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# A NEW AND ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP MODEL TO ANALYZE THE ROLE OF LEADERS IN FOREIGN POLICY

**ŞUAY NILHAN AÇIKALIN**
suaynilhan@gmail.com
Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University (Turkey). Her current research centers leadership of Angela Merkel and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan vis a vis Turkish-German relations and her research interests are Turkey- EU relations, integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey, youth work. Also, she has been working on application of chaos and complexity theory in international relations, and gastrodiplomacy and fashion diplomacy

## Abstract
The role of leaders in foreign policy analysis has an extensive literature and comprises subfields. Operational code and leadership trait analysis are prominent qualitative methods used in the field. However, the changing nature of international relations encouraged a rethink of the role of leadership in foreign policy and the analysis approach. In this respect, this article aims to introduce a new alternative leadership model, which is called the SNA Leadership Model, developed with four dimensions of; i) contextual background of the country, ii) personal background of the leader, iii) approaches and behaviors, and iv) reflections of background in making foreign policy. The model is developed as a new perspective about the role of leaders in foreign policy through an eclectic and holistic approach.

## Keywords
Political leadership, model, foreign policy, approaches, behavior

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# A NEW AND ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP MODEL TO ANALYZE THE ROLE OF LEADERS IN FOREIGN POLICY

**ŞUAY NILHAN AÇIKALIN**

## Introduction[1]

Making foreign policy is a dynamic and complex process, which comprises various actors which make the process difficult to analyze. Among these various actors, political leaders have undeniable effects in making foreign policy; however, scholars were late in focusing on understanding the role of leaders rather than structural factors (Horowitz and Fuhrmann, 2018).

From the historical perspective, the Cold War was a fruitful time for studying leaders with psychology and organization perspectives in order to analyze making foreign policy (Byman and Pollack, 2001). The origins of studies about the role of leaders in foreign policy analysis are two works; 'Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics' by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (1954) and 'Man–Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics' by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965). The work by Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin called Decision Making claimed that leaders who act on behalf of the state take action and used this as an approach to study international relations (1962). One of the main assumptions of the article focused on leaders as a decision unit who pursued a specific objective (1954; 2002). As inevitably reflected in the literature, through the Cold War American policymakers and scholars gained interest in the psychological traits of foreign leaders to predict future motives of these leaders (Renshon and Renshon, 2008). Since then, the literature analyzing the role of leaders in making foreign policy has been growing. Two distinctive approaches have been used widely as qualitative methods, operational code and leadership trait qualitative methods, and each involve their own limitations. The personal background and characteristics of the country, especially, were ignored in these approaches.

Modeling is a unique form for developing and constructing of new ideas. Constructing a model in social science is a popular tool to both visualize and analyze phenomena, which also allows flexibility for scholars.

In light of this, the article aims to introduce a new approach to analyzing the role of leadership in making foreign policy called the SNA Leadership Model, named based on the initial letters of the author's name.

[1] This article was prepared from the author's PhD thesis entitled "Leadership and Foreign Policy: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel"

## Overview of Existing Approaches to Analyzing Leaders in Foreign Policy Analysis

As mentioned in the introduction, the literature about analyzing leaders' roles in making foreign policy is dominated by two approaches of operational code and leadership trait analysis (Erhan and Akdemir, 2018). Firstly, operational code analysis was originally developed by Nathan Leites to analyze the strategies of Soviet Politburo members in 1950. Alexander George developed the method of 'operational code of analysis' in his work called 'The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making' (1969). The method he developed involves classifying and comparing individual leaders depending on certain political beliefs which are assumed to influence the leader's perception of the world and how they make decisions in foreign policy in two dimensions of philosophical and instrumental (George, 1969). In order to identify this process, Alexander developed sets of questions for both dimensions. In recent years, this method was developed as a computer-coding system by different scholars. Examples include Marfleet and Miller's "Failure after 1441: Bush and Chirac in the UN Security Council" (2005), Malici and Malici wrote "The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung: The Last Cold Warriors" (2005) and Renshon's article called "Stability and change in belief systems: The operational code of George Bush" (2008)**.**

The second prominent method used for analyzing the role of political leadership in foreign policy is leadership trait analysis (LTA). This framework was developed by Margaret Hermann and contributed the personal characteristics of leaders making foreign policy to the literature (Hermann, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1987, 2003). In this approach, personality is defined as a combination of seven traits: belief in their ability to control events, conceptual complexity, need for power, distrust of others, in-group bias, self-confidence, and task orientation (2003). According to Hermann (2003), the selected seven traits trigger the emergence of specific behaviors in leaders. In other words, leaders who have high belief in their ability to control events and need for power, for example, are expected to challenge constraints; however, leaders with low belief in the need for power and/or who do not believe they can control events are expected to respect constraints. In addition to this, conceptual complexity and self-confidence are linked to characteristic of openness to information. Thus, Hermann suggested that leaders with high scores for traits and leaders who have high complexity and low self-confidence are expected to be open to information; however, leaders with low scores for both traits and leaders with high self-confidence and low complexity are expected to be closed to information. Through the years, LTA became one of the preferred tools to analyze the role of leaders in making foreign policy.

The two dominate approaches given in detail focus on psychological assessment of leaders and how it affects foreign policy mostly from a qualitative method perspective. On the other hand, Post contributed a quantitative method for analysis of psychological assessment for political leaders in foreign policy with the psychobiography approach (1979). Within the next decades, Post created a research team composed of psychiatrists, internists, psychologists, anthropologists, historians, and intelligence analysts to develop classified leadership profiles of various world leaders for the intelligence community and senior U.S. policy makers (Dekleva, 2018).

However, these approaches involved their own limitations. Levy underlined the two main problems of generalizing the high stakes and high stress world of elite in the decision-making process (2013). Furthermore, psychological assessment models do not provide holistic explanations for making foreign policy and lack explanations about the role of domestic and international conditions, as well leaders' personal background. In other words, each leader and their making of foreign policy can be deemed sui generis due to domestic constraints and interpretation of their background.

## Building a Model in Social Sciences

The literature and main approaches about political leaders and foreign policy are given in the previous sections. In this respect, a new approach is introduced with a model which can be used by researchers who do not just aim to compare and contrast leaders' beliefs and motivations, as well as their psychological traits and their emotions only. Also, notions and terms from various disciplines are consciously used in order to shed light on the interdisciplinary nature of leadership. Because of this, the idea of developing a new leadership model comprising these notions can be considered interdisciplinary.

Although constructing models is rare in the social sciences, the aim of modelling is to produce more customized, sophisticated, and artistic models (Little, 1993). Modeling plays a vital role in scientists' motivation to understand the world and phenomena (Toon, 2016). Hutten (1954) and Braithwaite (1953) stressed the importance of models in science within different aspects as follows:

- Tools for thinking and theory development
- To provide descriptive vocabulary
- Models are naturally incomplete and "not literal"—that is, they leave out things and are potentially misleading.

In addition to this, models useful in different fields of science mostly focus on the general agreement among philosophers of science because models provide knowledge that represents some real-world 'target systems' (Frigg, 2002; Giere, 2004; Mäki, 2009; Ramadas, 2009; Coll & Lajium, 2011). While a theory attempts to explain a phenomenon, a model tries to represent the phenomenon (Bhattacherjee,2012). Various understandings and explanations of modeling should be emphasized here. There are different meanings involved in the notion of modeling including statistical models, decision analysis, procedures and algorithms and social science theories (Checkland, 1981; Little, 1993).

In order to clarify this misunderstanding, here I employ modeling as a representation of a way of thinking; models are always interpretive and not simply driven by the phenomena (Bailer-Jones 2009). Models are products of, and tools for, particular kinds of thinking (Morrison & Morgan, 2000; Winsberg, 2001). Through modeling, complex phenomenon are simplified (Heyck, 2015). This simplifying can be done in different ways such as scaling down or up, reducing the number of variables or components, idealizing or abstracting from concrete situations, making something new and strange more familiar through analogy or representation in an easy form, visualization and more (Coll & Lajium, 2011; Heyck, 2015). In light of this, model building can be considered both an art and also a craft comprising a mixture of elements from inside and outside the original field of investigation (Moris & Morgan, 2000).

There are different analytical tools and models that can be used for foreign policy analysis, especially with the intensive use of information technologies, which have three main common elements with different degrees of depth of analysis. These elements are: (1) individual actors, who do what they like through collation and influence; (2) the cognitive process, either related to agenda setting or one of the stages of the policy process; and (3) political environment and the conditions surrounding the policy maker including political, social or economic factors (Hamza & Mellouli, 2018).

## New Alternative Leadership Analysis Model

The new alternative leadership model was developed as a tool to understand behavior patterns of leaders in making foreign policy in a limited manner. This model was named SNA, based on the initials of the authors' names. There are different elements which determine the making of foreign policy at leadership level such as institutional structure of the state, history, personality and psychological elements of the leader, etc. This model only considers the background of the country and personal background of the leader and selected approaches and behaviors, which are limitations of this model. In other words, this model only focuses on approaches and behavior of leaders that produce specific foreign policy patterns. It should be noted that ideas within these four dimensions are not only limited to the field of international relations, but also come from various disciplines.

In the SNA Leadership model, the first dimension is the contextual background of the country, which includes mode of governance, political system and political characteristics of the country. In addition to this, the model features the historical perspective of the country to draw a picture of conditions when the selected leader first came to power. The second dimension is the biography of the leader, which provides insights from their childhood, youth and early political life. This dimension is inspired from the integrated political personality profile of Jerold Post as follows; 1) psychobiographic discussion, 2) personality, 3) worldview, 4) leadership style, and 5) outlook (2014: 329). The third dimension is approaches and behavior of the leader that combines ideas with a multidisciplinary perspective. The fourth and last dimension includes six patterns for foreign policy of leaders developed based on the third dimension of the SNA Leadership Model.

The visualization of the SNA Leadership Model is shown in Figure 2. In Figure 2; each circle represents each dimension of the SNA Leadership Model, which are named D1, D2, D3 and D4. Also, light points on each circle indicate subtitles in the dimensions. Eight light points represent a total of four approaches and four behaviors in the third dimension. Lastly, six light points symbolize six patterns in the fourth dimension of the SNA Leadership Model.

**Figure 1: Visualization of the SNA Leadership Model developed by the author**




## D1: Contextual Background of the Country in Which the Leader was Born and Raised

The socio-political and cultural context of the country are undeniable factors and leadership is given meaning by the contextual background of the country, while leaders also add new meaning to the contextual background of their country. The socio-political and cultural context creates sociological, political and psychological conditions for formation of leadership. These elements are fundamental determinants of the perceptions and judgments that cause a person to be adopted and accepted as a leader in a society. The socio-political and cultural context of the country gives meaning to leadership and also determines the type of leadership. This is an undeniable reality for influencing and unifying people to gain power and action while pursuing clear goals and creating a common future, as well as changing the socio-political and cultural context of the country. Thus, the leader is someone who can play the role of both evaluating and knowing the socio-political and cultural context and its resulting elements, and is also able to reshape and recreate socio-political and cultural visions for the future. Thus, the leader is an element of the socio-political and cultural context that adds new meanings to the socio-political and cultural context of their country.

## D 2. Background of the Leader

The early years and experiences of leaders can be used as a guide to understand their motivations and policy-making process (Breuning, 2007). In this respect, the SNA Leadership Model analyzes the background of the leader based on two sub-categories of personal background and political life from past to present. In the first sub-category, the leader's family, socialization processes, student years, success and failures and critical events in life are given. In addition to this, their physical appearance, life and working style are included to evaluate esthetic sensitivity as well. The second sub-category includes development of leader's political career and their politics in different political positions.

### D 3. Approaches and Behaviors in Political Leadership

The third dimension can be deemed one of the most original sections of the SNA Leadership Model comprising the approaches and the behaviors of political leaders. "Approach may be defined as the basic philosophy or belief concerning the subject matter being considered" (Höfler, 2005). Approach is the set of assumptions or perspectives held by individuals related to their field. In this respect, the SNA Leadership Model is a holistic multidimensional model providing new perspectives for how people understand, perceive and analyze the notion of leadership. Chowdury defines the notion of holistic as follows; "Being holistic means developing systems 'state of mind' which enables the practitioner to chart interrelationships, recognize emergence and work with and challenge different mental models reflecting alternative boundary judgments" (2019). Constructs are described as multidimensional when their indicators are themselves latent constructs (Edwards, 2001:145). So, a multidimensional construct represents a theoretically meaningful, overall abstraction that relates these various latent constructs to each other (Law et al., 1998). Political leaders who adopt this approach are naturally expected to deal with facts in a holistic multidimensional way. In this sense, leaders will try to both perceive the big picture and not ignore the details at the same time, which leads to the multidimensional and dynamic nature of the holistic approach that leaders adopt in their behavior. In this respect, the multidimensional and holistic perspective plays a key role in determining the four approaches and behaviors selected in the model.

## Approaches

- **Awareness of the chaotic nature of the system:** Social systems are naturally complex systems that include various actors with endless interactions in an international system (Geyer and Rihani, 2010). In these systems, leaders will be aware that they have to make decisions within a complex system where their actions can have unanticipated effects, to approach their goals indirectly through multiple paths in order to reduce the risk of failure, and to adopt careful and cautious policies while expecting dangerous nonlinear consequences (Jervis, 1997). The expected approach from a leader includes awareness of the structure of the system, exploration of the basic elements that affect the system and the relationship of these factors affecting the system periodically and taking into account the power of network in decision-making. These realities emphasize the importance of having a multidimensional leadership profile beyond the usual leadership traits (Erçetin et al., 2013; Erçetin et al., 2014).
- **Thinking in kaleidoscopic and catalytic ways** is important for leaders. Catalytic and kaleidoscopic thinking means a high level of awareness and sensitivity regarding the fluidity and intensity of continuous change within the international system. This thought system makes leaders sensitive to events where the phenomenon can always have different perspectives which enable the leader to obtain higher levels of commitment and performance from people. Furthermore, Petrini considered a

metaphor for kaleidoscope creativity; "reorganizing different parts that create a new reality" (1991:27). Similarly, Harris (2009: 78) emphasized that catalytic and kaleidoscopic thinking is an emergent event that can trigger entirely new possibilities due to the change in perspective. Indeed, Harris defined catalytic and kaleidoscopic thinking as planning for the future which is 'not there yet'. In today's complex and uncertain world, leadership and characteristics of leadership change rapidly and intensely according to time and situation (Bennet, 2016).

- **Being Glocal:** The word glocal comes from the Japanese word 'dochakaku' (Tulloch, 1992). In recent years, Roland Robertson defined the notion of glocal and glocalization as the dual character of the globalization process; being 'globalization' and 'localization' simultaneously (1992). In the global context, leaders demonstrate high level of awareness and sensitivity about what is happening. Specifically, developing policies vis-a-vis developments in their own countries. At the same time, the power and sphere of leaders has been increased by the globalization of local social, cultural, economic and political values. As Erçetin and the others suggest, glocal leadership requires a glocal strategy where all stakeholders should think globally and act locally (2017: 76). Likewise, leaders require unique glocal strategy to promote their own local values on a global scale.
- **Having unique values for humanity:** Allport and Vernon defined values as basic convictions or philosophy of an individual about what is and is not important in life (1931). Their definition of value also represents desirable goals in people's life. In other words, values are a vital element that is determinant of personal attitudes and behavior (Rokeach, 1973). This led to the question; are the values that they adopt what makes leaders unique compared to others? Leaders with values define a set of criteria. These criteria are generally shared in society within different aspects, such as events, facts, objects and people. The values presented by the leader are products of the historical and cultural background of the country, and also the current context and the future. The leader's values also reflect goals to be achieved in society through vision. Leaders who perceive their country as a global power or who aim to be a world leader themselves, try to create unique values for humanity that can be universally accepted. Stückelberger suggested that time and space contexts are influential in formation of values, including geographical conditions, ethnic identities, religious convictions, gender diversity, generational transformations, technological innovations and forms of organization in communities which can be collectively called contextual values (2016). These contextual differences may inevitably conflict with each other. Therefore, it is tough to set unique values for humanity and convert them into values which will be adopted by large masses of people both in their own country and externally where human beings are naturally part of an interconnected world (Raines, 2013). Lastly, it should be noted that when value acceptance is high around the world, the power and influence of the leader also increases within the international context.

## Behaviors

Behavior is defined as a set of actions within a web of relationships where dynamic interaction plays key role (1991). Also, behavior is observable activity of humans that is sourced from the accumulation of responses to internal and external stimuli (Flexner et al., 1987). Thus, 'the contextual background of the leader's country' and 'the background of the leader' play influential roles in this new model.

- **Production of entangled solutions** is defined as an important feature of the universe as revealed by Alain Aspect and his group in 1982. Aspect proved experimentally that the universe has invisible bonds and that objects are connected to each other. If micro particles are able to make immediate contact with each other, the reason for this is not that they send signals to each other, but rather they act as a single unit which means separation is an illusion. **'**Entanglement**'**, in other words, signifies a relationship so intensely and densely connected that it shows the unrealistic existence of separate phenomena. These phenomena should be considered to instead form a wider unified system, or even a kind of **'**nondualistic whole**'** (Elbe and Buckland-Merret, 2019). Thus, it reveals chronic problems in producing concurrent solutions for both prospective problems and solutions that will affect the whole international system and its actors. It is very important for a political leader to produce policies with this awareness. The policies that the leader produces with human, moral and legal values will ensure that, even if not immediately, they will be successful because of the deeper level of reality.
- **Determinants of uncertainties:** Determinants of uncertainties means to be flexible and ready to make a timely transformation based on these uncertainties. It is one of the most important behaviors that political leaders must have in order to capture temporality and to react to situations in a timely manner (Erçetin, 2016). This is particularly important during times of crisis when unpredictability is at its height and survival within national and international platforms is the top priority and critical for leaders. As Petzinger mentioned, the emergence of 'dynamic tension' during the crisis period involves multidimensional potential and advantages for all actors (1999). That's why, being timely and flexible are important characteristics to be determinant of uncertainties. Kesselring claims that modern living involves constant change, motion and transit (2008). In these social systems, flexibility is a liquidity where changing and transformation is normal (Bauman & Haugaard, 2008). From this perspective, leaders are expected to be flexible in order to make well-timed decisions. Otherwise, their decisions will create irreversible consequences for their countries and the international system. In this sense, it can be said that leaders gain influence and power in the international system by shaping the trends and interactions that occur, rather than controlling the behavior of the international system. Therefore, leaders should be determinant of uncertainties as normal through various scenarios and designs, along with the priority and interests of their country. Leaders should set new policies and agendas based on new circumstances with regard to uncertainties.
- **Simplexity:** The notion was borrowed from Kluger's (2008) book called Simplexity: Why Simple Things Become Complex (and How Complex Things Can Be Made Simple). Kluger defined simplexity as "a groundbreaking new concept that reveals the hidden ways the world really works. From the micro to the macro, simplexity is a startling reassessment of the building blocks of life and how they affect us all." Gribbin defined simplexity as an idea located between complexity and simplicity. Furthermore, Berthoz

(2012) explained simplexity as more than mixing of complexity and simplicity as follows:

> *Given the complexity of natural processes, the developing and growing brain must find solutions based on simplifying principles. These solutions make it possible to process complex situations very rapidly, elegantly, and efficiently, taking past experience into account and anticipating the future.*

When it comes to simplexity in the leadership context, it can be defined as a set of behaviors that ensure analysis by synchronizing events on national, regional and global scales, while including holistic and multidimensional solutions. Just as Berthoz defined simplexity, political leaders are expected to be dynamic, creative and unexpected in expressing their unique leadership styles, vision and intelligence as opposed to the conventional approaches of leaders. Political leaders should be able to think complexly, but also have the ability to turn complexity into an asset. It needs to be simple, clear and goal-oriented to encompass complexity. In addition to this, simplexity can be found in their rhetoric as well. Lassiter claims that usage of language is a complex process, which would be matured by the simplexity process but should be simple yet rich in terms of meanings and content in order to energize the masses (2019). In other words, leaders should use simple language to explain complex phenomena to people.

- **Create the attraction field** is knowing that the influence and power of leadership depends on interacting with others and the nature of these interactions. Multidimensional interactions always bring serious risks for political leaders due to the unpredictability of interactions that may develop and the kind of effects that will occur. Political leaders are aware of this reality and do not fear intense interactions. Even the political leaders who are luck makers that create an attraction field that expands with each interaction. In other words, they increase their social networks through interactions, making people feel their presence and duty at any time throughout instant interactions. They wisely evaluate their interactions in order to increase the power of their political capital which consists of people, experiences, and phenomena. They can use the latest technology effectively for this purpose.

### D 4: Reflections of Backgrounds on Foreign Policy Making

The third dimension of the SNA Leadership Model comprises approaches and behaviors that are shaped by the contextual background of leader's country and personal background. The fourth dimension of the SNA Leadership Model is reflections of the previous three dimensions on making foreign policy. Six foreign policy reflections were chosen as dynamic ideas which are products of the multidisciplinary leadership and international relations literature.

– **Negotiation**: Negotiation is one of the basic functions of diplomacy. Definitions of negotiation have varied through the years, but it commonly refers to a formalized process relying on verbal communication including a sub-class of bargaining aiming to reach an agreement between actors (Jönsson, 2002). Karns and others underlined the relationship between diplomacy and negotiations as follows; "diplomacy is a tool in international governance, while negotiation is an instrument of diplomacy" (2010: 3-

4). As expected, leaders are expected to be an influential actor in negotiations, while negotiation as a vital component of leadership (Rubin, 2002; Zohar, 2015). Different behaviors make leaders great negotiators. Changing international environments have created more complex environments, which also reshaped the negotiation ability of leaders as well how leaders should determine new sets of strategies. Firstly, flexibility, leaders should adopt to different scenarios and possibilities to reach an agreement. Secondly, creativity which is also related to the strategy of flexibility that focuses on producing different scenarios. Thirdly, leaders should strengthen their personal relationships with other leaders to learn the social cues of the other negotiator. Fourth, leaders should be patient and not to give up negotiations and leaders should be tenacious in negotiation which is a process where persistence is important (Rubin, 2002; Mastenbroek, 2002).

- **Connectivity**: As the international system is highly chaotic, interdependency is the new normal which multiplied with the increasing numbers of actors. In other words, the boundaries between global and local become invisible (Tomé & Açıkalın, 2018). The nested and more connected structure of the international system nudges leaders to reconsider how they perceive the international system. In this respect, Gelb defined connectivity as "the art of connection — creating and maintaining genuine rapport with others — is the key to building relationships, resolving conflict, and making creative possibilities come true" (2017: 26). In addition to this, Olson & Singer discussed how connectivity is related with the leadership phenomenon as follows; "it is one of the three core leadership actions, along with contribution and collaboration, that fit with our complex and highly dynamic world" (2004: 45-48). Thus, leaders must anatomize the dynamics of regional and global events through the notion of connectivity, which can be realized on three levels of transactional, relational and social. Inevitable connectivity between different actors who foster interdependency between phenomena should be understood by leaders. In other words, even micro events between two actors can affect the international system. That's why leaders are able to use connectivity for power in foreign policy decisions in order to produce long-term policies.
- **Personal diplomacy**: Political leaders became more visible and central actors in making foreign policy in the last decade (Nuswantoro, 2010; Hinnebusch, 2018). In this international environment, the notion of "personal diplomacy" brings more meaning to policy making. Personal diplomacy can be defined as diplomatic efforts "when a particular national leader tries to sort out an international problem on the basis of their own personal relations with, and understanding of, other national leaders" (Robertson, 2002:147). There is no doubt; political leaders live in a social environment that is composed of other political leaders from different countries (Dumbrell, 2013). In this respect, personal interactions between political leaders should be taken account in international relations under certain structural, bureaucratic and psychological conditions (Ülgül, 2019). Thus, leaders' personal connections and communications with other leaders play an important role in making foreign policy. As mentioned, the connections and intensity between leaders in the international system are vital and can be intensified through face-to-face meetings and phone calls (Hall & Yarhi-Milo, 2012). This can be considered to be an important

driving force for the sphere of power, in terms of the international system and domestic politics in the leader's country.

- **Entrepreneurship**: According to Schumpeter, an entrepreneur is a person who is willing and able to convert a new idea or invention into a successful innovation (1942). It is considered to be an emergent characteristic for political leaders. As touched upon, the international system has given a more multidimensional role to individual actors, especially to leaders. There is increasing interest in political entrepreneurs, individuals who change the direction and flow of international politics (Klein et al., 2010). Thus, entrepreneur leaders are expected to seek innovative policies in the international system. In light of this, entrepreneurship is considered to be an indispensable characteristic of leaders. There are different entrepreneurial qualities, which are having a vision, being extravert, focused and decisive, opportunistic, agreeableness, persistent, having a kaleidoscopic perspective and confidence (Harper, 2006; Obschonka & Fisch, 2018). Entrepreneur leaders who have these qualities should lead the process of affranchising the capabilities of societies and enabling them to identify and take ownership of ideas and pursue them by making something extraordinary with a common vision (Praszkier & Nowak, 2011). In a changing world, leaders should have a strategy that includes entrepreneurial components that must embody some ideas or insights into new combinations of resources for dealing with both risks and opportunities at the same time (Schneider & Teske, 1992).
- **Solution seeking**: Crises are a natural part of the international system. In the 21$^{st}$ century, international crises have become multifaceted and interconnected (Ahmed, 2011; Avenell & Dunn, 2016). Due to the nature of crises, they imply greater influence than expected, as leaders are at the heart of crisis diplomacy as decision makers. Bjola underlined that entropy sources in international crises demand strong leadership (2015). From this perspective, leaders first should define and analyze the crisis from different aspects, then create a feasible environment by creating teams to focus on solutions. In other words, leaders must come to the table with solution seeking resolutions which aim to solve common problems from the perspective of the larger picture and looking for long-term solutions in the best interest of all parties (Farrell, 2013). Leaders can be only solution seekers through a deep and multidimensional approach with different set of solutions. In other words, solution seeker leaders have both a solution seeking approach and a solution-focused mindset.
- **Peace orientation**: As mentioned in the solution seeking part, crises are a natural part of the international system. As well as crises, peace is also an idea that was identified in international relations from different angles. However, the SNA Leadership Model uses Galtung's positive and negative peace definitions (1996). Positive peace is that which is built upon positive relationships and interactions of human society. Establishing structural conditions that facilitate an environment built on positive interactions and engagements between actors is vital for peace. Negative peace, on the other hand, focuses on the reduction of violence, or efforts to solve current problems of conflict and discord (Galtung, 1996). Peace is not an exception that should be redefined in 21st century through enlarging and deepening vis-à-vis new security threats (Beyer 2018). Based on Galtung's definition, leaders are important in two ways, in both providing an environment, and being agenda setters. Mainly, leaders should provide both national and international environments with international

organizations and other nations to ensure sustainable peace. Also, leaders can be agenda setters, which includes solutions to new types of security challenges such as immigration, hybrid wars, radicalization, environmental degradation and digital security as top priorities in the 21st century (Bachmann, 2012). Consequently, leaders should be peace-oriented in their policy making for both foreign policy and domestic politics.

## Conclusion

The SNA Leadership Model presents the background of the country, personal background, approaches and behaviors of leaders and their reflections in the leaders making of foreign policy. Though this model has similar elements to previous works about leadership in foreign policy, it introduces a new structure with four main dimensions of the contextual background of the country in which the leader was born, the background of the leader, the approaches and behaviors of the leader and reflections of leader's background in making foreign policy. Creation of the model was the product of long-term efforts to bring a new and fresh perspective to the literature. Compared to current approaches to analyze the role of leadership in making foreign policy, the SNA Leadership includes domestic and personal elements with multidisciplinary ideas. This model was used to analyze the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel through selected case studies. Also, an important contribution of this model is that other scholars can analyze various research questions with different approaches, behaviors and reflections. Consequently, the SNA Leadership Model can be modified for different research questions, is dynamic and flexible similar to the nature of leadership.

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# WAR DRONES: LEGAL AND BIOETHICAL CONCERNS

**CESAR OLIVEROS-AYA**
coliveros@ucatolica.edu.co
Lawyer. PhD in Bioethics. Master in administrative law and university teaching and research. Research Professor at the Catholic University of Colombia, Bogotá, Cundinamarca (Colombia).

**Abstract**

This article aims to identify the points of tension byusing drones in military and/or war activities, from the perspectives of international law and bioethics. From the analysis of documents in secondary sources, it has been possible to elaborate a characterization of the main aspects of controversy and conclude that the risk of damage in the use of these artifacts must be subject to reduce human casualties and, for this, it is necessary to deepen the harmonization of bioethical principles regarding the theme.

**Keywords**

Bioethics, International Humanitarian Law, Weapon, War, Artificial Intelligence.

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# WAR DRONES: LEGAL AND BIOETHICAL CONCERNS[1]

**CESAR OLIVEROS-AYA**

## Introduction

In the first civilizations, war had a connotation of art, honor, and honor for the defense of peoples, of nations, and the protection of those distinctive principles that summons them. Since ancient times that assumed the character of art and, for this, it was based on principles that, remotely, were the light of the *ius ad bellum.* Societies older than Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome, considered that not every person could become a soldier, only the best, the most skilled, those who assumed the training tending to fight with the respect, dignity, and dedication that their political organization merited, had to be chosen.

But the world wars came, and that practice took a radical turn. Technology made it possible for war to be depersonalizing and one could speak of mass armies, replaceable soldiers, generals that no longer faced combat on the battlefields, but hid in large castles, directing military strategies as if they were a board game. All this made more evident the gap that separates hierarchs from subordinates.

The consequence of the above was to formalize rights on how to wage war, discovering that it was necessary to protect life as an essential right of the individual and, from there on, to erect a compilation of universal rights, so that the idea of humanity would again have a transcendent meaning.

Plausible but not admirable, the Western world gave rise to a new line of legal study based on human rights as if it had discovered something not previously thought. Based on rhetoric bordering on euphemism, without direct acceptance, what was done was to admit the failure of law as a social science. Even today, it is insisted on without bowing its head to the abuses committed.

However, just as a child who is warned, recommended, and prohibited certain behaviors that are harmful to his/her safety, health and physical integrity, the human being continues to ignore these minimum standards of planetary coexistence; mankind continues to tempt the fate of coexistence and invent new artifacts to show how creative the human being is in causing death and destruction of his fellowmen. In that, humanity has shone brightly.

[1] Article translated by Hugo Alves.

Evolution has gone from hand-to-hand combat, to short,medium- and long-range sharp weapons, to firearms in all categories, shapes, quality, size and material, each time avoiding direct contact with one another. The atomic bombs were out of competition to stop thinking about topics such as defense and neutralization, and, thus, show the great creative capacity in making evident the skills of destruction, elimination, and annihilation in all their splendor.

Curious tendency to avoid the individual, because the idea of combat ends up being reduced to its minimum expression. In some way, it amounts to objectifying the other, to ignoring the smallest detail that can establish some emotional sense for that one who is hardly considered, more than an adversary or enemy, a hinance; a token to be removed from the game board.

To that end, creativity has not ceased in its path to patent new mechanisms, artifacts, devices, etc. that achieve greater security for those who activate them and, at the same time, greater lethality for the objective (because in this sense, if they are individuals, it is better not to allude to them as human beings).

Today, the problem is oriented to the application of artificial intelligence in armed conflict and, in that context, the use of drones to achieve a much more effective distancing when attacking and destroying a target.

Much has been said about regulating, limiting, and even prohibiting those weapons that are not balanced and proportionate to the development of war... "humanize" the war, as if at the point of euphemisms, the impact of the warlike act was diminished.

Consequently, within the framework of international law, the hard law issue has allowed normative instruments to emerge in the light of normative instruments, such as the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Considered Excessively Harmful or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (ACC or CCAC), signed in Geneva, Switzerland, on October 10, 1980, understood as an extension to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

From that perspective, questions arise linked to prudence for the use of these unmanned weapons.Are they lawful? Do they guarantee the care of the civilian population? How is liability handled in case of violation of the law? If it does not expressly rule on drones, what is their treatment? If they are not used in conflicts, what is the scope of domestic law?

In this regard, this paper investigates the problems involved in the use of drones as a weapon and what is the main concern for them to be admitted from a bioethical point of view. Therefore, it outlines as an academic objective to identify the scope of the biolegal problem involved in the use of drones, their role as conventional weapons and the effects they can cause to the individual, nations, and the world in general.

The textthus starts from the definition of the concept of drone, the questions that the doctrine has made around it, and then exposes the disquisitions around its characteristics and insertion in war scenarios, culminating with reflections taken from film narratives that contribute to the debate in the sense of future concerns about the implications and gaps derived from acceptable use in terms of relevance and effectiveness.

## Drones as military devices: more than an autonomy problem

The U.S. military has defined the drone as a vehicle that can travel by land, sea, or air, but controlled remotely or even automatically. Thereis a big apprehension that it can take weapons characterizations and, in short, once the human crew is suppressed, any vehicle can be droneized. They may be subjected to telecommanding or autopiloting; receive names such as"Unmanned Aerial Vehicle(UAV) or"Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle"(UCAV),depending on whether it carries weapons or not. In this case, they have received nicknames such as "aerial surveillance devices transformed into killing machines", or "flying cameras, high resolution, armed with missiles" (Chamayou 2016: 18).

The use of unmanned aircraft for combat has its antecedent in 1849, when the Austrian army attacked the city of Venice with a fleet of unmanned hot air balloons (Rushby 2017: 23); it is also necessary to consider the works of George Cayley in 1909, of the Wright brothers, including the concept of pilotless aircrafts, as well as that of target drone*,*and, since the 60s the military assumption of the invention under the acronym RPV*(*Remotely Piloted Vehicle),modified in the 90s by UAV (UnmannedAerialVehicle)*,* then moving on to UAS*(*Unmanned Aircraft System)(Gertler, 2014).

From a technical point of view, drones are robots,as they can have a certain level of autonomy in their movements; this aspect warns of new ethical problems for their handling and insertion in different activities. If technology can increase this capacity, at the same time the scope of decision-making that should be inserted into its software will have to be questioned. Consider, for example, the risk of coupling the technology of a virtual game to a weapon whose risk of getting out of control may be imminent (Rossini and Gerbino: 8-9).

Regarding legal aspects, the topic is involved with the so-called Law of Air War, which is part of the law of armed conflicts or Hague Law, as well as with Geneva Law or International Humanitarian Law. The first originated at the First International Peace Conference in The Hague (1899), where the world powers approached their gaze to the dire possibilities of air warfare, an appreciation extended until the second event held in 1907 (Villamizar 2015: 93-94).

The first remote-controlled aircraft emerged just before World War I (Grossman 2018: 5), an event that was attempted to be avoided by the Allies by signing the Declaration of 1907, while the major powers omitted to do so. This caused the aviation to be used by the two sides to bomb each other since the regulations were mandatory for the states parties if they faced each other (Villamizar 2015: 94).

In 1922 the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments was held in which a commission of lawyers commissioned a Regulation on Air Warfare that never entered into force. But it was in the heat of World War II that the waring sides attempted to develop drones. Then, in Vietnam, Firebee drones entered the scene, at the behest of the United States of America. It has been since the 90s and the beginning of the 21st century, that it has been achieved, from computer science and remote technology, to turn drones into the sophisticated weapons of today (Villamizar 2015: 94).

Military drones are divided into explicit attack weapons and devices with complementary military uses, the functional characteristics of which are similar, namely:

> *"The engines of unmanned aerial vehicles emit a characteristic sound. These contain bombs and missiles controlled by a laser, but their main tool is contained in the nose. Inside it is a black box that communicates with a satellite. This connection is what allows one to operate the drone over a long distance. At the bottom are distributed three different cameras: one infrared, one for long distances and the last for close-up views. Drones transmit the images captured by their cameras, thus allowing them to monitor territories or attack targets. If the UAV is hit or destroyed by the enemy, the pilot is not in danger, as he is in an air base thousands of kilometers away. It takes two human operators to guide a drone. The pilot will oversee operating the device, and another one will oversee controlling the cameras. If a target is located and it is necessary to attack, the pilot will choose the weapon he will use manually. The operator points the target with the laser, and the pilot shoots at the push of a button"* (Fernández 2017: 6).

Unmanned technology is already widespread and will be very prolific soon. As it expands and increases, the most advanced armies will manufacture drones of high sophistication; on the other hand, states with lower capacity will gain new levels of attack and surveillance and, inevitably, there will be more options for terrorists and insurgents to get theirs (Grossman 2018: 5).

Therefore, in the current context, according to Kelsey Atherton from*Popular Science,*what is included in the concept of drone as a category alludes to any unmanned and remotely piloted flying craft, ranging from something as small as a radio-controlled toy helicopter, to the 32,000 pound or 104-million-dollar Global Hawk (Kreps 2016: 7).

But there is confusion among artifacts that might well fit into that definition; starting by stating that drones are getting smaller and amateur aircraft models have become more sophisticated. For example, these can be equipped with first-person view (FPV) capabilities in which a camera is mounted in front of the aircraft model and flown through a video downlink displayed on a portable monitor or video. The moment this FPV goes beyond the line of sight, the Armed Forces would likely consider it a drone that would fall within its regulatory framework. However, operating within line of sight does not mean that an aircraft is not a drone. Quadcopters are traditionally operated within the line of sight and are commonly considered drones.

Another potential source of misperception is the difference between a drone and a cruise missile. While the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) considers cruise missiles as a type of drone, they are distinct platforms. Although they can be confused with cruise missiles, there are two differences between them:

**Table 1 - Based on studies by Sarah Kreps**

| Drones | Cruise missiles |
|---|---|
| Can be recovered | They are unidirectional systems |
| Ammunition is segregated and separated | Ammunition is integrated into its fuselage |
| In ranged attacks, their range is shorter | In ranged attacks, their range is longer |
| They are slower | They are faster |
| Likely to require operational bases | No operational bases required |
| They are not manned | They are not manned |

Source: Sarah Kreps (2016: 8)

From these approaches, one of the great problems arises around the insertion of drones in war. It is about how to harmonize these artifacts with International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. Several informal meetings have been held in May 2014 and April 2015, within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCAC), located in the city of Geneva, to discuss this aspect that represents a wide legal vacuum that must be paid attention without further delay (Del Valle 2016: 226).

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), as defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross, are:

> *"Any weapon system with autonomy in its critical functions, i.e., a weapon system that can select (search, detect, identify, track or select) and attack (use force against, neutralize, damage or destroy) targets without human intervention"* (Queirolo 2019).

Despite this notion, it has been difficult for the international community to fully identify the figure, especially since it alludes to "emerging technologies", but it has been estimated that they have as a common denominator the ability to select and attack targets "without ongoing human intervention, in an open environment, under unstructured and dynamic circumstances" (Del Valle 2016: 228).

Similarly, in terms of classifications, autonomous weapons manage to be discriminated against in three ways according to the human involvement that may exist in their actions. In the following table, the English denominations are derived from Human Rights Watch's interpretation and those in the second row correspond to the categories used by the United States Department of Defense:

**Table 2 - Elaborated from the studies of María Julieta Del Valle**

| Human-in-the-Loop Weapons | Human-on-the-Loop Weapons | Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons |
|---|---|---|
| Requires a human command to select and attack targets | The system selects and attacks targets, but under the supervision of a human operator | Can select and attack targets without any human intervention |
| They are semi-autonomous systems | They are autonomous weapon systems supervised by humans | Fully autonomous weapon systems |

Source: María Julieta Del Valle (2016: 228)

For Christof Heyns, Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council, these systems have remarkable military advantages, as they:

- Offer greater protection of one's own armed forces (saving soldiers' lives and preventing injuries).
- Multiply the force employed.
- Expand the battlefield (facilitate penetration behind enemy lines and can stay in the theater of operations longer; much longer than people).
- Have a shorter reaction time than humans.
- Will never act out of panic or revenge, or racial hatred...
- Will be able, in the future, to employ less lethal force, avoiding unnecessary deaths; hence, technological development can offer, as alternatives, the immobilization or disarmament of the objective (Gutiérrez and Cervell 2013: 29-30).

As it has been observed, although the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in the military field is not new, the use of drones today obeys the idea of technostrategy, promoted since the Cold War, under the premise of reducing fatalities according to the US anti-terrorist policy (Villamizar 2015: 91).

The legal controversy around these artifacts is becoming more important, and especially in that it is argued the need to define a normative support that is clear, valid, and effective as soon as possible, given the enormous gap that the subject implies in a world where asymmetric conflicts are more frequent.

For Jochen Kleinschmidt, beyond orienting the discussion towards autonomy, the controversy must be addressed in other directions, while drones "are not today the most autonomous weapons systems in use" (2015: 21).

Considering this, the divergent positions have not been long in coming; for example, for Judge Lord Thomas Bingham, drones are equivalent to anti-personnel mines and therefore their recognition is not admissible; on the other hand, in the framework of the Annual Congress of the American Society of Law,held on March 25, 2010, Harold Koh, legal advisor of the Department of State, supported argument in favor (Villamizar 2015: 92).

In this constant tension, international law is subjected to the interpretative swing without there still being an environment of legal certainty that clears the uncertain panorama. Therefore, a third position has been guided by Peter Maurer, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which defends the legality of drones used as weapons, by assimilating them to those that are launched from helicopters or fighters.

It happens that the problem of illegality lies in the contextual study of operations under the framework of IHL, with respect to which it is necessary, of course, to differentiate between combatants and civil society, as well as the respective assets and this is done with caution; likewise, it is necessary to cancel attacks that cause excessive or disproportionate damage, as well as to avoid with the transport of unconventional weapons and give greater preference to those that improve the accuracy of the attacks in order not to affect collateral damage (Villamizar 2015: 92, 98).

A tenuous doctrinal consensus on the subject has been recognized, highlighting the prevalence of the principle of proportionality, the protection of civil society and the responsibility of the chain of command, as fundamental legal axes to give clarity to the thorny study on the desirability of this modality of armament.

## Concerns from bioethics

In accordance with the fundamental principles of bioethics, the problem assumes a tension between the adequate and the inadequate, especially in the case of implications derived from the sovereign expression of states.

It is not possible to estimate that drones will disappear from the war scene; they are here to stay, and, in this sense, they emerge as considerable weapons in future confrontations that, of course, there will be.

However, it is necessary to assess the relevance of a moderate use of drones, about these potential damages that they may cause.

Bioethical interpretation is usually oriented from the concurrence of four essential principles: non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy, and justice. As it is known, its correspondence with dilematic aspects is usually moderate. In the above case, its scope is complex, especially because of the nuances involved in the possibility of causing damage.

For example, in the face of non-maleficence, the duty is to avoid any attempt on life. In this sense, the use of drones in war conditions would be oriented, in extreme cases, towards the affectation of material things or goods.

Regarding charity – which in a conflict is paradoxical – it is reflected in the prohibition of the use of force that finds its exceptions in "the authorization of the United Nations Security Council to carry out coercive action and the legitimate defense of States" (Ferrari, 2021: 111).

Likewise, justice and autonomy swing on the relativity of events insoil, as they are limited to the sovereign vision of states, an aspect that is a principle, but, at the same time, segregates the factors of incidence of the decisions to be taken.

It is not easy to bring up a precise approach to these parameters of duty, because in the scenario of warlike conflicts, irrationality makes possible any consequence to the detriment of the proper condition of humanity, especially when it is evident how "international law has been brewing in function of war" (Oliveros, 2020: 131).

In the international regulatory landscape, the states that are at the forefront of the regulation of these devices are Australia (an essential reference around private messaging), Ghana (with the most extensive network of drones oriented to social services), China (in terms of health care, derived from the Covid-19 pandemic), USA (which, despite its unseated arms race and the use of drones in military activity since the 50s, has also used them for citizen protection purposes) and Spain, which in terms of privacy and citizen security is based on Royal Decree 1036 of 2017, issued by the State Aviation Safety Agency (Ortiz and Sánchez 2020: 19). These scopes emphasize a non-war use, since they are oriented towards the benefactor purpose that underlies technology, an aspect that it seeks to improve the living conditions of nations.

The inclusion of drones in this scenario opens multiple possibilities, not only in terms of promoting asymmetric warfare, but also in that, probably, the affront towards human beings begins to diminish. There is a need for a collaborative correspondence between states within the complex scenario of international relations. To do this, it will be necessary to deepen the scope of artificial intelligence supported by prudence, restraint, and caution. Maybe it is asking a lot, but it is an urgent need to consider.

## Conclusion

The drone, as an artifact that can be used for military tasks and military confrontations, has become an important option within the tensions that move states to demonstrate their power. One of the main concerns of the use of these is the ability to locate targets at a distance and, even more, the detection subject to an uncertain and, probably, wide autonomy that can generate an imbalance in the abuse of that power.

However, it is estimated that they can also contribute to reducing the deaths of human beings in war, given the impersonal and remote-controlled character that identifies them. Under that gaze, its military incursion is susceptible to justification.

Despite the hermeneutic difficulties involved in studying the problem from the perspective of bioethical principles, it is necessary to formulate new criteria that involve an appropriate use of this technology and thereby avoid catastrophic events to dignify the human condition over war pretensions, to comply with greater rigor, the scope of courtesy, cooperation, and reciprocity, as the basis of international law.

An insistent and permanent call is needed to the international concert of relations between states, to effectively regulate the use of drones to put technology for the benefit of humanity, e.g., in citizen protection work, assistance in health services, messaging work, etc.

In this vein, emphasize the responsibility that underlies the nature of the positions held by heads of state, heads of government, military, political and social leaders to avoid the trivialization of violence whose risks tend to deify Human Rights to the point of trivializing life itself while individuals are considered as mere pieces in war chess games.

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**THE DIRECTIONS OF MOVEMENT FOR SOCIALISM (MAS) IN BOLIVIA: THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY**

**NATALIA CEPPI**
natalia.ceppi@fcpolit.unr.edu.ar
PhD in International Relations from the National University of Rosario (Argentina). Master in Integration and International Cooperation (CEI-CERIR-UNR). Degree in International Relations (UNR). Deputy Researcher at the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET). Professor of Consular and Diplomatic Law, Bachelor's Degree in International Relations, Faculty of Politics and International Relations (UNR).

**Abstract**

Foreign policy and diplomacy are, within the framework of International Relations studies in general, two categories that enjoy great prominence. In practical terms, they have a close, symbiotic bond and even the idea persists that both mean the same thing. However, from a theoretical-conceptual perspective, foreign policy broadly implies the objectives of the state at the international level, while diplomacy reflects the means to achieve them. Based on this, this paper seeks to identify and reflect on the central axes that crossed the dynamics of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy of Bolivia during the three governments of Evo Morales (2006-2019). Likewise, a brief projection is made on this very particular binomial after the return of MAS to power, following the triumph of Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca on October 18, 2020.

