “the de-internationalization of the problem and its ‘proper’ redefinition as a bilateral issue” (Masunungure and Bazda 2010, 211), that is, in the conflict’s context, between the two Cypriot communities. However, the internationalization through the conflict features have not been mitigated, and this has an explanatory value to why the Cyprus problem remains unresolved. Although in the Greek flank, Greece has for long lost its influence upon Greek Cypriot policy-making, in the Turkish flank, Turkey remains as party to the dispute, mainly due to Turkish Cypriot clientelism and dependence towards Turkey. Enabling the Turkish Cypriot community to be less dependent

upon Turkey's economic support is key to eliminating the *internationalization through conflict* features of the Cyprus problem, and thus for it to be resolved.

The Cypriot parties' perceptions of the conflict and the way in which they frame a solution need to be transformed. Greek Cypriots need to accept that Cyprus must belong to both communities and their demand for the Greek Cypriot 1974 refugees return to their homes to the north be satisfied. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, need to realize that they cannot indefinitely occupy a large part of the island and their need for security and for not feeling threatened by Greek Cypriot domination must be met (Nicolet 1999, 106-107). Despite the continuing mediation efforts since the 1960s, still no settlement has been achieved between the Cypriot communities. As long as internationalization features allow for each of the communities to hold stakes over the other, the Cyprus problem will remain unsolved.

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