**Keywords**

Bolivia, MAS, foreign policy, diplomacy, change/continuity

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Natalia Ceppi

# THE DIRECTIONS OF MOVEMENT FOR SOCIALISM (MAS) IN BOLIVIA: THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY[1, 2]

**NATALIA CEPPI**

## Introduction

The arrival of MAS to the presidency of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, after its first presidential victory on December 18, 2005, constituted a fact of great impact beyond its implications in the national reality. At the regional and extra-regional levels, the media, academics, and policymakers closely followed the rise of the Evo Morales-Álvaro García Linera formula. Such an expectation can be understood, among other things, from the development of the electoral contest itself. In the collective imaginary, the 2005 elections were not seen as just another suffrage, that is, as part of the intrinsic practice of the democratic game, since these, for the first time since 1985, offered reliable possibilities to put an end to the coalition governments that constituted the period of the so-called Pacted Democracy[3].

In this context, the triumph of MAS was an unprecedented event for several reasons. In the first place, its access to power was given through obtaining an absolute majority of the votes (53.74%), which had not happened since 1982. Secondly, MAS differed from traditional political parties by being a political movement that represented and, at the same time, articulated indigenous, peasant and trade union demands, whose identity components were wielded around the strong leadership of Evo Morales (Mayorga, 2008, 2016). Thirdly, its government program was focused on the process of *Refounding the State,* which, broadly speaking, implied disruptive policies not only at the domestic level, but particularly in the external agenda and in the international linkage of the country. For MAS, it was imperative to provide foreign policy and diplomacy with new contents and structures by understanding them as the reflection of national identity, but also because they would allow the satisfaction of certain political and economic interests.

[1] Article translated by Hugo Alves.

[2] The present work continues and deepens some lines of analysis that have been developed in previous research instances within the framework of the National Research Council Scientific and Techniques (CONICET).

[3] Exeni Rodriguez (2016: 84-85) maintains that Agreed Democracy is "taxation" of the Pact for Democracy as a post-electoral event of the 1985 elections where the Presidential election fell to Congress in the absence of an absolute majority. By tradition, the first majority was ratified, but on that occasion, Hugo Banzer Suárez, a former de facto president, and DNA candidate, was displaced by Víctor Paz Estenssoro of the MNR. with the backing of his party and other forces Legislative. Two months later, ADN supported the Executive in parliament, and they signed a governance pact. From there, the traditional parties (MNR, ADN and MIR) were rotating in power thanks to the alliances made in the Legislative together with other minor forces.

This paper proposes to reflect on the central aspects that have marked the compass of Bolivia's foreign policy and diplomacy during the three administrations of Evo Morales (2006-2019). It also seeks to infer possible modes of action in the matter with respect to the recent mandate of Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca, whose triumph in the elections of October 18, 2020, gave way to the return of MAS to the executive branch after the interim government of Jeanine Áñez. It is argued as a conjecture that, under the leadership of Morales, the foreign policy and diplomatic actions of the Andean country have been disruptive and marked by a rhetoric with a strong ideological component, especially when compared to the governments that preceded MAS. In both cases, there is a clear commitment to pragmatism to conquer and benefit from the political and economic possibilities of the context, whether in the framework of bilateral relations or in multilateral instances.

For the purposes of this study, a qualitative methodological design has been used with a view to comprehensively characterize the core of the analysis. Being flexible and having a holistic perspective, it approaches the object of study from the idea of unity, that is, as a whole – and not as a sum of parts – so the focus is on the phenomenon and its context (Taylor and Bogdan, 1987; Sautu, 2005; Hernández Sampieri, Fernández Collado and Baptista Lucio, 2014). On the other hand, the empirical references come from official documents, national regulations and specialized articles on the different edges that are part of the research, using bibliographic and documentary searches as techniques for collecting information.

In organizational terms, the analysis is presented in three sections. In the first one, a brief presentation is made on the MAS government proposal at the domestic level and then establish its connection regarding the external actions of the country. It should be noted that the stay of MAS in the presidency of Bolivia throughout three consecutive administrations aroused curiosity and interest on the academy, whose production has put under the spotlight multiple aspects and dimensions that have been part of the government plans of Evo Morales, both domestically and externally. In general, at the domestic level, studies focused mainly on the relationship of MAS with social movements, the territorial advance of the ruling party *versus* the decline of the opposition; the demands of the indigenous-peasant collective and its proposal for change in the link between the state, society, and market forces. Regarding the country's external actions, much of the analysis has focused on the transformations that have been established since 2006 in the central guidelines and basic guiding principles of foreign policy, the agenda items and in the regional and extra-regional links of an actor with little room for maneuver in the international context (Fernández Saavedra, 2011; Canelas and Verdes Montenegro, 2011; Trejos Rosero, 2012; Namihas, 2013; Olmos Castro, 2014; Ceppi, 2015, 2019; Querejazu Escobari, 2015; Souza, Cunha Filho and Santos, 2020; Ponce Costa, 2020, etc.). This has had as a correlate, the enrichment of academic debates and, at the same time, has contributed to strengthen the analysis of this process based on two central notions in the international activity of states, such as foreign policy and diplomacy. Both categories have a close relationship and great coupling, and it is common that they are usually used as synonyms. However, for International Relations and Diplomatic Law, they conceptually comprise different notions (Pérez Manzano, 1989; Moreno Pino, 2001, Arredondo, 2016; Vilariño Pintos, 2016; Hocking, 2016). *Foreign policy* represents the objectives and goals of the state in its international actions, while diplomacy is an instrument – always peaceful – for the achievement of them (Arredondo, 2016: 8-10).

The second section identifies the most relevant aspects that have given content to the foreign policy and diplomacy of the Morales governments. Bearing in mind that in the foreign policy/diplomacy distinction, the former deals with the what (what goals or objectives) and the latter with the how (the means or tools), the most significant objectives of the period 2006-2019 are analyzed with their corresponding implementation policies. The decision to approach them in a distinctive way – in conceptual terms, but at the same time as a unit – contributes to deepen the theoretical analysis of each category. At the same time, their treatment together makes it possible to have a sort of snapshot; a more complete picture of the situation on the positions, decisions, and actions of policymakers at the international level, considering the domestic and systemic situations.

Finally, in the third section, which works as a closing one, some aspects related to the conduct that Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca intend – at least from the rhetoric – to print to the foreign policy and diplomacy of the Andean country are outlined tentatively.

## 1. The starting point

The arrival of Evo Morales and Álvaro García Linera to the presidency can be synthetically contextualized in a scenario that combined countless elements, many of them, opposed to one another: great expectations, in particular, on the part of the indigenous-peasant collective, political-institutional instability, and enormous challenges at the socio-political and economic levels. The promises of growth, development, and well-being of the governments of the Pacted Democracy – anchored in the implementation of orthodox economic programs – lacked correlation in the actions. At the beginning of this century, recession, poverty, and inequality had become a profound structural problem and, consequently, the *leitmotiv* of the demands for change *versus* continuity of a large part of the population[4]. Popular discontent was channeled into events such as the Water War (2000), the Gas War (2003), the resignation of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in October 2003 and multiple citizen and peasant protests that had social movements as main protagonists. Those made more evident not only the erosion of the traditional political parties, but also a determining factor in the triumph of MAS. According to Zuazo (2010), MAS has resulted from the expansion of democracy during 1982-2000 but, at the same time, it has been a consequence of its deep crisis. It was born by the decision of the peasant social organizations to have a political instrument, which was later extended to the cities, generating because of its triumph in 2005 the transition to an "urban party", with an overwhelming leadership of Morales as President and head of the party.

For MAS, the two decades of Pacted Democracy had generated a weak, porous state, whose roles and functions were restricted to favor transnational capital and the conservative groups that had traditionally governed the country (MAS-IPSP Government Program, 2005: 10). Faced with this, Evo Morales understood that the refoundation of

4 According to Bolivia's Social and Economic Policy Analysis Unit (UDAPE), in 2000, moderate poverty reached 66.4% of the population; extreme poverty accounted for 45.3% and the Gini Coefficient was 0.66. Statistics Dossier Number 30. Available at https://www.udape.gob.bo/portales_html/dossierweb2020/htms/dossier30.html.

the social pact required the existence of a state that had a strong presence in the domestic sphere and in the external agenda to establish multidimensional changes, in accordance with his campaign proposal. The guiding principles of action – which were subsequently renewed in the following mandates – were presented in the National Development Plan of 2006, as a comprehensive strategy, aimed at the construction of a *Dignified, Democratic, Productive and Sovereign Bolivia to Live Well* (National Development Plan, 2006). In general, it implied the implementation of measures aimed at redefining the state-market and state-society link, rescuing, and incorporating the worldview of the peasant indigenous peoples. For its part, *Vivir Bien*[5] is a philosophy, an ancestral paradigm conceived in interculturality; "an alternative civilizational and cultural horizon to capitalism and modernity", which is understood and achieved practically and collectively by integrating the social, cultural, political, environmental, and economic dimensions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 2014: 60).

In fact, MAS proposal for changing has rested on the construction of an active state – in this case, in its plurinational version – (Cordero Ponce, 2012), based on the ideals of national development, social reformism and more inclusive forms of participation and representation. At the domestic level, this process has been cemented through:

*a)* The nationalizations and renegotiations of contracts in strategic sectors, such as hydrocarbons (Supreme Decree 28, 701, 2006), mining [Huanuni, the most important tin mine in the country (2006)], telecommunications [ENTEL company (2006)], metallurgy [Vinto company (2007)], fuel [Air BP (2009)], electricity [Corani, Guarachi, Valle Hermoso and the electricity distributor of Cochabamba (2010)], smelting [the Vinto antimony plant (2010)], and airport services [SABSA (2013)-(CELAG, 2019)];

*(b)* The promulgation of a new National Constitution (2009), which, among other things, is based on the expansion of citizenship rights with the recognition of the rights of indigenous peasant communities, such as autonomies, intercultural democracy, and the formation of Bolivia as a plurinational state (Cordero Ponce, 2012);

*(c)* Commitment to the fight against poverty and inequality through the development of conditional cash transfer programs in health, education, the elderly, and pregnancy. At the end of Morales' third term, in 2018, 51.2% of the total population was a beneficiary of some social bonus (Ministry of Economy and Public Finance of Bolivia, 2019). This generated a virtuous circle with respect to social indicators since poverty – both moderate and extreme – and inequality had a clear downward behavior in the period 2005-2018. Moderate poverty went from 60.6% to 34.6%; the extreme kind from 38.2% to 15.2% and the Gini Coefficient from 0.60 to 0.46 (Ministry of Economy and Public Finance of Bolivia, 2019: 196-197).

However, for the *Refoundation of the State* to be understood in a comprehensive and conclusive way – "total refoundation", according to the MAS position – the foreign policy, diplomacy and international relations of the country must, by extension, have differentiating features from the governments of the Pacted Democracy.

5 On the analysis of *Vivir Bien* in Bolivia, it is recommended to consult Martínez (2016).

Now, what is meant by foreign policy and diplomacy? Returning to the initial proposal of this work, where these categories are observed in terms of unity, but at the same time they are conceptually differentiated, foreign policy comprises, following the ideas of Hermann (1990), a program – a plan that is elaborated from the executive power for the achievement of goals to be accomplished at the international level. In this sense, foreign policy, as stated by Wilhelmy (1991), Lasagna (1996), Milani and Pinheiro (2013), Busso (2016, 2019) and Míguez (2017, 2020), among others, is inscribed as public policy, that is, as the set of objectives and actions carried out by a government in the face of problems – or could be added, issues in general – that at a certain moment arouse interest on the part of the government itself as well as other actors, among them, the citizens (Tamayo Sáez, 1997). This implies, according to the analysis of Oszlak and O'Donnell (1976), a position taken by the state, which is concretized in decisions that are not necessarily expressed in formal acts, aimed at resolving that question that arises. Being a mode of intervention where the decisions or perspectives of various actors are included, this "position taking does not have to be univocal, homogeneous or permanent" (Oszlak and O'Donnell, 1976: 21). This results in three important elements to take into account: 1- that predominant position that concerns other sectors of society, develops in a specific historical context and moment; 2- when several actors coexist in the fixation of the position, sometimes, the decisions can be contradictory and/or conflictive and 3- the taking of position can be active or by omission, both being a way of dealing with the agenda item (Oszlak and O'Donnell, 1976: 21-23).

The particularity of foreign policy lies in the fact that when the state adopts positions in the face of problems of interest, a constant interaction between the domestic and external planes is observed (Busso, 2019, Míguez, 2020). In the words of Wilhelmy (1991: 177), the specificity of the international problem generates that foreign policy objectives are identified from the incidence of the influences that come from the political system, domestic considerations of politics and from the significance of the actors and the international environment.

Therefore, while foreign policy sets and decides the guidelines for action – mediate or immediate – by a state, diplomacy is a way of executing, always peacefully, that foreign policy (objectives and agenda items) that has previously been decided. That said, diplomacy is essentially a tool or an instrument at the service of foreign policy (Vilariño Pintos, 2016: 75). For Vilariño Pintos (2016: 75-76),"diplomacy is not an end, but a means; not a purpose, but a method". This implies understanding, according to the author, that foreign policy has a substantive character and diplomacy an adjective character, generating that they are – according to the neologism he uses – of an order that is "completive", since diplomacy does not have an existence separate from foreign policy.

Considering that in the construction of the objectives and agenda items that mobilize the international action of the states, there are factors of a domestic and systematic order, foreign policy, in its condition of public policy, is not something static or unalterable. On the contrary, the coexistence between change and continuity is a recurring pattern when it is put under analysis. In this sense, the foreign policy of MAS is no exception, since throughout the three administrations of Morales, in terms of Lasagna (1995), the presence of traditional and contingent criteria emerges. The former alludes to aspects or guidelines that are part of the assembly of a country's foreign policy, regardless of changes in government; being in the case study, the defense of democracy, sovereignty, and human rights; non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the claim for sovereign access to the sea in the face of their dispute with Chile. On the other hand, the latter responds to conjunctural questions by understanding the inclinations or preferences of the government of the day and the "inputs it receives from abroad" (Lasagna, 1995: 390-391). When applied to Bolivian foreign policy, the contingent criteria are unfailingly associated with the process of *Refoundation of the State;* the idea of rupture and the need to establish a paradigm shift in international relations. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the governments that preceded MAS shared a foreign policy whose objectives were marked by the political-ideological dependence of the United States of America, the fulfillment of the orthodox postulates of the international financial organizations and the obtaining of benefits for the ruling elites and the business sector (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 2014). Faced with this, the Morales administration set out to provide foreign policy with a new doctrinal structure in accordance with the redefinition of the state's ties with the market and society and the principles held in partisan terms.

In discursive terms, the former president opted for a rhetoric that was more radical than moderate, with a marked counter-hegemonic stance, very critical of capitalism in general and neoliberalism and a defender of *Vivir Bien* and the principles upheld by the indigenous peasant collective. This was reflected in the habitual use of the idea of "us-others" within the United Nations. Consequently, the "*we*" (the indigenous, peasants and social movements; the developing countries victims of capitalism and colonialism and the governments that seek a more just and equitable world) and the "*others*" [the pro-capitalist countries – USA – transnational corporations and international financial organizations (Olmos Castro, 2014)], have had a leading place in the dichotomous worldview of Morales as a leader, but also in the design of foreign policy and the so-called *People's Diplomacy*[6]*.*

This new paradigm was the framework of Bolivian foreign policy between 2006 and 2019, which was especially focused on the treatment of the following macro-objectives: *1)* the maritime claim, *2)* the establishment of complementary, diversified and less asymmetric external relations and *3)* the revaluation of national identity. Next, each of them was developed, also considering the diplomatic actions – as tools – that were implemented with a view to concretizing them. As Wilhelmy (1991: 179-180) puts it, the instrument – in this case, diplomacy – is at the service of the objective and "a repertoire of instruments must be adapted to each constellation of interests and objectives; the calculation of this adequacy constitutes one of the central tasks of the governmental actor in foreign policy".

[6] According to MAS, the "Diplomacy of the Peoples" is based on "Living Well" as a philosophical paradigm of the Andean indigenous peoples and it can be understood as one of the pillars of the foreign policy of the period, being this one in charge of fulfilling the established management objectives. It is clear from the official documents that it is a new way of carrying out a foreign policy whose principles, objectives, and interests, differ widely with the past. Its central characteristics are the broadening of the idea of international relations, that is, there is talk of linkage not only between states, but between peoples and/or nations; social movements have an important role, especially in political forums; promotion participatory democracy and the construction of solidary, complementary, and cooperative relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 2014: 111-112).

### 2.1. Maritime demand vis-à-vis Chile

Unlike the other objectives of the external agenda, the demand for sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean has been a constant in Bolivian foreign policy beyond the changes of government. Since the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1904, contacts with Chile have gone through various conflictive situations – including the rupture of diplomatic relations in 1978 – in the face of the existence of diametrically opposed positions: for Chile, the territorial issues were settled at the beginning of the 20th century, while, for Bolivia, sovereign access to the sea still constitutes a pending claim.

Seeking to obtain some kind of progress in the matter, Evo Morales bet on the dialogue with the first government of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) and both agreed on the need to renew the spirit of the bond between the two countries by signing the Agenda of the *13 points* or "agenda without exclusions", where the treatment of the maritime issue was incorporated. At that time, diplomatic efforts were concentrated at the bilateral level with the aim of improving the quality of interstate dialogue and from there delving into the possibility of finding a "face-to-face" agreement on the matter (CorreaVera and García Pinzón, 2013: 96). The meetings between Bolivian and Chilean officials were held annually and were in line with the process of rebuilding trust proposed by the then presidents. However, with the beginning of the government of Sebastián Pinera (2010-2014), the dialogue between the foreign ministries of Bolivia and Chile was gradually set aside, with crossed accusations about the responsibility of what happened, evidencing that the talks could never overcome the formal aspect due to the lack of mobility in the position traditionally held by each actor.

Towards this situation, Morales decided to establish changes in the actions of diplomacy in face of this historical claim. The first measure was presented in the creation of the Strategic Directorate of Maritime Reclamation (DIREMAR) within the ministry of foreign affairs, assigning it the tasks of planning, developing, and implementing everything related to the maritime issue. The second measure was reflected in the judicialization of the lawsuit before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on April 24, 2013, under the American Treaty of Peaceful Solutions of 1948, known as the Pact of Bogotá (International Court of Justice, 2013). However, the turn in *tactics* (diplomatic action) was not only evident in the abandonment of the bilateral level, but also in the axis of the claim since the demand did not focus on the direct denunciation of the Treaty of 1904 – as had happened other times – but on the alleged breach by Chile in its obligation to negotiate a sovereign exit to the Pacific. For the Bolivian foreign ministry, this obligation was based on a set of events, such as unilateral declarations, diplomatic exchanges, bilateral agreements and diplomatic declarations and interactions within the framework of the Organization of American States (OAS), which followed independently of the 1904 Treaty (International Court of Justice, 2013; Ceppi, 2019). Besides, Evo Morales took advantage of the opening sessions of the UN General Assembly to promote the Bolivian cause, raise its profile to the maximum and, at the same time, seek international support, appealing to issues such as Chile's lack of understanding in the face of a 'just and inalienable' claim; the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes, especially between neighboring countries, and the recommendations made by world leaders for the two states to work on finding a solution for that conflict[7].

Once the written and oral phases established in the regulatory procedure were carried out, the ICJ issued its judgment – binding and unappealable to the parties – on October 1, 2018. By 12 votes in favor and 3 against, the international court completely dismissed the Bolivian lawsuit by rejecting each of the legal instruments on which Andean diplomacy had built its claim (International Court of Justice, 2018). Beyond the legal evaluations that may be carried out, the ICJ pronouncement implied, from the perspective of Bolivia's international relations, the end of the judicialization of the claim as a diplomatic action and, consequently, the need to rethink in the future new mechanisms for the treatment of this problem. As González Vega (2019: 86) summarizes, "the Court did not [see] in any of the documents, of the long payroll provided by Bolivia, nothing more than mere political commitments, unfeasible to establish a legal obligation in charge of Chile" (...) "The closure of the judicial procedure has meant a defeat – almost without palliatives – for [Bolivia's] claims, given the tenor of the arguments developed by the Court. However, the disagreements between neighboring countries do not end with this" (González Vega (2019: 97).

## 2.2. External relations: new approaches, new media?

According to the ministry of foreign affairs of Bolivia (2014), *Vivir Bien* translates, among other issues, in the field of foreign policy, the construction of new forms of linkage based on cooperation, complementation and the reduction of asymmetries with a view to strengthening the regional and extra-regional positioning of the country. Seeking to get closer to this objective, Bolivian diplomacy provided different instruments at the multilateral and bilateral levels of the external agenda. At the multilateral level, regional integration occupied a prominent place throughout the three Morales administrations since "no country alone can meet its needs and solve its problems" (National Development Plan, 2006: 239). However, for MAS, traditional integration schemes, focused on economic-trade liberalization, such as the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) or the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), had as a critical point the lack of construction of a broader agenda that included addressing social, political, cultural, and environmental problems. Integration policies should have a 'holistic' perspective that would allow the development of relationships whose orientation rested on the principles mentioned above.

Faced with this new perspective, the schemes of cooperation and concertation that emerged in the light of the so-called "post-liberal regionalism" (da Motta and Ríos, 2007; Sanahuja, 2012), were the means through which the Bolivian government sought to channel much of its interests with Latin American peers regarding the political dimension. The dynamics of regionalism were not left out of the process of ascent that, from the present century, progressive governments had[8]. They not only questioned the idea of

[7] It is recommended to consult the speeches of the former president in the UN digital library. Available at https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=es&cc=Speeches

[8] As Svampa expresses (2017), with this generic category covering different policy and ideological trends, it alludes to the change of era that crossed much of the South American continent between 2000 and 2015.

open regionalism, that is, that regionalism that prevailed between 1990 and 2005, based mainly on trade where integration was directly associated with the liberal policies of the Washington Consensus, but also led to its redefinition (Sanahuja, 2012). Consequently, regionalism was thought in a post-liberal key, giving rise to structures such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Peoples Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP), or the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Despite their specific features, they were characterized, in general, by attaching importance to political and social issues, appeal to South-South cooperation, reject orthodox economic policies and promote a state more present in the different dimensions of the national agenda (Sanahuja, 2012).

MAS found in these mechanisms, on the one hand, spaces for dialogue, sometimes more ideologized, as is the case of ALBA-TCP and, on the other hand, platforms for the generation of agreements of various kinds, as well as the minimization of conflicts (Agramont Lechín, 2010). Taking the ideas of Diamint (2013: 64), these schemes[9], did not know the commercial plane; rather than that, they were conceived as primarily political and non-economic agreements, where the consequences of "political intertwining" extended to the economic field, contrary to the proposal offered by a process of classic trade liberalization. Bolivia's presence within the framework of ALBA-TCP is an example of this statement. The Andean country benefited from the sending of various social missions in the fields of health and education, that were supported by economic contributions (Venezuela) and human resources [Cuba (Ceppi, 2015]. It was also the recipient of donations, tariff reduction in trade agreements and reimbursable credits for infrastructure works (Vergara Toro, 2016). It should be noted that a large part of these funds was received directly from the Venezuelan embassy in La Paz, so the amount of money sent is not known exactly as the true destinations of the same (Vergara Toro, 2016: 77).

The promotion of an integration with a political nuance did not imply the loss of interest in traditional commercial schemes. Bolivia did not abandon the CAN and signed in 2012 – coinciding with the decline of ALBA – the protocol of accession to MERCOSUR as a member state, seeking to overcome its status as an associate[10]. In short, Morales leaned firmly towards multilateralism and integration, either in its "open regionalism" version – where the economic prevails – or the "21st century version", typical of the progressive cycle that mostly passed through the South American space between 2000 and 2015. Consequently, about regionalism, MAS appealed to *dual-member diplomacy,* which contributed to diversifying the foreign policy agenda, strengthened Bolivia's visibility in the regional context and energized, in general terms, contact with peers, especially with those who were in the same ideological harmony.

At the bilateral level, diplomacy broadened the horizon of inter-state dialogue to reach agreements on various issues, some of them still old, others with a propositional character. The renegotiation of energy contracts with Argentina and Brazil after the nationalization of YPFB in 2006, the final border demarcation with Paraguay, product of the Chaco War in 2009; the signing of a supplementary protocol to the International Labour Organizaion Conventions (1992) in 2010 and then the ILO Declaration with Peru

9 In her work, the author focuses on ALBA-TCP and UNASUR.
10 This process has not yet materialized.

in 2019; the renewal of memorandums of understanding with the EU on cooperation[11]; the establishment of diplomatic relations with Iran in 2007 and the updating of ties with China and Russia reflect the role of diplomacy as the executing arm of a diversified and pragmatic foreign policy (ministry of foreign affairs of Bolivia, 2014; announcement of the government of Peru, 2019).

At the extra-regional level, ties with China and the USA deserve special consideration. For its part, the Asian country had a vertiginous rise in the Bolivian external agenda thanks to trade complementarity – export of raw materials and import of value-added products – and the economic and political aid that has been framed as part of South-South cooperation (Hedrich, 2016). Taking advantage of Morales' anti-imperialist and counter-hegemonic rhetoric, China has provided loans and investments and acquired large volumes of products such as lithium, silver, tin, lead, refined copper, quinoa, and sesame seeds, among others. However, being an asymmetrical link, the Chinese action is responsible for determining, according to its interests, in what and how to forge bilateral agreements. In this sense, in terms of results, the compromise with China – which here is understood as a *receptive diplomacy* – would be far from fulfilling the objective of generating complementary and more balanced relations.

As for the link with the USA, the Morales government opted for a *diplomacy of retreat.* In the political arena, the relationship was characterized by tension and cooling. Ideological differences, especially during the Trump administration, rapprochement with Russia, China, and Iran; support for Venezuela; the expulsion in 2008 of the then USA ambassador, Philip Goldberg, accused of conspiring against the Morales government, and the suspension of the activities of the DEA and USAID in Bolivian territory, undermined the possibilities of building high-level contacts.

## 2.3. Bolivian identity to the world

Cultural diversity, as one of the basic features of the country, implied, at the level of the MAS foreign policy, the international promotion of a large part of the causes that make up the demands of the indigenous peasant collective. To this end, Bolivian diplomacy firmly bet on multilateral spaces, especially the UN, either by establishing a position on certain issues, or by taking the initiative with respect to the actions to be followed. In his years as president, Morales concentrated on:

*(a)* The defense and promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples (self-determination; the possibility of living in community; respect for customs and traditions; recognition of autonomy, etc.). Bolivia accompanied, together with other Latin American states, the initiative to have a declaration by the organization as a tool that would contribute to the process of reparation of those communities that were victims of the policies of colonialism. Finally, on 13 September 2007, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the general assembly with 144 votes in favour

[11] Bolivia and the EU have been pursuing their relations since 1995, especially in cooperation. It is the main recipient of EU bilateral development aid in Latin America, with a budget of 281 million euros for the period 2014-2020. Source: EU Delegation to Bolivia. In: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/bolivia/966/bolivia-y-la-ue_es.

and 4 against. In November of that same year, it acquired legal force in Bolivia when it was elevated to the rank of law.

*b)* The defense of the coca leaf as a symbol of Andean culture. According to Morales, the criminalization of the coca leaf constitutes a historical injustice by being directly associated with drug trafficking. "I mean it's the green coca leaf, not the white one. This coca leaf represents the Andean culture, the environment, and the hope of the peoples. It is not possible for the coca leaf to be legal for Coca-Cola and illegal for other types of medicinal consumption in our country and throughout the world" (Morales, 2006: 37). After several years of claims, the UN accepted in 2013 a reservation of the Andean country to the Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, in which Bolivia is recognized the *acullico* (chewing of coca) as an ancestral practice, as well as the consumption of the coca leaf for cultural and medicinal purposes and its legal trade within the national territory[12].

*(c)* Privatization of basic services. From the beginning of his administration, Morales launched a global campaign against the participation of private companies in the provision of services, including water. For MAS, they represent universal rights and not a commodity, so it is the competence of the states and not of the private sector to guarantee their access in a universal and equitable way[13]. At the V World Water Forum (2009), at the initiative of Bolivian diplomacy, 25 countries signed a declaration parallel to the official one, where access to water and sanitation were considered fundamental human rights (Justo, 2013). A year later, the Bolivian state bet more strongly on this request and requested – co-sponsored by 33 countries – that the UN be promulgated in this regard. With 122 votes in favour and 41 abstentions, the general assembly recognized the right to safe drinking water and sanitation as essential human rights per *se* and for the enjoyment of other human rights.

*(d)* Natural resources and climate change. In 2007 Morales stated that, for the indigenous movement, land was a sacred issue and therefore could not be turned into a simple business or commodity. In this sense, the former president has been an active actor in the promotion of the rights of Mother Earth and respect for the bond between indigenous peasant communities and natural resources by maintaining that capitalism is the cause of the process of environmental degradation and social inequalities between and within countries. In the Bolivian case, this criticism translates, in part, into the need for the state to regain prominence in the extractive industries, seeking to reduce the asymmetries in terms of benefits compared to the private sector. This claim had, like the issue of water, reception at the UN. On the initiative of Andean diplomacy, April 22, 2009, was declared the International Day of Mother Earth (UN general assembly, 2009). However, it is worth mentioning that this issue, as the axis of public policy, has not been without tensions and contradictions. The intensive exploitation of raw materials, particularly minerals and hydrocarbons,

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12 Consult Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. Available in: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-18&chapter=6&clang=_en#EndDec

13 Just (2013) affirms, based on the position of the constitutional court of the country, that the look anti-mercantilist it is a consequence of the events of the Water War in Cochabamba in 2000.

has been one of the pillars on which MAS based its social and economic policies. In the first decade of this century, coinciding with the boom in commodity prices, Bolivia, like other South American neighbors, bet on mega-extractivism,"promoting indiscriminate exploitation (...) with export objectives (Svampa, 2019: 70). Ties with Argentina, Brazil and China are examples of such. This whole process has put in check the basic principles of "Living Well", among which the abandonment of unlimited growth is promoted as part of the development and promotion of a more sustainable and solidary economy. In parallel, it has generated numerous conflict situations with indigenous and peasant communities because of the expansion of extractive activity – or related projects – in their territories, being emblematic the case of the Indigenous Territory and Isiboro-Sécure National Park (TIPNIS) (Svampa, 2019).

Finally, two events that are results of diplomatic work with a view to fulfilling the revaluation of cultural identity as an objective stand out: the incorporation of the *wiphala* – symbol of identification of the peasant indigenous peoples – in the acts of state, together with the tricolor flag and, the curricular changes in the training granted by the Bolivian foreign ministry to its officials. As an example, there is the teaching of the Aymara language, the introduction of subjects such as decolonization and political doctrines and the participation of the main indigenous social organizations in the training carried out by the diplomatic academy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 2014).

## 3. Áñez, the return of MAS and the memory of Morales

Throughout his three administrations, Morales gave a hallmark to Bolivian foreign policy and diplomacy. As noted at the beginning of this work, both were disruptive, but especially pragmatic. Disruptive by the doctrinal scaffolding and sustained actions, especially contrasting them with the nineties; pragmatic, because they were designed in the search for political and economic functionality, sometimes more of a partisan nature than as a government program. All this generated that the country had a great exposure on the international stage, being understood as an unprecedented moment.

The wishes of a fourth term on the part of Morales and García Linera were truncated in the face of the high degree of conflict that the country was going through, product of the claims around the 2019 elections where the ruling party had obtained a new victory. Here converged issues such as social polarization – those who supported the victory of MAS and those who rejected it for forcing their candidacies through the judicial route – and the denunciations of fraud by the OAS and the opposition parties. With no room for manoeuvre, the presidential formula was forced to resign a month later at the request made by the armed forces and other actors, such as the Central Obrera Bolivia (COB), paradoxically, related to MAS.

Jeanine Áñez, opposition senator for UD, occupied the presidency on an interim basis, after the resignations of the president of the senate and the first vice president of the chamber of deputies, with the task of calling elections again. In her brief stay, she sought to openly differentiate himself from the principles, postulates and political partners held by the Bolivian foreign ministry between 2006 and 2019 (ministry of foreign affairs of Bolivia, 2020). In general, she ordered a diplomacy of "reversal"*,* which was manifested in actions such as the withdrawal of Bolivia from ALBA and UNASUR; the open questioning of Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran; the request for membership of the Lima Group[14] and the existence of winks for the recomposition of the relationship with the US. Nor did she appeal to the Latin American approach – typical of MAS – by vehemently criticizing the accompaniment and protection of Morales and members of his cabinet by the governments of Argentina and Mexico[15].

The instability of the national scenario and the impacts of Covid-19 were delaying the holding of the presidential elections, which finally took place on October 18, 2020. With 55.11% of the votes, MAS returned to the Bolivian executive by the hand of two actors already known to the citizens: Luis Arce, minister of economy during the Morales administration and David Choquehuanca, in charge of the country's foreign relations until 2017 (Ceppi and Martínez, 2020).

The short time that has elapsed since the beginning of the new government allows, now, to make only some projections about the future of Bolivian foreign policy and diplomacy. From the government plan presented by Arce and Choquehuanca, it is inferred that foreign policy will show lines of continuity with respect to that implemented by Morales in terms of objectives and sustained postulates. Consequently, the rights of indigenous peoples, the defense of water and the coca leaf, the processes of integration and the maintenance of links with a focus on solidarity and cooperation, confirm, among others, the issues around which diplomacy must be put into action. "Bolivia's foreign policy has managed to place its own approaches on the international agenda (...) Its actions have been based on the Diplomacy of the Peoples for Life, which constitutes a vision of sovereign, proactive international relations with social participation (...) proposing initiatives of global interest, in the struggle for a culture of life and peace, to Live Well, and an international framework of solidarity, complementarity and strategic alliances capable of contributing to the development of the country" (MAS-IPSP Government Program, 2020: 45). Bolivia's return to ALBA-TCP, UNASUR and CELAC and the reestablishment of relations with Iran and Venezuela – suspended by Áñez – show that diplomacy would also be repeating the pattern of Morales' efforts.

However, it is important to consider that neither the actors nor the context (national, regional, and international) are the same as in the period 2006-2019. Arce must overcome multiple challenges both at the domestic level – reactivation of the economy, social conflict, pandemic – and in the external agenda. His statements have emphasized dialogue and consensus; elements that, it is assumed, would be the compass of the country's international action, which would contribute to lowering the profile of opposition and reactivity in the face of situations of dissent*.* In short, it is inferred, considering the first measures of the current president in this brief period of management and the

[14] This multilateral space Arose in 2017 to monitor the Venezuelan crisis, seeking to obtain a peaceful and negotiated solution, in clear opposition to the actions of Nicolás Maduro. The Lima Declaration was signed by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela (opposition). Bolivia joined during Jeanine's interin government Áñez resigned after the return of the MAS.

[15] Mexico granted political asylum, while in Argentina refugee status was processed.

difficulties of the complex scenario created by Covid-19, that Bolivian diplomacy will oscillate between marches and countermarches.

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# BIDIRECTIONAL VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL APPROACH TO CENTRAL AMERICAN WOMEN

**CESAR NIÑO**
cnino@unisalle.edu.co
Associate Professor of the Faculty of Economics, Business and Sustainable Development, attached to the Business and International Relations program at La Salle University (Colombia). PhD in international law from Alfonso X el Sabio University, Master in national security and defense from the War College and professional in politics and international relations from Sergio Arboleda University.

**CAMILO GONZALEZ**
manuelc.gonzalez@usa.edu.co
Assistant Professor of the School of Politics and International Relations of Sergio Arboleda University, master in politics from the University of Salamanca and professional in politics and international relations from Sergio Arboleda University (Colombia).

## Abstract

The central proposal of this paper is to approximate a theoretical model of women in criminal violence based on some Central American dynamics. Through *process tracing,* the stages of *women as recipients of violence* and women as vehicles *of violence* are raised. Indeed, the relationship between gender and criminality reveals the interaction between two fundamental facets: underground integration and criminal governance in the region. Underground and criminal integrations are found to be much more effective to perform because transaction costs between actors are lower, while, between states, by their own configuration, there are more limitations and robust integration costs due to variables such as sovereignty, politics, economy, and security. Based on the above, it should be mentioned that the reduction of violence against women does not lie in the increase in penalties, but in the effective functioning of justice operators. A reduction of such phenomenon must be based on greater agility of investigations and the strengthening of criminal policy, to minimize the capacity for action and coercion. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the policy seeks to increase persuasion against potential members of criminal networks to desist from their participation.

## Keywords

Criminal governance, underground integration, woman subject to violence, Central America.

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*Bidirectional violence: a critical approach to Central American women*
Cesar Niño, Camilo González

# BIDIRECTIONAL VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL APPROACH TO CENTRAL AMERICAN WOMEN[1]

**CESAR NIÑO**

**CAMILO GONZALEZ**

## Introduction

The factors of instability and insecurity in Central America have been concentrated in issues that jeopardize the states' ability to control and fight organized crime. Determinants such as drug trafficking, the presence of armed groups, gang violence, species trafficking and human trafficking, among others, have reshaped the region's security dynamics. This lends itself to a particular contrast in the way criminal groups, unlike states, achieve greater synchrony in activities of integration and fluid dynamism of illicit actions. In fact, regional integration models have been approached from a conventional perspective that generates distortions when it comes to understanding the phenomena that have made a special race to dominate the territories in the area. Issues that have achieved important intersections in academic agendas and in the construction of public policies such as violence, crime, and gender studies, have managed, from this configuration, to expand the research approaches and understand a dynamic and quite heterogeneous region. Therefore, academic approaches from Latin America have been determined by variables specific to the region, such as commercial environments, defense of democracy, human rights, economy, and politics. However, the region lacks its own models for its more complex realities outside the traditional. In other words, the most conservative analytical frameworks leave out issues that rival security policy architectures such as criminal logics.

Within the studies of integration, regionalism, governance and globalization, the literature reaches a great academic heritage in regular, conventional and traditional dimensions (Meyer, 2007). That is, a theoretical apparatus and case studies have been built referring to conventional models on integration with common economic, political, cultural, geographical and even social denominators (Barrett & Kurzman, 2004). In this order of ideas, the models of regional integration in Central America deal with alternatives and solutions to trade, democracy and development to reduce vulnerabilities to the constant sensitivities of the international system. Nevertheless, the region seems to have a subregion, an underground dimension and even an alternative construction of

[1] Article translated by Hugo Alves.

integration and governance defined as a criminal model in which women become recipients and vehicles of violence.

Based on the above, within the social constructions of crime, the role of women has been relegated to a subordinate plane in the gender relationship. This situation enables new approaches to understand a phenomenon little explored so far in the region and that generates great concerns for the elaboration of decisions on public policy in security.

That said, this paper seeks to answer the following question: how are criminal governance and underground integration built in Central America from gender violence? Consequently, the role of women is the center of gravity for the invisibility of crime in the region. In this way, criminal governance has managed to build the rules of the game, institutionalization and normalization among criminal groups that allows them to obtain a climate suitable for integration among them thanks to the institutional weakness of states, the high capacity of adaptation of their structures and the low bureaucratization for illicit businesses. Women's participation has not been addressed in depth in criminal participation, but as a recipient of violence, an exclusion that adds to gender asymmetries in security and organized crime studies.

Structurally, the text is divided into five parts. First, a theoretical and conceptual approach will be made to criminal governance and underground integration. Then, the phenomenon of women as subjects of violence will be exposed: between receiver and criminal vehicle. Subsequently, the theoretical model to explain the role of women in this phenomenon will be presented. Next, we will address underground gender integration as a Central American phenomenon. Finally, some general conclusions will be offered about the model and the horizon that the investigation of this phenomenon should follow.

## Theoretical approach: criminal governance and underground integration

The construction of concepts that escape traditional theoretical approaches are strategic challenges for the understanding and solution of the problems of contemporary Central America. Approaches to criminal governance have been focused mostly on casuistic dimensions in South America (Lessing & Graham, 2019). However, the commitment to identify the criminal phenomenon and the relational nature between its power, territorial control, illegal activities, violence and supplanting the state, respond to strategic concerns about the gaps in public policy and justice systems in the countries with the greatest institutional weaknesses. In this sense, works such as that of Desmond (2006) and Lessing & Graham (2019), understand by criminal governance the convergence and formation of structures between government officials, civil society and criminal actors, resulting in systematic practices for the regulation of activities (Desmond, 2006).

It is a parallel order relationship that moves along the fine line between the conventional and the unconventional. Indeed, criminal governance results in networks being voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Child, 2020). In this regard, codes of honor, reciprocal protection between individuals, territorial control, patterns of conduct, value system, among others (Núñez & Espinoza, 2017), are some characteristics that are projected on the imperatives of governance. In short, it is a system based on a series of complex relationships that connect the legal world with the illegal one (Garzón, 2012).

The last two decades have been permeated by major concerns about organized crime (Schultze-Kraft, 2016) from countries in the Global South that threaten the stability of the Global North (Ayoob, 1991; Benabdallah, Murillo, & Adetula, 2017; Sharp, 2011). Those concerns have reached a robust and growing material in terms of citizen security, but not in dimensions and explanations about the integration of networks and criminal groups with each other in Central America. The definitional gaps are themselves the first major problems for the design of policies and strategies.

In view of the above, while there has been a valuable attempt to resignify governance under irregular, asymmetric and unconventional conditions, the same is not true for integrations between criminal groups. In this manner, those integrations for the purposes of this document and as a conceptual proposal, are understood as underground due to their irregular condition and alternates to the classic models of integration between states. Although there has not been a robust proposal, works such as Niño (2017) ensure that terrorist groups from different geographies share patterns of communication, behavior and models of understanding that facilitate dialogue between organizations that do not always pursue common goals but do have similar vulnerabilities. For example, the markets of violence and the entropic factor of crime have motivated illegal structures to use parastatal resources to govern significant portions of territories and strategic corridors (Duncan, 2014; Raffo & Gómez, 2017). Taking into account the theoretical and conceptual approach applied to the Central American context, it is necessary to involve the impact of gender violence on the phenomenon of underground integration (Niño, 2020). Indeed, the natural dynamics of criminal governance have a substantial impact on women as the majority victims in the region. On the one hand, they are an actor that serves as a recipient of violence; on the other, as a criminal vehicle. Illegal brokers controlled by parastatal groups (O'Donnell & Wolfson, 1993) reach vital degrees of marketing women as tradable goods and as subjects of violence (Truong, 2001).

## Women as subjects of violence: between the recipient and the criminal vehicle

By 1970, some criminological research drew attention to certain studies associated with the causal relationship between female offenders and female emancipation (Smart, 1979). In the same order, it was argued, on the one hand, that wage-earning mothers raised children who would become criminals, while, on the other hand, the hypothesis was maintained that emancipated women become more crime-stinging due to their association with "masculine" values at work and their contact with opportunities for crime outside home (Smart, 1979). This was an argumentative construction that managed to generate distortions about the role of crime in society, a selective notion about the female role in society and crime associated with a subordination of the role of women in society and even in crime. Subsequently, works with a gender focus and different investigations that tried to depart from the classic configuration and causal relationship between emancipated women and crime, such as that of Chesney-Lind (1986), showed substantial changes and advances in the matter. This research warns about the visibility of generalized violence against women, but at the same time recognizes that to determine the analytical equity in this regard, it must be borne in mind that there is no clear information about violent women who attack other women.

On the other hand, it was also possible to construct a perspective in which the controversy about criminal and violent women has stimulated concern for the causes and correlates of female criminal behavior, particularly that of a violent nature in criminal structures (Bunch, Foley, & Urbina, 1983).

At the beginning of the 21st century, the research of Rushforth and Willis (2003) shed new perspectives on the relationship between women and crime. The authors mention that women's drug use is a defining factor in their involvement in crime and argue that the severity of women's drug use is more closely related to their criminality than to men (Willis & Rushforth, 2003). Likewise, female offenders are more likely than men to be incarcerated for nonviolent crimes, such as drug offenses, while men are more likely to go to prison for violent matters (Nazario, 2019; Willis & Rushforth, 2003). This opens up a new spectrum of analysis to dimensions in which women facilitate criminal activities for illegal networks based on the probability of association with minor crimes.

Women constitute a minority in the current global criminal context (Loinaz, 2016). However, the invisibility of women as protagonists of criminality has been constant both in the criminal sphere and the bibliographic and academic dynamics; also, though, women represent a sustained increase in captures, investigations, convictions and imprisonments in recent years (Loinaz, 2016). Global estimates in 2010 showed important results warning that 25% of offenders belonged to an exclusively female population, concentrating on the 10% being violent and 5% associated with sexual ones (Cortoni, Hanson, & Coache, 2010; Loinaz, 2016). And yet, the remaining 10% do not have an attribution and record for an absolute and determined type of crime.

Lastly, Central America is one of the most violent regions in the world, besides asymmetrical and volatile in terms of domestic conflicts, in particular the most unequal (Dalby & Carranza, 2019). On the other hand, it is also a region in which large manifestations of violence against women are estimated and its receptive character has attracted attention worldwide, contradicting the thesis of the works of the 1970s, in which a relationship between criminal women and their emancipation process was warned (Blanchard, 2003; IEEP, 2017). Undeniably, within the framework of criminal governance and underground integration, women become the turning point as subjects of violence in two dimensions: as receivers and vehicles. This phenomenon configures the two-dimensional proportion of violence (Niño & Méndez, 2020), a kind of dimension in which women have traditionally been violated but also have a participation in violent structures.

## Proposal for theorization of women in violence

To address the phenomenon of women as subjects of violence in the Central American context, *process tracing* method will be used. This method makes use of documentary evidence to infer the causal chain between the causes and outcomes of a given phenomenon (George & Bennett, 2005). Specifically, it will be used the variant of *theory-building process tracing* (Beach & Pedersen, 2019) to elaborate a theoretical proposal that expresses the underground integration from the gender perspective in Central America from the incorporation of the phenomena of women as *recipients of violence* and vehicles *of violence.*

The theoretical model assumes that there is a structural and visible phenomenon such as women as recipients of violence that is expressed in variables such as social behaviors towards women and the action of the state for the protection of their rights:

WRP= SPW+DPP

The Woman Recipient of Violence (WRV) is the result of the confluence of factors such as the social perception of women (SPW) and the distortions of public policies (DPP) to face their vulnerability to the phenomena of gender violence.

Nonetheless, this element of the model is what we could refer to as traditional in studies on violence and gender that identify only one side of the violence that is exercised against women. Our theorization proposal goes further by incorporating into the explanation the phenomenon of Women as Vehicles of Violence (WVV), which is characterized by the instrumentalization of women for criminal activities and that highlights the progressive change in the imaginaries and roles of women in criminal organizations:

WVV= WRV*CA

In the same sense, the state inability (SI) to regulate the activities and displacement of the state itself in the exercise of classical functions such as defense, effective border control and security, or the provision of public goods (Wickham-Crowley, 1987) suggests that the phenomenon as a whole has an intermestic nuance, and that there is a continuous interaction between domestic and international levels around gender violence. The sum of domestic violence at the structural and criminal actor levels, reinforced by the incapacity of the State, generates what we have called Underground Gender Integration (UGI):

WRV(IE)+WVV(SI)=UGI

The state incapacity (EI) is, thus, the constant in the dynamics of underground gender integration. Namely, it affects the process in a differentiated way with special emphasis on the woman who receives violence because it is she who implements weak public policies for the prevention of violence and protection of women.

One also mut consider – and in addition to the above – the inability of the state in its basic functions in accordance with the protection and effective territorial control, that increases the probability for women to mutate from a recipient to a vehicle of violence because they become an actor part of the criminal chain. Indeed, this involvement of women in criminal organizations has its center of gravity in the stimuli and incentives offered by the porosity of borders, the learning of criminals about the strategic value of women in their structures and the weakness of public institutions to prevent recruitment for such activities.

For the Central American context, this means that the region includes a phenomenon of violence[2], where such determines the dimensions and roles assumed by women in the Northern Triangle; therefore, crimes such as femicide, sexual and symbolic violence produce violent scenarios against women.

[2] Concept coined by the authors referring to violence as a phenomenon transversal to social relations in all its dimensions.

In this respect, for the purposes of this article, the underground integration of gender is the product of a violent and criminal process around the role of women in the region. Based on the foregoing, there is a structural cause that is the woman receiving violence evidenced in abuse, discrimination, and crimes against women. Due to the violence and presence of criminal actors, a new notion of women as a vehicle of violence is configured. The latter has become a criminal strategy and innovation that allows the underground integration of gender due to the little effective control of the territory that occurs especially in the border areas. Causal mechanisms such as state instability, border porosity and the exploitation of the role of women in society by criminal groups are vital for the understanding of the role and participation of women in transnational crime.

## Underground gender integration: a Central American phenomenon

The woman of the Northern Triangle is constructed as a subject of violence from a convergence of structural variables such as the perception of women in society and their economic autonomy. Additionally, symbolic violence opens a new unaddressed spectrum of violent women, whose roles in criminal structures build underground circuits of delinquency. Consequently, we find that public policy designs are focused on mitigating the first dimension (woman receiving violence), leaving aside the prevention of the phenomenon of violent women. Women opt for violence and crime as a plausible space to protect their active role within a structure, generate codes of respect and aspirations for promotion in a criminal pyramid.

For the first dimension on women as recipients of violence in the region, it is configured in various ways: sexual, economic, emotional, or psychological (IEEP, 2017). According to the above, the countries belonging to the Central America Northern Triangle showed the highest rates of violent deaths of women in the world during the period 2007-2012 (Montti, Bolaños, & Cerén, 2018). Namely, El Salvador was the one that during the recorded period had the highest rate of violent deaths of women in the world with 14.4 women killed per hundred thousand, then Honduras with 10.9 violent deaths and in third place Guatemala with 9.3 deaths of women (OHCHR, 2014). Consequently, women configure a center of gravity in the reception of violence due to cultural factors such as violent masculinities, the historical behavioral normalization of cultural violence, violent family environments and the invisibility of violence.

On the other hand, the crimes of trafficking and smuggling of women have an interesting point for analysis on criminal governance frameworks[3]. Both smuggling and trafficking have become attractive crimes for criminal organizations in the region such as El Salvador's "Los Perrones". They possess the routes, contacts and an architecture of underground integration with illegal Honduran, Cuban, Mexican, Panamanian, Colombian, European and even African groups (Pérez, 2014), but in particular their closest underground associations are with Barrio 18 and Mara Salvatrucha (InSight Crime, 2016).

[3] While human trafficking has a characteristic of the victim's voluntariness with the event and involves the crossing of borders, the trafficked woman, despite her will and consent, is also a victim. In the area of trafficking, contact is under deception and coercion and the consent of the female victim is flawed and does not involve the crossing of a border. (SEGOB, 2011).

A second dimension of study is that of a vehicle for crime. Women are used as means of committing crimes such as extortion. Research conducted by Demoscopía S.A. (2007) on gender composition has shown that women make up between 20 and 40% of Central American gangs. They assume functions of collecting information on potential victims and collecting extortion (Bonello, 2019), the main source of income for these organizations. In this regard, women have been strategically involved in the criminal chain, exploiting the advantages offered by judicial loopholes when it comes to persecuting them.

This dimension redefines the historical role of women, transforming their passive role into an active one within criminal organizations. Social construction and "otherness" (Mouffe & Laclau, 2007; Prozorov, 2015) have allowed their participation to become a hinge between groups and networks and, at the same time, a blind spot in front of security and justice operators.

## Conclusions

This work reflects an academic effort to build a new concept and involve it in the regional debate on violence and criminality associated with women, as well as a contribution to the state of the art of such knowledge. Underground integration, from a gender perspective, has been built from two dimensions associated with women as subjects of violence: receiver and criminal vehicle. This is a commitment to resignify regional integration in terms of new problems that imply strategic solutions. In short, integration is also understood from alternative and unconventional points, such as trade and politics, but are extended to spheres where the state is not the center of gravity and criminality reaches to design less bureaucratic underground ecosystems, yet with high lucrative returns.

On the other hand, the limited academic and documentary sources on violent women represent a difficulty in building a state of the art on this field. Subsequently, this research is an invitation to deepen and expand academic advances on two phenomena that have been addressed in a traditional, way such as gender and regional integration. On the one hand, gender as an explanation of new mobility of women in the social structure and on the other, regional integration as a phenomenon that has multiple edges that deserve to be studied such as criminal governance, the roles of conventional and unconventional actors, corruption, the supplanting of states by irregular actors, organized crime with the capacity to overwhelm the system and regular institutions. In fact, for crime there are no borders comparable to the conception of states; in crime, institutions are created irregularly to compete and even replace the rules of the state game. This modifies and reconfigures the regional, geopolitical, economic, and legal space on which traditional regional integration models are built.

In fact, one of the main challenges to correct regional weaknesses in this area is to standardize and systematize statistics and data on gender violence, which are mostly aimed at evidencing the phenomenon of women who have been violated and to show in the same way the dimensions in which violent women integrate the criminal structures of the region. On the other hand, criminal policy must incorporate a differentiated gender and regional component. In this way, to agree on public policy strategies that imply the protection of women who have been violated and, at the same time, the disengagement of women from criminal structures. In effect, private companies must facilitate the insertion of women into the workforce while state operators must redefine and conquer natural spaces of their constitutional configuration. Finally, in social terms, the community must assume an active role in the denormalization of violence as a social practice.

It should, hence, be mentioned that the reduction of violence against women does not lie in the increase in penalties, but in the effective functioning of justice operators. A reduction in the phenomenon must be based on greater agility of investigations and the strengthening of criminal policy to minimize the capacity for action and coercion. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the policy seeks to increase persuasion against potential members of criminal networks to cease from their participation.

Security strategies must be built based on the particularities and phenomenologies of the region and be solved in that the gender approach, beyond the discussion between femininities and masculinities, contributes to the understanding of criminal governance and underground integration against women as subject and tradable pattern of regional violence.

Overall, this document is an effort to try to explain what concerns a phenomenon of great concern to regional security and justice operators. The role of women in the criminal spheres as victims and criminals has led to some of the invisibility that is of concern when developing public policies and comprehensive security strategies. Throughout the study it is determined that underground and criminal integrations are much more effective to perform because the transaction costs between the actors are lower, while, between states, by their own configuration, there are more limitations and robust costs of integration due to variables such as sovereignty, politics, economy, and security.

This work also seeks to contribute to future new lines and agendas of research in Latin America. Gender studies have been related to explaining issues concerning equity, participation, women's demands with politics, rights, access to justice, work, and the economy. Overall, this research seeks, among others, to contribute from gender studies to the understanding of the phenomenon of integration, particularly in Central America and in new approaches to the role of women in security dynamics.

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# THE STRAIT OF BAB EL-MANDEB: STAGE OF GEOPOLITICAL DISPUTES

**ANTÓNIO GONÇALVES ALEXANDRE**
amgalexandre527@hotmail.com
Collaborating researcher at the Research and Development Center,
Military University Institute (Portugal)

**Abstract**

Situated between Yemen to the Northeast and Djibouti and Eritrea to the Southwest, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is the closest area between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa and connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Thirty-two kilometres wide, the strategic value of the Bab El-Mandeb Strait is associated with the fact that it is the shortest sea route between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.

According to data from the2019US Energy Information Administration*,* 6.2 million barrels of crude and refined oil flowed daily across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait toward Europe, the United States of America and Asia in 2018. On the other hand, a2017 report byChatamHouse identified 14 chokepoints that it considered critical to global food security, with the Bab El-Mandeb Strait being one of the most relevant.

This article aims to analyze the ongoing geopolitical disputes in this region, particularly between the USA, which maintains a strong structure, and the emerging powers, China, and Russia, which are positioning themselves to strengthen their presence. The results show that this competition, at the global level, exists and is even in an upward cycle.

**Keywords**

Bab el-Mandeb, sea routes, international maritime trade, geopolitical disputes

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# THE STRAIT OF BAB EL-MANDEB: STAGE OF GEOPOLITICAL DISPUTES[1]

**ANTÓNIO GONÇALVES ALEXANDRE**

## Introduction

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait (Figure 1) is currently oneof four criticalchokepoints[2] for international oil trade(Cunningham, 2018)

**Figure 1 - Bab el-Mandeb Strait**




Source: (Wood, 2018)

According to Aljamra, approximately 57 supertankers from the Persian Gulf states cross the strait every day, totaling close to 21,000 a year (2019). The flow of oil across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait accounted for 9% of total transoceanic oil (crude oil and refined petroleum products) in 2017. About 3.6 million barrels/day (b/d) headed north towards Europe and America, and 2.6 million b/d flowed in the opposite direction, mainly to China, India, and Singapore(EIA, 2019)

This strait and its surrounding waters, which Daly(2009) considered "chaotic and dangerous", and Mourad(2018) said were "the scene of a struggle for power and influence", have been facing threats that could jeopardize freedom of navigation. Those includethe endless conflict in Yemen between the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and

[1] Article translated by Hugo Alves.
[2] Bottlenecks in the marine environment of high geostrategic and geoeconomic value that connect important waterways and cause natural congestion to maritime traffic (Popescu, 2016).

president AbdRabbuh Mansur Hadi's forces,as well as the terrorist groupsoperating there(Zaouaq, 2018).

The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which in 2015 joined the Saudi coalition that opposed Houthi rule in Yemen, has seized the island of Perim (located on the Yemeni side of the strait), trying from there to drive houthi militias off the extensive west coast. In mid-2019, after a United Nations-mediated ceasefire, they even gained control of the important port of Hudaydah (Figure 2), relevant to ensuring supremacy over control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait(Aljamra, 2019)

**Figure 2 – Areas under control of the Yemeni government and the Houthis**


Source: (BBC, 2019)

The rivalry for control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is part of a regional conflict between Iran and its Shiite allies on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and its Sunni allies on the other. Tehran's involvement in the Yemeni conflict is considered by Zaouaq (2018) as part of a broader military strategy, through which Iran intends to be able to block merchant shipping traffic through the region's two important chokepoints (Ormuz and Bab el-Mandeb) (Figure 3). Soage even dubbed this conflict the "new Cold War of the Middle East"(2017)

**Figure 3 - Arab Peninsula Chokepoints**




Source: (EIA, 2019)

The existence of violent extremist organizations with links to al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) raises additional security concerns in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and adjacent maritime spaces. The historical precedent of the attack on the USS[3]destroyer,Cole,in 2000, in the port of Aden in Yemen,as well as the 2002 attack on the oil tanker Limburgin the Gulf ofAden, both claimed by al-Qaeda, symbolize the ability of these groups to undermine maritime security in the region. Both al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which dominates an important stake of territory, and a small IS organization, are active and of increased concern (Mahmood, 2019)

In methodological terms, given the limitations of space, it was necessary to delimit of the research, based on the criteria of content, space and time. Regarding content, and despite the relevance that non-state actors undeniably have, we intend to focus only on state actors, and within them only at the global level (USA, China, and Russia). The choice for these actors is that USA is the hegemonic superpower, which has been challenged by China, that wants to return to a stage where it was dominant for several centuries, and by the revisionist claims of Russia, which seeks to regain its influence in international terms, lost with the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991. The analysis focuses on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and adjacent maritime spaces (Red Sea and Gulf of Aden). In terms of time, the study is based on more recent years, especially since the outbreak of the Yemeni conflict in 2015, until the end of 2019.

Our argument is to demonstrate that the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and surrounding areas, because of their relevance to international maritime trade, especially energy, are an important stage of geopolitical competition and the assertion and projection of power by global powers, with the disputes between them on the rise.

This paper is divided into three chapters, in addition to the introduction and conclusions. The first covers the historical framework of the relevance of the Strait. The second evidence the most relevant conjuncture geopolitical factors. The third presents a foresight view of geopolitical interactions between the actors concerned. The conclusions are the geopolitical disputes at stake.

## 1. Historical framework

In recent years, we have seen the return to a very strong geopolitical strife between the global powers in the Arabian Peninsula region and its surrounding maritime spaces. USA, whose presence has been regular and hegemonic over the years, is now looking with apprehension at China, with growing (economic and military) interests in the region, and Russia, which seeks to regain the influence that the Soviet Union once had, especially during the Cold War period(Aljamra, 2019)

When the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, Europe and Southeast Asia became closer, and the Bab El-Mandeb Strait gained greater importance. It could be sailed directly from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, so the distance from Asian ports to European oneswas reduced by up to two-thirds. The route through the Bab El-Mandeb reached frank preponderance and became even one of the most crucial in the world(Wood, 2018).

[3] Acronym forUS Navy ships: United States Ship.

Although the Horn of Africa[4] was (more) a stage of competition between USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, after its end and, above all, after the Battle of Mogadishu[5] in 1993, the international community seemed to have become almost completely disinterested in this region, until very recently when this trend was reversed and renewed widespread attention was paid. This was largely due to the significant increase in international maritime trade. To get an idea, and according to Pothecary (2016), almost all maritime trade between Europe and Asia, including energy trade, approximately 700 billion U.S. dollars (USD), went through that strait in 2016.

The main security developments that have occurred since the beginning of the 21st century (terrorism and maritime piracy) and the region's high geostrategic value have caught the attention of various powers, creating a rampant race to build military bases. In the specific case of Djibouti, a state that became independent in 1977, in addition to a French naval base (which already existed), it now housed several foreign military bases, including an American (established in 2002), a Japanese (2011), an Italian (2012) and a Chinese (2017), the first military infrastructure in Beijing abroad. (Safak, 2019)

In the past decade, several states have invested in several ports in the Horn of Africa, often after obtaining trade agreements, with the opening of nearby military bases (e.g., China in Djibouti, the UAE in Berber, Somaliland[6], and Turkey in Mogadishu, Somalia)(Berg & Meester, 2018)

**Figure 4 - Military bases and port operators in the Horn of Africa**




Source: (Berg & Meester, 2018)

4 Geographically comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia (Melvin, 2019).

5 This followed the fall of the president Siad Barre, 1991. TheUnited Somali Congress (USC) determined that it was Ali Mahadi Mahamed his successor. Parties within USC opposed it, leading to its split into two parties: those who supported Mohamed and those who supported the general Farrah Aidid. The country was involved in a civil war without a cartel. On October 3, 1993, another attempt was made (after five previous failures) to capture the general Aidid, who was supposed to be meeting with his party's chain of command in a building in Mogadishu. This mission was a huge failure and resulted in the death of numerous U.S. military personnel (Alvarenga, 2008).

6 It incorporates the territory of the former British Somaliland. Although it officially belongs to Somalia, it unilaterally declared independence in 1991, which, however, is not internationally recognized.

The growing number of foreign military bases (and those already projected) (Figure 4), along with the assiduous presence of high-level numbers of different nationalities in different states of the Horn of Africa, highlights the unmistakable importance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the entire Southern coast of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in terms of security, geoeconomics and regional geopolitics (Safak, 2019)

## 2. Identification of relevant geopolitical conjuncture factors

According to Nogueira, geopolitical studies could be better understood holistically if factors other than purely geographic ones were considered, identifying, by the way, several non-geographic factors. However, in addition to these geographical and non-geographical factors, which he grouped as "structural factors", he identified other factors, which he called "conjunctural", including social, economic, political and military factors. (2011)(Nogueira, 2011, pp. 300-303)

In this context, and due to the need to delimit our research, this chapter only proceeds to the identification of conjuncture factors, focusing on the main political, economic, and military factors that influence the geopolitical and geostrategic situation in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and adjacent maritime spaces, and which have a greater impact on the relations between the actors concerned.

### 2.1. United States of America

Washington's overall goals have invariably focused, over the years, on containment of the power that dominates the "Heartland". In fact, Nogueira considers that during the Cold War the thought of Nicholas Spykman and George Kenan exerted decisive influence on American foreign policy, both in the constitution of alliances and in the theory of restraint of the assumed opponent (USSR), and that, more recently, geographers and political scientists, such as Cohen and Brezinski, and then Kissinger, have continued to focus their analyses on the need for control of Eurasia(2018)

In line with the above argument, Washington will not fail to avoid any hegemony in Eurasia by a power or alliances of powers, namely China-Russia, also intending to maintain a unipolar international order achieved in the post-Cold War period and the command of the sea[7], which the status of maritime power of excellence has long conferred on it.

In political terms, since the terrorist attacks on American soil in 2001, the US has been developing an ambitious action plan against Islamic extremist groups in various regions of the Middle East (ME)[8]. The fight against terrorist organizations in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula regions, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, and AQPA and IS in Yemen, is part of that plan. To this end, it was essential to set up a military base in Djibouti, the first on the African continent, the place of origin of the drones used in aerial bombings, due to its proximity to both areas of operations(Braude, 2016)

[7] According to Julian Corbett (1918), the objective of naval warfare must always be, directly or indirectly, to ensure the Command of the sea, or prevent the opponent from guaranteeing it.

[8] The role that the USA should play in the ME has, however, been the subject of thorough internal analysis, after more than a decade and a half of "wars" that Edelman (2019) called them "expensive, inconclusive and endless".

The maintenance of many military and effective bases in the Persian Gulf, which Figure 5 shows, is apparently in line with the decision of the U.S. administration, which began with President Obama, that after years of strong strategic investment throughout all ME, with results below expected, they needed to reduce their presence in the region. This fact cannot cease to be seen, however, as an unequivocal warning from Washington, to Beijing, that it does not give up guaranteeing military hegemony in the Western Indian Ocean region. On the other hand, Russia's failed attempt to have a military base in Djibouti is symptomatic of the power and influence the US continues to have in the region, and a clear sign from Moscow that it will not ease its revisionist claims[9].

**Figure 5 – U.S. military bases and personnel in the Middle East**




Source: (South Front, 2019)

In economic terms, the Arabian Peninsula no longer has the relevance it once had in the past to the need for access to energy, since USA has become, through the discovery of shale gas, self-sufficient and the largest single producer of crude oil in 2019, even surpassing Saudi Arabia. However, the ME, (BP, 2019)*per se,* remains a region of enormous global importance, since it is "besieged" by several seas and gulfs of unusual relevance (Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea) and by narrow preponders and canals (Ormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and Suez), which makes it both an aldraba and a bridge between three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa).

Washington's concerns now focus on preventing any power from disrupting the economy and energy security through oil. This may be the reason why, despite the implementation phase of the military retraction in the generality of the ME, determined by the Trump administration, the American presence in the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding maritime spaces remain at very high levels.

[9] Despite the official argument used for banning the construction of this military base was that Djibouti did not want to "become the ground for a possible future proxy war" (Melvin, 2019).

In military terms, if the Persian Gulf's air and marine bases[10] guarantee the ability to intervene in the Strait of Ormuz and allow strong opposition to Iran's possible temptations to interfere with free maritime trade at this point*,* Djibouti's base[11] is key to this happening in relation to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The U.S. presence in Djibouti also fulfills another twofold objective: to support the Arab coalition fighting houthis in Yemen, either through logistical support or through the provision of intelligence*;* and to isolate and weaken Iran to ensure the annihilation of its regional hegemonic temptations.

## 2.2. China

After centuries of isolationism and numerous internal conflicts, China has entered a cycle of strong economic growth and has been engaged in the current century, especially since 2003, with the presidency of Hu Jintao, in a process of multidimensional global expansion, which has culminated, already with Xi Jinping, in the definition of his ambitious "Chinese dream" of the "great revitalization of the Chinese nation". That is, moreover, according to Tomé (2019), Beijing's great goal, defined at the end of the 1970s by Deng Xiaoping, but which remain valid. Tomé points out that Xi Jinping's leadership only presented in a "more concrete and ambitious" way the aforementioned "Chinese dream", with the celebration of "two centenaries" symbolic for the regime: that of the creation of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021, and that of the creation of the People's Republic of China in 2049. Regarding China's "grand strategy", Tomé considers(2019, pp. 80-81) that it is based on a long-term strategy, based on "peaceful rise" and "win-win*" logic,* with mutual benefits for China and its partners, without taking any confrontational stance.

Beijing's option of having regional bases in the Indian Ocean is aligned with the strategic shift from simply continental to simultaneous continental and maritime power[12], empathized in its 2015 White Book on Defense, in which it is said that "[the] traditional mentality that land exceeds the sea must be abandoned, and great importance should be attached to the management of seas and oceans and the protection of maritime rights and interests" (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015), and it stems from the fact that China has become open to the world, both in terms of imports and exports.

In political terms, the use of the military base in Djibouti[13] and the management of the port of Gwadar in Pakistan assure China of the strategic depth it needs not to remain confined to the seas surrounding it: Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea[14]. This is very relevant, as it guarantees a possible tactical advantage in the event of a future conflict, as both infrastructure sits with greater logistical support to its fleet in a

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10 In November 2019, the number of U.S. personnel amounted to about 37.000 military, divided by Kuwait (15,000), Qatar (10,000), Bahrain (7,000) and UAE (5,000) (South Front, 2019).

11 With an estimated 4,000 troops last November, according to the publication (South Front, 2019).

12 It will be the first time in history that a continental power has cumulatively become a maritime power, calling into question classical geopolitical theories that confront the capabilities of maritime powers vis-à-vis continental powers, those developed by Halford Mackinder (1904 and 1919) and by Nicholas Spykman (1942).

13 With a nine-year lease, existing facilities allow to accommodate up to 10,000 military (Saffee, 2017).

14 The establishment of Chinese military facilities in Djibouti is seen on the western side as building an advanced strategic deployment capability as an instrument of a policy to promote Beijing's gradual increase in maritime power in the Indian Ocean (Henry, 2016).

region far from mainland China, and, in peacetime, contributes to increasing maritime security in a region where there are latent threats, namely conflicts between opposing groups (as is the case in Yemen and was, Somalia), terrorism and maritime piracy. The management of the port of Gwadar and the possible building of a new military base in Jiwani also strengthen ties with Beijing's traditional ally in the region, Pakistan.

In economic terms, the security of maritime communication lines across the Western Indian Ocean is critical to the energy imports that China needs, those from the Persian Gulf producing countries, but also from Africa, as Beijing is clearly committed to diversifying its supply. But this security is vital to the success of the "Belt and Road Initiative" (Figure 6).

**Figure 6 – "Belt and Road Initiative"**




Source: (Kuo & Kommenda, 2018)

The building of the military base in Djibouti is therefore, strictly speaking, the guarantee of the energy security that China needs to import energy and raw materials and economic security to export its products, which is crucial for China's economic growth and social stability, and which Tomé considers "decisive factors as a source of legitimacy for the Chinese regime"(2019, p. 75)

In military terms, Djibouti's base allows Beijing to project a large power and outright expansion of its naval capabilities, to closely rival the dominant power, the US, which has equally significant military facilities just a few kilometers from China's and increase the status of great power in a region of enormous geostrategic relevance[15].

[15] It is worth noting that the decisive role that Djibouti's military infrastructure played in the process of evacuating 621 Chinese citizens and 279 foreign citizens from 15 countries from Yemen in 2015 following the escalation of the Yemeni conflict, which unequivocally showed the relevance of Beijing having a logistical base in that region (Melvin, 2019).

### 2.3. Russia

In a speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007, Putin openly criticized NATO's expansion to the East and the US positioning, namely its demand for a unipolar world and the unrestricted use of force, in the shiver of international law, making it clear that Russia did not intend to fit into this kind of world order (Putin, 2007).

In this regard, Tomé points out that Russia is "a great resurgent power willing to take its place in a multipolar power structure". Its global objectives thus include the restoration of its "sphere of influence", adopting "expansionist" behaviors, in a logic of imposing a "living space", once lost (2018, p. 70)(2018, p. 92)

In this context, Russia sees stability in Southern Yemen as an essential condition for its goal of developing this sphere of influence throughout the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea and aiming to achieve the preponderance it once had, especially during the Cold War period, particularly after seeing the possibility of having a military base in Djibouti. On the other hand, negotiations for the establishment of a logistics centre to support Russian military forces in Sudan have entered a phase of lesser flash[16]. The Yemeni option thus naturally appears as the priority route.

As the opposing parties to the Yemeni conflict retain control over separate areas with access to the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea coasts – the United Nations recognized government controls the island of Socotra, the Southern Transition Council (STC)[17] exercises authority *de facto* over the port city of Aden and the Houthis occupy ports on the Northwest coast – Russia sees the policy of strategic neutrality[18] as the guarantor of a future lasting presence in the region, even if it often engages with the various rival factions.(Ramani, 2019)

It is in this sense that, in political terms, Moscow has opted for initiatives that have earned it recognition from the various regional powers. In the Yemeni conflict, for example, it has put in place a bold plan of neutrality among the various opponents, allowing it to keep open the possibility of assuming preponderance, at the UN, in the negotiations of a peace plan for the country that serves all (antagonistic) interests in attendance.

In another context, it has successfully bet on an ambitious package of soft power measures[19]that has allowed it to change, almost radically, the perception that the states in the region have about Russia.

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[16] Much is due to the hesitations of the Sudanese leaders,who, althoughhave initiated a rapprochement with Moscow at the end of 2017, do not want to antagonize the US government, after economic sanctions that lasted two decades were lifted and allowed for a disconnection of relations between Washington and Khartoum (McGregor, 2017).

[17] Armed movement that defends the independence of southern Yemen. The purpose it pursues is the refounding of the People's Republic of Yemen, a socialist state that has existed since decolonization in 1967, and which during the Cold War had the support of the Soviet Union (Ribeiro, 2018).

[18] It can be explained, according to Ramani (2019), by Moscow's material interests in the Gulf of Aden, by aspirations to promote soft power throughout the Middle East and the desire to balance the divergent interests of the other powers present in the region.

[19] The first, and perhaps the most relevant, is related to the building of the international television network, the Russian Today(RT), which has a service in Arabic, the RT Arabic, and which is already one of the three largest TV networks in the region, along with Al Arabiya and the Al Jazeera(Suchkov, 2015). Another initiative driven by Moscow is the use of Russian compatriots as potential "agents of change", native Russian spouses who moved to the region some time ago. They are supported by the Russian Federal

In economic terms, Moscow's interest in establishing a logistics centre in Eritrea, to be realized, aims to expand the volume of trade in agricultural and mineral products throughout the region. But oil product transactions will also continue along the Suez and Bab el-Mandeb route, especially if the Arctic route cannot be used throughout the year. This will certainly increase the Russian presence throughout the region.

In military terms, Moscow is committed to regaining the status of great power it has held in the region, still in the time of the former Soviet Union. To do so, it is necessary to ensure access to bases where they once existed, such as the port of Aden in southern Yemen, very close to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Socotra Island, geographically located in the middle of the Gulf of Aden, near the extreme northeast of Somalia, in the Puntland region (Figure 7).

**Figure 7 - Geographical location of the port city of Aden and Socotra Island**


Source: Adapted from Google Earth (2018)

But Russia has even more ambitious goals than trying to connect the Horn of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula. To this end, Moscow has developed several contacts with Djibouti to build a military base there, without success though. After that they turned to Somaliland, a project under development that, to be realized, and once the doors of the port of Aden are opened, will guarantee it a substantial future strategic advantage around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

## 3. Geopoliticalinteractions- aforesight view

We will now seek to focus our attention on the potential relationships between the interests of these actors, in line with the geopolitical factors that were listed before. From the analysis we can identify areas of accommodation, areas of possible conflict and areas of probable conflict, meaning, respectively, areas where there is expected to be no conflict soon, areas in which due to supervening developments conflicts may occur, and, finally, areas in which the conflict is already latent. It is also possible to list

Agency for International Development, and their role focuses mainly on culture, scientific cooperation, the study of the Russian language and the promotion of ties with the Russian diaspora (Suchkov, 2015).

relations of opposition (which are the overwhelming majority) and convergence (only perceited in terms of energy security) between the actors concerned.

### 3.1. United States of America

In the case of the US, winning the "war on terror" does not entail any implication for any of the other powers. It is Washington's plan since the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in September 2001, and both China and Russia have remained on the sidelines of this initiative to carry out successive attacks against hot spots by Islamic extremist groups in Somalia and Yemen. Ensuring energy security in maritime spaces also seems not to cause any embarrassment in the other powers. They are both, therefore, accommodation areas.

The initiative to seek to isolate Iran and weaken the Houthis rebels in Yemen is in clear opposition to Moscow's policy of maintaining "bridges" with the most influential actors in the Yemeni conflict, which, too, is not openly hostile to Iran. The ongoing American strategic retraction in the ME does not seem to have extended to the various military bases existing in the different maritime spaces of the Arabian Peninsula. However, if the option of redirecting the defense effort to East Asia led to a significant decrease in personnel in the Western Indian Ocean, this could lead to a considerable increase in the influence of the other powers in the region, right away due to the absence of the dominant power, and, at the limit, to a possible increase in disputes between them. But if the U.S. option for a greater presence in East Asia does not mean reducing the numbers in this region, then surely the U.S. will try to ensure the hegemony it has maintained, which may conflict with the growing interests of both China and Russia. We are here in the presence of possible areas of conflict.

U.S. hegemonic ambitions in the region and the attempt to gain military advantages in a potential future conflict with the other powers, with China, are assumed to be areas of probable conflict.

### 3.2. China

As for China, the area relating to the protection of energy imports does not seem to collide with any area of the other powers. Both USA and Russia are energy exporters, so it is not expected that they can influence the acquisition of the energy that China needs and passes through the western Indian Ocean Sea routes (unless by an American containment strategy). This is, therefore, an accommodation area.

The protection of the BRI may, soon, conflict with the interests of the other powers, especially if there are substantive dividends for Beijing that will allow it to consolidate the top role of economic power and be tempted to channel a significant part of the proceeds obtained to strengthen its military power. We are here in the presence of a possible area of conflict.

Intending to assume the status of great power in the region and balance the traditional influence of Washington, Beijing clearly goes on a route of excessive rapprochement with the power that has been hegemonic in the region, the USA, and even with the revisionist power, Russia, which seeks to return to a plan of great prominence and relevance that the Soviet Union has once had. The use of the Djibouti Base to obtain future income, to achieve tactical advantage in the event of conflict, is opposed to the American interest in ensuring military superiority at the top of the spectrum of conflict. China's transition from continental power to both continental and maritime power comes in clear opposition to the U.S. that it detains and intends to maintain military hegemony in the Western Indian Ocean. They are all areas of probable conflict.

### 3.3. Russia

Moscow is seen as the last of the major powers to seek to join the other, USA and China, which have already established positions near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and to increase their political, military, and economic influence in the region (Dahir, 2018)

As far as the expansion of Russia's economic interests is concerned, it is unlikely that such enlargement will raise extreme opposition from the US and even China, if themajor project of theBRI is not jeopardized. This is an accommodation area.

Russia's unequivocal commitment to favouring a robust soft power policy in the region, that will allow it to alter the perception of countries in the region and to make future dividends, not only in leading a possible peace process in the Yemeni conflict, seeking to isolate Washington, that openly supports one of the contenders, such as, above all, in the ambitious project to return to Yemen and settle in the Horn of Africa, it could cause an escalation of tension in the region, particularly with USA, but also with China. We are in the presence of areas of possible conflict.

On the other hand, we have been witnessing a firm commitment by Moscow to regain the lost status in the surrounding maritime spaces of the Bab el-Mandeb, in line, moreover, with what Grygiel (2019) argues, which regards Russia's return to the Mo as one of its "three axes of expansion". In this sense, Moscow has been pursuing a bold project allowing it to gain permanent access to military bases in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, and a further link between the two spaces. If that happens, this will mean obtaining an extremely relevant and advantageous position in the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, clearly rivaling the two other powers. This is a likely area of conflict.

## Conclusion

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a chokepoint of high geostrategic and geoeconomic value and has become in recent years, together with the adjacent maritime spaces, a place of intense competition between global powers, which have objectives they intend to achieve. The involvement of these actors and the intricate pleiade of interests at stake, rarely coincident, produce, unsurprisingly, numerous relations of opposition between them and scant relations of convergence, particularly focused on energy security.

In general, the three global powers have sought to consolidate their presence in states of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden, not only to gain access to other regions thereafter, but also to project power far beyond their natural borders. The establishment of anAmerican military base in Djibouti in 2002, China's subsequent entry into the Western Indian Ocean in 2017, also through Djibouti, and Russia's attempt to ensure a continued military presence in those maritime areas, particularly in Yemen, are an example of this.

Washington will certainly want to maintain the command of the sea inthe Horn of Africa, that its status as a maritime power of excellence has enabled throughout the century, and it is not expected that the ongoing USA military retraction throughout the ME will be followed in that region and, consequently, in the maritime spaces surrounding the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. In this context, Djibouti's military base assumes increased preponderance not only for USA to secure control over a fundamental strait for international maritime trade, in particular energy, such as Bab el-Mandeb, but also as a way of containing any expansionist attempt by China in the region, especially after Beijing has managed to establish its first military base out of its doors, precisely in the territory of Djibouti.

China's choice to build that military infrastructure has raised alarms in USA. On the one hand, because this action undermines their strategic interests, calling into question its long-standing dominance in the region, both economically and militarily. On the other hand, because they consider that China's so far limited role in the region can be understood as an incentive for a more significant future military presence. And it is indeed expected that this will happen, as a more robust presence of China in the Horn of Africa will serve a dual purpose: to ensure the safety of the BRI maritime route, which crosses the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Red Sea; also, to balance Washington's traditional influence in that region.In this sense, China's actions in Djibouti will certainly influence its ambitions for power in the region, especially when it intends to assume itself as a relevant maritime power.

Russia, for its part, seeks to return to a level of significant influence in the region it has held in the past, in the Soviet Union era, especially by establishing at least one military base in Aden, Yemen, very close to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This revisionist stance collides, however, with the American hegemonic claims and the clear rise of China. We can therefore face in the long term the coexistence of military infrastructure of the three global powers, separated only by a few tens of nautical miles. Tensions between them in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and surrounding areas will be inevitable.

The maritime spaces of the Red Sea, Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden have in fact become successively more securitized over the past decade, leading to an unprecedented militarisation of the region, with USA, China, and Russia taking a very active part in this process. However, the interest of these actors in ensuring that international maritime trade, especially energy, is not threatened, leads to the thought that safe passage into the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is not called into question, and this is perhaps the only relationship of convergence between them. However, the other relationships that could be identified between the global powers are of opposition. And it is even expected that we will continue to walk a path centered on a seemingly endless cycle of sharp growth of geopolitical disputes in the region at the global level.

We conclude by stating that it was possible to prove that the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and adjacent maritime spaces, in particular because of the relevance they have to international maritime trade and the possibility of asserting and projecting power of the actors present there, are, nowadays, an important stage of geopolitical competition of the global powers (USA, China, and Russia), and that the disputes between them are in an ascending phase.

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# EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS IN MALI AND ITS BORDERLANDS – A CASE FOR STABILISATION

**ANA CARINA S. FRANCO**
anacarina.sfranco@gmail.com
Independent Consultant and PhD candidate in International Relations at Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal). She has a master's degree in political and Social Sciences – International Relations, Université Catholique de Louvain. She is currently providing independent evaluation and analysis services to international organisations on peace and security, including within the European Union's Instrument contributing to Peace and Security, and the CivilnExt project aimed at strengthening situational awareness, information exchange and operational control in the context of civilian missions under the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy

## Abstract

The article's main objective is to contribute to a better understanding of the concept of stabilisation, in both academic and policy terms, by analysing theoutcomes of counterinsurgency and support to peace operations in the Sahel by regional, continental, and extra-continentalactors. It addresses the problematic associated with the so-called 'intervention traffic jam' resulting from numerous external initiativesin the political process and conflict dynamics of Sahelian countries, with focus on central and northern Mali and its borderlands.

The external interventions entered a new phase of the so-called liberal peace project when, in the 2000s, peacekeeping modalities evolved into integrated or multidimensional missions, as well as into a normative framework for statebuilding. Furthermore, interventions in the Sahel reflect a return to stabilisation in the early 2010s – a concept that emerges as an alternative to the peacebuilding-statebuilding nexus which dominated the previous decade.

Despite the numerous stabilisation efforts, there are recurrent episodes of extreme violence in the ethnically diverse central Mali, along with increased insecurity in neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger. The insurgency phenomena in the border areas between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso (Liptako-Gourma) is often not only directly linked to the association between the expansion of Salafi-Jihadist movements and the Malian political crisis of 2012, but also to the weak state presence in large regions in the Sahara-Sahel and the challenges posed by ethnic pluralism.The article concludes by emphasising the lack of integration of stabilisation responses into a political approach considering different governance strategies. It also stresses the need to prioritise the restoration of the state's legitimate authority despite the achievement of a modus vivendi in the country's northern region.

## Keywords

Stabilisation, Peace Support, Intervention, Statebuilding, Sahel

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# EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS IN MALI AND ITS BORDERLANDS – A CASE FOR STABILISATION

**ANA CARINA S. FRANCO**

## Introduction

The article addresses the problematic associated with the so-called 'intervention traffic jam'[1] resulting from numerous external initiatives, namely in the form of military and peace support interventions, being implemented in the Sahel since the 2012 Malian politico-military crisis. Its main objective is to understand and analyse the effect of those operations, or the "partnership peacekeeping"[2], in the political process and conflict dynamics of Sahelian countries, with focus on central and northern Mali and its borderlands. Furthermore, it aims to contribute to a better understanding of the concept of stabilisation in both academic and policy terms.

The cross-border nature of threats to state security in the Sahel hinders responses of an exclusively military nature led and/or supported by intervention actors (state, international organisations, ad-hoc coalitions). These actors are either regional (G5 Sahel, Economic Community of West African States - ECOWAS), continental (African Union - AU), or extra-continental (France, United Nations - UN, European Union - EU, United States of America - USA). The article explains how, despite the proliferation of external initiatives in support to security sector reform, the growing counterinsurgency logic, along with the long-term privatisation of public services such as security, further challenged the state's legitimate - rather than legal - authority.

The article concludes by emphasising the limits of the technocratic approach of the stabilisation responses, as well as the lack of their integration into a political approach considering different governance strategies.The prospect of a less linear systemic societal-based approach may be exemplified by recent international and national supportto bottom-up approaches. They often materialise in the establishment of local peace deals led by non-state actors within the more polycentric and complex conflict dynamics in Mali's central region and southern borderlands.

The research is based on an analysis of the literature, as well as of remote semi-structured and open interviews and personal communications with both former and

[1] The expression 'intervention traffic jam' has previously been used, e.g., in the July 2020 issue of *International Affairs,* guest-edited by Jacobsen & Cold-Ravnkilde to characterise the proliferation of foreign assistance initiatives in the Sahel.

[2] Williams (2021: 24) refers to this "partnership peacekeeping" as the current norm in Africa, entailing "collaboration on operations between two or more multilateral institutions and/or various bilateral actors".

current UN and EU staff members, and independent experts in 2020 and 2021. All interviews were conducted under the Chatham House Rule, thus no direct references to individuals who took part in a personal capacity are provided in the text.

## Conceptualising Stabilisation

Stabilisation efforts are meant to support states undergoing conflict - at different stages - and often consists of processes where military actors support civil-led processes, which can be translated into both peace-support and counterinsurgency[3] operations (Curran &Holtom 2015: 3, Mac Ginty 2012). Contemporary external interventions, including in the Sahel, progressively constitute stabilisation and/or counterinsurgencycombined with counterterrorism operations, posing a challenge to the classic and liberal paradigm of peacebuilding, and resulting in its retraction both as a concept and as a practice (Karlsrud 2019a).

The concept of stabilisation emerged in the late 2000s as a pragmatic alternative to the peacebuilding/statebuilding nexus which dominated the previous decade (Andersen 2018). The first UN stabilisation mission dates to 2014 (Haiti). In 2015, the report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) would confirm the absence of, and need for, a definition of stabilisation by the UN (UN 2015; Andersen 2018). HIPPO refers to UN 'crisis management' missions, which would include stabilisation. Similarly, the EU uses the concept of 'crisis management', and the AU (along with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) 'peace support' operations. In the literature, stabilisation often corresponds to the definition developed by the British government. In this sense, it applies to situations where there is no political settlement and it would consist of a process aimed at establishing a political framework and agreement for a stable state, not necessarily a concrete final state (Aoi et al 2017: 4, 10-11).

Most interventions entail support to the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process, which constitutes a key component of statebuilding promoted by external actors, such as the EU, the UN, and the USA. SSR consists of "an entirely policy-driven concept" (Bleiker&Krupanski 2012: 37), in reference to processes requiring a civilian framework of democratic control that ensures accountability and transparency in the use of force. It promotes the legitimacy of the state in the monopoly of the use of force, ensuring that it has the capacity to escalate the use of force, but also that violence perpetrated by non-state political orders is eliminated. SSR processesfocuses mainly on reforming military institutions, most often including demobilisation programs – although, in the last decade, the concept has been reshaped in order to respond to the human security[4] agenda.

3 Contradicting the principles of peacekeeping, counterinsurgency operations seek to establish order by fighting the insurgency. Often based on British doctrine, 'insurgency' is understood as organised and violent subversion used to affect or prevent political control, thus challenging established authority. As counterinsurgency operations also aim at addressing root causes of the insurgency, they do require a multi-faced approach (Aoi et al 2017: 9).

4 The concept of human security reflects the paradigm shift, from war to law, in an international context where the law applies more to the individual than to the state (Kaldor 2014: 74).

## Existing critiques and advancements towards a "local turn"

Aiming to address the so-called peacebuilding crisis from the late 1990s[5], the institutionalist approach of 'peacebuilding-as-statebuilding' became the main objective of any international policy related to global security in the early 2000s. There was a new consensus towards a 'partnership' approach (between recipient countries and international institutions) to peacebuilding (Chandler 2017: 4). The global governance project or hegemony of liberal peace entered a new phase of external intervention with the development of peacekeeping modalities that evolved into integrated or multidimensional missions.

Yet the absence of peace in the context of conflicts within the state itself results in complex scenarios for the operationalisation of peacekeeping missions, which tend to implement robust mandates. Their mandates mirror the complexity inherent to intra-state conflicts, as opposed to so-called traditional peacekeeping missions operating in the context of inter-conflict, including monitoring demobilisation and ceasefire processes (Howard 2019a: 5). Several authors warn of the risks that such developments imply for the maintenance of peace as an instrument for peace, as well as for the need to reaffirm the political character of any UN stabilisation doctrine (Howard 2019b; Charbonneau 2019: 311; Karlsrud 2017: 1222-1225; Boutellis 2015: 4).

The identification of the flaws in the liberal peace project led to the emergence of new conceptualisations of peace (post-liberal). Existing criticisms of peacebuilding are essentially due to the inability of the liberal model to ensure the sustainability of peace, largely due to the imposition of technocratic state institutions. Chandler (2017: 4) refers to peacebuilding as 'sovereignty-building' and to 'sovereignty' as 'responsibility', in the sense that post-colonial, non-Western states become embedded in international institutional frameworks. In this context, there is a progressive shift from interventions which are end-based or goal-oriented focusing on formal state institutions to a less linear systemic societal-based approach, including hybrid forms of peace and everyday practices (Chandler 2017: 143-210; Mac Ginty 2010, 2011).

Despite the preeminent role given to the "local" in the strategy of most external interventions, national or regional actors who do not comply with international bureaucratic and technocratic standards are often marginalised from internationally-sponsored initiatives (Mac Ginty 2012b). Statebuilding is still seen as the "technocratic remedy" to e.g., "fragile" states (*Ibid*.). Therefore, the emphasis on the local does not automatically results in ownership and sustainability by the overall population of a recipient country or region.

The debate also reflects current views on foreign support to SSR. This concept tends towards a shift from a security foreign assistance paradigm - realistic and state-centred during the Cold War - to a liberal and more holistic approach. Thus, although applied to the security sector, SSR has been responding mainly to the agenda of

[5] A reflection of that crisis, peace interventions often resulted in the establishment of international peace protectorates, e.g., in the Balkans and in Timor-Leste, which contested the UN Charter framework of state sovereignty and non-intervention (Chandler 2017: 4).

(good) governance (Chappuis&Hänggi 2013: 170). That said, it is currently at an impasse between two conflicting frameworks, i.e., between the commitment to rule of law as the main SSR principle - liberal approach - and its insertion into the current 'local turn' in peace and conflict studies as a condition for sustainable peace - post-liberal approach (Donais&Barbak 2021: 3-5). For instance, when adopting a hybrid model of liberal nature[6], local non-state security providers also integrate the SSR process, given the ultimate objective of guaranteeing human security- Thus, despite the significant investment in the sector, from a hybrid school's perspective, the orthodox (liberal) approach is rather state-centric, ignoring local dynamics (Sedra 2013: 2019-222).

## Evidence from Mali and its borderlands

The period of analysis begins with the Malian political-military crisis of 2012,in the context of a post-*coup d'état* and the Tuareg rebellion, and subsequent intervention by France (Operation Serval) in support of the Malian government against groups with links to the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI). Initiatives carried out by regional/continental entities, namely the AU and ECOWAS through the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), were quickly replaced by and/or integrated in the United Nations peacekeeping mission, *Mission multidimensional Integrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali* (MINUSMA)in 2013. That same year, the EU established its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)military mission,EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali, later followed by the civilian EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Mali (2015). EUTM and EUCAP are both non-executive missions, mainly in support of the Malian security sector reform. Since 2017, the EU launched the regionalisation process of its CSDP in the Sahel, combining civil and military and establishing a network of security and defence experts in the EU delegations. At the same time, between 2013 and 2014, regional military missions with counterterrorism mandates were launched in the Sahel, including in Mali, such as Juniper Shield (USA) and Barkhane (France) operations. In 2017, the AU authorised the G5 Sahel Joint Force (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Mauritania). As from 2020, France leads the establishment of the Takuba task forcewith contributions from several EU Member States.[7]

External responses tend to be integrated into a policy approach or the security-development nexus. It is also at the core of the multi-donor 'Alliance Sahel' (2017) and subsequent initiatives, namely the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel - P3S (2019) and the Coalition for the Sahel (2020). However, these approaches prioritise state governance to the detriment of alternative forms of governance and informal social contract, whose understanding is gradually seen as essential to tackle the root causes of violent conflict. In fact, the region is still facing

[6] Sedra (2013: 211-223) distinguishes between three schools to explain the deficiencies of the SSR model (monopoly, "good enough", hybrid), based on similarities and differences in relation to the role played by the state.

[7] Takubatask force is currently focusing on theLiptako-Gourma region, the tri-border area (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) adjacent to the Niger river between the city of Gao in Mali and the capital of Niger, Niamey. It aimed at reinforcing Operation Barkhane, whose end was recently (June 2021) announced by French President Macron. The task force has two groups based in the Maliantowns of Gao and Menaka.

challenges from the longer-term presence of elements from the different Salafi-jihadi movements[8], together with the contested return of the state administration to central and northern Mali.

A key trend of the post-intervention period in Mali is the proliferation of both militias and political movements or very diversified political-military groups. Lecocq&Klute (2019: 49-53) place the Malian government amongst the numerous groups who "fight militarily and politically-often in fast-shifting alliances among them or with external power groups - for different objectives that likewise may change quickly as well". The most notorious have been Salafi-jihadist movements. In fact, the Sahelian region in general, and Liptako-Gourma area in particular, suffered from the wide expansion - albeit under very fragmented processes - of local al-Qaeda and Daesh affiliates from the 2000s and 2010s, respectively. To a lesser extent, the border Mali-Burkina Faso-Côte d'Ivoire has also been the object of the expansion of Salafi-Jihadi movements. Cross border security programmes under the Accra Initiative (not recognised by the AU) intended to tackle the insurgency, particularly led by the Group to Support Islam and Muslims (*Jamāʽatnuṣrat al-islāmwal-muslimīn* - JNIM), via operation Koudanlgou II in 2018.[9]

Despite initially having a role of mediation (monitoring of the peace process), the mandate of the MINUSMA has since been facing challenges in implementing a robust mandate in a context of intrastate conflict, insofar as the operationalisation of the mission has challenged the principles of peacekeeping operations, not falling within the spectrum of operations provided for in the Capstone Doctrine. Karlsrud (2019b) suggests placing the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA under a type of "chapter VII and a half" operation within the UN Charter – taking as an example former Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's conceptualisation of peacekeeping as a 'Chapter VI and half' operation, i.e., between the 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes' (Chapter VI) and the use of force (Chapter VII). In this sense, "Chapter VII and half" are Chapter VII peace operations "deployed in close cooperation with regional or subregional actors, either operating as part of the UN peace operation, or in close cooperation with it", namely African member states providing troops to missions with a peace enforcement, or at least a more robust, mandate (*Ibid*.: 496).

While the G5 Sahel Joint Forcecontinues developing its own capacity, MINUSMA is mandated to provide it with operational and logistical support, in particular to carry out counterinsurgency operations across the Sahel.[10]Facing a reputational risk, the UN mission collaborates, directly or indirectly, also with French-led regional Operation

8 The article adopts the expression 'Salafi-Jihadi movement' used by Maher (2016). Similarly, Dalacoura (2001: 235-248) and Dias (2010) adopt the concept of Islamist militant movement, which reflects the transnational character of what are commonly referred to as jihadist groups. Jihadism refers to the movements that emerged from the 1980s, characterized by a departure from the Sunni tradition in terms of how jihad should be conducted, for instance, by rejecting constitution-based political orders and committing violence against civilians (Thurston 2020:1-2).

9 The operation was undertaken by Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, with Mali as an observer. Most recently (March 2021), attacks have been perpetrated against gendarmerie and army positions in Côte d'Ivoire in the border area with Burkina Faso.

10 Based on interviews conducted remotely in 2021, the action of the Joint Force is barely perceptible given the lack of implementation of the operation.

Barkhane (which superseded Serval in 2014)[11] in its counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts (Boutellis 2021: 28-30, Charbonneau 2019). Nevertheless, this degree of participation of MINUSMA in counterinsurgency remains unclear. In fact, on the one hand, French-led Barkhane would collaborate with MINUSMA at a limited level, e.g., sharing information on security risks related to foreseen operations in areas where the UN mission also operates. On the other hand, cooperation between MINUSMA and the Malian government progressively focused on counterinsurgency mainly to neutralise armed groups.[12]

In relation to the Malian government, the mission is de facto partial, resulting in retaliatory attacks by insurgent groups and a growing counterinsurgency logic. It is also not governed by the principle of non-use of force. The use of force is permitted, albeit exclusively for the purpose of protecting peacekeepers and the civilian population, therefore, also not qualifying it as a peace enforcement mission (Kjeksrud&Vermeij 2017:227-245). In fact, since 2014, MINUSMA saw its mandate broadened to include e.g. protection of civilians and support to the reestablishment of authority by the central state. Since 2018, while the protection of civilians remained the focus, the geographical scope was extended to include central Mali. This aimed specifically at restoring the state's authority in the communal violence-inflicted areas of Mopti and Segou, where ethnic pluralism is more prominent compared with the northern region of Mali (van der Lijn et al 2019: 39-43).

The UN has showed reluctancy in prepositioning resources for the protection of civilians for what would become the major crisis in Mali as result of the increase in the inter- and intracommunal violence in the country's central region. When put in a complex situation, e.g., set up to deal with one conflict (in the north) and later having another one to handle (in the centre), the UN proved to be unfit for a prompt re-focus. In the north, a modus vivendi has been achieved between the two rival coalitions following the signature of 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Accord and despite its slow implementation (Boutellis 2021: 18).[13]

The sustainability of the external interventions and their stabilisation goal is questioned especially given the intensification of violence in the centre of the country. For instance, conflict between two ethnic groups in the region - the Fulani pastoralists, and the Dogon herders - together with intra-community conflict, can be seen as a product of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The combination of the retaliation by state security forces with the violent acts of the different movements led to the proliferation of self-defence groups. This contributed to a continuous violence cycle inter and intra communities, including the establishment of a Dogon countermovement acting against Dogon militia and favouring dialogue with Fulani allied to Salafi-Jihadist movements, or disputes over access to pastures between Fulani-supporting al-Qaeda and those from the same ethnic group supporting the Daesh (Benjaminsen& Ba 2021; ICG: 2020-3-4; van der Lijn et al 2018: 42).

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11 According to Harmon (2015), the replacement of Serval by Barkhane occurred not only due to France's need to intervene in the Sahel beyond Mali, but also because of concerns regarding Malian political leadership and inadequacy of national security forces, especially for desert warfare.

12 Interviews with current and former UN staff members, remote, February, April, May, and June 2021.

13 Phrasing one interviewee, "MINUSMA has settled for the "Darfur option"". Interview with current UN staff member, remote, April 2021.

Nevertheless, both international and national state actors have been paying attention to the central region. Whereas the 2018 *Plan de SécurisationIntégrée des Régions du Centre* (PSIRC) of the Government of Mali emphasised security aspects (along with overall return of the state and development), the 2019 *Stratégie de Stabilisation pour le Centre du Mali* had a clearer focus on the political aspects as part of a crisis exit strategy (ICG 2020: 20-22). Bottom-up approaches, often supported by international actors, including MINUSMA, international non-governmental organisations, but also by national actors such as the *Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali*, resulted in the establishment of local peace deals in the central region However, other peace deals were also led by elements of Salafi-jihadist movements, therefore enabling alternative forms of authority and governance (Boutellis 2021: 22-24, ICG 2020: 26-28).

Along with those movements, the formation of self-defence groups presented itself as a form of informal privatisation of a state/public service - security. For instance, Benjaminsen& Ba (2021: 5) affirm that Dogon militia consist mainly of traditional hunters trained and armed by the Malian state to de facto replace the national army in attempting to control the central region. Established in 2016, Dana Ambassagou is the main self-defence group implicated in scaling-up violence in the area, and essentially allied with the Malian state. Despite being formed mainly of *dozo* or local hunters, traditionally seen as community protectors, it also integrates other *dogon* militias and criminal elements originating from West African countries, namely Côte d'Ivoire. Furthermore, in recent years, a growing number of reports point to the fact that the increasing counterinsurgency logic has also driven national armies to commit violence action against civilians.[14]

Within the support to governmental security forces, assistance to SSR tend to follow the "technocratic turn" of internationally-sponsored peace interventions (Mac Ginty 2012b). Furthermore, there seems to be an imbalance between the normative and functional spheres, with emphasis on the functional aspects of the security sector (back to a 'train-and-equip' logic), at the expense of promoting standards and regulations, namely by the EU. In fact, assistance to state forces is driven by supply (of training, equipment, and advice), with experts and scholars reproaching the absence of due appropriation by national actors (Tull 2020, 2019; Jayasundara-Smits 2018; Ehrhart et al 2014). Moreover, external actors do not have access to existing power dynamics, many driven by neopatrimonialism with focus on personalities rather than institutions.[15] The dynamics inherent to local agency, including "locally-owned SSR"[16], are illustrated by military coups in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021.

Furthermore, rule of law-based SSR assistance is seen as too rigid to adjust to local contexts (Cravo 2016, Donais&Barbak 2021:5-6). Instead, one could advocate for a shift from legality to legitimacy within the existent hybrid security provision. In this context, one would privilege what Donais&Barbak (2021: 9-15) define as "polycentric

[14] See, for instance, the following online resources made available by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project - ACLED (https://acleddata.com/blog/2020/05/20/state-atrocities-in-the-sahel-the-impetus-for-counter-insurgency-results-is-fueling-government-attacks-on-civilians), and Orient XXI (https://orientxxi.info/magazine/au-sahel-les-massacres-s-amplifient-malgre-le-covid-19,3830)

[15] Interviews with former EUTM and current UN staff members, remote, April and May 2021

[16] "Locally-owned SSR" is explained by Donais & Barbak (2021:2) as the appropriation of process by the host government's side, characterised by a compromise of SSR ideals in face of power struggles and resistance to accountability measures.

accountability networks" within a SSR strategy beyond the state. It would enable to promote co-governance between state and non-state security providers, including required links with justice provision.

The article further explains how the state-centric approach - which informs external interventions – did not result in a solution for the Malian state (partial) collapse, in particular in northern Mali and its borderlands.

## From the Malian state recession to its partial collapse

Resulting from a limited selection of Weber's work, the institutionalist approach to statebuilding is criticised for the essentially technocratic perspective centred on the capacities and institutions, or apparatus, of the state underlying their monopoly of violence (Lottholz& Lemay-Hébert 2016). This neo-Weberian approach does not account for the more diverse and complex nature of the state, namely the relationship that is established between the state and society. On the contrary, the adoption of a post-Weberian line would allow the analysis of legitimacy in its historical and cultural dimensions, including alternative sources of legitimacy of social orders such as traditional ones, and how they overlap with, or are the object of, interference from global processes (namely intervention).

Most studies show that the Malian government has neglected the search for lasting solutions to the causes of the local insurrection which are related to a deficit in political governance in marginalised areas - and which are remotely related to the phenomenon of jihadism (Schmidt 2018: 294, 2013: 2017; Charbonneau 2019: 312). As Guichaoua (2020: 911) phrased, "post-colonial sovereignty in Mali was never in great shape", and external intervention in the post-2012 crisis only precipitated the state's (partial) collapse.[17] Prior to 2012, external actors, as well as national non-state actors, were already fulfilling the provision of public goods, including security in the northern region via loyal militias. Mali would fall into the "state disintegration" category as per Erdmann's typology: para-statehood or parasovereignty was exercised by non-state institutions "without completely supplanting the state or explicitly challenging it", thus resulting in "informal decentralization or privatization" (Erdmann 2014: 2019). However, the article privileges the concept of "state recession", which refers to a gradual process "by which the state has receded – in terms of political and territorial control, effective legal authority, and provision of security and services, including access to goods and markets – and the concomitant informalisation or privatisation of the economy and other state functions, including security" (Bøås& Jennings 2005: 390).

In this context, it is important to highlight the contribution of borders and peripheries of post-colonial states to the emergence of non-state forms of power whose vitality is not controlled by national or international regimes.Borderlands are often an example of spaces that "play an essential role in calibrating power relations between the state and its citizens", and "generate important resources that have a decisive impact on

[17] Erdmann (2014: 220) explains state partial collapse as the "loss of sovereignty within a limited territory, entailing a complete loss of the monopoly on the use of force and a simultaneous challenge to the integrity of the state", which consists in a relevant characterisation of statehood in Mali in the post-2012 political-military crisis.

state- and peace-building outside their immediate surroundings" (Korf &Raeymaekers 2013:9). The absence of state control over its border is illustrated by the experience of MINUSMA's border security programme. In the early years of its establishment in Mali, the UN peacekeeping mission conducted a mapping of all border posts in the country which, in fact, only existed in the southern borders; in the northern areas functional posts were inexistent and no border patrols were carried out between them. In sum, border management in Mali reflected its complex, and often uncoordinated, national security sector.[18]

At the same time, MINUSMA's mandate remains strict to Mali, with limited information being shared by neighbouring countries, except for the support of troop contributing countries from the region, namely Burkina Faso.[19] UN agencies would partner with local state actors in the southern border, notably the regional organisation *Autorité de développementintegré de la region du Liptako-Gourma* (ALG) for cross-border cooperation supported by the UN Development Programme. Created in 1970 with a development mandate for the border areas, ALG become active in the security sector as from 2017 and formalised its cooperation with the G5 Sahel in 2018.[20]

In fact, border management only became a priority for most external actors, in particular the EU, in the aftermath of the so-called 2015 refugee crisis. The EU provided significant investment in the area, either through its Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa or the CSDP missions on the ground, including EUCAP. EUCAP Sahel Mali would also eventually start supporting border control as from 2017 as part of the overall EU strategy for tackling irregular migration and insurgent activity.[21]EU'sintegratedapproach for border management and overall stabilisation is best exemplified by its*Programme d'appui au renforcement de la sécurité dans la région de Mopti et à la gestion des zones frontalières* (PARSEC) implementedsince 2017. PARSEC combines resources from EUTF, EUCAP and EUTM for the restoration of state authority in Mopti (central Mali), with a focus on borderland stabilisation in the Liptako-Gourma area along the Malian borders with Niger and Burkina Faso.[22]

The evolution of the stabilisation interventions in Mali since 2012 demonstrates that rather than promoting the restoration of the (legal) authority of the state, one would need to restore its *legitimate* authority. In this context, a critical perspective would entail the need to highlight aspects of post-colonialism or Eurocentrism, and local agency. This shift means combining an institutional dynamics top-bottom perspective with a bottom-top one, allowing a better account of the agency of the multiplicity of actors, state, and non-state.

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18 Interview with current UN staff member, remote, April 2021.

19 Interview with former UN staff member, remote, June 2021.

20 www.liptakogourma.org/signature-dun-accord-de-cooperation-entre-lalg-et-le-g5sahel

21 Interviews with former EUCAP staff member, independent analyst, and former and current UN officials, remote, May 2020, February - May 2021. In addition to the refugee crisis in Europe, the attacks in Bamako led by elements of Salafi-jihadists movement in 2015 also contributed to the decision to broaden EUCAP's mandate.

22 https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/mali/programme-dappui-au-renforcement-de-la-securite-dans-les-regions-de_en

## Conclusion

The Sahelian case illustrates an interventionist system or order where sovereignty is the dominant narrative. It constitutes a noteworthy case for the development of international and regional-led stabilisation doctrine and policies. There seems to have been an evolution from external interventions centred in both support to the political peace process, mainly in Mali, as part of any stabilisation process, and short-term counterinsurgency to full scale stabilisation efforts focusing on longer term counterinsurgency and support to the security sector along the lines of the security-development nexus.

Despite the significant investment in stabilisation initiatives in the region- rightly illustrated by the expression "intervention traffic jam"-, those initiatives were largely unable to move beyond the technocratic turn which characterises contemporary internationally-sponsored interventions. With some level of coordination, responses are implemented in the context of increased complexity resulting from the evolution of conflict and interventions from northern Mali to the central region and its border areas where ethnic pluralism tends to play a greater role.

The stabilisation efforts in Malihave proven effective if aimed especially at normalising the political relationship between Bamako and the northern political elites. Therefore, it corroborates the definition of stabilisation outlined earlier in the article as a provisional measure part of a process aimed at establishing a political framework and agreement for a stable - albeit not final- state. However, a political framework and agreement is nowadays also required to tackle the more complex, fragmented, and polycentricprocessesin the centre and southern borderlands, with subsequent spill-over of instability to the neighbouring countries.

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# CABO VERDE AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A BICENTENNIAL RELATIONSHIP

**JOÃO PAULO MADEIRA**

joao.madeira@docente.unicv.edu.cv

Assistant Professor at the University of Cabo Verde (Uni-CV, Cabo Verde) and Coordinator of the International Relations and Diplomacy course. Researcher at the Centre for Public Administration and Public Policies (CAPP-ISCSP-UL). PhD in Social Sciences from the University of Lisbon (ISCSP-UL), having completed in 2018 a mobility post-doctoral programme by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation at FCT NOVA as a member of the Network of Environmental Studies of the Portuguese Speaking Countries (REALP).

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## Abstract

Changes in the distribution of world power suggest that insular countries such as Cabo Verde should diversify international cooperation and thus ensure long-term benefits. This premise, combined with principles of solidarity, mutual respect, transparency and responsibility has enabled the signing of various agreements between Cabo Verde and the United States of America in the areas of security and defence, development aid policy, democracy and human rights. This article critically discusses the main gains achieved in the relationship between the United States of America and Cabo Verde, an former Portuguese colony until July 1975 and, after that date, an independent state, with the purpose of providing an analytical framework to respond to the current challenges. To do this, an exploratory qualitative study was carried out based on bibliographical and documentary analysis. The article concludes that Cabo Verde and the United States of America have been following the evolution of the international community, taking into account the importance in the region where the archipelago is inserted, sharing synergies and exchanging experiences in matters of development, defence and security.

## Keywords

Cabo Verde, United States of America, Bilateral relations, Defence and security, Development.

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**JOÃO PAULO MADEIRA**

## Introduction

The international system is currently characterised by the distribution of powers. As a result, it is necessary to establish alliances based on strategic alignments based on common principles, values and interests. States establish forms of relationship with other states to promote and consolidate their interests.

Relations between Cabo Verde and the United States of America (USA) originated in the 18th century. Three key moments in this history stand out: the first is the passage through Cabo Verde of a considerable number of Africans who were victims of the slave trade bound for the American continent; the second is related to the activity of American whaling ships from New Bedford and Nantucket in the Cabo Verde seas; the third follows the intensification of trade routes between the USA and West Africa (Lobban, 2018). The archipelago came to prominence by trading and exporting products to the USA and in particular to the city of Boston (Brooks, 1970; 2010; Duncan, 1972). This relationship and permanent forms of dialogue followed where the islands saw emigration as an opportunity to improve the living conditions.

Currently, the most representative Cabo Verdean communities are concentrated in the state of Massachusetts (capital Boston and nearby cities and towns such as Quincy, Randolph, Somerville and Cambridge) and south of Boston (Brockton, Taunton, Fall River, New Bedford, Cape Cod and Wareham) and the states of Rhode Island (Providence, Pawtucket, East Providence and Central Falls), Connecticut (Bridgeport and Waterbury), Florida, California, New Jersey, Virginia, Maryland, New York and Georgia (MOTT, 2020; Lima-Neves, 2015). The diaspora is over 250,000 (UN News, 2020) and is represented by the Cabo Verde Embassy in Washington, D.C. and the Consulate General in Boston, Quincy, Massachusetts.

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Georgia (MOTT, 2020; Lima-Neves, 2015). The diaspora is over 250,000 (UN News, 2020) and is represented by the Cabo Verde Embassy in Washington, D.C. and the Consulate General in Boston, Quincy, Massachusetts.

The USA sees Cabo Verde as an important partner that, since independence in July 1975, has committed itself to building a rule of law that promotes democracy, transparency and accountability of public institutions. Indeed, Cabo Verde is a state that ensures independence, responsibility and impartiality of the courts and the Public Prosecutor's Office, where civil and political rights are respected and the freedoms of expression, association and the press, among others, is safeguarded. It firmly defends the values of pluralist democracy and the rule of law and is based on the idea that the promotion of peace, security and social and economic development constitute the best option. The archipelago maintains relations with partners, whether countries or regions, based on trust, equality and reciprocity. Cabo Verde has sought, despite several limitations, to give consistency to domestic and foreign policies, approaching countries that are part of the southern hemisphere and simultaneously of the north to strengthen its diplomatic agenda. However, one may ask, what have been Cabo Verde's main gains in its relationship with the USA? What strategies should the archipelago adopt for its foreign policy?

The uncertainty and unpredictability that characterise the current international situation require countries such as Cabo Verde to adopt a stance based on pragmatism in their foreign policy (Graça, 2014; Madeira, 2016b). In this context, the historical relationship with the USA can be highlighted as an important anchor as the relations of more than two centuries that has united these two peoples. It is expected that together the countries will adopt a more committed stance and action articulated in principles and values with a view to addressing challenges that are common in security and defence, trade, development aid policy, democracy and human rights.

Cabo Verde, like other small island states, sees foreign policy as a resource for its development and an opportunity to participate in and be useful to the international community. The current financial crisis has been particularly affected partners such as the European Union and the USA. The situation is aggravated when the country is faced with other structural constraints, such as the substantial reduction in Official Development Assistance and the loss of some international grants, with the country still dependent on credit lines/concessional loans. This was accentuated after January 2008 when Cabo Verde moved to the category of Middle-Income Country. All these challenges have encouraged political leaders to rethink foreign policy in an attempt to create new models that point to the self-sustainability. Yet Cabo Verdean diplomacy has given signs of the ability to interpreted and responded to problems that, over time, embodied the promotion of various strategic partnerships for the development of the archipelago (Costa & Pinto, 2014).

## Cabo Verde-United States: a two centuries old historical relationship

Discovered between 1460 and 1462 by navigators in the service of the Portuguese crown, Cabo Verde served as an important hub for navigation and the slave trade, and the American continent stood out as one of the main destinations (Caldeira, 2013). The relationship between these two peoples is configured in what Thornton (2012) calls a history as old as the formation of the *Atlantic World*.

With independence on 4 July 1776 and the process of industrialisation from 1865 onwards, the USA gradually asserted itself, becoming militarily, economically and technologically the main superpower of the post-World War II era. The strategy was to develop forms of relationship with practically every country in the world. Friendly relations between Cabo Verde and the USA existed for more than two centuries, to the extent that in December 1818 the first US Consulate in sub-Saharan Africa was installed in Praia. Samuel Hodges, a businessman and native of Massachusetts, presented his credentials to Governor António Pusich as the first American Consul in Cabo Verde. The installation of the consulate was the result of an important element from a historical and diplomatic point of view[1] (Tolentino, 2019). This period undoubtedly marks the first steps in relations between these two peoples in their various forms, as a Colony until 1951 and then as an Overseas Province[2] until the proclamation of independence in 1975.

In terms of nation state building, Cabo Verde is, in the African context, a particular case and therefore deserves special attention. The opening of the consulate took place approximately one hundred and fifty-seven years before Cabo Verde's independence. Although these relations passed through Portugal until 1975, from that date on they took place between sovereign and independent states. This discussion reinforces the idea that nationhood in Cabo Verde precedes the creation of the independent state by centuries. This differentiates it from most African countries, where it is the state that has been promoting the formation of the nation (Madeira, 2016a). The construction of the Cabo Verdean nation is based on a long-term historical movement that began with the settlement in the 15th century, corresponding to the progressive structuring of the social formation engendered on the islands, with its uniqueness and correlative sociocultural patterns (Madeira, 2018).

Between 1900 and 1920, the USA received emigrants from the archipelago, mostly from the islands of Fogo and Brava, who ventured out on ships that caught cetaceans in the Cabo Verdean seas (Carreira, 1982). Although undocumented, the emigrants managed to enter American territory, fleeing the misery and poor living conditions that plagued the islands, especially the resulting crisis of subsistence caused by the prolonged drought between 1890 and 1903, which culminated in the famines of 1903 and 1904 (Carreira, 1977).

1 Activities commemorating the two hundredth anniversary of diplomatic relations between Cabo Verde and the USA took place in December 2018. This ephemeris is rightly reinforced by the fact that the first American Consulate in sub-Saharan Africa was established in 1818. In the 19th century, whale oil was used for lighting and many whaling ships sailed from New England to the seas of Cabo Verde, since it was a privileged location for the capture, transhipment, processing, landing and trade of this important substance extracted from the fat of whales fished. Cabo Verdeans participated in the fishing industry in the New England region and the Cranberry Peatlands. In 1843 the USA established the African Squadron in Cabo Verde for the purpose of capturing slave-trading ships (Canney, 2006). Another equally important historical fact refers to the participation of Cabo Verdeans in the United States War of Independence between 1775 and 1783 (U.S. Embassy in Cabo Verde, 2018; 2019).

2 See in this regard, Pimenta (2014: 252): 'The Revision of 1951 incorporated the Colonial Act into the Portuguese Constitution, with the title "Do Ultramar Português", while the Organic Charter of the Portuguese Colonial Empire was replaced by the Organic Law of Overseas. It was a transformation mainly of aesthetics, i.e. of terminology: the expressions "Portuguese Colonial Empire" and "Colonies" were replaced by "Portuguese Overseas" and "Portuguese Overseas Provinces".

Despite the close relations that existed for more than two centuries, the zof cooperation only became possible in July 1975, when the USA recognised Cabo Verde as an independent state. In 1977, two years after independence, Cabo Verde opened its first consulate in Boston to strengthen cooperation and support its diaspora in the USA (Amado, 2014).

Although these are two countries with substantially different weights in the international system, Cabo Verde and the USA have been engaged in a cooperative relationship that takes economic growth and security cooperation as central aspects. Over four decades, several agreements considered strategic have been signed, including: the *Millennium Challenge Account* (MCA), the *African Growth and Opportunity Act* (AGOA) and the *Status of Forces Agreement* (SOFA).

**Table 1: Main Milestones of Bilateral Relations Cabo Verde-USA**

| Period | Main events |
|---|---|
| XVIII century | USA ships catch cetaceans in Cabo Verde seas. |
| 1818 | Opening in Praia of the first US Consulate in Sub-Saharan Africa. |
| From 1900 onwards | Cabo Verdeans emigrate to the USA on whaling ships. |
| 1975 | The USA recognises Cabo Verde's independence. |
| 1977 | Opening of the first Cabo Verdean consulate in Boston. |
| 1983 | Official opening of the US Embassy in Cabo Verde. |
| 2004 | Cabo Verde benefits from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Programme. |
| 2005 | Cabo Verde signs the first MCA Compact which ran until 2010. |
| 2007 | Cabo Verde benefits from the *African Growth and Opportunity Act* (AGOA). |
| 2008 | Cabo Verde cooperates with the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). |
| 2009 | Hillary Clinton, 67th Secretary of State of the United States visits Cabo Verde. |
| 2010 | Installation of the Maritime Security Operations Centre (COSMAR) in Cabo Verde with USA funding. |
| | Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes, AFRICOM Deputy Commander visits Cabo Verde |
| 2012 | The archipelago signs the II Compact of the MCA which was in force until 2017. |
| 2015 | Group of US Senators visit Cabo Verde. |
| 2016 | Cabo Verde hosts the US military exercise *Epic Guardian*. |
| 2017 | Cabo Verde signs Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) with the USA. |
| 2018 | The President of the Republic of Cabo Verde ratifies the SOFA. |
| | Ambassador Alexander Laskaris, Deputy Commander of AFRICOM visits Cabo Verde. |
| | Cabo Verde interested in hosting the headquarters of the North American Military Command for Africa. |
| | Cabo Verde hosts the Africa Endeavor Symposium organised by AFRICOM. |
| | Beginning of the bicentennial celebrations of the friendly relations between Cabo Verde and the USA. |
| 2019 | Admiral James G. Foggo III, Commander of the Joint Allied Force Command Naples, United States Naval Force in Europe and Africa, visits Cabo Verde. |
| | Government authorises BCV to issue coin commemorating 200 years of USA-Cabo Verde friendship. |
| | The University of Cabo Verde, in partnership with the Embassy of the United States of America in Cabo Verde promotes events in honour of the 200th anniversary of the relations between Cabo Verde and the USA. |
| 2020 | The United States provides more than US$1.5 million to assist Cabo Verde in response capacity to COVID-19. |
| | Mike Pompeo, 70th Secretary of State of the United States, on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of Cabo Verde's independence, praises the relationship between the USA and Cabo Verde of more than 200 years and says that the USA intends to support Cabo Verde in "development efforts" and maritime security. |

| | |
|---|---|
| 2021 | USA provides US$1 million to Cabo Verde to strengthen criminal justice and combat organised crime.<br>On March 30, the governments of Cabo Verde and the USA held their Third Bilateral Partnership Dialogue, which was attended by government representatives from both countries and hosted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Communities and Defence of Cabo Verde, Rui Figueiredo Soares and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State of the United States of America, Robert F. Godec.<br>On April 23, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Communities and of Defence of Cabo Verde, Rui Figueiredo Soares, received the AFRICOM/US Department of Defence team that supported the Cabo Verdean government in the delivery of the first shipment of vaccines against Covid-19 to the islands of Fogo, São Vicente, São Nicolau, Sal, Boa Vista and Maio.<br>On 4 July, the first stone was laid for the construction of the new US Embassy on 4.5 hectares of land adjacent to the Government Palace in Praia and representing an investment of over US$400 million by the US Government in the bilateral relationship. |

Source: elaborated by the author based on Tolentino (2019), U.S. Department of State (2019), U.S. Embassy in Cabo Verde and analysis of data collected on the Inforpress website since 2018.

## Millennium Challenge Account and the impact on development in Cabo Verde

Cabo Verde's development has been thanks to the good management of Official Development Aid (ODA) and other international support. These efforts are recognised by countries and international organizations, especially with regard to compliance with the principles of democracy, good governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law. Based on these factors, Cabo Verde was awarded two compacts under the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Programme that have stood out as one of the main instruments of cooperation between the archipelago and the USA.

The MCA is an ambitious US Government Programme administered by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) through a foreign assistance agency created in 2004 by the US Congress. This programme essentially aims to reward countries that demonstrate a commitment to good governance, economic freedom and investment in their citizens (Mawdsley, 2007). For the USA, economic and social policies and democratic governance guarantee economic growth for the most vulnerable populations. This programme encourages countries to invest in infrastructure (roads and ports), energy, agriculture, land titling and property rights, water and sanitation, health and education (Resende-Santos, 2020: 109) and in promoting an economic and trade liberalisation agenda (Soederberg, 2004; Brainard, Graham & Purvis, 2003).

Cabo Verde applied for the MCA in 2004. From a list of 75 developing countries, it was ranked first place among the group of African countries and second place in the global ranking. Subsequently, the archipelago signed the 1st Compact on 4 July 2005, which was in force for a period of five years. The programme was financed to a total amount of approximately US$110 million.

The main objective of the 1st Compact was to improve infrastructure. Among the various financings, the expansion and modernisation of the Port of Praia and the construction and improvement of roads and bridges stand out. Furthermore, investment was made in the agricultural sector, namely in the field of capturing and using water and in agricultural production on the islands of Santo Antão, São Nicolau and Fogo, as well as in the public and private sector, thus promoting reform of the financial intermediation system and increasing competition in access to treasury bonds.

These investments aimed at supporting Cabo Verde in economic transformation, making it less dependent on remittances and international aid (Cardoso, 2014). Investment in the agricultural sector allowed for improved management of water resources and soil conservation and agro-industrial development, as well as access to credit.

**Table 2: Main projects developed under the 1st MCA Compact**

| Projects developed | Results |
|---|---|
| Watershed management and support for agricultural production | Twenty-eight water reservoirs; twenty-six catchment dikes; twenty-seven torrential correction dikes; forty-three small dams; three boreholes; twenty-seven water distribution systems; three rural extension centres; one post-harvest centre; five hundred and forty-nine farmers benefiting from drip irrigation systems and the installation of fifty-seven demonstration fields. |
| Construction and rehabilitation of road and port infrastructure | 39.3 km of roads rehabilitated; four road bridges built; expansion and modernisation of the Port of Praia. |
| Credit for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises | Creation of a private credit information centre. |
| Support to the e-governance system | Commitment to e-Government; improvement in the transfer, financial management and accountability of public administration; creation of a budget classifier and approval of a public market code. |

Source: elaborated by the author, based on Cardoso (2014).

The 2nd Compact was signed on 10 February 2012 and was in force from 30 November 2012 to 30 November 2017. Its main objective was promoting economic growth and poverty reduction in Cabo Verde. The Compact focused on reforming two strategic sectors, namely the water, sanitation and hygiene sector and the property management or land registry sector. This package was funded to the value of US$66.2 million for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), Property Management for Investment Promotion (LAND) and also a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (M&E).

The WASH project was conceived with the objective of supporting the restructuring of the Water and Sanitation Sector and sought to re-establish, through a thorough reform, a financially sound institutional base that would provide services to Cabo Verdean households and businesses. Under this project the following institutions, programmes and plans were created: the National Agency for Water and Sanitation (ANAS), the National Water and Sanitation Council (CNAS), the Social Integration and Gender Plan for the Water and Sanitation Sector in Cabo Verde, the Intermunicipal Company Águas de Santiago (AdS), the Water and Sanitation Fund (FASA) which integrates the Social Access Fund (FAS). The later provided the most vulnerable populations in urban and rural communities with access to water and sanitation services in the fight against poverty. LAND is a project to reduce the time and costs associated with property registration, thus providing greater legal certainty to real estate transactions, as well as promoting land investment and productivity. Within the scope of this project, the institutional, procedural and legal bases were created to guarantee greater legal security in access, management and property transactions (MCA Balance Magazine, 2017).

**Table 3: Main Projects Developed under the II MCA Compact**

| Projects developed | Results |
|---|---|
| Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) | Restructuring of the water and sanitation sector; creation of the National Water and Sanitation Agency (ANAS), the National Water and Sanitation Council (CNAS), the Social Integration and Gender Plan, the Intermunicipal Company Águas de Santiago (AdS) and the Water and Sanitation Fund (FASA) which integrates the Social Access Fund (FAS). |
| Investment Promotion Property (LAND) | Installation of the Land Information System; creation of the National Institute for Land Management (INGT); approval of the Special Legal Regime for the Execution of the Land Cadastre; publication of the Regulations for the Legal Regime of the Land Cadastre; Officialization of the Operations Manual. |
| Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (M&E) | Discussion and definition of relevant issues in order to assess the sectoral impacts of the Water and Sanitation and Property Management for Investment projects |

Source: prepared by the author based on data available in MCA Balance Sheet Magazine (2017). II Compact of the Millennium Challenge Account Cabo Verde.

Cabo Verde was the first country to be selected by the MCC Board of Directors, for the 2nd Compact and also the first to apply for a 3rd Compact, but without success, as it was not selected. These Compacts have enabled development in several areas: infrastructure, agriculture, sanitation, hygiene, water resource mobilisation and property management. Furthermore, they have contributed to the transformation of the country, especially in its modernisation and in its social and economic progress (Tolentino, 2019).

## AGOA: opportunities and benefits for Cabo Verde

To improve sub-Saharan countries' development, in May 2000 the US Congress enacted the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). This was a trade agreement that encourages sub-Saharan African countries to export products to USA markets. AGOA, as an integral part of the U.S. Foreign Trade and Development Act, allows more than 6,000 varieties of products and facilitates these countries' access to credit. It also provides technical assistance and training (Páez; Karingi; Kimenyi, 2010).

AGOA allows more than forty-five sub-Saharan African countries to export to the USA market duty-free and quota-free. Since coming into force, this agreement has served as an important pillar in the relationship between the USA and Africa, providing economic opportunities, facilitating regional integration and the business environment (Shapouria; Trueblood, 2003). Indeed, the creation of a favourable environment for private sector investment has been a priority, making African companies more competitive. With the implementation of this programme, exports increased by more than 300%, thus enabling the creation of about three hundred and fifty thousand direct jobs and hundreds of thousands of indirect jobs (Montezinho, 2015).

Under the law, USA exports to sub-Saharan Africa have tripled. The USA has an interest in enhancing its influence and strengthening relations with African partners. Sub-Saharan African countries undergo an annual review of their statutes. Several criteria are also evaluated, including good governance, market economy, elimination of trade barriers and promotion of US investments, development of anti-corruption mechanisms and protection of labour-related laws. The countries eligible to participate are determined based on these parameters.

In addition to this annual assessment, to enter the US market, products must meet certain requirements regarding their origin. In particular, they must originate from one or more AGOA beneficiary countries, be imported directly from a beneficiary country into the USA and be 100% grown, produced or manufactured in one or more beneficiary countries.

In 2007, Cabo Verde graduated as a middle-income country and has benefited from this programme by being able to access a range of financing alternatives. Despite the recognition that the AGOA programme represents an important step towards the aspirations of an island and archipelagic country, there has been much discussion about its use. The reports point out that exports of Cabo Verdean products to the US market have fallen far short of expectations. Indeed, within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), only Gambia and Guinea-Bissau performed less well than Cabo Verde (Montezinho, 2015).

Economists, policymakers and business associations sought to understand the reasons for the poor results and recommended strategies for improving exports under the programme. The President of the Sotavento Chamber of Commerce, Jorge Spencer Lima, said that the main barriers for Cabo Verdean companies include difficulties in terms of costs and bureaucracy, as well as language barriers. In Spencer Lima's opinion, everything happens in English, which in many cases, Cabo Verdean business people do not understand or master. João Alvarenga, economist, believes that the main problem is related to the Cabo Verdean workforce because it is not minimally prepared for the quality criteria required by the program, adding that the country, historically, has a trade deficit. This is because it imports more than it exports. AGOA would be an opportunity to reverse this scenario, at least with the USA (Montezinho, 28 June 2015).

The former Minister of Tourism, Investment and Business Development, Leonesa Fortes, believes that Cabo Verde has a small number of companies producing for export. She also argues that it is necessary to further strengthen the industrial fabric in order to take advantage of AGOA. The first step to reverse this scenario was to create institutions specialised in these areas, namely the Institute for Quality Management (IGQ), created by Resolution no. 41/2010 of 2 August. In addition, the state should continue to work on developing industrial and trade policies so that Cabo Verdean companies can organise themselves and acquire greater production capacity (Expresso das Ilhas, 12 September 2015).

According to current Minister for Industry, Commerce and Energy, Alexandre Monteiro, eighteen years after the promulgation of AGOA, Cabo Verde has not known how to take advantage of this window of opportunity. The archipelago is still making initial steps towards creating an environment to produce and export more competitive goods and services. Ana Lima Barber, president of Cabo Verde Trade Invest between 2016 and

2020, said the country has products that could be exported under AGOA, but they still need to be qualified in order to unblock obstacles at the logistics level (Santiago Magazine, 21 February 2018). Donald Heflin, US Ambassador to Cabo Verde between 2015 and 2018, also draws attention to the following: Cabo Verde should take more advantage and thus explore the USA market, as it could export 7% of its goods but unfortunately has done nothing in this direction, as the country is very dependent on the European economy (Inforpress, 2018). The US Ambassador to Cabo Verde since September 2019, John Jefferson Daigle, said that USA companies and entrepreneurs do not know much about investment opportunities in Cabo Verde. He believes it is possible to put Cabo Verde on the US investment map and stresses the importance of initiatives such as the Cabo Verde Investment Forum (CVIF) held in Boston between 30 September and 1 October 2019. This type of meeting is an opportunity to attract high-level business interests and a chance to establish business partnerships.

The ambassador points to the interest of the Cabo Verdean government in carrying out the project to implement the Amilcar Cabral Submarine Cable linking Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Guinea-Conakry and Sierra Leone with the possibility of also linking Gambia and Senegal. This is an ambitious initiative under the project to create a connectivity hub in Cabo Verde for the development of broadband telecommunications in the countries of the region. The US Ambassador to Cabo Verde made it clear that he intends to bring together, the government of Cabo Verde, technicians, the US Embassy and the US Department of Commerce in order to address this possibility (Montezinho, 2020).

Taking into account the opportunities that AGOA offers, Cabo Verde has worked on empowering businesses by creating conditions to attract investment and improve the business environment. AGOA forums are promoted annually and should be used by the country to debate and find the best alternatives, especially with regard to reducing trade barriers.

AGOA Resource Centres (ARCs), established by the West Africa Trade Hub (WATH) in all AGOA beneficiary countries in the region, including Cabo Verde, have sought to advise businesses on maximising investment opportunities under the AGOA provisions. This has facilitated linkages between businesses in the sub-Saharan Africa region. CRA's and AGOA Information Centres are under the responsibility of Cabo Verde Trade Invest.

## Cabo Verde and the AFRICOM

After the September 11, 2001 attacks, US foreign policy assumed another dimension, regarding international security. As a way of safeguarding its interests, US military forces began intervening more regularly, mainly in regional spaces where there are threats (Bernardino, 2008), including the proliferation of illegal immigration networks, drug trafficking and terrorism.

Due to the growing geopolitical and geoeconomics importance of the African continent, the US government established a specific Command for Africa, called AFRICOM, based in Stuttgart, Germany, within the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP). AFRICOM, like other Commands, namely EUCOM, CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM, PACOM, work to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and maritime piracy (Strategic Culture Foundation, 30 August 2018). In addition, the Command is responsible for operations, exercises, training of military personnel and security cooperation with African countries. The creation of AFRICOM in 2008 is considered by Munson (2010) as one of the most important moments in the relationship between the USA and the African continent.

The U.S. Military Command for Africa installed more than fifty networks and small military readiness bases or stations for the purpose of executing advanced security and contingency operations. It has a permanent support base in the Republic of Djibouti and has under its jurisdiction all African nations with the exception of Egypt which is under the jurisdiction of CENTCOM. The Command contributes to the improvement of sustainable development and security levels on the continent (Strategic Culture Foundation, 30 August 2018). AFRICOM seeks, in collaboration with other US government agencies and international partners, to carry out military security actions through specific programs aimed at promoting a stable and secure environment in Africa. The Command creates the conditions and contributes to African ownership to ensure that African countries create the conditions for the resolution of their own security problems (Breschinski, 2007: 50). Cabo Verde, for having a vast maritime area is, in the view of the former AFRICOM Deputy Commander Alexander M. Laskaris, a quality partner in the materialisation of the Command's objectives (Lusa, 04 May 2018). The archipelago, as well as other West African countries, has the potential to produce far-reaching benefits in terms of patrolling and surveillance of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in addition to developing professional and practical training programmes in security. The focus has been on promoting technical and material conditions for the Coast Guard.

It was within the framework of AFRICOM in June 2010 that the US government funded the installation of the Maritime Security Operations Centre (COSMAR) based in Praia, Santiago Island. The Coast Guard and the Naval Squadron are based in Mindelo, São Vicente Island.

Since then COSMAR worked on the planning of joint operations within the framework of maritime surveillance agreements with other countries with the aim of combating phenomena, not only concerning drug trafficking, but also human trafficking, terrorism, piracy and other similar acts. The surveillance and enforcement work is carried out in coordination with various national entities with responsibilities in this area (Madeira, 2019b: 164).

Cabo Verde accepted AFRICOM assistance (Garcia, 2017: 104) by investing in the planning of joint operations with special emphasis on maritime surveillance and prevention of illicit trafficking (e-Global, 2018). Investment in security is part of the country's ability to attract foreign investment through a marketing strategy of good governance (Baker, 2009) in favour of well-being, democracy, human rights and transparency. This point reinforces the idea that, since independence, elements of Cabo Verde's foreign policy have accompanied successive governments, namely [1] the privileged geostrategic position in the Middle Atlantic; [2] political stability and good governance; [3] the perspective of territorial security and non-alignment in ideological blocs, however, maintaining political-diplomatic relations with various states; [4] a culture of social peace reflected in internal and external policy; [5] a commitment to diplomacy of modesty and proximity based on the principles of peace with the aim of resolving or circumventing socio-economic constraints (Madeira, 2016b).

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The archipelago has also participated in joint military exercises that demonstrate the country's commitment and interest in straitening the relationship with the United States. Examples are the exercises Saharan Express, Flintlock and Obangame Express held in the West African region. In 2016, the US Military exercise Epic Guardian took place on the island of Sal, Cabo Verde. It was the first time that Cabo Verde hosted an exercise of this magnitude, whose objective was to strengthen cooperation between the two-armed forces in the fight against transnational threats.

Sal Island was also a host between July 30 to August 3, 2018, as part of the 13th Africa Endeavor Symposium which was attended by over thirty African countries. The event enhanced communication between African nations and Command capabilities, seeking to encourage African Union (AU) forces and the African Force on Standby (ASF) for the purpose of engaging in humanitarian assistance missions, natural disasters, conflict resolution and peacekeeping. The event provided delegations from the attending countries, international, regional and sub-regional institutions an opportunity to address the main cyber challenges on the African continent and thereby find viable solutions to ensure access to information technology (Government of Cabo Verde, 30 July 2018).

The USA interest has been to deepen its relationship with Cabo Verde, as the archipelago is strategically located in the Atlantic Ocean and can serve as an important regional security partner. The USA encourages Cabo Verde to combat threats and to continue investing in democratic institutions in order to promote socio-economic development.

## SOFA: strategic agreement between Cabo Verde and USA

With the aim of ending security threats and encouraging international peace, the USA has negotiated strategic agreements with countries to provide a legal basis for strengthening the defence and security of the signatory states and which allow the US

Armed Forces to operate in their territories for a certain period, as well as to use their military facilities for refuelling, transit, surveillance, among other functions. Several cooperation agreements were also signed, including the Foreign Forward Operating Sites (FOSs) and the Cooperative Security Location (CSLs), supported by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA).

The SOFA falls under the Bilateral Immunity Agreements ('BIAs') based on Article 98 (2) provisions in the Rome Statute of 1998 not to surrender US citizens to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which are in accordance with the American Service-Members' Protection Act (ASPA) approved by Congress in 2001. The ASPA provides for cuts in military assistance to ICC member states that do not sign bilateral agreements not to surrender US Citizens to the ICC with the US Government. In practice, this means that all recipients of US Assistance who are signatories to the Rome Statute are required to sign a document conferring immunity on US citizens present on their territory, preventing them from being prosecuted by the ICC. In this context, it is important to note that since the early 2000s, agreements of this kind have been signed in more than 100 countries (Resende-Santos, 2020).

The good relationship between Cabo Verde and the USA was reflected in the September 2017 signing of the SOFA that opened up space for strengthening military cooperation between the two. It created legal conditions to allow the presence of US forces in the archipelago. The agreement, which was under negotiation since 2008, defined the terms of military cooperation between Cabo Verde and the USA, with special emphasis on the status of US soldiers in Cabo Verdean territory. Washington and Praia have made it clear that, after signing the agreement, they will work together in the area of security and stability, especially with regard to maritime safety (Tolentino, 2019).

Notwithstanding the debate around the advantages and disadvantages of the SOFA for Cabo Verde, which was ratified in 2018 by the President of the Republic of Cabo Verde, Jorge Carlos Fonseca, it could serve as an important instrument for closer cooperation with the USA, considering that security should be seen as an important pillar of development for any state. With the signing of the SOFA, the Cabo Verde government recognised the need to strengthen a legal structure for managing and monitoring cooperation, which could become an important instrument for supporting the country's security and development.

The proliferation of transnational threats puts African states on alert, including Cabo Verde. Due to its strategic location in the Atlantic, Cabo Verde has been a prime target of transnational criminal organisations (TCOs). As such, the country has the mission and obligation to ensure national defence and security, which will only be possible if the archipelago continues to invest in improving its relationship with international partners (Madeira; Monteiro, 2017).

This paper does not explore the advantages and disadvantages of the SOFA, nor the constitutionality or otherwise of the clauses contained in this diploma, but rather to understand its scope, insofar as Cabo Verde is still unable to guarantee the security and defence of its territory on its own. It is based on the following assumption: defence and security have come to assume a transnational character and require from states, regardless of their size, forms of cooperation in the military, economic and technological fields through the establishment of partnerships considered relevant.

Investing in defines and security policies is a very significant aspect of development. Indeed, development is only possible if the country becomes aware of the importance of establishing strategic agreements. These instruments make it possible to create conditions at the level of security, essentially in the maritime space, thus improving the capacity of the Coast Guard, the patrolling of territorial waters and humanitarian missions. Cabo Verde has been made efforts in improving political and diplomatic relations with the United States, while demonstrating a commitment to the countries of the southern hemisphere. Cabo Verde, a small state, and the USA, a superpower, have established a magnificent, long-standing, stable and trusting relationship (Tolentino, 2019).

In this context, it is important to note the Strategic Concept of Defence and National Security (CEDSN) establishes the fundamental aspects of the global strategy adopted by the Cabo Verde State in achieving the objectives of the security and defence policy. The CEDSN outlines the sectoral guidelines on security and defence, to instruct for greater effectiveness and efficiency in their application, to articulate and harmonise sectoral policies of activities with an interest in security and defence, to optimise the result and repercussions of the application of the values and objectives of security and defence in foreign policy and domestic policy, and in the provision of security for citizens and public and private property. In this context, the CEDSN states that the Cabo Verdean strategic triangle is only completed with the American side, where countries such as Brazil, to the south, and the USA, to the north, are located. The USA is, in fact, a development partner for Cabo Verde with which the country should further develop relations in the area of security and defence (CEDSN, 2011: 9).

## Conclusions

It is widely recognised the importance that Cabo Verde attributes to its foreign policy. Indeed, the country places foreign policy at the centre of importance because it is a strategic concern and contributes to development and national security.

Since independence in 1975, the archipelago has demonstrated a commitment to the promotion of peace. The commitment has resulted in improved living conditions for Cabo Verdeans, overcoming some limitations of a small and insular state dependent on external aid. The country's path is the result of a unique effort and allowed for the creation of an image of a stable state that, despite scarce resources, managed Official Development Assistance, relying on third state support or international organisations. This path provoked special interest from foreign partners such as the USA, which has supported the country in terms of security, aid policy, the fight against poverty and the promotion of democracy and human rights.

Cabo Verde’s integration in the international context is not only a strategy but, above all, is unavoidable in maximi

ing its influence. The challenges for Cabo Verde in the current international context are taking actions that allow for a secure international integration in a way that it can continue to establishing partnerships and agreements with countries in the sub-region (Madeira, 2015), as well as improve existing partnerships, such as with the USA.

The historical ties between Cabo Verde and the USA have been developing for over two centuries. Nonetheless, there is a need to strengthen what already exists, whether through the diaspora or initiatives by entrepreneurs, organisations, institutions, media and governments[3]. In recent years, there has been a growing awareness for Cabo Verdeans to participate in study programs at US institutions of higher learning or exchange programs. Notable examples include the Entrepreneurship Programme for African Women (Project 54/WIA 54 Award) and Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI). These programs facilitate the establishment of future contacts for business and partnerships. In the words of Marissa Scott-Torres, Chargé d'Affaires of the American Embassy in Cabo Verde until 2019, at the Commemorative Gala of the Bicentennial Gala honouring 200 years of historical ties between the United States and Cabo Verde held in Praia on 16 December 2018: "there is a very profound and steady relationship between our two countries—that is not best expressed in words, but in deeds (…) We honour and recognize that relationship. We pay tribute to our past and the future of our relationship"[4].

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[3] The relationship at the bilateral level between Cabo Verde and the USA is reinforced on several occasions, official meetings and gatherings. See, for example, the reference expressed in the Government Program and Confidence Motion (2021-2026) - VIII Constitutional Government (2021: 13): At the bilateral level, Cabo Verde (...) "nation with secular relations with the United States of America, where the largest Cabo Verdean community of the diaspora resides, with emphasis on mobilisation of skills and influence of the diaspora in favor of Cabo Verde, in attracting investment, tourism, knowledge and technology and in strategic defence and security agreement".

[4] In this regard, see: U.S. Embassy in Cabo Verde (2018, December 16). Bicentennial Gala - Chargée Scott remarks. Available at https://cv.usembassy.gov/bicentennial-gala-chargee-scott-remarks/.

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# CABO VERDE AND SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE: A NEW BRAZILIAN DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE IN THE GULF OF GUINEA?

**ALEXANDRE ROCHA VIOLANTE**
alexandreviolante@id.uff.br
Navy Captain. Executive Coordinator of the Center for Strategic Studies and Marine Spatial Planning (CEDEPEM, Brazil). Collaborating Professor of International Relations at the Institute for Strategic Studies (INEST) from the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). International Relations Instructor at the Naval War College (EGN). PhD candidate (2019-) and Master in Strategic Defense and Security Studies at UFF. Master in Naval Sciences and Specialist in Business Management by EGN/Instituto COPPEAD/Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), in 2013. Specialist in International Relations from PUC-RJ, in 2012. Specialist in International Law from Cândido Mendes University - RJ (2011). Studies policies related to the sea, more specifically those related to the Atlantic.

**Abstract**

Brazil, Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe are States that, with the deposit of the 60th State to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, on November 16, 1994, obtained greater jurisdictions over "their oceans". These increases, merely in their Exclusive Economic Zones, reached about 182% for Cabo Verde and 160% for São Tomé and Príncipe, in relation to their land jurisdictions. Their locations, in areas of high geopolitical relevance, at the confluence of Atlantic maritime communication lines and near the Gulf of Guinea, end up posing "new" and traditional threats. Thus, through aspects dear to strategic studies, in the search for greater induction of security in the region, this paper sought to analyze the bilateral and multilateral relations of Brazil and other relevant actors with these states in the area of defense. It was perceived that more assertive actions by Brazil, in the last two decades, have provided the creation of a defense architecture, composed of Embassies, Technical Support Groups and Naval Mission Centers. Finally, it was found that Brazil has become an actor of relative relevance in maritime security in the region, in face of the presence of other relevant states in the region, such as China, USA, India, Spain and Portugal, among others.

**Keywords**

Brazil, Cabo Verde, Cooperation, São Tomé and Príncipe, Security and Defense.

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# CABO VERDE AND SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE: A NEW BRAZILIAN DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE IN THE GULF OF GUINEA?[1, 2]

**ALEXANDRE ROCHA VIOLANTE**

## Introduction

The Gulf of Guinea is located on the West African coast, bounded by the Equator and the Greenwich meridian. Therefore, it is not only limited to Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, but also includes 15 other states: Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Republic of Congo[3].

There are several countries with projections of hegemony in the region, such as Angola and Nigeria. At another level, one can also point to a new zone of contention for influence that involves the United States, China, and the EU in the incessant search for natural resources, and, on the other hand, Brazil seeking greater political leadership in its strategic surroundings (Nascimento, 2011).

The research is justified by the increasing importance of the South Atlantic, especially the Gulf of Guinea, in the geostrategy of the main actors of the international system, here represented by Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. These are located at the confluence of Atlantic Maritime Lines of Communication and in jurisdictional areas privileged by living and non-living resources, being quite susceptible to transnational illicit activities, such as piracy, terrorism, human and drug trafficking, commonly called "new threats", without forgetting the traditional threats (state ones).

These states belong to the Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOP), presenting similar characteristics derived from their histories, such as colonization, independence and post-independence, and are distinguished by their political choices and levels of development.

Their maritime sovereignty increased with the entry into force of UNCLOS in 1994. Table 1 below presents the maritime territories of these countries in comparison to their land portions.

[1] Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.

[2] This paper is an extension of the research conducted by the author in the Master's Program in Strategic Defense and Security Studies (PPGEST) at the Institute for Strategic Studies (INEST) at the Fluminense Federal University (UFF), and that is currently being continued in the doctoral program at the same institution.

[3] It is worth noting that it included states that, although not directly bordering the Gulf waters, are in its strategic surroundings, either for political cooperation in various areas, or for other regional interests.

**Table 1: EEZ, Territories, Sea/Land Factor**

| Country | EEZ (km²) | EEZ Territory (km²) | Sea/Land factor |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brazil | 3.500.000 | 8.500.000 | 0,43 |
| Cabo Verde | 734.265 | 4.033 | 182,06 |
| São Tomé and Principe | 160.000 | 1.001 | 159,84 |

Source: Updated by the author. CNUDM

Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe now have extensive EEZs, where there are good prospects of having large reserves of hydrocarbons and other minerals, as well as living resources. Observing the more specific geography of the Gulf of Guinea, one can perceive a strategic area for international maritime commerce, since there is no bottleneck in the region that could lead to large concentrations of ships or possible blockages in areas of high transit of vessels, such as the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal.

Since the 2010s, there has been an increase in piracy activities in Africa. If until recently the actions were restricted to its eastern coast, especially in the maritime vicinity of Somalia, they are now advancing in the west, even threatening the jurisdictional waters of Cabo Verde, further north, in the so-called "Atlantic Basin”. These "new threats" generate interest and attention from extra-regional actors and also from Brazil. Many transnational illicit activities are already present in the vicinity and in the blue Amazon[4], such as illegal fishing, drug and weapons trafficking, smuggling and embezzlement.

As a problematization of the research, new threats and traditional (state) threats - such as, for example, the interests of extra-regional powers that may diverge from the needs and political objectives of the states of the region - can relativize their maritime sovereignty through securitization[5] of these marine spaces for the sake of international security. Thus, it is understood that the security and defense of these jurisdictional waters is becoming more and more of a priority, which requires strengthening not only the soft power, but mainly the military hard power of the Gulf of Guinea states, in surveillance and maritime patrol actions.

Therefore, this work, aiming to solve the problem presented in the previous paragraphs, regarding maritime security in the geostrategy of the Gulf of Guinea, had as its main objective to analyze Brazil's bilateral and multilateral relations in the area of defense, besides other relevant actors.

Through qualitative analysis, based on the historical and descriptive method, and the use of the Case Study methodology (which involved Brazil and these two African states), the creation of a Brazilian defense architecture in these states was perceived, aiming to increase the induction of security in the geostrategy of the Gulf of Guinea. This architecture could become a model to be expanded (if requested) as a cooperative policy to increase military hard power to the Gulf of Guinea states - if requested by them.

4 The Blue Amazon is represented by the marine areas under national sovereignty or jurisdiction, its interior waters, its 12MN Territorial Sea (TS), its 12MN Contiguous Zone (CZ), its 188MN Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and its 200MN Continental Shelf (CS), which can extend for another 150MN, corresponding, currently, to approximately 5.7 million km².

5 It can be said that the process from "non-politicized to politicized" until it becomes a threat to national, regional and international security requires public actions that are characterized as securitization (Violante, 2017).

## 1. Defense cooperation with Cabo Verde: Brazil and other relevant actors

Cabo Verde has many similarities with Brazil. Some of them are cited in the poem "You: Brazil" by the Cabo Verdean poet Jorge Vera-Cruz Barbosa[6].

*I like you, Brazil,*
*because you are like my land.*
*I well know that you are a whole world*
*and that my land is*
*ten islands lost in the Atlantic*
*without any importance on the map.*
*I have heard about your cities:*
*The wonder of Rio de Janeiro,*
*dynamic São Paulo, Pernambuco, Bahia de Todos-os-Santos.*
*Whereas the ones here*
*are but three small towns.*
*I know all this perfectly well*
*but you are similar to my land.*

### Brief Background

Cabo Verde has a land area of 4,033 km², a maritime coastline perimeter of 965 km and an EEZ of 734,265 km². Most of the population, about 530,000 inhabitants, is located on the islands of Santiago and São Vicente (the country's main islands). The main city in Santiago is Praia, the capital, seat of the government and of foreign diplomatic representations, with approximately 135,000 inhabitants; on the island of São Vicente is Mindelo, the second largest city with about 75,000 inhabitants.

Portuguese explorers discovered and colonized these 10 islands in the 15th century, which were then uninhabited. In 1475, the archipelago was seen as the first European settlement in the tropics. Starting in the 16th century, precisely in 1507, the islands began to serve as a warehouse for slaves brought from other African countries, which generated a multicultural nation, influencing its settlement (Foy, 1998).

Over time, Santiago Island became the political, administrative and economic center of the colony. The slave trade ended up structuring Cabo Verde socially and economically, which determined the economic hegemony of a white elite that ended up spreading, despite the perversity of slavery, new knowledge, technologies and cultures (Davidson, 1988 *apud* Madeira, 2014).

As a result of the miscegenation between the European and the African, the mestizo assumed an important role in the dissemination and affirmation of Cabo Verdean cultural identity, especially with the systematic abandonment of European settlers in the 19th century. The mestizos changed the existing structure of racial inequality (Seibert, 2014). This social ascension affirmed the cultural identity of the "sons of the land," especially

[6] Poem You Brazil. Available at: <http://www.antoniomiranda.com.br/poesia_africana/cabo_verde/jorge_barbosa. html>. Accessed on: May 26, 2020.

after the abolition of slavery in 1876. In this way, society became divided more by economic aspects than by social ones.

The new Portuguese colonization period, which occurred with the introduction of plantation culture in the mid-18th century, did not reach Cabo Verde. Constant drought, water scarcity and arid soil did not provide the necessary conditions for this new commercial exploitation. The continuous abandonment of the islands and the lack of investments generated social dissatisfaction and poor income distribution among the local elite. Thus, in the 20th century, trade unions and sector associations favorable to modernization, liberalization, and Portugal's relative political and administrative autonomy were formed (Violante, 2017).

From there, clandestine political movements occurred on the islands. Perhaps the main one was the integrated pro-independence movement in Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde, under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral, Aristides Pereira, and Luis Cabral. This resulted in the creation of the African Party for Independence (PAI) in 1956, later renamed the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC). This party had as its basic guideline the "reafricanization" of the two nations, in the face of the cultural assimilation movements they suffered (Rizzi, 2012).

After the independence of Portuguese Guinea, which occurred unilaterally on September 24, 1973, when it was renamed Guinea-Bissau, the Carnation Revolution, which overthrew the Salazar dictatorship on April 25, 1974, contributed to the acceleration of the independence processes in the other Portuguese colonies, which benefited Cabo Verde's negotiations abroad (Rizzi, 2012). Making an analogy with the independence of Brazil, in Cabo Verde relevant political movements were perceived that pressured the Portuguese political power to accept an independence in a negotiated way.

During the establishment of the nation state between 1975 and 1990, the one-party model prevailed. The PAIGC administered Cabo Verde until 1981, when a *coup d'état* took place in Guinea-Bissau, which led to the separation of the parties and the change of its name to African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde (PAICV). The PAICV governed the country until 1990, with a socialist orientation, but without direct alignment with the former USSR. In this period, its international insertion was based on pragmatism, but in more assertive relations, firstly with Europe (Portugal) and secondly with countries in Africa and other continents. The absence of natural resources did not provide much choice for Cabo Verdean society, which became dependent on the resources of its diaspora and international development cooperation. Thus, according to Seibert (2014), its intellectual elites analyzed the benefits and challenges that regional integrations would provide, not leading to a process of a "Creole independence"[7] based on an automatic "reafricanization".

With the end of the Cold War, a broad process of democratization, political and economic openness was discussed peacefully and institutionally by society. A new constitution was promulgated in 1992, with the adoption of a multi-party system and the change from a parliamentary system of government (which was effectively headed by the president of

[7] The consolidation of a Creole society, with its own culture and languages, originates from the interrelation of European culture and other African cultures, mainly due to the time lapse of colonisation by the metropolis (Seibert, 2014).

the republic) to a semi-presidential system, with a parliamentary bias. With this, foreign and domestic policy effectively became commanded by their Prime Ministers.

In concluding this brief background, it should be noted that Brazil has had strong ties with Cabo Verde for more than five centuries. The formation of the identity of the Brazilian people went through the arrival of the first slaves from Cabo Verde and the shipping companies, as well as a strong Cabo Verdean nationalist sentiment to join the Brazilian Empire on the occasion of the Brazilian independence in 1822 (Correia & Silva, 2015), and the rapid recognition of its independence in 1975 are good examples of this linkage (Violante, 2017).

The next section deals more specifically with the relations of Brazil and other relevant states with this strategically important country in the Gulf of Guinea.

## Relations with Cabo Verde

The great challenge of today's Cabo Verdean society is to generate wealth where there are almost no natural resources and no large domestic consumption market.

Cabo Verde takes advantage of globalization, present since the great navigations of the 15th and 16th centuries, and, in a more accentuated way, since the 20th century. Its proximity to Europe, continental Africa and the American continent places the archipelago in a relevant strategic position.

This proximity to Europe has generated constant debate and criticism about its model of international insertion. In economic and social terms, Cabo Verde has stood out in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the transition from Least Developed Country (LDC) to Middle Income Country (MIC) at the UN has not reflected sufficient progress to solidify a relevant structural change in its development. There is still a lack of more concrete investments, specifically in infrastructure and in improving the provision of services for the country to become a logistics hub between the three continents. Many of these Cabo Verdean demands have been met by countries like China, the United States of America (USA), Portugal, Spain, and Brazil, among others, through cooperation actions, as will be seen below.

Regarding piracy, drug trafficking, and terrorism, the concern of the Cabo Verdean state has been with maritime traffic at the confluence of the North Atlantic with the South Atlantic and also with the Gulf of Guinea. Data from the EU and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in the last two decades have shown the increase in the number of these illicit activities, which are no longer restricted to the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden.

On the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Armed Forces of Cabo Verde, in Praia, on 15/01/2012, and also on the occasion of the seminar "Security and Development: Connections and Challenges", in Praia, on 25/07/2012, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Jorge Tolentino, reiterated that:

> *[...] the government's option to reinforce the Coast Guard both in resources and equipment, so that it can fulfill its role as the State's authority on the Sea and can be a decisive piece in the development and success of the Sea cluster [...]. The strengthening of the Coast Guard, namely through the acquisition*

> *of naval and aerial means and the creation of legal conditions for its affirmation as a guarantor of the State's authority at sea, as well as the development of the necessary links between the relevant institutions for maritime safety are undoubtedly concrete and decisive steps* (Tolentino, 2016, pp. 103-116).

In a growing assertiveness, the participation of Cabo Verde could be verified as being more present in the sewing of partnerships, in the training of personnel and in the provision of means by means of its public policies.

On June 24-25, 2013, heads of states and commissions from ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) met in Yaoundé, Cameroon's capital, to discuss and agree on an important agenda in response to illegal maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea (Violante, 2017).

On that positive line in the area of security, Cabo Verde assumed the presidency of ZOPACAS in 2014. In July 2016, the National Assembly began debates on the ratification of the security and defense protocols of the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS, signed in 2010, in view of the favorable opinion of the Cabo Verdean Superior Council for National Defense (CSDN). In the words of then-President Jorge Carlos Fonseca, "This would imply a fuller membership of Cabo Verde in the African Union and ECOWAS, and would open the legal possibility for the country to participate in intervention, peacekeeping and other forces that are constituted under the decisions [...] of the two organizations[8]".

It is interesting to note that ECOWAS has focused in recent years on providing its own integrated maritime strategy to its member states, especially with regard to transnational illicit activities, as well as possible disputes over natural resources such as oil (ICG, 2012; Zucatto & Baptista, 2014).

These African international organizations, based on the understanding of the Yaoundé Summit, have sought, through cooperation among the states of the region and international partners, solutions against piracy, terrorism, smuggling, embezzlement, among other threats in these marine spaces.

Zucatto and Baptista (2014) also add that Cabo Verde has found as an alternative to combat piracy the hiring of private security companies. In 2012, the government granted a license to Cabo Verde Maritime Security Services (CVMSS) to hire, on an exclusive basis, private maritime security companies that could use the islands as bases for the embarkation and disembarkation of their armed security teams. According to the 2012 publication Shipping News and Views, the British company SeaMarshals Ltd. was the first to receive permission to use Cabo Verde as a base for security operations in the West African region. In an article by the authors in the journal "Cardo News" (2014), the country was confident in a new maritime strategy that should provide greater communication between regional and international Organizations for the training of qualified military personnel, especially in its Coast Guard.

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[8] Cabo Verde prepares accession to security and defense protocols. Available at: http://www.portugaldigital.com.br/lusofonia/ver/20104583-cabo-verde-prepara-adesao-aos-protocolos-de-seguranca-e-defesa-da-ua-e-da-cedeao. Accessed on: August 25, 2020.

On 02/12/2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Luís Filipe Tavares, expressed at the opening of the 2nd annual meeting of the G-7 plus Friends of the Gulf of Guinea group[9], in Praia, Cabo Verde's willingness to host one of the maritime coordination and surveillance centers in the Gulf of Guinea sub-region, "provided that ECOWAS and international partners commit to assist in its operationalization, making available the necessary technical and financial support and requested technical and financial support for its assembly[10]".

Aiming to reform its Naval Power, Cabo Verde has sought more robust defense agreements and projects both multilaterally and bilaterally, mainly with China, USA, Portugal, Spain and Brazil.

Chinese cooperation has mostly taken place in the area of infrastructure. Since 2003, China has increased its cooperation and economic relations with the entire West African coast, especially in the Gulf of Guinea. There has been cooperation in the areas of health, training and qualification of personnel with the offer of scholarships for undergraduate and post-graduate studies, donation of equipment, including military equipment, help in food security and emergency events, and economic cooperation in the areas of construction, trade, ship repair, and electronic governance[11]. This greater Chinese presence in Africa highlights its global geopolitical and economic interests, associated with the "One Belt, One Road" project [12]. According to the Brazilian ambassador to Cabo Verde (2007-2010), the presence of Chinese technical cooperation would not be a competitor for Brazilian cooperation. In this regard, trilateral cooperation could be carried out in the area of health (HIV-AIDS), transport and science and technology[13].

More specifically regarding defense, in December 2012, China and Cabo Verde signed an agreement to supply military equipment. This agreement was aimed at strengthening the Cabo Verdean Coast Guard, more precisely in the purchase of vessels to strengthen its surveillance and patrol capabilities in its jurisdictional waters. Over the past decade, military equipment has been delivered to the country to the tune of nearly €38.5 million, which included two Patrol Vessels, as well as two helicopters. In return, China has operated shipyards of the Cabo Verdean company CABNAVE, on the island of São Vicente. In 2016, a port complex, intended to support Chinese fishing vessels in the South Atlantic, was completed on the island of Santiago.[14] This project is well regarded in Cabo Verde, as it can be used as a commercial and logistical support warehouse, in a cluster

9 The G7 friendliest countries in the Gulf of Guinea are: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Interpol, European Union, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Kingdom, USA, Interpol, Canada, South Korea, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Interpol, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), as well as other countries in the region and African regional organizations such as ECOWAS, CEEAC, CGG and AU.

10 Cabo Verde may host the Maritime Coordination Center for the Gulf of Guinea. Available at: <http://www.expressodasilhas.sapo.cv/politica/item/51160-cabo-verde-pode-acolher-centro-de-coordenacao-maritima-do-golfo-da-guine>. Accessed on: 04 Dec.2020.

11 Brasemb Praia to Sere Telegram - 28/01/2006.

12 This refers to a power project that involves cooperation in all areas, especially infrastructure, aimed at integrating the Far East with Western Europe from Russia by land and from the Indian Ocean by sea. See more in: Violante, Marroni and Maia (2020) - "Reflections on hegemonic warfare today: China and the United States of America". Geosul Journal, v.35, n 77, p 531-552. Available at: < https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/geosul/article/view/73966>. Accessed on: 21Feb.2020.

13 Brasemb Praia to Sere Telegram – 04/06/2010.

14 Cabo Verde and China are highly fruitful. Available at: <http://inforpress.publ.cv/cooperacao/126456-as-relacoes-entre-cabo-verde-e-china-sao-altamente-proficuas-ministro-jorge-tolentino>. Accessed on: 28 Jun.2020.

of the sea, which can meet the demand from other countries, such as Europe and ECOWAS.

More precisely since 2014, the US has turned its attention more assertively to opportunities on the African continent. Investments to the tune of $33 million were pledged at a summit that encompassed 45 heads of state in Washington in late 2014. This was one of the actions implemented to try to contain China's advance, concomitantly with the strengthening of trade partnerships and infrastructure activities. In the words of President Obama during the event: "we want Africans to buy more American products and Americans to buy more American products" (Africa 21 Magazine, 2014, p. 25). Cabo Verde was represented at this summit.

The U.S. has signed important cooperation agreements with the government of Cabo Verde. On March 24, 2014, two cooperation agreements were signed to combat illicit transnational maritime activities in order to obtain reciprocal logistical support in the region. According to a note from the Cabo Verde Ministry of National Defense, the first agreement was framed within the framework of strengthening joint response capabilities to so-called "new threats". The second concerned equipment procurement and mutual support between the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Cabo Verde Ministry of Defense, regulating joint exercises, training, deployments, port calls and other cooperative efforts in logistical support, supply and service needs[15].

Portugal has been a major player in cooperation in several areas with Cabo Verde. Investments average around €10 million per year. In the last two decades, Portugal has been Cabo Verde's largest net donor, also standing out in the areas of education, vocational training and health. In 2014, 11 cooperation instruments in various areas were signed, including memoranda of understanding in the areas of higher and basic education and protocols in the fields of education, health, linguistics and economics[16].

Portugal has increased its defense cooperation, especially in the training of military personnel, in exercises on Cabo Verdean territory and also at sea. The most relevant fact is the signing of a new defense cooperation agreement on 14/08/2013, which resulted in closer actions aimed at maritime security, as well as the integration of military personnel of the Armed Forces of Cabo Verde in Portuguese contingents in missions to support peace and humanitarian assistance (Diário Oficial de Cabo Verde - I Série n° 42, 2013, p. 1084).

Portugal and Cabo Verde signed an additional protocol to the treaty for the joint surveillance of maritime spaces under Cabo Verde's jurisdiction during the 3rd bilateral summit in December 2014. They also reinforced the closer training of military personnel of the Cabo Verde Coast Guard (GCCV), affirming that the sea is a strategic design of both countries[17].

[15] Cabo Verde and USA sign agreements. Available at: <http://brasilsoberanoelivre.blogspot.com.br/2014/03/cabo-verde-e-eua-assinam-acordos-de.html>. Accessed on: 28 Jun.2016.

[16] Portugal and Cabo Verde sign 11 cooperation agreements. Available at: <http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2014/12/18/portugal-e-cabo-verde-assinam-11-acordos-de-cooperacao>. Accessed on: 28.jun.2016.

[17] Portugal and Cabo Verde sign 11 cooperation agreements. Available at: <http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2014/12/18/portugal-e-cabo-verde-assinam-11-acordos-de-cooperacao>. Accessed on: 28.jun.2016.

As for Spain, the visit of the Spanish Minister of Defense, Pedro Morenés Eulate, in March 2013, served to renew the main commitments of defense cooperation, with special emphasis on the following initiatives: fulfillment of the joint maritime patrol plan and the training of Cabo Verdean military within the scope of the formation of a future specialized unit in the fight against terrorism and the protection of strategic infrastructures. The Spanish MD also framed the ongoing bilateral cooperation within the framework of the initiatives undertaken by EU and NATO countries aimed at promoting security in the Sahel region. In this line, the training of African armed forces assures itself as one of the main objectives of the Western defense organization in the near future (Violante, 2017).

Brazil's bilateral relations with Cabo Verde, which began positively in the late 1970s/1980s, have been on the rise, despite a brief retreat from more assertive interactions with Africa during the Collor administration (1990-92) and greater prioritization of the so-called "Great PALOP countries" during much of the Cardoso administration (1995-2002) (Violante, 2017).

At the end of the Cardoso government (1995-2002), a greater interaction of Brazil with the horizontal axis of international relations was perceived, which reached Cabo Verde in cooperation in all technical areas, in addition to educational and humanitarian cooperation. Over the last two decades (2001-2020), the foundations of a defense architecture were established and have been continued in the present time, regardless of government ideological biases, which portrays a relative continuity of actions and of a State policy.

Brazil's technical cooperation in the area of defense is based, besides ethical and interdependence commitments, on its political objectives, namely: the safeguarding of national interests - threatened by maritime insecurity in its strategic surroundings -, regional stability, peace and security in the South Atlantic, and greater international insertion in multilateral forums.

Regarding the increased interest in the Gulf of Guinea, we highlight the understanding reached during the XIV Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), in July 2009, which aimed to strengthen multilateral cooperative ties between Brazil and the PALOP. Another moment to be considered was the visit of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) to Praia on the occasion of the 1st Summit between Brazil and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), on 07/02/2010. This summit sought to bring Brazil closer to the countries of the West African coast, commercially and strategically. The scheduling of this special summit was a desire of Brazil that happened at the initiative of the Cabo Verdean diplomacy together with the other representatives[18]. At the end of the meeting, the Cabo Verdean press did not spare praise to Brazil for putting West Africa back on its priorities[19].

[18] Brasemb Praia to Sere Telegrams: 26/11/2009; 17/02/2010; and 30/04/2010 (Brasemb Praia to Sere means telegram sent from the Brazilian Embassy in Praia to the MRE and its respective Africa Division). This also applies to Brasemb São Tomé para Sere. These official documents are listed in footnotes to make the text clearer and with fewer interruptions, in view of their large appearances in the research.

[19] Brasemb Beach to Sere 21/07/2010.

In 2013, the defense cooperation agreement with Cabo Verde, signed in 1994[20], was finally ratified by the Brazilian National Congress. The then Minister of Defense, Celso Amorim, emphasized, by letter No. 11422/2012/MD, that technical-military cooperation with Cabo Verde was one of Brazil's priorities for strengthening the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) and the CPLP. Thus, the Commander of the Navy, by Ordinance No. 444 of 12/08/2013, created the Center of the Brazilian Naval Mission in Cabo Verde (NMNBCV), which has as main tasks:

I. carry out a survey of the real needs of the Cabo Verde Coast Guard, in order to elaborate a proposal for a Cooperation Agreement between the two countries;

II. manage the human, material and patrimonial resources under its responsibility;

III. advising the Brazilian Ambassador in Cabo Verde on issues under the responsibility of the Center (BRASIL, 2013, p. 1).

Although Cabo Verde faces no international dispute or other contention over its jurisdictional waters, its maritime vocation is inexorable. Its Coast Guard includes the Coast Guard Command, the Operations Center for Maritime Security (COSMAR[21]), the Naval Squadron and the Air Squadron, and has as one of its tasks: to maintain control and patrol and oversee the country's jurisdictional waters.

This Center was inaugurated in Praia, on November 19, 2013, and is composed of a chief, in the rank of Frigate Captain, and an assistant in the rank of Petty Officer. During the visit, Minister Amorim praised the importance of training personnel, highlighted the challenges of maritime security and noted that transnational crimes have spread in the vicinity of the Brazilian strategic environment, factors that generate the need for "permanent concertation within ZOPACAS", but also through bilateral agreements with friendly countries (Violante, 2017).

Giving continuity to affirmative actions in defense, the Naval, Army and Air Force Defense Office was created on 03/20/2014. The main task of the Agency is to intensify bilateral ties between Brazil and Cabo Verde, especially in defense cooperation, within the context of strengthening the ZOPACAS and the CPLP.

The presence of Brazilian military personnel in Cabo Verde is relevant because Brazilian cooperation, unlike that of other countries, does not have a bias towards the imposition of norms or an interventionist character. Chinese cooperation can be considered complementary to Brazilian cooperation in other areas, but not in defense. Its most assertive actions portray a competition that is not only economic, but also geostrategic, mainly in the establishment of logistical support points/bases in the region. China has aggressively invested in this model, with the donation/financing of military means (Violante, Marroni & Maia, 2020).

[20] The agreement is available at: <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/1994/b_96/at_download/ arquivo>. Accessed on: 29 may.2016.

[21] The creation of COSMAR is the result of a partnership with the US, which shows the interest of NATO's main partner in the Gulf of Guinea region. However, it seems that the diversification of Cabo Verde's partnerships with Brazil, China, Latin America and ECOWAS, in the area of defense, presented new alternatives with less relativization of its sovereignty, avoiding the concept of "shared sovereignty".

Such Chinese actions also occurred on the occasion of the increase in Brazilian defense cooperation with Namibia, after the establishment of a Brazilian Naval Mission in this state. Adding to the long-standing and consistent relations established in Brazil-Namibia cooperation, via the Naval Cooperation Agreement[22], China has invested heavily in that country, by financing aircraft for its Air Force and, more recently, by acquiring the Logistical Support Ship "Elephant", which has become the largest ship of Namibia's Naval Wing. Therefore, although Brazilian cooperation in defense has included the transfer of material doctrine and the training of human resources, as well as the donation of means, these actions have not prevented the purchase of military hardware from China.

Patrol Captain, Pedro Santana, Commander of the GCCV in 2016, pointed out that the current Brazilian defense architecture marked "a very strong position on the part of the government of Brazil," bringing another "dynamic in terms of cooperation in the maritime area," especially in the training of Coast Guard cadres. However, other cooperative actions can be increased, such as investments in infrastructure, with "the construction of naval support points for their ships and boats[23]" – that is, what China seeks to implement, based on the *one belt, one road* strategy.

A more assertive posture of the Brazilian state in financing projects of strategic interest to Brazil and Cabo Verde, by national companies, despite the economic crisis caused by COVID-19, are opportunities to be considered in the short and medium term. This has already occurred in other African countries, through the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) and other development agencies, in the 2000s and until the first half of the last decade (2011-2020).

Another positive factor of this Brazilian defense architecture concerns its value: it is low cost, especially when compared to other projects that reach the order of millions of dollars and euros, provided by the USA, China and, to a lesser extent, Portugal.

The establishment of port and airport facilities by Brazil, either permanent or temporary, in addition to meeting Cabo Verde's demands, would represent a factor of strength in case of crises or international conflicts, as it could provide control posts for Brazilian ships and those of other countries that send a good part of their exports by sea, using the main sea routes from South America to Europe.

Brazilian soft power is being intensified by this cooperation process. It is also noticeable that the Naval Mission Center established in Cabo Verde can be expanded, as happened in Namibia. As for support activities, many measures that helped the formation of the Namibian Naval Wing can also be implemented in Cabo Verde. The increase in the number of courses, especially with the sending of Brazilian military personnel to Cabo Verde, in addition to the financing/donation of naval and air assets would increase this model of cooperation.

This architecture inserted in the Cabo Verdean strategic concept of defense, placed Brazil in the list of countries and international institutions of security and defense that operated more closely in the region, such as NATO, ECOWAS, Portugal, Spain, China and the USA. Cabo Verde has transformed its defense guidelines into a state policy, given the good

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22 The agreement seeks, among other things, support for the creation and strengthening of its "Naval Wing (Violante, 2017).
23 Violante, 2017 - Santana Interview, 2016.

governance and pragmatism of recent governments. Its proactive role in international organizations, in addition to strengthening international cooperation with traditional partners, establishes new partnerships in the face of the complex scenario of international maritime security.

## 2. Defense cooperation with São Tomé and Príncipe: Brazil and other relevant actors

Like Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe has strong historical ties to Brazil. A trading post for slaves coming to the Caribbean and to Brazil, many blacks from all over Africa and the residents of the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe helped develop not only the culture, but also the Brazilian nation-state, until the late abolition of slavery.

Below is the transcription of the Santomean Poet Olinda Beja, portraying the vocation to the sea, the suffering of slavery, in short, the origin of her people, who contributed so much to the formation of the Brazilian nation.

***WHO ARE WE****?*[24]

*The sea calls us, we are islanders!*
*We carry salt and foam in our hands*
*we sing in the canoes*
*we dance in the mist*

*we are fishermen-sailors*
*of living tides where we hide*
*our ignored soul*
*our island people*
*our island sways to the taste of the waves*
*and brings to spread on the sands of history*
*the voice of gandu*
*in our memory...*

*We are the crossbreeding of a god who wanted to show*
*to the universe our tarnished color*
*we resist the voracity of time*
*to the appeals of nothingness*

*we will continue to plant cocoa coffee*
*and eat breadfruit for pleasure*
*children of the sun and the bush*
*torn from the pain of slavery.*

[24] Poem from the book "Aromas de Cajamanga", organized by Floriano Martins. Available in: http://www.antoniomiranda.com.br/poesia_africana/s_tome_princepe/olinda_beja.html. Accessed on: 29.jun.2016.

## Brief Background

Officially called the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, this island state, located in the Gulf of Guinea, consists of two main islands: (São Tomé Island and Príncipe Island) and several other islets, in a total of 1001 km², with about 190,000 inhabitants. Of the total population, about 185,000 live on the island of São Tomé and about 8,500 live on the island of Príncipe. They all descend from various ethnic groups that emigrated to the islands during the Portuguese colonial period. Like Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe belongs to the category of island microstates.

Between 1470 and 1471, the Portuguese navigators João de Santarém and Pedro Escobar discovered the islands of São Tomé, Príncipe and Anobom. The strategic importance of these islands was only appreciated by the Portuguese in 1482, when they initiated contacts with the Kingdom of the Congo. In 1485, Dom João II established them as a colony in order to begin sugarcane cultivation (Seibert et al., 2002).

From then on, according to Neves and Ceita (2004), the process of formation and socio, political and economic evolution of São Tomé and Príncipe began. Based, initially, on the planting of sugar cane and slave trade, it passed, later, to the cultivation and commercialization of cocoa and coffee. This development can be divided into three periods:

I) 16th century to the first half of the 17th century - characterized by the arrival of the first inhabitants of the islands, the introduction of new species of fauna and flora, sugar production, slave traffic to Brazil and the Spanish colonies in South America;

II) Second half of the 17th century and into the 18th century - period of relative commercial decadence with the end of the sugar cane cycle. The colony began to sustain itself through the slave trade and subsistence agriculture. In view of the colonizer's "abandonment", there was the beginning of the formation of autochthonous groups (blacks and mestizos), which gave rise to an embryonic nationalism; and

III) XIX and XX centuries - when Portuguese interest reemerged with the introduction of cocoa and coffee cultures by plantation. This fact brought structural changes in the economy and society that, with the end of slave labor, resulted in the migration of several African ethnic groups, such as the Angolares, Tongas, servants, and Cabo Verdeans, which prevented the consolidation of a typical Creole society. Seibert et al. (2002) and Rizzi (2012) add that until 1961, forros, Angolares and Cabo Verdeans were considered citizens under Portuguese law, while other Africans were treated as natives, that is, considered second-class citizens.

It is interesting to note that Brazil had an active participation in its social formation process, directly influencing the main economic cycles of its history. First, in a negative way, when the Brazilian sugar, of better quality, productivity and price, caused the disappearance of the sugar cane mills of São Tomé; the second, also negative, on the occasion of 200 years of ostracism by the colonizer, when the islands became a mere warehouse for slaves[25], destined almost exclusively for Brazil; and the third, now in a positive way, when Brazilians from the state of Bahia introduced the successful cocoa crop in São Tomé (Management Report - Brasemb São Tomé - 2015).

It can be seen that both São Tomé and Príncipe and Cabo Verde had their identity formed by Creole societies. However, São Tomé and Príncipe had its "creolité" modified[26] for this new stage of colonization. Cabo Verde did not have the plantation system implemented due to its climatic peculiarities and, for this reason, maintained a certain degree of autonomy in local administration (Violante, 2017).

This point is relevant to understand the dependence of the Portuguese in the administrative conduction of the former colony. Until the 1840s, the islands were practically self-governing. The forros, who belonged to the Creole elite, were employed in the administration, engaged in urban services, and were small owners, tenants, or subtenants of plantations. With the arrival of coffee and cocoa in the second half of the 19th century, this elite became politically and economically marginalized, losing the positions they had gained with the exhaustion of the sugar cane industry. Thus, the colonial hierarchy again prevailed (Seibert, 2014; Sanguin, 2014).

Taking a leap in time to discuss the process of independence, it is important to realize that it was not so peaceful. The autonomist movements in the Portuguese colonies in Africa, originated and established in Lisbon, marked the awareness of the organized struggle for political self-determination. In September 1960, the Committee for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (CLSTP) was created. (Neves & Ceita, 2004).

Between comings and goings, it was only in July 1972 that the CLSTP was reconstituted under the name of Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP), strongly influenced by the Cabo Verdean PAIGC. In a crescendo of actions, the Carnation Revolution (April 1974) ended up encouraging greater political actions in the islands. As a result, negotiations between the MLSTP and the metropolis advanced. Thus, on 11/26/1974, the Algiers Agreement was signed, which set the date of 07/12/1975 for the independence of the archipelago (Rizzi, 2012).

With the relaxation of the autocratic regime and the arrival of multipartyism in 1990 and democratization in 1991, political disputes intensified and several parties were created. However, unlike Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe has been marked by political instability throughout its history, which has affected good governance[27]. According to Seibert (2008), São Tomé and Príncipe was and still is characterized by dependence on foreign consultants and the distribution of power in a historical minority, which has hindered the implementation of satisfactory public policies to boost its development.

Despite the improvements shown by the São Toméan economy, this has not been enough to reduce the levels of unemployment and poverty. The discovery of oil deposits in its jurisdictional waters may be a path to a more accelerated development that will increase

[25] The island of São Tomé differed from the slavery entrepôt of Cabo Verde, since it aimed much more at preparing labor for work. Thus, when returning to Africa, some former slaves in Brazil preferred to return to São Tomé because of the family ties established there than to return to their countries of origin.

[26] Miscegenation in Cabo Verde was more present between white Europeans and blacks, while in São Tomé and Príncipe it was mostly Africans who worked there on the sugar cane, coffee and cocoa plantations (Seibert, 2014).

[27] Since its democratization in 1991, there have been two failed coup attempts. Regarding prime ministers, since independence, there have been 22 prime ministers up to the present (2021).

significant economic and social gains. Current technological advances have already made deepwater oil production possible in Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe's neighbors in the Gulf of Guinea.

## Relations with São Tomé and Príncipe

São Tomé and Príncipe has an extensive maritime area under its jurisdiction – almost 160 times its land area (see Table 1), which requires attention to traditional and "new threats", as well as possible litigation in its jurisdictional waters, since there are intersections in its maritime borders with other Gulf of Guinea states.

Regarding maritime borders, Sanguin (2014) reminds us that one of the pragmatic and peaceful solutions to overcome these types of conflicts is the establishment of a joint development zone. In this way, states share disputed or intersecting areas rather than confronting each other for control of maritime resources. This solution is derived directly from article 83 of the CNDUM. This was done, in an agreement involving its neighbors and, mainly, Nigeria, with the establishment of a joint petroleum exploration area, called the Joint Development Zone (JDZ). It should be noted that the supervision of the JDZ would be carried out by a joint military force, which has not been put into practice to this day. The Coast Guard of São Tomé and Príncipe (GCSTP) is not yet fully capable of performing this task on a regular basis. Thus, maritime security in the JDZ has remained largely in the hands of Nigeria.

Within the security context, both CEEAC and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) started, as of October 2009, to work on a security strategy for the Gulf region, based on two elements: the creation of a Regional Maritime Security Coordination Center for Central Africa and the promotion of greater synergy between the GGC and ECOWAS countries. This strategy also has six objectives: sharing information and management; joint surveillance of maritime space; harmonizing actions at sea; introducing a regional maritime tax; acquiring equipment for common use; and institutionalizing a periodic maritime conference (ICG, 2012; Zucatto & Baptista, 2014).

CEEAC has divided Central Africa into three geographical zones: A, B, and D, covering a band from Angola to the maritime borders of Nigeria and Cameroon Among these zones, "D" - which reaches Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and São Tomé and Príncipe - is seen as the one with the highest risk of maritime insecurity. Thus, in 2009, the member countries signed a maritime surveillance agreement called SECMAR, which provided for the opening of a multinational coordination center in their maritime operational centers (ICG, 2012; Zucatto & Baptista, 2014).

As major contributors to CID, we highlight, Taiwan (until December 2016), China (from 2016), Nigeria, Angola, Cabo Verde, France, Portugal and the USA.

It is estimated that Taiwan has invested more than US$ 240 million since the establishment of diplomatic relations with São Tomé and Príncipe in 1997, namely in health, agriculture, infrastructure and education[28]. More recently, in April 2015, Taiwan

[28] Taiwan signs new cooperation program with STP. Available at: <http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2015/04/24/taiwan-assina-novo-programa-de-cooperacao-com-sao-tome-e-principe/>

and São Tomé and Príncipe signed a new cooperation program for the biennium 2015/16, which contemplated financial support of more than US$ 15 million, the largest amount so far (Violante, 2017).

**Figure 1 - ECCAS Maritime Areas**




Source: ICG, 2012.; Zucatto and Baptista, 2014

It is worth noting that even after the rupture of diplomatic relations with China in 1997, the State of São Tomé has always maintained friendly relations with the Chinese political power. In October 2015, São Tomé and Príncipe signed an agreement with China Harbour Engineering Company for the construction of a deep-water port. This infrastructure project is valued at US$800 million and the first of three phases should be completed in 2018[29]. However, to date, this important project for the solidification of the São Toméan economy is still in its early stages. If completed, the deep-water port will offer an infrastructure that will meet not only its logistical needs, but those of the other countries in the Gulf of Guinea, transforming São Tomé and Príncipe into a logistical hub due to its strategic position in the region.

This further rapprochement, according to the news outlet "DW", resulted in the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between São Tomé and Beijing on 12/22/2016. This fact caused automatic rupture with Taiwan, by recognizing "only one China”. As a counterpoint, the Taiwanese government claimed that São Tomé and Príncipe tried to "take advantage by swinging between the two sides of the Strait" and denounced that

[29] Chinese build deep-water port in STP. Available at: <http://www.construir.pt/2015/10/13/chineses-constroem-porto-de-aguas-profundas-em-sao-tome-e-principe/>. Accessed on: 29 Jul.2016.

the Santomean government had asked for "an astronomical amount in financial support" of around US$100 million (about 96 million euros) to continue supporting Taiwan[30].

In the decade from 2011 to 2020, India has intensified projects and activities in the Gulf of Guinea region in order to counterbalance projects of greater Chinese political and economic insertion. India understands the Gulf of Guinea as key to decreasing dependence on oil imports from the Middle East, especially with Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, which may result in future agreements for the exploration and exploitation of crude oil on the islands, as well as the sale of military equipment (Violante, 2017).

Although they have not yet jointly formed a military force for patrolling the JDZ, Nigeria has demanded greater participation from São Tomé and Príncipe. In 2013, an agreement was established for the training of São Toméan Officers at the Higher Institute of the Nigerian Military Academy. In 2016, there were about 20 Santomean military personnel in this cooperation program, which strengthens the partnership between the two countries that share a vast maritime border[31].

Resulting from a return to greater assertiveness in relations with Angola, in June 2014 an agreement was signed involving internal and external security and civil protection between the two countries. These agreements aimed to adjust the level of cooperation already achieved in previous decades. Thus, the instruments allow both to cooperate in the areas of training of personnel, criminal intelligence, combating illegal immigration, illegal trafficking and sale of firearms, drug trafficking, combating terrorism, and technical advice in these areas[32].

As part of a policy of greater rapprochement with the countries of the West African coast, there were two visits between the Heads of Government of São Tomé and Príncipe and Cabo Verde. The first in Praia, on 12/11/2015, and the second in São Tomé, in February 2016. On these occasions, cooperative actions were agreed upon in the following areas: agribusiness, professional training, health, maritime, water management, tourism, electronic governance, public administration, civil aviation, etc. The creation of a biannual summit between the two governments was also agreed upon. São Tomé approached ECOWAS with the intermediation of Cabo Verde. This resulted in the prioritization for the adoption of a new strategic vision of the CPLP for the oceans. The idea of both states is to act uniformly in the bloc of small African island states before international organizations and forums such as the PALOPs, the AU, the Gulf of Guinea Commission

[30] 19 years later, São Tomé swaps Taiwan for China - site. Taipei. Refused to give $100 Million in aid. Beijing applauds rupture that leaves rebel island with only 21 diplomatic allies - DN News. Available at: <http://www.dn.pt/mundo/interior/19-anos-depois-sao-tome-troca-taiwan-pela-china-5565650.html.>. Accessed on: 26 Dec 2016.

[31] São Tomé wants Cabo Verde's support for further rapprochement with ECOWAS. Cabo Verde government webpage. Available at: <http://www.governo.cv/index.php/rss/6358-sao-tome-quer-apoio-de-cabo-verde-para-maior-aproximacao-a-cedeao.>. Accessed on: 26 jun. 2019.

[32] Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe sign security cooperation agreements. Available at: http://m.portalangop.co.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/politica/2014/5/26/Angola-Sao-Tome-Principe-rubricam-acordos-cooperacao-dominio-seguranca,d5f9eaac-a7cc-4d93-bdf6-7bb4dee04fc5.html. Accessed on: 20 jul.2016.

and the EECAC, especially in the area of defense, so that their interests are not restricted to the regional powers of the region (Angola and Nigeria) [33].

The closure of the French embassy in São Tomé on 24/08/2015 has caused surprise. According to the Head of Mission for cooperation and cultural action, Patrick Cohen, the financial crisis forced France to reduce its presence in countries with which the level of cooperation did not justify maintaining the operation of an embassy[34]. This denotes the decline of French cooperation with São Tomé and Príncipe, which was one of the largest between 1980 and 2000 (Violante, 2017).

Portugal is also a very important partner. More than half of everything imported by São Tomé and Príncipe comes from this state. In all areas of cooperation, Portugal has remained one of the main providers of financing and donations. With regard to cooperation projects, Portuguese Official Development Aid to São Tomé and Príncipe was around 15 million euros per year (Violante, 2017).

Portugal has established a technical-military cooperation program for cooperation between the Portuguese Navy and its Coast Guard on the issue of surveillance and inspection of its jurisdictional waters. This agreement was intended to prevent the strengthening of criminal groups or groups linked to international crimes, such as piracy and terrorism. In 2015, Portugal donated two vessels to the Coast Guard in order to strengthen its capacity to respond to transnational threats (Violante, 2017).

Portuguese defense cooperation has also been responsible for training military personnel, through some Portuguese officers posted in the archipelago. In an interview with the African news website "Pana Express" in March 2015, the then defense minister of São Tomé and Príncipe, Carlos Stock, highlighted the gains of defense cooperation with Portugal, stating that the training of marines and the air surveillance patrol of São Toméan territorial waters by Portuguese Air Force aircraft is a clear sign of the excellent cooperation between the two states[35].

Since the 2000s, the U.S. has given Africa a new strategic status. This can be seen in the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, which aimed to expand cooperation platforms in African states and regional organizations in order to prevent conflicts and create secure and favorable environments for regional and U.S. security. The creation of the *United States Africa Command* (AFRICOM) in February 2007 to promote U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its adjacent maritime space has been used as a tool of foreign policy, military cooperation, civilian and military technical training, and humanitarian aid.

33 Cabo Verde and São Tomé strengthen cooperation. *Voices from the World-RFI-Portuguese*. Available at: <http://pt.rfi.fr/cabo-verde/20160222-cabo-verde-e-sao-tome-reforcam-cooperacao>. Accessed on 02 set. 2019.

34 Available at: http://www.vitrina.st/vitrina4029.htm. Accessed on: 29 jul.2016.

35 São Tomé and Príncipe and Portugal renew defense cooperation agreement. Available at: <http://www.panapress.com/Sao-Tome-e-Principe-e-Portugal-renovam-acordo-de-cooperacao-no-dominio-da-defesa---3-630428658-47-lang4-index.html>. Accessed on: 20 jul.2016.

**Figure 2 - US Regional Commands**


Source: Naval Power Site. Available at: <www.podernaval.com.br.> Accessed on: 25 May 2016.

Thus, this new U.S. insertion strategy turned more intensively to Africa as a whole, but more specifically to the Gulf of Guinea. Under the guise of international maritime security, combating piracy and terrorism, the US Navy began to conduct a series of patrols and exercises in the region. Such actions even encompassed the reactivation of the Fourth Fleet at United States Southern Command (USSSOUTHCOM), as well as training of GCSTP military personnel throughout the decade (Violante, 2017) and continuing into the present day.

However, the largest cooperative defense action taken by the U.S. was the installation of radar on the islands in 2008. This project called Marine Domain Awareness[36] is a surveillance system to provide security to the country's jurisdictional waters and, consequently, to all maritime traffic in the Gulf of Guinea. Importantly, the information gathered from the larger vessels and ships is accessible to the U.S., and is available to neighboring countries[37].

This successful experience in maritime security by the US has fostered a greater sensitivity to the issue of maritime security in the archipelago. The "collaboration" with the security and "maintenance" of the sovereignty of the countries surrounding the Gulf of Guinea has even led to the possibility, reported by the national and international press, of the installation of a US military base in São Tomé and Príncipe. This attempt did not materialize, having been denied with some vehemence by the Santomean rulers and also by Washington[38].

There have also been more comprehensive defense initiatives in exercises with the Navies and Coast Guards of Gulf countries. In this regard, the U.S. Navy has regularly visited São Tomé and Príncipe, Nigeria, and other countries on the West African coast, such as

[36] The programme allows the detection of ships at sea that have transmitters to provide their positions, destination and cargo uninterruptedly. This device is called Automatic Indentification Service (AIS). These detections allow littoral states to control maritime traffic in their areas of responsibility.
[37] This is not the first time that São Tomé and Príncipe has served as a base for military surveillance. After independence, the former USSR installed a radar system on the island of São Tomé (Nascimento, 2011).
[38] Brasemb São Tomé to Sere –Telegram, 14/11/2003.

Cabo Verde and Gabon, under the auspices of the "African Partnership Station" program. Together with NATO, the US also conducted the exercise "Obangame Express", which aims to promote interoperability and combined training, in order to increase maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea region. This exercise included the participation of West African Navies and Coast Guards, including the Brazilian Navy (Violante, Marroni & Maia, 2020).

But São Tomé and Príncipe demanded an increase in its Coast Guard, in order to perform surveillance and patrol activities in its extensive maritime area. Thus, in order to increase its deterrence and surveillance capacity, especially in the "protection of resources and to ensure tranquility in the oil exploration business," in the words of Defense Minister Elza Pinto, São Tomé and Príncipe requested Brazil's help.

Going back in time, Brazil's bilateral relations with São Tomé and Príncipe, especially in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, were almost non-existent. Despite being one of the first states to recognize its independence, in 1975, the ideological biases imputed by the Cold War caused São Tomé and Príncipe to prioritize its international relations in an almost automatic alignment with the socialist bloc (Violante, 2017).

Unlike Cabo Verde, which already had a history of cooperation in previous decades, bilateral relations occurred more intensely only in the late 2000s. The political and economic opening of both states ended up diversifying their international relations in the most diverse areas of cooperation. The training of personnel in the administrative and educational areas was prioritized, and, as a novelty, cooperation in defense.

Thus, in response to a request from São Tomé, in March 2009, the Brazilian Minister of Defense, Nelson Jobim, visited São Tomé and discussed support to strengthen GCSTP. It was decided, after signing a memorandum of understanding on defense on March 23, 2009, that Brazil would train professionals and provide its Coast Guard with the necessary equipment for the surveillance of its jurisdictional waters (Rizzi, 2012; Correio da Semana, 28/03/2009, p. 4 *apud* Nascimento, 2011).

In a cooperative *crescendo* in bilateral and multilateral relations, at the 12th Meeting of the CPLP Defense Ministers, held in Brasilia on November 10-11, 2010, a defense cooperation agreement was signed[39]. According to the Advisor to the Director of National Defense, Lassalete Neto[40], such an agreement generated great expectations regarding the training of personnel and restructuring of the Armed Forces in the short, medium and long term.

Also at this meeting, Minister Jobim reiterated the need for the South Atlantic to remain free of nuclear weapons, and that it was essential to preserve the current environment of peace and stability without the interference of powers outside the region. Jobim was supported by the African participants. On the subject, the Portuguese Defense Minister pointed out that NATO could also play an important role in promoting stability and cooperative security under the auspices of the UN. The Minister said he was convinced that over time it would be possible to develop a regular defense dialogue between NATO

[39] The entire agreement is available at: <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/2010/acordo-entre-o-governo-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-e-o-governo-da-republica-democratica-de-sao-tome-e-principe-sobre-cooperacao-no-dominio-da-defesa>. Accessed on: apr.25, 2016. It is still in process for ratification.

[40] Violante, 2017 - Lassalete interview, 2016.

and other partners, including the African Union, with Portugal as an important partner in this connection[41].

In a *crescendo* of meetings in the CPLP, a possible multilateral cooperation involving Brazil, Portugal, Angola, and São Tomé and Príncipe was ventured in November 2010. To this end, a joint exploratory mission was conducted between Brazil and Portugal. This mission intensified the exchange of information and jointly evaluated the possibilities of cooperation in the recovery of São Toméan military infrastructure. From this mission, the possibilities of cooperation in defense with São Tomé and Príncipe were perceived, as well as its obstacles, mainly due to the inexistence of local companies for the necessary logistical support in ship maintenance (Violante, 2017).

Between 2011 and 2020, São Tomé and Príncipe was one of the countries that benefited the most from projects developed in partnership with Brazilian institutions, in areas such as health, education, agriculture, the promotion of regulatory agencies, and defense. This does not mean that Brazil is on the same level as the largest collaborators, such as the countries presented here (Violante, 2017).

In the multilateral area, Brazil has achieved greater space in discussions on maritime security in regional bodies of which São Tomé e Príncipe is a member, such as the CGG, CEEAC, and the G-7 friendlier to the Gulf of Guinea. In the latter, Brazil was an observer for many years, becoming a permanent member in 2020. However, it is important to note that such an organization is under the leadership of the richest countries in the world, which may not directly contemplate the region's priority interests.

Brazil's more assertive stance in continuing its policy toward Africa resulted in the creation of the Marine Technical Support Group (GAT-FN), in 2014, and, in a *continuum*, with the creation of the Brazilian Naval Mission Center in São Tomé and Príncipe (NMNBSTP), by Ordinance No. 533 of the Commander of the Navy, dated November 10, 2014, with the following attributions:

I. carry out a survey of the real needs of the Coast Guard of STP, in order to elaborate a proposal for a Cooperation Agreement between the two countries;

II. monitor and support the activities of the Marine Technical Support Group in São Tomé and Príncipe, subordinated to the Core;

III. manage the human, material and property resources under its responsibility; and

IV. to advise the Brazilian Ambassador in São Tomé and Príncipe on matters under the responsibility of the Nucleus (Brasil, 2014, p. 1).

As a result of repressed demands from São Tomé and Príncipe, this initiative was activated on 05/06/2015. During the CPLP Defense Ministers Summit, on 05/26/2015, the Center was inaugurated by the Defense Ministers of Brazil and São Tomé and Príncipe, Jaques Wagner and Carlos Stock, respectively (Violante, 2017).

It was found, then, that the NMNBSTP, its GAT-FN and its Defense Attachment, even cumulatively to Luanda, are the main projects of defense cooperation between Brazil and

[41] *Ibidem*.

São Tomé and Príncipe. This defense architecture has been considered as primordial by the Ministry of Defense and Sea of São Tomé.

In a political-strategic analysis, Ambassador Leitão comments on this cooperative architecture, implemented during his mission in São Tomé and Príncipe (2011- 2016)

> *The Brazil-São Tomé and Príncipe Naval cooperation project has been of undeniable magnitude and has been very well accepted in local circles. Sketched out since the first months of my administration, the result of talks between authorities of the two countries, the project under consideration is of singular relevance in view of the maritime security challenges faced by the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, including STP. International piracy and smuggling are real problems to be faced by a country that has only a precariously equipped Coast Guard. Thus, the Brazilian Navy has a notable role to play in this country* (Leitão, 2016).

In this sense, the Director of National Defense himself, Colonel (Ref.) Alfredo Marçal Lima, added that the agreement with Brazil and with other countries, such as the USA and Portugal, are relevant for the country to explore all its potentialities, highlighting its particularities and complementarities. Additionally, he reiterated that for the security and defense of the South Atlantic, the agreement of Brazil and São Tomé and Príncipe is not sufficient, and that it is necessary to sign additional protocols and new understandings for the surveillance and monitoring of these jurisdictional waters, in light of the growing risks of transnational threats in the Gulf of Guinea[42].

Ambassador Leitão and the Director of National Defense, Alfredo Lima, believe that a project to increase the surveillance of the South Atlantic, such as the Blue Amazon Management System (SISGAAZ), would meet the needs of Santomean maritime sovereignty. According to Alfredo Lima:

> *[...] Today STP faces a major challenge, which is the security of its national waters. That is why it has been developing its own efforts and with bilateral and multilateral partners, aiming to ensure the safety of navigation, the protection of living and non-living resources that contribute to the development of the country and global security* (Violante, 2017 - Interview Lima, Alfredo, 2016).

Leitão adds:

> *The creation/implantation of a maritime surveillance system, based on the fundamentals of maritime situational awareness, along the lines of SISGAAZ, is an objective of any coastal state, and São e Príncipe is aware of its attributions in the management of the waters under its jurisdiction* (Violante, 2017 - Interview Leitão, 2016).

[42] Violante, 2017 - Interview Lima, Alfredo, 2016.

These ideas remain current. SisGAAz is a strategic project that can serve not only the interests of Brazil, but also of the countries of the West African coast, such as Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. In this way, the US radars on the island of São Tomé, under the control of the US Department of Defense, would gain an alternative of greater integration and less interference in São Tomé's internal affairs. In addition, this system intends, in view of its greater complexity, to have a wider reach, serving the entire Atlantic.

As for the expenditures of this established defense architecture, the opinions highlighted in the analyses of Brazil's defense cooperation with Cabo Verde remain very small, compared to countries with a higher level of international development cooperation than Brazil, such as the U.S., China and Portugal.

## Final Considerations and Perspectives

Even during the phase of prioritization of more sophisticated centers of power, there was always an African policy of Brazil in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). The PALOP and the CPLP were part of the selective partnerships with Africa, besides Nigeria, Namibia and South Africa, mainly. However, within the proposed selectivity, the states with the greatest power capabilities have benefited more, to the detriment of other strategically important ones, such as Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe (Violante, 2017).

These States on Brazil's Atlantic eastern border have gained large maritime areas under jurisdiction with the entry into force of UNCLOS. However, they need the means and capacity to rationally exploit and protect their living and non-living resources in their EEZ, CDZ and CS, given the presence of "new threats" in the Gulf of Guinea region and, why not say, traditional state threats, mainly from extra-regional powers.

Cabo Verde's defense strategy, for political, economic and strategic reasons, is more in line with the European states, without, however, automatically or unconditionally aligning itself, which allows the opening of various fronts in its bilateral and multilateral relations.

Even political instability, present throughout the history of São Tomé and Príncipe, with the existence of 22 prime ministers in the last two decades, has not ideologically prevented the strengthening and growth of bilateral relations with Brazil. Both states have joint political, strategic, commercial, and diplomatic interests.

In the multilateral area, there were important interactions between Brazil, Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, mainly in the area of maritime safety. In this context, meetings with the Gulf of Guinea Commission, CEEAC, ECOWAS, and the G-7 friendliest of the Gulf of Guinea have been highlighted. In the latest meetings of the G-7 friendliest, solutions to transnational illegalities in the region were proposed, including the creation of a Regional Maritime Coordination Center to be built, possibly, in Cabo Verde.

Brazil sought, in these two decades (2001-2020), the complementarity of win-win relations in defense cooperation with Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. Soft and hard military power were combined in actions to strengthen their coast guards, so that they could provide, in the not-too-distant future, their own defense and maritime security without further interference or external dependence. The creation of Technical Support Groups and Naval Mission Centers in Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, based on the successful experience in Namibia (a project far less costly than others undertaken by the US and China, for example) formed an important "defense architecture" for the states involved. This project can be spread, in a more inclusive way, to the entire West African coast, if these states so desire. These Centers or Missions could function as logistical defense hubs for training personnel and providing military means to the entire region.

The search for integration of maritime spaces, such as in a network of land and maritime sensors, air and environmental monitoring can be implemented from this architecture. Cooperation agreements between Brazil's Integrated Center for Maritime Security (CISMAR) and Cabo Verde's COSMAR, through the Blue Amazon Management System (SisGAAz), when implemented, will provide greater strategic area mobility and prompt response to environmental disasters, maritime traffic control, and faster responses to maritime security threats.

Furthermore, the possibility of a more assertive role for Brazil in the region, through requests for Brazil to cooperate in surveillance and patrol actions in its jurisdictional waters, may raise international legal issues. The option of participating as a component of a Multinational Maritime Task Force, at the request of the countries in the region and endorsed by the UN, seems a more feasible solution in the medium term. However, such a plea, even if accepted, will demand the elaboration of an internal legal framework that legitimizes the use of Brazilian Naval Power, and an external one, by means of more specific bilateral and even multilateral cooperation agreements.

On China and US investments in the Gulf of Guinea, these ultimately generate gains and some trade-offs. Relationships are beneficial as they are understood by the recipient states as relative win-win relationships. However, they also become controversial by granting, for example, control of a large part of their strategic sectors and port infrastructure to these countries. These relations that mix horizontality and verticality end up deriving in relative interdependence in the region. The United States currently imports about 30% of its oil needs from the Gulf of Guinea. China, on the other hand, imports about 40% of its needs from the region, in addition to other important inputs for the development of its consistently growing economy.

Recently, since 2019, Portugal has been developing the idea of creating an International Organization or Agency, called "Atlantic Centre", to be established in the Azores, to mainly discuss issues related to Atlantic security and defense. It is worth noting, however, that in addition to Brazil, this forum would encompass the presence of other relevant extra-regional actors, such as the US, Spain, France, the UK, etc.

Brazil cannot dismiss the possibility of agreements with actors with greater political will, capacity, and resources, since these will always be present in the region. Portuguese foreign policy has sought to act as a link between the North Atlantic and the South Atlantic. Portugal and Brazil are important actors and cooperation partners in Africa. Their proposals are not mutually exclusive, since they do not necessarily involve belonging to one Lusophone or Brazilian nation. Thus, a possible combined development of a maritime security strategy for the region, aimed at the integration and promotion of sustainable development of the oceans, could go through the CPLP, as it is a forum that has always sought cooperation between the participating states. From these discussions, other forums such as the AU, CEEAC, ECOWAS, G7 plus friends of the Gulf of Guinea cannot be forgotten because of their political, economic and strategic importance on the West

African coast.

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# BUSINESS MODEL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EDUCATION SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE: A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH

**PEDRO CABRITA**
pncabrita@gmail.com
Independent researcher (Portugal) focused on the problematic of organizational development in Africa, particularly in Lusophone Africa. He has a master's in development studies from the School of Social and Human Sciences of ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa and bachelor in management from Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

**RENATO PEREIRA**
renato.pereira@iscte-iul.pt
Professor of General Management at ISCTE Business School, ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa. Researcher at the Business Research Unit (ISCTE-IUL, Portugal) the Observatory of Foreign Relations (Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa) and the Emerging Markets Research Center (ISCIM, Maputo). Also, PhD in management sciences, Université Paris Dauphine

**MAOMEDE NAGUIB OMAR**
manotio@yahoo.com.br
Post-doctorate fellow and researcher at OBSERVARE-UAL; associate professor at ISCIM-Instituto Superior de Comunicação e Imagem de Moçambique (Mozambique) and researcher at the Emerging Markets Research Center. Also, PhD in higher education studies and master's in public management, both from the University of Aveiro, as well as apost-graduate from the University of Witwatersrand

## Abstract

This research aims to determine the business model of non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) of the education sector in Mozambique. The work adopts a constructivist methodological approach in two stages: (i) inductive, centered on the construction of a proposal of social business model Canvas from the observation of 15 NGDOs operating in the education sector in the country, based on a theoretical framework solidly supported in the literature; (ii) deductive, testing the proposed model using a panel technique that allowed the refinement and reconstruction of the proposal initially formulated. The paper contributes to the literature on social business models by making a pioneering validation of knowledge built in this area and in a field of application not yet explored. The contribution to international relations lies at the level of the data collected and information produced on international cooperation in Mozambique.

## Keywords

International cooperation, Mozambique, canvas social business model, NGDOs, Education

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# BUSINESS MODEL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EDUCATION SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE: A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH[1]

**PEDRO CABRITA**

**RENATO PEREIRA**

**MAOMEDE NAGUIB OMAR**

## Introduction

Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs) play an increasingly important role in Africa because, among other reasons, the recent Covid-19 pandemic and accelerated population growth raise challenges that are difficult to address only with the intervention of traditional actors – state, families, and businesses.

The importance of these organizations is particularly noted in Mozambique, one of the *countries on the UN's least developed countries list,* which has very pronounced shortcomings in structural sectors such as education, health and feeding.

The business model of these organizations is generally difficult to grasp, which makes it difficult to assess the value created by them and the extent of the externalities (positive and negative) generated for Mozambican society.

This research, thus, contributes to the knowledge on this topic by providing a pioneering study on NGDO business models in Mozambique, focused on the education sector.

## 1. Literature review

### 1.1. "Third Sector" business

In Mozambique, in 2015 there were more than 11,000 non-financial institutions, 9% of which were in the education and research sector, surpassed only by religious (26%) and commercial (20%) organizations. Nevertheless, in terms of expenditure for services provided, non-profit institutions (NPIs) associated with education are the ones with the second highest percentage, being only surpassed by social services. Of this total, only 285 are NGDOs, 53% of which are national, 32% are foreign and 15% are

[1] Article translated by Hugo Alves.

unclassified institutions. 35 were dedicated only to education, occupying the second highest percentage after human health and social action activities. Its presence is most notorious in the provinces of Inhambane, Sofala and Manica, being mostly in municipal areas compared to districts without local authority. The number of organizations of this nature has continuously growth since 1975, reaching a maximum of 582. They employ about 17,000 people, mostly men. Compared to other areas, the growth of this segment has been constant, while in other sectorsit varies depending on the time and volume of investment (INE, 2015).

The activity of these social organizations falls under the so-called "third sector". This epithet is due to the terminology of "civil society organizations" (CSOs) that do not fit into the other two business categories (first sector, government; and, second sector, market) (Aveni, 2018; Osborne, 2008).

The third sector is made up of organizations whose mission is to contribute directly and specifically to the welfare of a community in which resources are extremely limited, taking the nature of foundations, associations, religious organizations, cooperatives, among other civil activity organizations created on the initiative of citizens, hence having been called "Non-Governmental Organizations" (Defourny& Nyssens, 2008). They are active in major public service areas, such as "health, education, culture, human rights, housing, environmental protection, local development, or personal development" (Salvatore, 2004, p. 27).

These organizations contribute to production, distribution, provision of services, assistance, savings, and security in a democratic andcollective way, and associated manner with free initiative and the right to individual freedom. They have created a new concept of economy, called "solidarity economy" for not recognizing the market as an area of operation for their business model (Singer, 2002).

The strategy and structure of these organizations varies widely, and three different cases can be identified. In a first group, we find organizations that have a social mission, and are therefore fully inserted in the solidarity economy. In a second group, we find organizations that operate with two interconnected business models, one oriented to competitive success in the market and another that channels its resources towards social purposes. Finally, we have a third group that has two totally separate businesses and where fundraising is completely autonomous from the social cause and has a purely profitable purpose (Aveni, 2018).

The space of action and the capacity to raise support from public agencies and other entities by these organizations has increased substantially, and theoretical and ideological criticism have emergedin the wake of the criticism of the relationship between capitalism, social inequalities, and poverty (Singer & Brandt, 1980). With these criticisms, fragmentation also arose by areas of activity, leading to a specialization that did not seek to solve all social problems at the same time (Gohn, 1997).

It is in this context that NGOsin education are beginning to emerge in force, presenting palliative perspectives, change, innovation and political pressure, exposing the gaps of political power regarding the guarantee of access to education. Initially, these were isolated initiatives, with low visibility and little sustainability. However, with the improvement of results and the increase of studies and attention from academics, their initiatives have gained importance and social notoriety, although there are also negative impacts (Coutinho, 2004).

According to Freire (1987, 1989, 1992), the role of these organizations in popular education has been extremely positive. This has given them a role of "protectors" of the populations, which has substantially strengthened their social legitimacy.

With the increasing importance of NGOs and the evolution of the concept of "development", the concept of "NGDOs" (non-governmental organizations for development) emerges, also emerging the need to specify concrete areas of action of these organizations (Calheiros, 2003; Seers, 1969).

The institutionalization of the concept of "development" arises from the need for scientific validation and political-institutional recognition in the post-World War II, for various reasons, the most cited being the independence of the former European colonies and the need to rebuild Europe, both linked to the foundation of accumulation processes, the need to create social order and the convergence of the state's interventionist logics in the economy (Roque-Amaro, 2017).

This concept has become morecomplexwith the theoretical evolution of both Keynesian and Marxist-Leninist inspiration, in the dichotomy capitalism–socialism, which has mobilized politicians and anonymous citizens, strategies and plans, theories and practices. From 1992 on, it will be dubbed "post-development", or beginning of a new era, from the different experiences of industrialization and economic growth, cultural values, and geostrategic interests, finally basing on the logics of inequality and gender domination (Roque-Amaro, 2003).

Just as the discussion around the concept mobilizes different positions and arguments, the projects of non-governmental organizations for development also vary in form,organization, and objectives because of the constant emergence of new problems. The sphere of action of these organizations is divided into three main areas: development cooperation, education for global citizenship, and humanitarian and emergency action (Portuguese NGDO Platform, 2020).

The number of these organizations has been continuously increasing, being accompanied by the expansion of literature related to the subject (Bendell, 2000). This growth has led to the emergence of institutes and foundations to measure, facilitate, and certify their real impacts, as well as to connect the associated and involved parties, such as the government, individuals and collectives, public bodies, and community institutions (Patrocínio, 2020). Recently, one of the qualifications associated with NGDOs that has gained the most importance is that of "OSCIP" (Civil Society Organization of Public Interest) that recognizes them as partners of public authorities (Neto, 2017).

As their importanceincreased, the need to measure the impact of these organizations arose. To this end, performance indicators have been created in monitoring and managing operations and resources and achieving objectives, both to measure the impact of organisations in an individual way and jointly (Lugoboni et al, 2016). Indicators should focus "on a process as systematic and objective as possible, consisting of evaluating a project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. It is intended to determine the relevance and degree of achievement of the objectives, as well as efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability in terms of development. An evaluation should provide credible and useful information and allow lessons learned to be incorporated into the decision-making process of beneficiaries and donors"(CICLP, 2014, p.8). It is also necessary to follow a process for evaluation and it is therefore mandatory that indicators are based on recognized formulas to increase their credibility and realism (Cohen & Franco, 1999).

### 1.2. Canvas Business Model and *Canvas Social Business* Model

The business model is an intermediate layer between the strategic and operational dimensions of an organization and describes how it creates, delivers, and retainseconomic value (Osterwalder, 2004). Its structure is based on a set of building blocks that allow us to understand how this process occurs (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010).

Osterwalder & Pigneur (2010) developed the business modeling tool known as "Business Model Canvas*",*specifically targeting for-profit organizations, based on 9 building *blocks: "*customer segmentation*",*"value propositions", "channels", "customer relationship", "sources of income", "key resources", "key activities", "key partnerships", and "cost structure".

With the extensive and successful use of this tool, suggestions have emerged to extend its use to non-profit businesses or with social impacts (Resende, 2016). Although Business Model Canvaswas created for all types of businesses aimed at creating value, its use by social organizations implied considerable adaptations (Doherty, 2019).

It was with this concern in mind that we sought to develop a "Social Business Model Canvas*".* From several advanced proposals (e.g., Agafonow& Donaldson, 2015; Canestrino et al., 2019; Carayannis, 2021; Czinkota et al., 2020; Gauthier et al., 2020; Maurya, 2010; Sabatier et al., 2017; Sparviero, 2019; Spiess-Knafl et al., 2015; Umar et al., 2020), the Social Entrepreneurship Agency, among others, has been developing and refining a *complete* Social Business Model Canvas framework (SEA, 2020).

The choice *of* these building blocks aimed to ensure the following: the validation of the basic idea; the reduction of risks; the obtaining of resources; the reflection on oneself and on its business; the media; and, finally, support for management. This led to the need to contemplate the structure of the business plan through entity history; underlying market; positioning in the market; design concept/idea/product; commercial strategy; management and control of the business; investment required; and their financial projections.

All information must be present in the final table, and it must be accompanied by a visual learning methodology through colors that facilitate the distinction of related areas, with an action plan in 4 stages and groups: the creation of value (green); the value proposition (orange); the delivery of the value (yellow); and capturing and sharing value (blue). In addition to these there is also the Mission of the value (dark grey) and the Externalities of the same (light grey). Finally, the model must be accompanied by the explanation of each choice with an accessible and direct languageand, if possible, should mention the timeframe of each objective.

**Figure 1 - Representation of the Social Business Model Canvas**

<table>
<tr><td colspan="5">Mission<br>What is the main objective and purpose? This should be the space linked to the organizational and personal origins and also to present the protagonist decisions and activities supporting the Mission</td><td rowspan="2">Positive Externalities<br><br>What are the main benefits and positive impacts of the activities performed by the organization?</td></tr>
<tr><td>Problem<br>What is the group's main problem and its perspective?</td><td>Key Activities<br>What are the key actions to be taken, to meet the objectives?</td><td rowspan="2">Value Proposition<br>Through the delivery of value to the target group, what are the expected results?</td><td>Relationship with the beneficiaries<br>Who will receive the value proposition? What is the relationship to be had withthe target group and what are the points to be taken into account?</td><td>Relationship with Taxpayers<br>Who can contribute to the organization and how to maintain the relationship between parties?</td></tr>
<tr><td>Solution<br>Whatistheproposedsolutio n to solve thedetectedproblem ?</td><td>Indicators/Res ults<br>What are the indicators that were chosen to measure the impact? Whether they are social, political, environmental or economic.</td><td>Channels<br>How to access resources and how to get them to their destinations?</td><td>Partners<br>Who are the key partners that can contribute to success?</td><td rowspan="2">Negative Externalities<br><br>What are the side effects on the target group and third parties? How to mitigate these.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Cost Structure<br>What are the main costs to be taken into account in the strategic elaboration of the plans?</td><td colspan="2">Financial Sustainability<br>What are the budget limits and how do you keep spending and revenues in balance?</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Adapted from SEA (2020)

Within THE NGDOs, the approach is tailored according to the target audiences, their activities, relationships, and desired results, so that the organisation concerned competently fulfils its mission. This segmentation is justified by the variety of NGDOs and responses to be made to the different groups and realities of the most diverse development challenges. In addition to the variety of beneficiaries segments, within each of the areas the emergence of new inequalities and barriers to development causes new segments to emerge, accompanied by new approaches and distinguishing factors.

## 2. Empirical study

### 2.1. Research methodology

The objective of this work is to build a business model proposal for NGDOs in the education sector in Mozambique. Considering that a study of this nature had never been carried out in this country before, we formulated the following research questionsq: How is the(social) business model of Mozambican NGDOs in the education sector characterized? Does the use of the Social Business Model Canvas tool allowyou to describe this business model?

To answer these questions, we divided empirical work into two stages: (i) an inductive stage, based on observation, analysis, description, and interpretation of the business models of fifteen NGDOs in the education sector working in Mozambique. These organizations were selected based on their approach, results achieved and availability of information. The sample was stratified by size (small, medium and large), regional focus (international, national and local) and also by motivation (political, religious, social, etc.), culminating in the construction of a provisional proposal of a business model representative of the reality studied according to the Framework Social Business Canvas Model (SEA, 2020);(ii) a deductive and confirmatory step, through a focus groupmethodology, in which a carefullyselected panel of observers was invited to assess the provisional proposal, extracting from its feedback elements that allowed the refinement of the model and the submission of a second proposal, empirically supported.

Data analysis, in both stages, was performed through qualitative and quantitative modeling techniques using Microsoft Excel software.

## 2.2. Problem and Solution

The fundamental problem is the lack of access to education in Mozambique. The solution is the availability of resources that can make a difference generating a chain effect that changes not only the availability of education, but all the factors linked to it. However, not all realities have the same problems or the same responsiveness, so the main difference between the studiedNGDOs lies precisely in the different approaches and responses mobilized.

## 2.3. Segmentation - Beneficiaries

With three types of education – formal, non-formal and informal – and various levels of evolution within each, the first challenge for NGDOs in the field of education is the choice of the approach to be followed,considering the existing population, the historical context, the existing conditions, the potential, interests, and the duration of the project.

All fifteen studiedNGDOs made the evaluation process for the decision and chose to create schools with formal education models in isolated places, choosing for this reason segregated populations with difficult access to education and urban centers. Although the Mozambican state provides schools throughout the country, they are not of widespread access and there are no responses for isolated populations.

The type of teaching chosen is formal education because it is the type of education promoted by the Mozambican state. There are, however, differences in the selection of students and trainees for the programs and in the level of education provided.

In the studiedNGDOs, fourteen of the fifteen have as object early childhood and basic education, one of which focuses only on early childhood education and the other only on basic education. Of the same fourteen, only six have projects with secondary school students, seven with university students and nine with teachers and communities.

Based on the data collected, one can see that the preference goes to the most basic levels. Older individuals have greater obligations to contribute to family support and tend to drop out of school before reaching secondary level. This results in the sustainability of projects due to lack of audience, forcing interested students to send students to other locations with scholarships.

The number of NGDOswith adult and community training shows that there is interest and beneficiaries available. These projects vary in approach and purpose from group to group and locality to locality.

### 2.4. Key activities and resources - Beneficiaries

In the area of education, the key elements are:

- space/rooms;
- teachers/trainers
- students/trainees
- educational/formative content;
- school supplies.

All other necessary resources, such as uniforms, computer devices, toilets, canteen, among others, are not priorities.

In ten of the NGDOs analyzed, it was on their own initiative and using own funds that the space for the classes was created. These spaces end up being multipurpose, allowing community meetings, temporary health posts, among others.

Teachers/trainers are usually Mozambicans. The students are mostly localsof the area where the classes take place and the peripheries of these localities. When significant travel is required,networks are created between communities to ensure the safety of the student. In this study, three of the NGDOs had this network created. There is rarely a refusal of students, even when headcount far exceeds maximum capacity.

The contents taught are official and defined by the government. These programmes are generally adapted to the local reality, atthe level oflanguage, practices, andcustoms, to enhance the adoption and results. Depending on the level of education and the NGDOs approach, local crafts are also taught to fix populations and increase the impact on local development.

Most projects take place in isolated areas where there is no access to school supplies. Therefore, they must be bought elsewhere, eventually coming directly from abroad.

In view of the deep needs of the populations in which they are included, NGDOs end up developing other activities in key areas such as health, nutrition, water, community participation, technological innovation, services, and the environment.

The organizations analyzed have activities in three different areas, in addition to education, and only one of them has some participation in only one extra area and a single organization participates in all other areas.

They all have community projects, focusing on an integrated approach to development. Health is the second emphasis of care, focusing on the action in the education of healthy practices, medical examinations, and availability of medications. Then we find the concern for the lack of nutrition and water, under the maxim that "a hungry student does not learn", materialized by the availability of meals in school that for many represents the only hot meal they have during the day.

Finally, in the two least participated areas we find technological innovation and services (eight) and the environment (four). It should be noted that there is no standardized relationship between the size of NGDOs and their presence in different areas, and that seems more like a strategic option issue.

Summing up all the projects of all NGDOs, we have a total of seventy-two in education, with a maximum of fifteen and a minimum of only one per organization. Unlike extra activities, in education activities the dimension is critical. BigNGDOs have a larger and more decentralized area of activity, with fifteen projects taking place simultaneously in fifteen different locations. Small ones, however, usually have more than one project at the same time, focus on the same location for synergies of Results/Impacts.

## 2.5. Channels

Since channels are the way to connect the parties considering key activities and resources, one can strategically define the following 3: communication, distribution, sales, and donations.

Starting with the communication channel, the goal is to present and make known what has been and will be done to strengthen or create relationships with the target associates, while disseminating relevant information. This communication has an internal and an external component:

- Internal communication - between the participants of the organization. The main result is the account and activity report where the results of internal activities are disclosed.
- External communication - with civil society, with beneficiaries and taxpayers.

In our sample, only four of the fifteen chose to subcontract the communication. All NGDOsthat were studied have accounts on social networks (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, LinkedIn, among others), a website and a newsletter. On all these platforms thereare links to the website. These tend to be transparent in their content, easy to navigate and oriented to attract potential supporters of the cause, be they associates, donors, volunteers, or partners. Many even include a blog or news wall. Newslettersvaryfrom monthly, quarterly, semiannual, and yearly. They are almost all digital and delivered by email. Four of the organizations deliver paper magazines, letters, and bulletins.

In addition to these, there are other communication channels such as television, telephone and radio, the latter being only used by one of them. Based on our data collection it is possible to state that although there are investments in communication, they are mostly reduced and are not used in a differentiating way.

As for distribution channels, these are used, in most cases, for both the main activity and the secondary activities. Regarding the main activity, the school materials of both pupils and teachers are concerned and may also include other assets. There are three main origins: the localities themselves (six of fifteen), other national localities (fourteen of fifteen) or foreign (twelve of fifteen). Local distribution is common in projects that have been on the ground for the longest time, revealing that distribution channels evolve over time. As for the other two origins, the exchanges are greater at national level, except in a case that favors foreigners.

Finally, in sales channels and donations it is possible to detect a pattern in the type of contact because all privilege electronic communication with their donors, partners, and customers, including digital signing of contracts, receipt of contributions by bank transfer and communications/meetings on virtual platforms. As for physical contact, twelve NGDOs, do so to deepen the relationship between the parties, using dynamics of active participation, dissemination of data and holding face-to-face events. The three that do not, receive their financial contributions almost exclusively from the same sources of funding.

### 2.6. Relationship with beneficiaries

Knowing the needs and constraints of the beneficiaries, it is possible not only to define the strategy of implementation of the project, but also the monitoring of its participants:

- A priori - Before the implementation of the projects, their leaders went to the localities to check the interest of potential students and family members, study their culture, raise needs, define objectives, and prepare an initial proposal. In most cases, formal or formal agreements have been made with local community leaders and education leaders to ensure the commitment of the various parties.
- During – It was identified that some of the projects have no deadline and others have only a generic one (e.g., last quarter of year X, or when another objective is reached). This makes the evaluation *during* crucial, focusing on the relationship with beneficiaries by measuring levels of school interest and adapting to needs. The focus is as much on the result as on the adhesion of students, teachers, and the community where the project is inserted, since without themit will hardly be successful.

- posteriori - Reaching the end of the project cycle, it is necessary to measure its level of achievement. In addition, it is required to bridge the gap with future proposals from the same or other organizations.

### 2.7. Relationship with customers/contributors

In the studiedNGDOs, the importance of customers/taxpayers who assume themselves as funders/investors of the organization is linked to the channels of communication and sales/donations. Both parties seek to carry out the interest, the retention of stakeholders and the expansion of the offer, not only to increase the network of contacts but also the value of the raisings, which will increase financial sustainability. To this end, in addition to the use of the communication channel, organisations seek to attract, maintain, and broaden interest as follows:

- Godparents (solidary sponsors)/associates - The raising takes place in two main ways: the indirect, through the information available in the communication channels and the word of mouth among acquaintances of the organization; and direct, in the events of the organization and in *tête-à-tête* programs. Direct fundraising is considered more effective.
- Donations - Work for those interested in supporting, but without availability or interest in staying associated, that is, without additional commitments or responsibilities. It can be constant or punctual and have as object the most varied type of goods or services. The more specific the donation request, the higher the probability of obtaining a higher value.
- Sales – They are carried out through an independent/autonomous business, but associated with the cause, and the value proposition is the support to education although the usefulness of products and services is different from it.
- Funds and grants – A privileged route to financing non-profit organizations, it is a source that is always at the top of the priorities of NGDOs.
- Events – They are one of the most effective means to achieve the three objectives of the relationship with customers. They allow you to create a hybrid space between formal/informal and exclusive/open. However, they entail increased charges.

Based on the collected data, it is possible to notice that all fifteen NGDOs use donations, twelve of them use funds and grants, and ten have godparents/associates. Of the twelve organizations that receive funds and grants, only eight have at the same time godparents/associates. In other cases, when they do not have solidary sponsors/associates, have funds and subsidies and vice versa, except in a case where it was chosen not to use any of these mechanisms. The organization of events was observed in eight organizations and six of them make sales to customers.

On average, three of these mechanisms are used by each organization, two of which use them all, four of them use four, seven of them use three and two of them only use two. One cannot identify a relationship between the choice of relationship forms and the size of the organization, its origin, or success rate. It is, however, possible to detect that when organizations are in the expansion phase, they opt for two main approaches to increase the number of customers/contributors.

The results obtained allow us to conclude that contributions per donation are a source of funding generally used, both for the reasons listed above and for their versatility, easy adaptation to the needs of NGDOsand by the reduced need for commitment. Donations materialize in different ways: money, school supplies, clothing, clothes and even air miles; no dominant pattern has been identified. In addition to the permanent open bank transfer mechanism, many organizations choose specific moments in advance by disclosing the timing of such collections. Another possible means istaxconsignment incountries where it exists, which, despite not reaching significant values, contributes to the public notoriety of the NGDO.

Aid for funds and grants has been growing and showing up as one of the main forms of support for new organisations in need of initial investment. Funds vary in origin, but most are deprived of institutions, foundations, companies, and organizations. There is, however, a significant use of public funds. Most applications are renewed when the fund comes to an end, so it is important to maintain the relationship and show the results and impacts. In the organizations that were analyzed, only one of them uses funds and subsidies in addition to donations, which shows their concern to join civil society.

The use of the concept of godparent/associate is very popular among NGDOsin education. Those receive periodic information about their godchildren, constantly strengthening the bonds between the parties. To have as many solidary sponsors as possible, organizations provide flexible financial contribution schemes. This component is usually not sufficient to sustain project expenditure, forcing organisations to look for complementary forms of funding.

Events have a diversity that is difficult to standardize. They include workshops, training, group activities, meals, play sessions, hiking, among others. There is also a wide variety of results, whether in terms of profits, increased network of associates, dissemination of a given project, among others, regardless of the size of the NGDO or its level of notoriety. In the analyzed sample, five out of eight of those who chose to bet on the events had godparents/associates.

Finally, the option to make associates into clients has been a little used option in the sample that was studied. All NGDOs that do so, have products associated with education and some produced in the localities of the projects or that are traditional in respective areas. Of the six that do as such, only one focuses exclusively on sales as a source of income, in addition to donations. However, they all have a social impact organization model.

### 2.8. Cost structure

Knowing the main and secondary activities, their associated factors, the channels that are used and the specific needs of beneficiaries and taxpayers/customers, it is possible to have a complete view of the costs that the organization will incur in a project. The collected data in this study does not allow to indicate a pattern for the two categories mentioned in the theoretical contextualization (fixed costs and variable costs) or for the two structures (economies of scale and economies of scope) due to the lack of information and the various specific approaches and strategies. However, it is possible to mark and relate the main expenses found.

Fixedcosts:

- Expenseswith project staff - The four main cost centers identified in schools are: teachers, trainers, and educators; the school's attendants and assistants; the cooks (when there is a canteen); and school supplies (including school insurance). In addition to those, there are administrative services and management,as well as coordination, that are ensured as much as possible by local people to strengthen organizational sustainability.
- Expenses with the organization's staff - In addition to the human resources of the projects, there are also people who work in the management of the organization itself. The main functional areas identified are strategy, financing, communication, accounting, human resources, and project management.
- Office supplies - Most workers are associated with the consumption of materials. There is a tendency to make a forecast of these consumptions or even a delimitation of budgetary possibilities to fix these costs.
- Communications - To create a communication channel between projects and the organization it is necessary to develop a safe, stable, and cost-effective approach. Although it is not a reality common to all NGDOs studied, most of them favourinternet for this purpose.
- Leasing - Both in the projects and in the organizations' locations there are associated leases, mainly of equipment and facilities. In the sample that was studied, leasing is justified because itis less costly than the acquisition. It is possible, however, to see that the most common rental cases refer to real estate.
- Services - Unlike the rental of equipment and facilities, in the provision of services there is a balanced division between the expenses of the projects and those of the general administration.

Variablecosts:

- Energy and water - These costs arise from both basic and superfluous consumption as the utility differs. Much information about them was not found in the NGDOs evaluated.
- Depreciation - Based on the study done, it is possible to detect that this type of cost is reduced compared to the other projects' charges.
- Feeding - In NGDOs that had feeding canteens for their students, costs often vary, making it impossible to classify them as a fixed cost. Nevertheless, in the sample these costs are presented as fixed because an average is made that varies depending on the location and other relevant constraints.
- Other expenses - All other expenses required.

With its costs listed, we can see that fixed costs are more significant than the variables in NGDOsin education, preponderating the economies of scope. At the same time, there are economies of scale in exported goods, from clothing to school supplies as well as in food products.

## 2.9. Financial sustainability

Financial sustainability is the NGDO's long-term ability to generate the financial resources that are necessary to develop its strategic purpose. To dothis, it is necessary to ensure that the sources of revenue are sufficient to cover the expenses necessary to carry out strategic planning, accounting, flexibility/adaptability, and vision for the future.

The value and number of sources of income have been increasing in NGDOs, enhancing the emergence and expansion of this type of organizations. Themainsources of resources are as follows:

- Sponsorship fromlegal entities;
- Support from individuals;
- Donations from foundations and international organizations;
- Partnerships with government agencies;
- Consignment of taxes.

## 2.10. Main partnerships

Partnerships have different origins, but the common purpose of optimizing business models, reducing risk, and increasing capabilities. They vary in type and motivation, depending on the specific focus, and can therefore reach different elements of the business model.

The main types are four, having as a common element the *win-win logic*that determines the basis of a key partnership:

- Strategic alliances - Partnership between non-competing organizations seeking complementarity;
- "Coopetition" - Cooperation between competing organizations that want to share risks;
- Joint ventures - Joint creation of new temporary businesses, usually to respond to a tender/call,which individually none of them could win;
- Buyer-supplier agreements - Targeting predictable and stable supplies, especially in markets characterized by volatility.

In terms of motivations, one can find four main types: optimization and economy of scale; cost reduction through subcontracting and infrastructure sharing; reducing the risk of uncertainty through partner involvement; and acquisition of resources and private activities, such *as* know-how,licenses or even investment capacity.

Partnerships within NGDOs are usually made with a particular focus. In addition to the association with small entities and individuals, there is growing concern about the impact of involvement with large companies that are increasingly appealing to corporate social responsibility.

## 2.11. Value proposition

By having a common problem and strategic objectives, the NGDOs studied converge on a similar value proposition. The main difference between them lies at the level of communication channels, fundraising approaches,as well as the locations where they focus.

If one Analyzes the value proposition in a deep way, it is identified that the biggest difference is in the communication channels,particularlywebsites, because there is an appreciable variation in quality and accessibility, ease of navigation, availability of information and speed of response to contacts.

The creation of value for the possible taxpayer is done through the dissemination of the reality object of intervention, using images and videos of local people, in general children, who despite living in strongly disadvantaged contexts, show great happiness for being able to go to school. Another approach is the presentation of results that give a perspective of effectiveness, success, and impact on development.

## 2.12. Results/Impact

The fifteen NGDOs studied present different indicators and results, but all consider efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, and impact. All of them show the evolution of school performance, the number of students and the number of actions carried out.

Regarding the evolution of school achievement, the most used indicators are the following: the literacy rate; the human development index; the average age of schooling; the average mortality/life expectancy rate in the first five years; family income; and poverty reduction.

In terms of the number of students, this indicator measures not only participants/influenced but also associated material assets, to go beyond the simple registration of students present through these: attendance rates; number of subscribers; school progression; average age; resources that are available per student; number of textbooks; number of scholarships available; school supplies, among others.

Regarding the number of actions performed, both school and extracurricular activities are reflected, making all the dynamics of the teaching-learning process. The number of schools are considered; the number of classes given per class; exchanges made; the number of meals served; the number of health examinations carried out; the number of sessions with the community; and the number of projects developed.

The local development resulting from the NGDOs studied is notorious and presents several stimulating results/impacts for beneficiaries, workers, and taxpayers.

### 2.13. Positive and negative externalities

In positive externalities, we have the positive evolution of the local human development index.

Starting with the fight against poverty, by empowering the population, the existing economic activities undergo an upgrade process while creating space for other activities to develop. With this evolution, resources are freed up to invest more in health, which leads to increased hope and quality of life for populations. Another important aspect, related to local trade, is that it tends to increase in areas close to schools, creating a virtuous cycle.

In parallel to formal education, there is general and community education where moral and civic education is transmitted, favoring citizenship and the strengthening of democratic values. Well-structured education networks make it easier to implement national and international policies, measures, and actions, favoring and accelerating their evolution. There are also other factors associated with the education promoted by these NGDOs, such as the reduction of child labor and the development of talents.

On the side of negative externalities, we have the dependence of local communities on NGDOs. That makes it to local communities become vulnerable to the economic fluctuations of countries where sources of income are located and to changes in the interests of taxpayers. On the other hand, when they feel this support, national authorities relax their own efforts and investments, making it difficult to standardize education at the country level, creating and deepening differences between communities. Imbalances in local commercial activities may also arise, leading to the segregation of certain communities and giving rise to new communities in need.

### 2.14. Mission

Despite differences in strategies, main activities, internal organization, value proposition, projects, beneficiaries, customers, channels, cost structure, financial sustainability, problems, and solutions, it is possible to conclude that the mission of NGDOsin education in Mozambique is to promote the sectorto combat inequalities and increase the development of the country, seeking change for the better.

## 3. Social business model Canvas of education NGDOs in Mozambique

### 3.1. Presentation of the proposed model

Based on the empirical analysis developed in the previous section, we advanced with the following proposal of social business model Canvas for NGDOsin education in Mozambique:

**Figure 2 - Proposal of a social business model Canvas for NGDOsin education in Mozambique**

<table>
<tr><td colspan="5">Mission<br>To promote education as a way to reduce inequalities specific to each locality and as a crucial factor for progress in development.</td><td rowspan="2">Positive Externalities<br><br>- Empowerment of the population<br>- Increase in productivity<br>- Emergence of new activities<br>- Stimulation of the economies<br>- Improvements in the health sector<br>- Democratic communitarianism</td></tr>
<tr><td>Problem<br>Vulnerability of communities due to low level of education.</td><td>Key Activities<br>- Classes/training<br>-Community Participation<br>- FundRaising<br><br>Secondary Activities<br>- HealthandWellness<br><br>Note: Based on the activities, define all necessary resources</td><td rowspan="2">Value Proposition<br>To convey the value proposition in the most impactful, visual and attractive way, showing that:<br><br>- Supporting the development of realities in need is accessible<br>- Everyone has the possibility to contribute.<br>- The results are noticeable, and the more possibilities there are, the more it changes.</td><td>Relationship with the beneficiaries<br>Measuring their interest and evolution in order to give a complete andadapted response<br><br>- A Priori<br>- During<br>- Posteriori</td><td>Relationship with taxpayers<br>Defining a strategy to attract interest and raisefunds through:<br><br>- Solidary Sponsors/Associates<br>- Donations<br>- Sales<br>- Events<br>- Funds andGrants</td></tr>
<tr><td>Solution<br>To enable access to education for all interested members of the target audience</td><td>Indicators/Results<br>- Number of Students<br>- Evolution of school performance<br>- No. of actionstaken</td><td>Communication Channels<br>- Social Network<br>- WebSite<br>- Newsletter<br>Distribution Channels<br>- International<br>- NationalDistribution<br>- Local Distribution<br>Sales Channels<br>- Direct<br>- Indirect</td><td>Partners<br>To Detect all those who can contribute with goods and services<br><br>- Associations/Institutions<br>- Companies<br>- Publicentities<br>- Local partners</td><td rowspan="2">Negative Externalities<br><br>- Dependence of the population on the NGO<br>- Acting in thethird sector<br>- Diversity of means among NGOs<br>- Possibility of unbalancing the economy<br>- Creation of segregated communities</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">CostStructure<br>To try to define fixed costs and variable costs in order to reduce risksand look for partners that can help reduce these.</td><td colspan="2">Financial Sustainability<br>- Try to forecast costs so that at th eend of the year expenses do not exceed revenues.<br>- Create a financial cushion to reducerisks</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration

## 3.2. Model validation

To validate the model built, a focus group techniquewas used, materialized in a panel of five qualified observers, purposely invited for this purpose and who were asked to comment on the adherence of the proposed model to the represented reality.

Three sessions were organized with a duration of 60 minutes each,with a 24-hour break in between. Given the current situation, the sessions took place virtually, using the digital platform Zoom.

The five experts were:

- The representative of an educationNGDO working in Mozambique, outside the sample studied;
- A beneficiary of an education project of an NGDOin education working in Mozambique, at the age of 18;
- A client/contributor of an educationNGDO working in Mozambique;
- A partner of an NGDOin education working in Mozambique;
- A representative of the Ministry of Education and Human Development of Mozambique.

The model was tested according to the approach proposed by Fern (1982).

A discussion of the Mission Statement began. Although there was widespread agreement with it, the panelists suggested that the existing formulation be complemented with "human and economic" to specify the type of development targeted by education NGDOs.

The problem was then analyzed. There was a consensus in the panel on the importance of the elements formulated. However, it was emphasizedthat it was pertinentto add individuals and families and not restricting the problem to only to communities.

Regarding the key activities, the panel considered the activities put forwardas valid, but suggested adding a component relatedto the mobilization of volunteers. Considering the concrete reality of the country, and the specific experience of the panelists, volunteers are a determining component of the success of these organizations.

As for the Value Proposition, the panel found interesting the elements included in this section but suggested a reformulation to make clearer both the concept of value in a social business model and the scope of it.

As for the relationship with the beneficiaries, the panel considered the objectification in time steps to be particularly relevant. They proposed, however, that the beneficiaries should be specified, seeingno advantage ifthey wereonly implied.

The Relationship with Taxpayers block found unanimous support, and it was considered that it reflects the reality of the population studied.

In the Partners' analysis, the panel considered that the study carried out is correct, but that the list of the same should not be restricted and therefore it was suggested to be added "in particular, but not exclusively".

In the Channel block, the panel considered the presentation developed in three subgroups particularly relevant. Therefore, there was support for the formulation made of this block.

In the discussion of the elements placed in the Solution, the panel considered that the formulation developed was clear, but that it would be pertinent to join, at the end, "of each specific project and/or NGDO".

As for the Indicators/Results, the panel agreed with the chosen elements and discussed some others that could join those. However, this analysis did not exactly result in a concrete proposal for the combination of indicators, but only a recommendation to consider more alternatives.

The panel's assessment of financial sustainability is that, in the proposed model, the elements presented reflect a satisfactory response to the requirements of the model used, thus supporting the proposal made.

As far as the Cost Structure is regarded, the panel considered that there could be greater precision of this element, considering the information collected when assessing the data collected.

Regarding the appreciation of externalities, and starting with the positive ones, the panel suggested small improvements in detail that were promptly met and resubmitted to the same panel for final validation.

On negative externalities, minor changes and details were also suggested and it was stated that, overall, the proposal presented reflected the opinion of the elements of this focus group.

Therefore, the validated model presents the following configuration:

**Figure 3 - Social Business Model Canvas for NGDOs in the field of education in Mozambique, after focus group validation**

<table>
<tr><td colspan="5">Mission<br>To promote education as a way to reduce inequalities specific to each locality and as a crucial factor for progress in terms of human and economic development.</td><td rowspan="2">Positive Externalities<br><br>- Capacity building of the population in key competencies<br>- Increased productivity of the Mozambican economy<br>- Development of new economic activities<br>- Stimulation of depressed economic activities<br>- Improvements in the health sector<br>- Increasing democratic communitarianism</td></tr>
<tr><td>Problem<br>Vulnerability of individuals, families and communities due to low level of education.</td><td>Key Activities<br>- Classes/training<br>- Community Participation<br>- Fundraising<br>- Mobilizing Volunteers<br>Secondary Activities<br>- Health and wellness<br><br>Note: Based on the activities, define all necessary resources</td><td rowspan="2">Value Proposition<br>The generic benefit offered is EDUCATION. Hence the following:<br><br>- Supporting the development of realities in need is possible<br>- Everyone will find an intervention space to give their contribution<br>- The results are expressive and clearly measurable</td><td>The beneficiaries are individuals in need of education, by age groups, previous qualification levels and geographical areas<br>Measuring their interest and evolution in order to provide a complete and adapted response at the various stages:<br><br>- A Priori<br>- During<br>- Posteriori</td><td>Relationship with taxpayers<br>To define a strategy to attract interest and raise funds through:<br><br>- Sponsors/Associates<br>- Donations<br>- Sales<br>- Events<br>- Funds and Grants</td></tr>
<tr><td>Solution<br>Enable access to education for all those</td><td>Indicators/Results<br>- Number of Students<br>- Evolution of school performance</td><td>Communication Channels<br>- Social Network</td><td>Partners<br>Detect all those who can contribute, namely with goods and services,</td><td>Negative Externalities<br><br>- Dependence of</td></tr>
</table>

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| who are interested from the target audience of each specific project and/or NGDO | - No. of actions taken | | - WebSite<br>- Newsletter<br>**Distribution Channels**<br>- International<br>- National Distribution<br>- Local Distribution<br>**Sales Channels**<br>- Direct<br>- Indirect | though not exclusively.<br><br>- Associations/Institutions<br>- Companies<br>- Public entities<br>- Local partners | the population on the NGO<br>- Acting in the third sector<br>- Diversity of means among NGOs<br>- Possibility of unbalancing the economy<br>- Creation of segregated communities |
| **Cost Structure**<br>To make a prior operational risk analysis to determine the level of sustainable fixed costs, trying, whenever possible, to replace them by variable costs, since operational leverage is not an objective of these organizations. | | | **Financial Sustainability**<br>- Try to forecast costs so that at the end of the year expenses do not exceed revenues.<br>- Create a financial cushion to reduce risks | | |

Source: Own elaboration

## Conclusion

The present work represents the first case identified in the literature of application and validation of the Social Business Model Canvas in NGDOs in Mozambique. The results achieved and described in this investigation support the pertinence of using the business model as a fundamental framework in the evaluation of the activities of third sector organizations.

Important implications can be drawn both for the management of these organizations and management of education in Mozambique. The participation of a representative of the Ministry of Education and Human Development of the country allowed considering this second vision in the validated model.

Finally, the main limitations were the fact that it was not possible to include further observations in our sample, or detailed data on the costs of the NGDOs assessed.

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# THE EUROPEAN UNION'S RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE FUND, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROJECT AND ITS FUTURE PROSPECTS

**FILIPE GUERRA**
filipe.guerra@ua.pt
Jurist. Master's student in the course of Public Administration and Management and of PhD in Public Policies, in the Department of Social, Political and Territorial Sciences of the University of Aveiro (Portugal). Post-Graduate in Labour Law by the Institute of Labour and Company Law of the Faculty of Law of the University of Coimbra and also holds a degree in Law from the Lusíada University of Porto.

## Abstract

Throughout its history, the process of European integration has been shaped by successive stages of transfer of competences and powers from the Member States to the European Union and its institutions. At the same time, and with progressively shorter latency periods, several moments of crisis in the integration process were recorded. Of these crises, the financial crisis that began in 2008 was of particular importance, demonstrating the difficulties in reaching consensus and the fragmentation of interests within the European integration process.

This article aims to make a historical revisitation of several crisis moments in the European integration process, with special attention to the past sovereign debt and Eurozone crises. From this exposition, an argument is made about the susceptibility of fragmentation of interests within the European Union, what are the causes and consequences of this fragmentation and how this was reproduced throughout 2020 in the construction of the Recovery and Resilience Fund, launched by the European Union in response to the crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, a diverse set of perspectives on the Resilience and Recovery Fund and its relevance in the framework of the continuity of the European integration process is presented.

Finally, we conclude that the European integration process is once again marked by the strengthening of its political agenda and by recent signs of adaptation of the European Union institutions to the management of constant crisis cycles, allowing the integration process to continue.

## Keywords

European Union, Resilience and Recovery Fund, Integration, Crisis, COVID-19.

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# THE EUROPEAN UNION'S RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE FUND, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROJECT AND ITS FUTURE PROSPECTS[1]

**FILIPE GUERRA**

## Introduction

From a geographical point of view, the European integration process is composed of successive enlargements to new member states, thus incorporating a growing diversification of national realities and new sub-regional scales with different levels of development.

Throughout its history, the integration process has faced several moments of crisis, exposing growing asymmetries and divergences of interests, with emphasis on the *Brexit* process, which led to the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union (EU), a precedent never before experienced.

The health crisis generated by the Covid-19 pandemic, starting in early 2020, within weeks reached all EU countries. However, the impacts of this crisis, were not the same in all Member States, not only from the health point of view, but also in terms of its effects on national economies. In this context, the pre-pandemic economic conditions of the member states and their resilience to various types of crises were some of the elements that created relevant differences.

Faced with the political and legal framework of the EU, to which the Member States have freely surrendered, and with a crisis that, although on different scales and dimensions, has affected everyone, the European institutions have begun to construct an economic plan for the rapid recovery of national economies. However, early on, in the various negotiating arenas, various fundamental disagreements were found as to its constitution, with the repetition of disagreements already expressed in previous crises, namely from 2008 onwards.

Throughout 2020, the EU showed signs of fragmentation, including the constitution and political solidification of national blocs with divergent interests within its institutions. Despite the health and economic emergency, only at the end of 2020 did the EU reach a final agreement between its institutions and the Member States, through a negotiation with a joint solution between the Recovery and Resilience Fund and the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027.

This article initially presents the founding aspects of the previous political and financial crises, what their economic and political consequences were and how these were

[1] Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.

projected into the negotiations of the Resilience and Recovery Fund. Next, the main negotiating divergences and key moments throughout 2020 are observed, as well as the characteristics and expectations about the future of the Recovery and Resilience Fund. And finally, we point out the changes and policy differences adopted by the EU in the resolution of crises, which signs of transformation can be observed at present and their relevance in the context of continuity of the European integration process.

## Theoretical framework: lessons from the Eurozone crisis and its projection in 2020

Alongside the successive enlargements with new Member States and the strengthening of the powers of its institutions, the European integration process around the EU has at the same time been marked by several moments of divergence and tension between Member States. Over the decades these tensions have been frequent, but it has been recorded that latency periods between crises are progressively shorter. Since 2008, there have been four particularly visible moments of crisis, namely the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, the Brexit process, and so-called illiberalism (Hooghe & Marks, 2019).

The crisis surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic throughout 2020 in the EU has produced consequences on several levels, highlighting its health, economic and social impacts. The capacity of the EU institutions to solve the set of problems triggered by the pandemic crisis would be a new test of the resilience of its institutions, of its capacity to build consensus and common solutions, towards the continuation of the integration process. From an economic, political and social point of view, the so-called Eurozone crisis in 2008 had left important consequences and set an unpleasant political precedent. It was now important to recognise whether the EU could develop a different economic crisis resolution.

The Euro Zone crisis in 2008 was triggered after the successive collapses of various financial institutions in the USA, starting with the notorious *Lehman Brothers* case. From these collapses, on the other side of the Atlantic, and the exposure of European banks to this crisis, a sovereign debt crisis was created, to the extent that some EU Member States did not have the necessary liquidity to save their banking systems, thus requiring external assistance (Glencross, 2014).

Against this background, in the so-called sovereign debt market, some southern states, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal (and Ireland), became debtors, while the central states became creditors, insofar as they allowed the debtor states to continue to be financed in the sovereign debt market (Grauwe, 2016). However, the creditor states imposed as a counterpart to their financial assistance, the imposition of domestic austerity measures on the debtor states, as a guarantee of repayment of the amounts borrowed (Grauwe, 2016).

In this process, the European Commission did not remain equidistant, accepting to become an agent of political pressure in defence of the creditor countries, pressuring the debtor countries to take austerity measures and the so-called structural reforms (Grauwe, 2016). The solution found and its political construction, with different institutional levels, constituted a combination of intergovernmental coordination and supranational hierarchy (Börzel, 2016).

The impact of austerity measures, such as the increase in unemployment or the cuts in pension systems, in debtor countries, has led to strong public opposition, which has had immediate political effects, namely electoral, with the rise of populist and Eurosceptic movements, among other extremist parties. Large sections of the electorates in debtor countries blamed the EU for austerity measures and their effects (Ceballos, 2015). In short, the 2008 crisis, demonstrated a correspondence, between the effects of the policies pursued from the EU institutions, their nature and their impact on the lives of citizens, and the evidence of solidarity between member states, with the acceptance of the European integration process.

The economic crises from 2008 and in 2020, even though at their origins they are completely different in nature, with regard to the issues and the negotiating blocks formed, which resulted in negotiating divergences, have some relevant similarities, although in the projection of their conclusion there are significant differences.

Within the scope of the similarities between crises, to which reference was made, the way in which these periods of crisis exposed the profound asymmetries existing between the economies of the member states and the respective political interests, on the one hand, and, on the other, the visible susceptibility to division between member states in the EU institutions, with a tendency towards the formation of negotiating blocs defending disparate interests and with different proposals. The EU currently seems to have structural differences, which nevertheless reveal a strong interdependence between member states.

The 2008 crisis and the solutions found, namely with the imposition of austerity measures on debtor countries, had set precedents as to the form and content of its resolution, resulting in a serious political crisis, with signs of discontent in the continuity of the integration process. The risk of a possible repetition in 2020 of the solutions and formulas of the past was posed by the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. In this context, the question was whether there would be a repetition of policies or whether the EU had understood the potential disruptive consequences of its solutions in deepening its integration process. Important political figures in 2020 were also present in the 2008 policy definitions, such as Christine Lagarde, current President of the European Central Bank, or Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany.

## Methodology

This article was carried out through the attention dedicated to a multiplicity of sources, seeking to ensure their multidisciplinarity, analytical diversity and reliability. In this sense, a survey of data was carried out based on statements and publications of representatives of the EU and its Member States, collected through the certified and official websites of the EU institutions. In other cases, the collection was carried out from reproductions published in various media and news agencies of international reference, preferably specialised in matters of politics, economics and the EU. This collection was carried out throughout the years 2020 and 2021.

The search for academic literature, for the literature review, sought to focus on publications whose analysis focused on matters related to the European integration process, the European integration crises, the Eurozone and sovereign debt crisis, the Recovery and Resilience Fund and the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. In this sense, we selected a set of publications that presented varied perspectives, seeking greater analytical and multidisciplinary breadth and variety, in which cases of analytical complementarity were also found. Most of the selected sources, in terms of authors and place of publication, are of European origin. In this search and selection exercise, we also sought to include the most recent publications, with the final selection being representative of the period between 2014 and 2021.

## The Recovery and Resilience Plan: characterisation

Throughout the year 2020, the European institutions faced the need to sustain the severe economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. The 2020 crisis was delivering the biggest shock to the European economy since World War II, in the words of Christine Lagarde (2020). The EU should rise to the occasion, and the response that the EU would be able to give to the serious crisis would be a responsibility, the failure of which could represent a potential existential crisis (Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020).

Faced with the political centrality of the health crisis, and in national health systems, the EU institutions initiated in the first quarter of the year the first steps to counteract the growing crisis, which was already affecting the economies of the Member States. Thus, on 26 March 2020, an envelope of 37 billion euros, was approved in the European Parliament, from amounts reallocated from appropriations for structural funds and other cofinancing where unspent (European Parliament, 2020a). But given the scale of the crisis much more would be needed and negotiations began at the highest level for the formation of a major post-crisis recovery plan.

At the end of the extraordinary summit of heads of state on 26 March, the outlook was not encouraging. Member states were divided on the launch of European debt securities (so-called "*coronabonds*") and the nature of other possible financial instruments (Siza & Aníbal, 2020). The political climate was very tense and potentially discordant, as evidenced by the statements made by the Portuguese Prime Minister, António Costa, in response to the Dutch proposal for an investigation into the budgetary conditions of the southern countries, not hesitating to consider that "such a statement is repugnant within the framework of a European Union. And that's just the expression: repugnant (...) nobody wants to listen to Dutch finance ministers again, as we heard in 2008, 2009, 2010" (O'Leary, 2020). The reference to the 2008 crisis and its divisions was evident.

Days after this summit, Pedro Sanchez, Prime Minister of Spain, a country hit hard by the pandemic crisis, published a clear article in several European newspapers on the magnitude of the crisis and the relevance of what was at stake, linking European solidarity with the need for cohesion, arguing that without this cohesion the credibility of the European project would be compromised (Sanchez, 2020). The EU needed to find solutions that would ensure its bonds of solidarity.

On 18 May, Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron, leaders of the so-called Franco-German axis, held an important meeting with a view to the EU's future response to the crisis. From this moment came the proposal to establish a fund consisting of 500 billion euros, to be distributed among member states, and to be reimbursed in the future (Boffey, 2020). This meeting and the respective conclusions were particularly relevant because they revealed a strategy of economic governance different from the one followed in the 2008 crisis, through a financial exit common to all Member States, using a "Recovery Fund" (Bundesregierung, 2020).

The European Commission's proposal for the Recovery Fund, presented on 27 May, reproduced the essence of the Franco-German proposal, but increased its figures to 750 billion, divided between grants and loans, to be made possible through an EU loan from the financial markets, and made possible through a new own resources ceiling, on a temporary basis, of 2.00% of the EU's gross national income (European Commission, 2020a). The EU seemed to have understood that, unlike the solution adopted for the Eurozone crisis, loans are not sufficient to stabilise crisis situations, carrying significant potential for divergence between nations, parallel to their asymmetries.

Even so, several countries were not satisfied with this European Commission proposal, in particular the so-called "frugals" - the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Denmark - which did not shy away from issuing several public statements of disagreement in the days and weeks that followed. Among its main reasons were the considered excessive weight of its contributions (Euroactiv, 2020), the haste in negotiations (Reuters, 2020), the excessive disproportion of grants over loans (Lovfen, 2020), or the absence of necessary structural reforms in assisted countries (Politico, 2020). Their discordant stance imposed the continuity of negotiations and recalled some demands of the creditor countries during the Eurozone crisis.

After intense negotiations, on 21 July, the President of the Council, Charles Mitchell, announced "we did it" (Herszenhorn & Bayer, 2020). There would be agreement on the Recovery and Resilience Fund, negotiated in parallel with the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, presenting itself as providing 750 billion euros, distributed between 390 billion in grants and 360 billion in loans, integrated in an overall package of 1824.3 billion euros, called 'Next Generation EU'. The result of this programme was that the so-called frugals also achieved some victories on their agenda, such as the reduction of the amount initially foreseen for subsidies or the extension to themselves of the rebate mechanism (which allows for the reduction of contributions to the Community Budget), among other aspects (European Council, 2020a).

The following months saw new rounds of negotiations on the Resilience and Recovery Fund and the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, with difficulties in reaching agreement between the European Council and the European Parliament, particularly on new sources of revenue and financing, on the payment of interest (whether to be allocated inside or outside the Community budget) or on the funds allocated to various Community programmes. Difficulties only overcome on 10 November (European Council, 2020b).

The process of approving the Recovery and Resilience Fund and the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 (their joint negotiation had created a reciprocal dependency) would still experience new difficulties at the end of the year, with the so-called illiberal member states (Hungary and Poland) obstructing their final approval due to the defence mechanism of the rule of law (Struczewski, 2020). This was a mechanism that conditioned the access to community funds to the verification of the protection of the rule of law, in matters such as the independence of the judicial systems. After weeks of negotiations, which included public accusations that were not very favourable to Hungary and Poland (Hall, 2020) and even references to the exclusion of these countries in the ongoing process (Baume & Burchard, 2020), it was possible to reach an agreement by resorting to a delay in the implementation of this mechanism. Thus, both parties seemed satisfied (Bayer, 2020).

The eventual final failure of the negotiations, and the EU's inability to act in unity at a time of serious crisis, could have a high cost on the continuity of the integration process, and the EU could find itself caught between reform and even dissolution (Celi et al., 2020).

Over the months, successive negotiations in various arenas revealed the EU's susceptibility to the constitution of blocs of countries within its institutions, according to their respective interests and which to a large extent reflect the previous tensions and different agendas, already known from 2008. In 2020, there was also the affirmation of a new bloc typology, namely the group of so-called illiberals. On the other hand, and significantly, there was a different typology of EU approach to the crisis, apparently driven by the Franco-German axis.

## Recovery and Resilience Plan: a reaction to crisis in structural design

The economic crisis, triggered by the pandemic COVID-19, has affected individual Member States, but not all of them in the same way, with significant differences in impact. Among several factors contributing to this asymmetry, one can highlight the different levels of confinement and economic and social restrictions imposed by countries; the greater losses in economies more dependent on services and tourism; the greater impact in countries with a higher level of indebtedness and therefore less capacity to take fiscal or debt measures with the markets; or even the different quality and effectiveness of the response of national governments (Sapir, 2020). We can also mention that the different impacts of the pandemic on health systems is another relevant factor.

According to data presented by André Sapir (2020), the impact of the pandemic on Member States' GDP was particularly significant in Croatia (-13.4%), Spain (-12.5%), Ireland (-12.1%), France (-11.7%) and Italy (-11.5%). While countries like Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Finland and Poland were the least affected. From these data, one can therefore foresee different needs for aid.

The Recovery and Resilience Mechanism presented as the central axis of the 'Next Generation EU' programme, has EUR 672.5 billion available, of which EUR 360 billion is loans and EUR 312.5 billion in grants, according to the conclusions of the European Council of 21 July 2020 (European Council, 2020c). According to different analyses, the main beneficiaries of the 'Next Generation EU' programme will be the countries of

Southern and Eastern Europe (Alcidi & Gros, 2020) and this mechanism can thus contribute to the reduction of economic asymmetries between Member States (Watzka & Watt, 2020).

According to Watzka and Watt (2020), if the destination of the funds serves to finance public investment (as is planned), several consequences can be expected, among which are: an increase in public capital stocks throughout the EU area, especially in Southern and Eastern countries; a decrease in economic asymmetries; as a consequence of the increase in GDP, public debt ratios will tend to fall; and finally, in the countries most affected by the crisis, the plan may compensate for productive losses in the pandemic. In other words, a redistributive character of this project can be detected, in the sense that it benefits the less developed countries. This aspect also indirectly benefits stronger economies, such as Germany, which also need economic stability from member states for their export markets.

The policy of redistribution between countries, based on a combination of subsidies and loans, in addition to combating asymmetries between Member States (which had not happened before), strengthens the legitimacy of the EU and its institutions by contributing to greater economic and social cohesion.

Access to the funds allocated to the Recovery and Resilience Mechanism by the Member States is conditional on the presentation of their national recovery plans, which must correspond to the various criteria presented by the European Commission, and to which they must be submitted, normally by the end of April 2021, subject to subsequent final approval by the European Council (European Council, 2021). The respective payments will be made according to the fulfilment of various objectives and may be interrupted if these objectives are not met. Moreover, this conditioning and possibility of interrupting payments was one of the victories obtained in the negotiation rounds, led in large part by the so-called group of frugals (the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Sweden).

However, the financial availability of this stimulus and its practical implementation are not linear, entailing some risks of failure, highlighting at least two difficulties. On the one hand, as the allocation of funds is planned for the period between 2021 and 2023, and their disbursement until 2026, it is still unknown how they will be distributed over time (Watzka & Watt, 2020), on the other hand, the different levels of absorption capacity for European funds by the Member States should be considered, as in the disparity observed between Estonia's absorption rate of 95% and Croatia's of only 48%. In this way, there are also significant asymmetries which jeopardise the usefulness of the plan (Darvas, 2020).

Thus, there are two types of risk that may arise, the first related to the traditional slowness of absorption of structural and investment funds by the States, and the second due to the limits in the capacity of national governments to channel large sums of public money (Alcidi & Gros, 2020). It will be a challenge for many Member States to deal simultaneously with the rapid implementation of such significant amounts, and also, from the Community perspective, a significant risk of losing the opportunity to affirm its project.

The traditional operationalisation of community programmes always requires definition, approval and implementation procedures, which tend to be lengthy and prolonged

(Darvas, 2020), and this mechanism is no exception. This will be a difficulty whose rapidity to overcome will be crucial for its effectiveness at a time of crisis that will require effective and equally rapid responses, under penalty of frustration and discontent in the neediest economies and in public opinion expectant after media and hopeful announcements.

On the other hand, it could always be argued that financial markets could help solve this problem of speed by providing immediate loans to countries, thus avoiding, or reducing, recourse to loans later. However, this possibility does not obviate the need for quick procedures and payments given the magnitude of the economic crisis in member states (Darvas, 2020).

Access to the funds of this new instrument is also subject to a set of options and objectives predefined by the European Commission (European Commission, 2020b), which are much more ambitious than a response strictly directed to the challenges posed by the pandemic, corresponding in their discretion to a set of objectives of strategic importance for the political and economic stability of the EU (Alcidi & Gros, 2020). It is difficult to observe a direct relationship between the "fight against climate change" or the "digital transition" as immediate responses to the increase in unemployment related to the economic shock waves triggered by the pandemic. Based on this apparent duality of objectives, a clear definition of the real possibilities and criteria for directing funds becomes more complex.

According to Iain Begg (2021), the EU is witnessing a reassertion of its industrial policies and a paradigm shift towards market liberalisation, in line with the more recent past. Among other potentially explanatory elements for this paradigm shift are concerns about low growth rates in the EU, the growing role of China and Europe's loss of influence, or technological and productive changes in fields such as automation or digitalisation. The Recovery and Resilience Plan seeks to provide responses to these and other contemporary problems, such as climate change. Reflecting these concerns, there is increasing visibility of the term "strategic autonomy" in the European discourse.

The 'Next Generation EU' programme is still mistrusted because it focuses its funding on national regeneration programmes and their infrastructure, lacking a long-term perspective of investment on a European scale, with a broader view of all the Member States and not only of successive national levels (Watzka & Watt, 2020).

## The Plan and the Future of Integration in the European Union

According to Charles Michel, President of the European Council, when presenting his proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework and recovery package, "the objectives of our recovery can be summed up in three words: convergence, resilience and transformation. More concretely this means: repairing the damage caused by Covid-19, reforming our economies and reshaping our societies" (European Council, 2020d).

Charles Michel's statements convey the idea that his proposal is not only aimed at repairing the damage caused by Covid-19, there are much higher goals with future, economic and social implications. Thus, given the size of the financial packages and the nature of their objectives, their success may help to reduce existing asymmetries and create greater interdependence between Member States, strengthening their ties to the EU and its institutions, deepening the integration process and opening the way to a new phase of institutional construction (Braun, 2015).

According to Jean Pisany-Ferry (2020a), the Recovery and Resilience Plan is a risky bet by the EU and its institutions. Should this Plan succeed in reaching, or even surpassing, its objectives, it could pave the way for new steps in the process of European integration, recovering the expectations it created, extending into new areas such as fiscal unification together with monetary unity (let us remember that monetary unity did not also include unity of the banking system). However, if it fails, this could turn the Plan into a serious blow to the credibility, effectiveness and quality of the responses that the EU can provide in emergency and crisis situations, frustrating federalist or other aspirations towards deeper European integration.

To avoid potential frustration and discontent, the EU could have been clearer on the transformative and structural role of its Recovery and Resilience Plan, however better immediate impact it may have on the less advanced and hardest hit economies (Pisany-Ferry, 2020b). For the economic recovery of the Member States, it will also be important to overcome the health crisis, efficiently massify the distribution of available vaccines (a subject on which the EU and its Commission have been the target of criticism) and put an end to the successive confinements of the population, freeing up relevant economic activities that are being hampered.

## Conclusion

The combination of the need for a rapid response to the economic crisis and the tendency for slow political decision-making and implementation processes of the EU institutions is complex. Faced with an emergency of the gravity of the current economic crisis, swift and effective responses would be needed on the huge losses that member states are already facing. And the architecture of the Recovery Plan does not seem to fulfil this requirement. Moreover, even in the context of its approval, the traditional difficulties and the slowness of several Member States in absorbing Community funds will have to be taken into consideration.

The EU showed signs of understanding about the possible costs of its inaction in the face of a crisis unprecedented since its foundation, and began to build its reaction. In this way, it has shown a quicker ability to react than in previous crises, also demonstrating a capacity for learning and better crisis management, probably gained through its accumulated experience (Wolf & Ladi, 2020). Even so, the period of negotiations for the establishment of the Recovery and Resilience Fund, as mentioned, did not hide the existence of various types of asymmetries between Member States, and consequently the existence of internal divergences within the EU, confirming a still persistent trend.

Unlike the 2008 crisis, in which only after the bankruptcy of banks and the onset of economic chaos did the EU feel forced to intervene and initiate proceedings, in 2020 intervention began earlier, with different political premises and objectives, and safe from the suspicion of favouring more developed countries. On the contrary, the EU has sought a concerted and participatory response by the Member States, with a redistributive profile, in favour of the weakest economies hit hardest by the pandemic, constructing a Recovery and Resilience Plan which, among other things, gives priority to subsidies over loans.

The fact that the EU has reached agreement on such relevant matters, on the response to the current crisis but also projecting a set of structural policies and economic development objectives for its future, tending towards economic cohesion and the correction of asymmetries, reveals new ambitions and a renewed commitment between Member States, with new elements of a political and economic nature, in the sense of strengthening their interdependence and cooperation. In short, the continuity of the integration process.

In the hardest moments of the Eurozone crisis, the EU was accused of depoliticising the economic adjustment programmes in the debtor states, a moment characterised by Schmidt as a 'policy without policies' (2020) with consequences for people's perception of its role, subordinated to the public image of technocratic institutions such as the so-called *'Troika'*. In 2020, by contrast, the leading national and institutional political figures gave visibility to their political role, as well as that of their European institutions. The political line of technocracy submerged again, with a return of the so-called politicisation (Wolf & Ladi, 2020). Personalities such as Merkel, Macron, von der Leyen and Mark Rutte were constant presence in the media and decisive in the course of the negotiations.

In short, at the confluence of these elements, it can also be said that the role of the EU and its institutions in the 2020 crisis, as presented in this article, reveals a growing political capacity to adapt to crises. The succession of crises in a short space of time will have built this capacity, by adapting to a permanent state of adversity and divergence, shaping the interior of the institutions and enabling them to the necessary responses.

However, a number of challenges and risks remain. By building a joint solution between the 'Next Generation EU' programme and the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, and assuming negotiating simultaneity and interdependence between the programmes, and that they are not only about solving the present crisis but also reshaping member states' economies, the EU and its leaders are taking on responsibilities and burdens that are not without risk in case of failure.

At present, as mentioned, there are already serious reservations about the effectiveness of these funds, about the adequacy of their amounts and the speed of their implementation, given the scale of the current crisis (Celi et al., 2020), as well as about the capacity of Member States to absorb them. If its ineffectiveness is confirmed, and in a context of asymmetries and political divergences - discrete for the time being - new forms of crisis in the integration process may emerge, both at the level of political leaders and in national public opinion, as has been seen in the past. As an example of the various weaknesses that continue to plague the EU, we note the negative reactions of various political actors to the problems in the procurement and distribution of vaccines for the Covid-19 pandemic.

In conclusion, the EU has corrected some mistakes made in the past and pursues an apparent line of increasing politicisation and accountability of its institutions. Given the expectations created among national public opinions, the success of the 'Next Generation EU' programme will be relevant in the present and future development of the European integration process, but also in defining the relevance of the EU in the international context.

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# A KUZNETS ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH: AN APPLICATION ON RISING POWERS

**HÜSEYIN ÜNAL**
huseyin.unal@ktu.edu.tr
Karadeniz Technical University, Department of Econometrics

**HÜLYA KINIK**
hulya.ercan@ktu.edu.tr
Karadeniz Technical University, Department of International Relations

**Abstract**

This study aims to test the validness of Kuznets' hypothesis in major rising powers between the years of 2000 and 2018 within the scope of the relationships between life expectancy at birth (throughout the paper-life expectancy-LE) and economic growth. Using panel data analysis method, we investigate if there is a curve such as Health Kuznets Curve (HKC) for life expectancy. The empirical findings indicate that the validity of HKC hypothesis could not be obtained for Brazil, Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa and Turkey. A U-shaped relationship exists between these two variables for these countries. In other respects, we found empirical evidence of a Kuznets'curve and inverted U-shaped relations between economic growth and life expactancy for Australia, China, Indonesia and Korea. Empirical evidence also suggests that there is not any relationship between economic growth and life expectancy for India.

**Keywords**

Life Expectancy, Rising Powers, Economic Growth, Panel Data Analysis, Kuznets's Hypothesis

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# A KUZNETS ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH: AN APPLICATION ON RISING POWERS

**HÜSEYIN ÜNAL**

**HÜLYA KINIK**

## Introduction

Life expectancy is among the most significant indicators of health and public welfare widely used to measure the general health status of a population. In practice it is a reasonable proxy for population health (Canning 2012: 1784) and a measure that summarizes the mortality level of a given population in a given year. It provides us with key information about the development level of a country's welfare state (Bayın, 2016: 94). Health issues have become essential as countries with higher life expectancy have a tendency to show a better level of development and achieve long-term economic development (Hassan et al, 2016: 105).

In this context, we analyze the relationship and causality between life expectancy and economic growth and different control variables under the Simon Kuznets's "inverted U-curve hypothesis" for 10 rising powers named BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and MIKTA countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia) during the period 2000-2018, using panel data method. Although rising powers phenomenon is a new concept, it has been a subject to many studies but there has been very little published on their status in health. These countries not only prioritize economic development, but they also put emphasis on the cooperation in the field of global health. They have been recognised for their capacity and potential to influence global health. On the other hand, BRICS and MIKTA countries together represent nearly 50% of global population. Accordingly, it is crucial to analyze their situation in terms of life expectancy as a key representation of a population's general state of health.

Over the past few decades, new rising powers have achieved notable success with regard to their life expectancy. These improvements have been result of several factors such as growing incomes and increasing education as well as governments' attempts to develop their citizens' health status. Global life expectancy at birth in 2018 was 72.5 years ranging from the lowest as 63.9 years for South Africa to the highest as 82.7 years for Australia among selected countries. As the Figure 1. shows that during the given period, there has been an increase in life expectany of South Africa but it is stil below the world average. On the other hand, Australia and Korea rank among ten nations with the highest life expectancy. The life expectancy at birth is 77.4 years for the total population in Turkey which ranked 52 in the world in 2018.

**Figure 1. Life Expectancy At Birth (both sexes combined, world rank, 2018)**




Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

Within this framework, this study is organized as follows: the first part summarizes the existing literature on the determinants of life expectancy; section 2 reviews Kuznets Hypothesis as theoretical background and describes the method of data collection and methology of the study; section 3 examines the results of the study and the latest section reports the conclusions.

## 1. Literature Review on the Determinants of Life Expectancy

Numerous previous studies devoted to investigate different life expectancy determinants have taken into consideration several factors like income, inflation, education, health care spending, improved water coverage and sanitation, employment rate, urbanization, and many others. However, there is a lack of consensus about the variables that determine life expectancy in empirical evaluation. The only consensus is that income affects life expectancy positively.

In his cross-sectional study, Grossman (1972) investigated that inflation negatively affects life expectancy, and household welfare was generally damaged due to increasing prices. Preston (1976) evaluated the relative importance of income and variations in income in determining the levels and fluctuations in the level of life expectancy. The main result of his study is that life expectancy was correlated with per capita income, but eventually changes in income have been quite unimportant since World War II to affect changes in life expectancy.

In their study, Rogers and Wofford (1989) found that urbanization, agrarian population, illiteracy rate, safe drinking water, average calorie per person and doctor per population had a significant role on life expectancy for developing states. Gulis (2000) found that income per capita, public spending on health, access to water, calorie intake and rate of literacy are highly effective in determining life expectancy for 156 countries of the world. Kalediene and Petrauskiene (2000) indicated that urbanization is among the main life expectancy determinants for both developed and developing countries as they are able to reach better medical aid, more opportunities for education and advanced social and economic background which positively affected the health.

Hussain (2002) have also studied factors that affect life expectancy based on the cross-sectional data using multiple OLS. The result of his study suggested that life expectancies in developing countries could be significantly developed if close attention was given to fertility decrease and raising calorie intakes.

Yavari and Mehrnoosh (2006) examined how socio- economic factors affect life expectancy based on multiple regression analysis. The results of their study suggest a positive and strong interaction between life expectancy and per capita income, health expenses, literacy rate and daily caloric intake. Their study also shows that the number of people per doctor negatively affects life expectancy in African countries. Erdogan and Bozkurt (2008) analyzed the correlation between life expectancy and economic development in Turkey between 1980-2005 basen on ARDL boundary test model. They asserted that economic growth positively affects life expectancy in Turkey.

Kabir (2008) examined the socio-economic factors that have effect on life expectacy with ten widely used variables for 91 developing countries by applying multiple regression probit models. The findings suggest that almost all explanatory variables turned out to be unimportant, showing that socio-economic conditions can not be regarded as influential on the life expectancy of developing nations all the time.

Lei et al. (2009) explored the socioeconomic determinants of life expectancy in Beijing by using the linear stepwise regression model. The results show that floor space available per rural resident and GDP per capita have a positive relationship with life expectancy, while there is a negative relationship between life expectancy and the rural population proportion and illiteracy rate.

Balan and Jaba (2014) investigated the factors that determine life expectancy in Romania between 1970 and 2008. The results of their study reveal that a positive relationship exists between life expactancy and wages, the number of beds in hospitals, the number of doctors, and the number of readers subscribed to libraries. In addition, the proportion of the Roma population and the illiterate population ratio have negative effects on life expectancy.

Bilas et al. (2014) examined life expectancy for 28 European Union countries during 2001-2011 using panel data analysis method. They pointed out that both GDP per capita and level of education expained between 72.6% and 82.6% of differences in life expectancy.

Based on data from 1970 to 2012, Ali and Ahmad (2014) also studied determinants of life expectancy for Oman by using ARDL boundary test method. In their analysis, they included the following determinant factors: per capita income, food production, schooling rate, population growth, inflation and CO2 emissions. According to the results, food production and schooling rate positively affect life expectancy and have statistically significant effects on life expectancy while inflation and per capita income had negative and unreasonable impacts on life expectancy. The results also suggest that population growth had a negative and significant effect on life expectancy while CO2 emissions had positive and statistically insignificant impact on the life expectancy in the long-term and a negative and statistically significant effect in the short-term.

Jaba et al. (2014) studied the correlation of health expenditures with life expectancy in selected 175 countries between 1995 and 2010 by using panel data method. There is a significant correlation between these two variables.

Memarian (2015) analyzed the relationship among health spending, life expectancy and economic growth in Iran from 1989 to 2011 deploying the ARDL econometric model. He found that as life expectancy and health care expenditure increased economic growth increased as well.

Based on A Vector Autoregression (VAR) Analysis method, Sede and Ohemeng (2015) analyzed the socio-economic determinants of life expectancy in Nigeria between 1980 and 2011. They mesured the effects of different independent variables as follows: per capita income, secondary school enrolment, public expenditures on health, unemployment rate and the Naira exchange rate. Schooling rate in secondary education, per capita income and government expenditure on health were not significant in determining the life expectancy in Nigeria. However, unemployment and exchange rate had a significant effect on life expectancy.

Şahbudak and Şahin (2015) studied the relationship between health indicators and economic growth in BRIC countries between 1995 and 2013 by using panel data method. They used GDP as dependent variable and included the share of health expenditures in GDP, life expectancy at birth and child mortality rates as independent variables. Results showed that there is a positive relationship among the share of health expenditures in GDP, life expectancy at birth and economic growth; but negative correlation exists between economic growth and child mortality rates.

Monsef and Mehrjardi (2015) studied the determinants of life expectancy in 136 countries during 2002-2010 based on panel data analysis method. Their study shows that unemployment and inflation have a significant negative effects on life expectancy. However, a positive relationship exists among the gross capital formation, national income, and life expectancy.

Hassan et al. (2016) researched the relationship between life expectancy rate and expenses on health, GDP, education index, improved water coverage, and improved sanitation in 108 developing countries during 2006-2010 based on panel data analysis. The empirical results indicate that there is a positive correlation between life expectancy rate and all selected indicators.

Within these framework, this paper tries to answer what factors determine life expectancy as a key elemet for the nation’s health status for BRICS and MIKTA groups based on panal data analysis as a parallel of Kuznetz' theoretical model. Several authors have examined Kuznets' hypothesis with cross-country data, but these studies have generally tested the validity of this hypothesis analyzing relationship between income growth and environmental pollution. Therefore, this study will make a significant contribution to the scarce literature which have tested the validity of Kuznets' hypothesis in health. Nevertheless, country selection is another substantial contribution for existing literature on rising major powers. Based on the literature review, the data used in this study were listed below and they were all obtained from World Bank's website.

– LE = Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
– GDP = Real GDP per capita (2010 constant)
– INF = Inflation rate (annual %)
– POPD = Population density (people per sq. km)
– HE = Current health expenditure per capita(% of GDP)
– FR = Fertility rate (births per woman)

## 2. Testing For a Kuznets Curve: Econometric Methodology

Simon Kuznets' "inverted U-curve hypothesis" is among the most enduring and significant arguments in the social sciences history. Kuznets's central purpose was to question if inequality in income distribution increase or decrease during a country's economic growth (Kuznets, 2015: 1). At early stage of development little inequality is seen in a poor country. Later, inequality worsens as income increase, but after reaching a peak, inequality begins to decrease with more increase in growth. Present studies which have referred to and tested a health Kuznets' hypothesis are quite rare. While some of the studies confirmed a Kuznets' curve others failed to find any evidence. For instance, Sahn and Younger (2009) examined the relation between level of well-being and inequality at inter-country and intrahousehold levels by applying individuals' body mass index (BMI) as the proxy of well-being. They did not find an evidence of a quadratic curve for BMI-inequality. Molini et al. (2010) have also explored a relationship between the Human Development Index (HDI) and the index of concentration of BMI in developing countries applying quadratic specifications. They found a U-shaped relation between inequalities in BMI and HDI for Vietnam.

In the study, the Kuznet hypothesis adapted for 10 rising powers between 2000 and 2018 is tested with the following model:

$$InLE_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 InGDP_{it} + \gamma_2 InGDP_{it}^2 + \gamma_3 InHE_{it} + \gamma_4 InPOPD_{it} + \gamma_5 InFR_{it} + \gamma_6 INF_{it} + e_{it} \quad (1)$$

where, i denotes rising powers, t denotes year 2000-2018 under observation, $\gamma_0$ denotes constant term, $\gamma_1$, $\gamma_2$, $\gamma_3$, $\gamma_4$, $\gamma_5$ and $\gamma_6$ denote the effects of the regressors on the life expectancy, and $e_{it}$ denotes the error term. Besides these, $InLE_{it}$ is the log-transformed life expectancy, $InGDP_{it}$ is the log-transformed per-capita real GDP, $InHE_{it}$ is the log-transformed current health expenditure, $InPOPD_{it}$ is the log-transformed population density, $InFR_{it}$ is the log-transformed fertility rate and $INF_{it}$ is inflation rate. The data on life expectancy (year), real GDP per capita (2010 constant), fertility rate (births per woman), current health expenditure (% of GDP), population density (people per sq. km) and inflation rate (annual %) are achived from the World Development Indicators.

Equation (1) indicates the effects of economic growth, inflation rate, health expenditure, population density and fertility rate on the life expectancy. We also present an experimental model to examine whether there is a KC for life expectancy by adding $(InGDP_{it}^2)$ to the model. If $\gamma_1 < 0$ and $\gamma_2 > 0$, there will be a U-shaped relationship between life expectancy and real GDP growth rate, but If $\gamma_1 > 0$ and $\gamma_2 < 0$, there will be a inverse U-shaped relationship between real GDP growth rate and life expectancy (HKC valid).

## 2.1. Cross-sectional dependence test

It is important to test the Cross-Sectional Dependence (CD) in estimating panel data models. If CD is checked, the estimator results can be unbiased and consistent (Pesaran, 2004; Breusch and Pagan, 1980). Therefore, cross section dependence should be determined in panel data. LM test proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) is used for panel data whose cross-section (N) dimension is smaller than the time dimension (T). The LM test statistic is calculated as follows:

$$LM = \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^{N} T_{ij}\,\hat{\rho}_{ij}^2 \quad \sim \quad \chi^2 \; \frac{N(N-1)}{2} \tag{2}$$

in which $\hat{\rho}_{ij}$ denotes the correlation coefficients and calculated as follows:

$$\hat{\rho}_{ij} = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T} e_{it} e_{jt}}{(\sum_{t=1}^{T} e_{it}^2)^{1/2} (\sum_{t=1}^{T} e_{jt}^2)^{1/2}} \tag{3}$$

For LM test, the null hypothesis is $H_0\colon \hat{\rho}_{ij} = Cov(e_{it}, e_{jt}) = 0$ (cross-sections are independent) and the alternative hypothesis is $H_1\colon \hat{\rho}_{ij} = Cov(e_{it}, e_{jt}) \neq 0$ (cross-sections are dependent).

## 2.2. Panel unit root test

In the existing literature, according to the cross-sectional dependence, panel unit root tests are examined under two groups as first generation and second generation. First generation unit root tests give unreliable results in the occurrence of CD. Second generation unit root tests are tests that are robust to CD (Pesaran, 2007; Phillips and Sul, 2003). In this study, we use second-generation CADF (cross-sectionally augmented ADF) and CIPS (cross-sectionally augmented IPS) unit root tests to examine the stationarity of the series (Pesaran, 2007). The CADF regression is identfied in Eq.(4).

$$\Delta Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i Y_{it-1} + \delta_0 \bar{Y}_{t-1} + \delta_1 \Delta \bar{Y}_t + \epsilon_{it} \tag{4}$$

Firstly, the CADF statistics are calculated for each cross-section in the panel data from the t statistcs ratios of $\beta_i$ in shown Eq.(4). Then CIPS statistics are computed for the entire panel by taking the average of the CADF test statistics.

$$CIPS = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} CADF_i \tag{5}$$

In Eq.(5) CIPS statistics values are compared with the table Critical Values (CV) calculated by Pesaran's Monte Carlo simulation, which tests the stationary hypotheses. If the calculated CIPS statistic values are smaller than the table CV, the null hypothesis that assumes the existence of the unit root is refused. If not, the null hypothesis are accepted and the series are said not to be stationary (Pesaran, 2007: 277-278).

### 2.3. Slope homogeneity test

It is important to check the slope homogenity of the cross-section units in the panel data, in the occurrence of CD. This is because, the units in the panel data can interact with each other and slope heterogeneity may occur. Therefore, it is necessary to check slope homogenity in order to make reliable estimation (Breitung, 2005). The first known studies in the literature on heterogeneity with panel data were conducted by Swamy (1970). The next the standardized dispersion statistic ($\bar{\Delta}$) and the biased-adjusted one ($\bar{\Delta}_{adj}$) was proposed by Pesaran and Yamagata (2008). This statistics, which utilizes $E(\bar{z}_{it}) = k$ and $var(\bar{z}_{it}) = \frac{2k(T-k-1)}{T+1}$ , are described in the following equations

$$\bar{\Delta} = \sqrt{N}\left(\frac{N^{-1}\tilde{S} - k}{\sqrt{2k}}\right) \sim \chi_k^2 \tag{6}$$

$$\bar{\Delta}_{adj} = \sqrt{N}\left(\frac{N^{-1}\tilde{S} - E(\bar{z}_{it})}{\sqrt{var(\bar{z}_{it})}}\right) \sim N\,(0{,}1) \tag{7}$$

where $\tilde{S}$ denotes Swamy test statistic. In the heterogeneity test, the null hypothesis is defined as the slope coefficients are homogeneous.

### 2.4. The AMG estimator

This article make use of Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator that is immune to slope heterogeneity and CD. The AMG estimator was proposed by Eberhardt and Teal (2010) and Eberhardt and Bond (2009). The procedure for the AMG test is shown in Eq.(8) and Eq.(9).

$$\Delta Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i \Delta X_{it} + \sum_{t=1}^{T} \delta_t D_t + \gamma_i \Delta f_t + \epsilon_{it} \tag{8}$$

$$AMG = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\widetilde{\beta_\iota} \qquad (9)$$

in Eq.(8) express an OLS regression at first difference, θ and Δ represent the coefficient of dummy variable and the first order difference operator, respectively, in Eq.(9) which $\widetilde{\beta_\iota}$ indicates the estimates of $\beta_i$.

## 3. Empirical Results and Discussion

In this article, the impacts of economic growth, inflation rate, health expenditures, population density and fertility rate on life expectancy at birth were analyzed for 10 rising powers using panel data method during the period from 2000 to 2018. Table 1. shows the sum of the selected countries' statistics on the basis of these variables. Using these data, first of all, the cross-sectional dependency of the series (since T> N) was examined with the Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM test. According to the results of CD, the stability of the variables was tested with the CIPS test, one of the second generation unit root tests, and the test results were presented in Table 2. In the second step, the heterogeneity of the slope parameters was checked with the Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) test and the results were summarized in Table 3. In the final phase, the relationship between the series was estimated by using the AMG estimator which is resistant to the CD and the heterogeneity of the slope coefficient, and the results were given in Table 4.

**Table 1- Summary statistics of BRICS and MIKTA countries**

| Country | LE | GDP | HE | POPD | FR | INF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 81.360 | 51209.913 | 8.449 | 2.838 | 1.837 | 2.694 |
| Brazil | 73.130 | 10468.200 | 8.393 | 23.122 | 1.901 | 6.495 |
| China | 74.127 | 4361.510 | 4.443 | 141.673 | 1.632 | 2.196 |
| India | 66.157 | 1334.378 | 3.678 | 407.740 | 2.697 | 6.363 |
| Indonesia | 68.742 | 3073.312 | 2.691 | 132.004 | 2.460 | 6.788 |
| Korea, Rep. | 79.656 | 22021.771 | 5.865 | 508.278 | 1.195 | 2.525 |
| Mexico | 75.005 | 9545.083 | 5.618 | 57.856 | 2.390 | 4.638 |
| Russian Federation | 68.465 | 9996.949 | 5.100 | 8.790 | 1.498 | 10.727 |
| South Africa | 57.844 | 7048.591 | 7.355 | 41.959 | 2.568 | 5.360 |
| Turkey | 74.010 | 11091.942 | 4.769 | 93.621 | 2.215 | 16.364 |
| Descriptive Statistics | | | | | | |
| Mean | 71.850 | 13015.170 | 5.636 | 141.788 | 2.039 | 6.415 |
| Median | 72.760 | 9139.397 | 5.237 | 73.542 | 2.099 | 4.920 |
| Maximum | 82.749 | 56864.330 | 9.467 | 529.359 | 3.311 | 54.915 |
| Minimum | 53.444 | 826.593 | 1.909 | 2.493 | 0.977 | -0.732 |
| Standard Deviation | 6.858 | 14041.350 | 1.916 | 166.825 | 0.506 | 6.923 |
| Skewness | -0.679 | 1.995 | 0.243 | 1.314 | -0.048 | 4.668 |
| Kurtosis | 3.285 | 5.999 | 2.030 | 3.211 | 2.293 | 30.717 |

Table 1. illustrates that Australia has the highest value in terms of life expectancy, per capita income and health expenditure, and has the lowest value in terms of population density. Although Korea has the lowest fertility rate, it is the country with the highest population density. Turkey and then Russia differ greatly from other countries in terms of high inflation rates. Except South Korea, Australia and China, all countries in the table have inflation rates above the world average. While India draws attention as the country with the highest fertility rate, it generaly has the latest place among the given countries in terms of other variables. India's life expectancy is less than other countries in the table.

**Table 2- Cross-section dependence and panel unit root tests results**

| | Breusch-Pagan LM [p-value] | CIPS-stat. (level) |
|---|---|---|
| InLE | 646.60*** [0,000] | -2.599*** |
| InGDP | 725.02*** [0,000] | -2.671*** |
| InGDP$^2$ | 723.02*** [0,000] | -2.597*** |
| InHE | 266.68*** [0,000] | -2.575*** |
| InPOPD | 702.39*** [0,000] | -3.089*** |
| InFR | 464.53*** [0,000] | -2.316** |
| INF | 107.81*** [0,000] | -2.898*** |

Notes: ** and *** denote at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Critical values for the CIPS test are -2.560, -2.290 and -2.150 at 1,5, and 10 percent at level, respectively.

According to the Breusch-Pagan LM outcomes presented in Table 2., the null hypothesis is refused and alternative hypothesis, which states that there is CD was accepted. Therefore, it was decided that there is a CD between units. The CIPS statistics, used in the occurrence of the CD, presented on the right of Table 2. demonstrated that all variables are stationarity at levels.

**Table 3- Slope heterogeneity test results**

| Slope homogeneity | Test statistics | p-value |
|---|---|---|
| $\bar{\Delta}$ | 5.556*** | 0.000 |
| $\bar{\Delta}_{adj}$ | 7.301*** | 0.000 |

Note: *** indicates 1% significiance level

The homogeneity tests of the slope coefficients were checked by Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) test. According to all standardized dispersion $(\bar{\Delta})$ and biased-adjusted $(\bar{\Delta}_{adj})$ statistics given in Table 3., the null hypothesis which assumes that the slope coefficients are homogeneous is rejected at the 1% significance level. Accordingly, we can conclude that the slope coefficients of the panel data used in the study are heterogeneous.

**Table 4-Panel AMG parameter estimation results for Life Expectancy**

| Country | InGDP | InGDP² | InHE | InPOPD | InFR | INF | **HKC** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 17.666*** [0.000] | -0.813*** [0.001] | -0.048 [0.342] | -0.204*** [0.008] | -0.058** [0.013] | -0.001 [0.680] | ✓ |
| Brazil | -3.428** [0.031] | 0.180** [0.034] | -0.012 [0.272] | -0.266*** [0.000] | -0.242*** [0.000] | -0.001 [0.339] | U-Shaped |
| China | 0.173** [0.014] | -0.015*** [0.000] | -0.005 [0.257] | 1.060*** [0.000] | 0.015 [0.917] | -0.001 [0.781] | ✓ |
| India | 0.177 [0.270] | -0.015 [0.146] | 0.006 [0.396] | 0.412*** [0.000] | 0.113*** [0.000] | -0.001 [0.257] | X |
| Indonesia | 2.194*** [0.008] | -0.146*** [0.004] | 0.002 [0.674] | 0.308*** [0.008] | -0.391** [0.014] | -0.001 [0.385] | ✓ |
| Korea, Rep. | 2.144*** [0.000] | -0.108*** [0.000] | 0.012 [0.361] | -0.164 [0.391] | -0.022*** [0.000] | -0.001 [0.610] | ✓ |
| Mexico | -7.041*** [0.006] | 0.385*** [0.006] | 0.031*** [0.002] | -0.917*** [0.000] | -0.559*** [0.000] | -0.001*** [0.006] | U-Shaped |
| Russian Federation | -3.071*** [0.006] | 0.172*** [0.005] | 0.049** [0.029] | 0.151 [0.665] | -0.025 [0.234] | -0.001 [0.643] | U-Shaped |
| South Africa | -51.547*** [0.000] | 2.906*** [0.000] | 0.082 [0.170] | 0.769*** [0.000] | 0.491* [0.053] | -0.001 [0.498] | U-Shaped |
| Turkey | -1.994*** [0.002] | 0.108*** [0.002] | 0.009 [0.358] | -0.118 [0.134] | -0.144* [0.078] | -0.001*** [0.000] | U-Shaped |
| Panel | -4.473 [0.427] | 0.266 [0.392] | 0.013 [0.258] | 0.103 [0.565] | -0.082 [0.363] | -0.001*** [0.000] | X |

Notes: ***, ** and * denote at the 1, 5 and 10 percent at levels, respectively. INF coefficients is taken as -0.001 because the parameters are less than -0.001 in models.

Table 4. shows that HKC hypothesis is valid in Australia, China, Indonesia and Korea suggesting that life expectancy increases with economic development up to a turning point, while economic growth continues to increase, life expectancy begins to drop after this turning point. On the other hand, there is a U-shaped relationship between life expectancy and economic growth for Brazil, Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa and Turkey. In other words, for these countries, as economic growth increases life expectancy decreases up to a turning point and then these variables begin to increase together. Population density and fertility rate positively affect life expectancy at birth for India, and there is no relationship between economic growth and life expectancy at birth.

According to the results in Table 4., health expenditures positively affect the life expectancy only in Mexico and the Russian Federation, and there is no relationship between the given variables in other countries. The results also demonstrate that the fertility rate has a negative effect on life expectancy in general. The inflation rate coefficient is negative for each country, but this variable does not affect life expectancy in the given period except Turkey and Mexico. While the population density negatively affects life expectancy in Australia, Brazil and Mexico, it has a positive effect on life expactancy in China, India, Indonesia and South Africa.

## Conclusion

Life expectancy is one of the most important indicators of health and community well-being used to measure the general health status of the population. It is an identifiable measure of the overall mortality level of a given population over a given period of time and it is often used to compare health status disparities between countries. Life expectancy is also an indicator of a country's economic and social development. There are several studies aimed at revealing the level of life expectancy and the variables affecting it. Some of these studies aimed to analyze the trends in life expectancy over time; some of them aimed to compare the health status of countries; others aimed to examine the relationship between life expectancy and variables that affect life expectancy. The identification of the factors that affect LE is expected to contribute to the planning of future health resources and services. In addition, learning more about the relationships between these two variables is significant for policy implementations for governments to cope with challenges resulted from increasing life expectancy.

In this study, we examine the existence of a quadratic relationship between economic growth and life expectancy at birth for BRICS and MIKTA countries and test for a health Kuznets's curve and which has been widely overlooked in the literature by using panel data method. The results of the AMG model applied in the study suggest that the relationship between economic growth and life expectancy seems to fit a Kuznets' curve for Australia, China, Indonesia and Korea. On the other hand, the validity of HKC hypothesis could not be obtained for Brazil, Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa and Turkey. There is a U-shaped relation between economic growth and life expectancy at birth for these countries. We did not find any evidence of a quadratic curve for India, which means there is no quadratic relationship between economic growth and life expectancy at birth. In this case, it is thought that there may be a linear relationship between economic growth and life expectancy at birth for India in the examined period, and further studies are recommended to reveal what extent and how exactly these or other factors affect life expactancy in major rising powers.

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# UNDER THE BREEZE OF THE PORTUGUESE INDIAN OCEAN: TOURISM AND HERITAGE IN ZANZIBAR

**MARIA JOÃO CASTRO**
mariajoaocastro@fcsh.unl.pt
PhD in Contemporary Art History and integrated researcher of the Humanities Centre (CHAM) of the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences of the New University of Lisbon (NOVA/FCSH, Portugal). Member of scientific committees, organised and participated in academic events, actions carried out in Portugal, Spain, France, Scotland, Romania, Italy, Dubai, Brazil, New Zealand and Zanzibar, which resulted in the publication of articles. Her fields of specialisation focus on the History of Art and Contemporary Culture, inflecting on the connection of Art with Power both in relation to Travel and (Post) Colonial Studies and Tourism. She is currently a post-doctoral scholarship holder of the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia with the project "ArTravel. Travel and Colonial Art in Contemporary Culture".

**Abstract**
Tourism is, in the 21st century, the largest industry in the world and a phenomenon structured on the basis of a dynamic and tentacular articulation. Among the forms enshrined in the phenomenon, the so-called "memory tourism" has gained relevance, based on a colonial heritage whose values are formulated according to a reminiscence of a once shared culture/ heritage: that of overseas empires. By gaining a new prominence, these post-colonial places open themselves to new readings, responding to a societal challenge of contemporary mobility by looking at the journey as a way of building culture and defining identities, for which we propose to map the heritage of portuguese roots in the archipelago of Zanzibar, a place integrated in the Lusitanian empire for two hundred years and a source of multiculturalism and otherness that our time is heir.

**Keywords**
Colonial Empires, Indian Ocean, Heritage, Tourism, Contemporary.

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*Under the breeze of the Portuguese Indian Ocean: tourism and heritage in Zanzibar*
Maria João Castro

# UNDER THE BREEZE OF THE PORTUGUESE INDIAN OCEAN: TOURISM AND HERITAGE IN ZANZIBAR[1]

**MARIA JOÃO CASTRO**

## Introduction

Tourism is today the industry with the greatest impact on the world economy, constituting a global and transversal phenomenon of tentacular scope. In its genesis, tourism and colonialism are not phenomena of the same order, but tourism and imperialism are products of the same context being intrinsically linked since they both involve the possession of a territory and its exploitation.It is certain that the ascendancy of European empires in the development of tourism has a strong impulse in the Universal Exhibitions, showcases of overseas territories that, by crystallizing a whole exotic and distant imagery, drove an elite to embark on the colonial journey that would soon become massified, contributing to the contemporary global tourism phenomenon.[2]The motivations behind such an impetus are based on distinct reasons, but there is one that has been gaining weight when it comes to choosing a travel destination: the post-colonial nostalgia that aspires to visit places stopped in a certain stone-time, not yet fully contaminated by an accelerated urbanity, momentarily giving back an experience that the daily life of Western society has long excluded.This kind of "tourism of nostalgia" has been gaining fans and we can understand why. Whether for the architecture, the cultural heritage, the appeal to the "Good Wild" in us, the artistic legacy or another reason rooted in a common past, the former European colonies have become tourist destinations of choice. On the other hand, the fact that tourism is a fundamental ally of economic, social and cultural development, generating important revenues, has increased pressure on the authorities, with the need to manage it responsibly and with critical thinking, so that it is an issue on the government's agenda, particularly with regard to the heritage to be preserved, whether material or immaterial.

In this sense, the so-called "Tourism of Memory" has been gaining an increasing prominence not only within national and regional government policies but also within

1 Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.
2 It is clear that tourism as a social phenomenon did not emerge with the Exhibitions; its genealogy dates back to the late 17th and early 18th centuries with the *Grand Tour*, a movement born in the heart of the English aristocracy that proposed to complete its education by verifying/visiting its civilisational past. However, this tour was always channelled towards the great European artistic centres (first Italy, then France and Greece) and did not therefore include the territories of the Empire, whose residents/visitors were mainly missionaries, administrators and troops.

academic research. Hence, this reflection proposes to create a "Tourism of Memory" route of Portuguese heritage in Zanzibar in response to the question: what heritage of Portuguese origin can be found in the Zanzibar archipelago? Its justification is based on the centrality of heritage as the legacy of a shared memory and its basic objective is to facilitate the integration of tourists into history by making them part of it.In other words: the stimulation of knowledge by the "other" makes us know ourselves better in an effective and full interculturality. The attainment of this central objective requires research in synergy, hence the chosen methodology is anchored in interdisciplinarity (historical science, heritage, archaeology and art history) with a cross-border vocation and valorisation with a pluricontinental emphasis. Since it deals with both material and immaterial heritage, the sources are mainly bibliographical and archaeological and range from the Portuguese national archives to the institutions responsible for conservation in the Zanzibar archipelago. As for its relevance, it is based on the fact that it responds to a tentacular societal challenge of contemporary mobility by looking at travel as a way of building culture and defining identities between visitors and the visited, producing knowledge and experiences capable of contributing to an enlightened citizen science.

## I. Historical-Patrimonial Context

As it is known, heritage is in its essence of a memorial order and that what characterises it is its symbolic character "a kind of immortalising aura" (Lourenço, 2015a: 54), of a moment passed, since all human works have their time counted. Now the cultural diversity resulting from human action over time in a given place has been valued for its pluralism, a characteristic that allows the development of a plurivocal knowledge. After a period in which anti-colonialism dominated public opinion, post-colonial tension slowly gave way to a less exclusive understanding of the meeting of cultures whose concern became centred on the preservation of the heritage bequeathed. An example of this was the creation in 1998 of the ICOMOS[3] International Scientific Committee network and, within it, the Committee for the Colonial Inheritance Partition.[4]This organisation has been drawing attention to the need to join efforts to preserve, study and promote heritage assets, given the importance of cultural diversity as a source of exchanges, innovation and creativity for present and future generations.

Thus, and within this dual dynamic (tourism-patrimony) UNESCO[5]has been classifying places, practices and expressions, recognised as an integral part of a culture. And that is what happened in 2000 with Stone Town, the old part of the city of Zanzibar on the island of the same name that saw the first Europeans arrive in 1503, during the voyages of exploration of the Maritime Route to India.

As the chronicles recount, the Portuguese were the first Europeans to settle in Zanzibar. Vasco da Gama (1469-1524) on his return from India pointed out the island, as recounted in the annals of the morning of 29 January 1499, when the Portuguese passed in front of Zanzibar (Fonseca, 1998:56):

3 International Council on Monuments and Sites. Online: https://www.icomos.org/fr (accessed 24.4.2021).
4 Online: https://www.icomos.org/risk/2001/colonial2001.htm (accessed 23.4.2021).
5 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

> *And on a Sunday, which was the twenty-seventh day of the month (27.1.1499), we set sail from here (Bass de S. Rafael) with a very good wind at our stern, and the following night we hovered. And when morning came, we found ourselves upon a very great island called Zamgibar, which is inhabited by many Moors, and the land is about ten leagues off. And on the first day of February, in the afternoon, we landed before the islands of São Jorge, in Mozambique.*[6]

In 1503, Rui Lourenço Ravasco imposed a tax on the sultan of Zanzibar to the Portuguese crown. Years later, and already firmly established in Mozambique and Melinde, Vasco da Gama's successors monopolised the East African traffic making Zanzibar a Portuguese protectorate since 1522 (Campos, 1935:1-20), although the feitoria and the hospitalization house were only established after Nuno da Cunha's (1487-1539) visit to the island in 1527.

In 1580, with the loss of independence of the Portuguese crown to Spain and the consequent weakening of the overseas empire, some overseas possessions were soon lost, namely Muscat (in 1650), Melinde (in 1660) and finally Zanzibar in 1698.

Since then, and between the end of the 17th century and the 19th century, the genealogy that reigned over the island gave it a new impetus, Arabising it and filling it with buildings with clear Islamic features, among which emerged architectures of Indian, African and colonial influences, the latter already in the 19th century, when the English took over the government of the island, turning it into a protectorate. It was precisely around this time - in 1879 - that Sultan Barghash (1870-1888) signed the famous Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with the King of Portugal. In 1885, the Kingdom of Portugal opened a consulate on the island and appointed Alexandre de Serpa Pinto (1846-1900) as its first consul. In the 20th century, between 1911 and 1918, Aristides de Sousa Mendes (1885-1954). In those times, the predominant population with portuguese roots on the island came from Goa, and dozens of families settled there, mainly dedicated to trade. The Portuguese colony was the second largest in number (about 400 people), after the British one (Mello, 1890: 89).

Focusing on the Portuguese heritage on the island, during the two hundred years that it captained Zanzibar, the crown of the kingdom of Portugal and the Algarve undertook buildings (trading post, church, hospital) and movements (change of capital) that would reconfigure its territory, although little has survived until today. But traces know how to speak to those who are willing to listen to them; you only need to look at some of the testimonies to be able to formulate a heterogeneous itinerary capable of rediscovering part of the Lusitanian heritage on the island.

[6] It is worth mentioning that even before Vasco da Gama, Pêro da Covilhã had already advanced along the East African coast, passing off the island, and he gives an account of this in his diary, although in an unclear manner. It is known that travelled for a long time the coast of Azania, having integrated vessels of Arab traders who regularly visited ports such as Mombasa, Melinde, Zanzibar, Kilwa or Sofala. See Leal Freire, Pêro da Covilhã, Gráfica S. José, Castelo Branco, 1964, p. 10.

**Image 1 - Reproduction of the frontispiece of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Lisbon**



Dom Luiz, por graça de Deus, Rei de Portugal e dos Algarves, Senhor de Guiné e da Conquista, Navegação e Commercio da Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia e da India, etc. Faço saber aos que a presente carta de confirmação e ratificação virem que aos 25 de outubro de 1879 se concluiu e assignou na cidade de Zanzibar um tratado de amisade e commercio entre Portugal e o Zanzibar, cujo teor é o seguinte:

Sua Magestade El-Rei de Portugal e dos Algarves e Sua Alteza Sayyd Bárghash-bin-Sa'îd-bin-Sultan-bin-Ahmad, Sultão de Zanzibar e suas dependencias, igualmente animados do desejo de estabelecerem por meio de um accordo solemne as relações de amisade que subsistem entre os seus respectivos paizes, territorios e povos, determinaram concluir para este effeito um tratado de amisade e commercio entre os dois paizes; e n'esta conformidade:

Sua Magestade El-Rei de Portugal e dos Algarves nomeou por seu plenipotenciario a Francisco Maria da Cunha, do seu conselho, commendador da ordem de Aviz, coronel de artilheria e governador geral da provincia de Moçambique;

Sua Alteza o Sultão de Zanzibar Sayyd Bárghash-bin-Sa'îd-bin-Sultan-bin-Ahmad nomeou seu plenipotenciario a Mahomed Ben Mahomed Bakusoomar, os quaes tendo trocado os seus plenos poderes, achados em boa e devida fórma, concordaram nos seguintes artigos:

ARTIGO 1.º

Haverá inviolavel paz entre Sua Magestade El-Rei de Portugal e dos Algarves, seus herdeiros e successores, e Sua Alteza Sayyd Bárghash-bin-Sa'îd-bin-Sultan-bin-Ahmad, Sultão de Zanzibar, seus herdeiros e successores, em toda a extensão de seus dominios e territorios, e entre os seus subditos respectivamente, sem distincção de pessoas ou logares.

ARTIGO 2.º

Os subditos de Sua Magestade El-Rei de Portugal terão plena liberdade de entrar em todos os portos dos dominios de Sua Alteza Sayyd Bárghash-bin-Sa'îd-bin-Sultan-bin-Ahmad, Sultão de Zanzibar, com carregações de qualquer especie que seja, e terão liberdade de vender as mesmas a quaesquer subditos do Sultão, ou a outros que as quizerem comprar, trocal-as por quaesquer productos ou manufacturas do paiz ou por outros generos, com excepção de polvora, munições e petrechos de guerra, que não poderão ser vendidos nos dominios de Sua Alteza sem seu consentimento.

Nenhum preço fixo será estabelecido por Sua Alteza o Sultão sobre os generos que tenham de ser vendidos aos negociantes portuguezes, ou sobre as mercadorias que elles desejem vender; porém o commercio será livre de ambas as partes para o fim de vender, comprar ou trocar, nos termos e pelos preços que o dono julgar conveniente, e quando os subditos de Sua Magestade El-Rei de Portugal quizerem retirar-se terão plena liberdade de assim o fazerem, e se alguma auctoridade de Sua Alteza o Sultão

مكاتبة في تقوية البيع والشرا واثبات الصداقة والمحبة
والمودة فيما بين حضرة سلطان البرتكال والكاربس وبين
حضرة السلطان السيد برغش بن سعيد سلطان زنجبار وما
يليها من البلدان التردد والمتجر ترفا وتصاعو فيما بين
سلطان البرتكال والكاربس وبلدان السطان السيد برغش
بن سعيد سلطان زنجبار والسيد السطان بمقتض ارادة سلطان
البرتكال والكاربس قبل ان يعمل مكاتبه لتقويه البيع والشرا
والصداقة والمحبة والتردد في صلاح الطرفين فلهذا سلطان
البرتكال جعل وكيلا افرنسيسكو مريا دكونيا دسيو كنسليو
كميندورده يوزديد اوبيس كرنل دوار تيليرى جورنر حرال
مسمبيج وحضرة السيد برغش بن سعيد سلطان زنجبار وما
يليها جعل وكيلا من طرفه محمد بن محمد احمد باقشمر وكل
واحد من الوكيلين المذكورين عنده حكم تفويض من سركاره
وقد اعرضا احكامهما وتفويضهما على بعضهما بعض وعملا هذه
المكاتبه التى ستاتي شروطها بقبول الطرفين المذكورين ٭

الشرط الاول

ينبغي اتمام الصداقة والمحبة والمودة فيما بين سلطان
البرتكال والكاربس وحضرة السيد برغش بن سعيد سلطان
زنجبار وما يتبعها من البلدان ٭

الشرط الثاني

رعايا البرتكال لهم الرخصه يدخلوا فى بنادير بلدان
السيد برغش بن سعيد سلطان زنجبار بالبضايع المجلوبة في
خشبهم ولهم الرخصه يبعوا تلك البضايع على كل من يريد
يشترى منهم ويعاوضوه ببضايع اخر التي تحصل من بلدان
سلطان زنجبار ويكون قطع الثمن بما يتفقوا عليه البايع
والمشترى لايكون احد من اتباع سلطان زنجبار يتعرضهم
ولايدخل نفسه فيما بينهم لا الة الحرب جميعها فليس لهم
جلبها الى ممالك سلطان زنجبار لا باذن منه واذا ارادوا
يشتروا بضايعا فلهم الرخصة ان يشتروا من كل من يريد
يبايعهم ولايكون احد من اتباع سلطان زنجبار يتعرضهم
ولايدخل نفسه فيما بينهم ويكونوا بانفسهم يقطعوا الثمن
وان كان احد من رعايا البرتكيس يسكن في زنجبار اويصل

Source: National Press (1940). Historical Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

However, this presence and heritage building in the Zanzibar archipelago is one of the least studied facets of Portuguese expansion and presence in East Africa. The direct contributions of Duarte Barbosa (c. 1480-1521), Gaspar Correia (1492-c. 1561) and João de Barros (c. 1496-1570). Meanwhile, more recent studies by Abdul Sheriff and Mark Horton have highlighted the issue, but only now, with the growing importance of tourism in countries' GDPs, has the challenge been set for other historians to explore the subject. Two orders of reasons may justify such a gap. Firstly, the focus on the objective-destination - India - relegating the anchorages of the Route to a secondary place; then the reduced and punctual sources, dispersed among documents of a very diverse nature, make it difficult to draw a clear picture of the presence and experience of the Portuguese in the lands of Zinj. Data with wide chronological hiatuses, documents spread across several archives without being catalogued and that include chronicles, reports, administrative notes and letters exchanged between Zanzibar officials and the authorities based in Lisbon, condition and explain the rarity (not to say absence) of studies of this specific historical reality. Even so, the information gathered points to guidelines on the Portuguese presence in the Zanzibar archipelago at a turning point of great historical and cultural potential.

## II. Subsidies for a Portuguese itinerary in Zanzibar

Designing a tourist itinerary through the material and immaterial heritage of Portuguese heritage in Zanzibar recovers a history registered at the time of navigation and exploration of the contours of the world, in consequent voyages that configured it on a global scale introducing the modern era. It is therefore important to bear in mind that history is made of layers, layers that overlap each other, the oldest ones sinking beneath the most recent ones, in an accumulation of sediments and testimonies that embody fractions of the historical narrative. In fact, it is in this past substratum that part of contemporary Zanzibar is enclosed and justified, so that listing this legacy constitutes an excellent access to understand and promote Zanzibar as a tourist destination.

It should be noted, however, that the aim is not to draw up an exhaustive list of the Lusitanian heritage on Zinj soil, but rather to create a patrimonial *corpus* with its own identity, and that this survey will always be provisional and subject to multiple readings.

## ZANZIBAR ARCHIPELAGO

UNGUJA (Zanzibar Island)

### I – Material Heritage

#### 1. Stone Town

With garrisons established in the ports of Zanzibar, Pemba and Mombasa, the old capital of Zanzibar situated at Unguja Ukuu, about twenty-four kilometres south of the present capital, was gradually relocated to a site further north-west, which was later to become known as Stone Town. As stated in the Portuguese manuscript of the *Relação made by Father Francisco de Monclaro of the Company of Jesus*, this was due to the port to the south, which was small[7] for the Portuguese ships to anchor. With the growing affluence of ships coming from India, the new capital made possible an increase in the port calls of maritime traffic in Zanzibar, reiterating the importance of this port on the Indian coast.

## 2. Trading post, Hospital, Church

In Stone Town, and after the visit of Nuno da Cunha in 1527, a trading post and a hospital house would be built, which surely coupled with a chapel-church. This was located in the so-called Old Fort (re) built by the Arabs after the conquest of the island from the Portuguese in the late 17th century. The indications are that, in 1612, there would have been an Augustinian church there, such occurrence appearing in the papal bull (Gray, 1958:174) of 21 January of that year, which shows the Lusitanian ecclesiastical commitment to East Africa. From the few things that are known, it seems that the Lusitanian missionary power found here a tolerant society but deeply convinced of its (Muslim) religiosity, so that the evangelisation was reduced to occasional conversions. According to the article by J. J. Campos, there was a building where the trading post and the Portuguese church would function, which would be protected by a wall later erected by the Arabs. In 1774, Alexander Dalrymple - the Scottish geographer - would state in his *Collection of Charts etc. in the Indian Navigation*, that this "fortress" looked like a ruined church. An inscription in the museum of Beit al Ajaib informs:

> *Portuguese remains indicate that there was a Portuguese chapel of cruciform design, with rectangular windows, built in the 16th century, and of which traces remain on the west wall of the old fort.*

And, a few metres away, at the Old Fort, a plaque reiterates that this was:

> *Erected by the Omani Arabs around 1700 on the basis of the materials of the old Portuguese chapel and adjoining residence.*

Recent studies and excavations - in 2017 and 2019 - confirm the church's authorship[8] and move towards new formulations of questions concerning its function and importance.

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7 *Relation made by Father Francisco de Monclaro of the Society of Jesus, of the expedition to Monomotapa, commanded by Francisco Barreto, Portuguese Manuscript no. 8, pp. 241-265, V., BNP, Lisbon, 1573, p. 344.*

8 Online: https://www.bristol.ac.uk/news/2017/august/early-portuguese-churches.html(accessed on 24.5.2021).

**Image 2 - Information plaque at the entrance of the Old Fort, Stone Town.**


Source: Photograph by Maria João Castro.

As for the old hospital, it was built after the visit of the future governor of India, Nuno da Cunha, who, after definitively conquering Mombasa in 1527, landed with his captain of the guard Manoel Machado in Zanzibar, where he left 200 patients in the care of Aleixo e Sousa Chichorro.From that date onwards, the island would figure as a port of hospitalisation for the sick on the Indian Route, since it was less palustrine than Mozambique (Strandes, 1961:118) and it was only with the expulsion of the Portuguese, in 1698, that the Real Hospital (on the island) of Mozambique became essential as a place for curing the sick soldiers and crew members coming in the ships of the kingdom.[9]

[9] The creation of the Royal Hospital (on the Island) of Mozambique dates back to the 16th century and, in 1681, its administration was entrusted to the religious of the Order of São João de Deus. In the following year, 1682, the hospitallers transferred the hospital to the south of the town, in an area considered to have better air.

## 3. Beit al Ajaib (House of Wonders)

### 3.1. Cannons

At the entrance to Stone Town's largest building until the last century are two Portuguese cannons.[10]Both pieces, cast in bronze, bear in relief the coat of arms of King Dom João III (1502-1557) with the crown and the royal figure "J" in ornament, the royal standard being supported by a heraldic lion. One of the pieces measures 3.7 metres and has a calibre of 20 centimetres and a diameter of 55 centimetres; the other is 3.12 metres long, with a calibre of 18 centimetres and a diameter of 44 centimetres. There is also another cannon, the largest of all, which is in the garden of the English Resident's Palace, 4.15 metres long.

A Persian legend recorded later reads:

**Images 3, 4, 5 - Portuguese cannons at the entrance of Beit al Ajaib, Stone Town**

Source: Photograph by Maria João Castro.

*In the name of God and by the grace of Mahomed Ali is communicated to the true believers gathered for warfare, the good news of success and victory in the year 1031 of Hegira.[11]During the reign of Shah Abbas, Safawi, King of Earth and time, whose power ever increases, Imam Kuli Khan, by the grace of Shah, Defender of Faith, conquered Fars, Lar, Mount Kaiwan, Bahrain and the Fortress of Hormuz and arrested Ibn Ayyub.*

[10] Online: http://memoria-africa.ua.pt/Library/ShowImage.aspx?q=/BIVG/BIVG-N026&p=24 (accessed on 21.4.2021).

[11] 1622 of our Common Era.

The inscription suggests that the cannons came from Hormuz, after the siege of 1622, and that the Arabs from Oman transported the pieces to Zinj.

### 3.2. Stone

In the ground-floor museum of Beit al Ajaib, in a corner and protected by a glass case, lies a grey sandstone stone, whose grooves draw letters that are grouped into Portuguese words. The chisel engraved a phrase from which the following letters are legible today:

VEL[12]

LEITAO[13]

G…SEM

TÃO MOR[14]

MEMDES[15]

SELO[16]

This type of stone does not exist in Zanzibar, so the stone is supposed to have come from Portugal.

**Image 6 - Stone with inscription in Beit al Ajaib, Stone Town**




Source: Photo by Maria João Castro.

12 Fragment of the word *Remarkable*?
13 Word for the given name *Leitão*?
14 Fragment of the word *Captain-major*?
15 Word for *Mendes* proper name?
16 Word for the given name *Vasconselos*?

As for the name, it is known that in Mombaça, the works on the fortress of Jesus were initiated by its first captain, Mateus Mendes de Vasconcelos between 1593 and 1596, and it is also known that the captain killed during the assault on the same stronghold in 1631 was called Pedro Leitão de Gamboa. The dating points to the 17th century so both hypotheses are plausible but need further study.

As for its function, the legend accompanying the stone says that it is a testimony to an *Old Leitão tombstone, apparently found in the area of Uroa, on the eastern part of the island*. However, its size and the inscribed words point more in the direction of having been a commemorative stone, since on tombstone other types of epigraphs tend to be engraved.

## 4. Portuguese Arch

At the corner of the intersection of Kanuda and Vuga streets, and set in a small garden, is the so-called Old Portuguese Arch. Although its construction and building are shrouded in mystery, its structure and decorative elements are identical to other Portuguese ones scattered around the world.Without being dated, the pointed arch with Corinthian lateral capitals may be a vestige of the Portuguese presence on the island, or simply have been built based on the religious architectural influence disseminated along the East African coast of Lusitanian origin.

**Image 7 - Portuguese Arch, Stone Town**

Source: Photograph by Maria João Castro

## 5. Streets

### 5.1. Portugueza Street

Portugueza Street was behind the old fort and was renamed Gizenga. Today, it remains one of the busiest streets in the capital as it was more than a century ago when most of the shops of the Portuguese merchants from Goa were located there. In period photographs one can see the signs with Portuguese surnames such as Silva, Paixão de Noronha, and which advertised the shops of various specialities such as medicine, wines and photography.

**Image 8 - Old Portuguese Street now renamed Gizenga Street, Stone Town, c. 1930. Period postcard**


Source: Author's collection

### 5.2. Souza street

About this street there is a testimony from the 19th century that describes it as follows:

*The Portuguese Indians, who composed a large colony in Zanzibar, were increasing in numbers; almost all of them were called Souza and sold alcoholic beverages. There is even a street of the Sousas in the city* (Anonymous, 1851: w.p.).

**Image 9 -Ad for the establishment *Sequeira & Souza,* Stone Town, 1924**




Source: Rohit Ramez Oza Collection, Capital Art Studio.

## 6. Fukuchani and Mvuleni Ruins

In the Beit al Ajaib museum in Stone Town, an inscription reads:

> *In Fukuchani and Mvuleni there were a number of estates or fiefs in these rural areas with arched doorways and gaps in the outer walls which, defensively, served to place firearms.*

The remains of the Portuguese houses of Fukuchani and Mvuleni are located in the north of the island. They were probably old merchants' houses, both dating from the 16th century.

At Fukuchani, opposite the island of Tumbatu, the enclosure around the main dwelling shows a wall enclosure two metres high, which shows, without much difficulty, holes drilled to place weapons in them. Each of these openings has a different orientation according to the angle of the target that was intended to be hit. The main building is now protected by a thatched structure that houses the walls dividing rooms arranged around a central corridor from east to west, with balconies at the front and back. The doors were designed in *vidaka* arches, typical of local architecture. The heritage authorities have carried out various excavations but little evidence has been recovered that does not allow their real purpose to be ascertained.

Less than a kilometre south of Fukuchani, a wall topped by a rusty gate guards Mvuleni. The construction plan of Mvuleni is almost identical to that of Fukuchani. Here too, openings can be seen in the defensive wall, which were used to display the weapons of their owners. The eastern wall of the enclosure encloses an underground tank fed by a fresh water spring. Unlike Fukuchani, the ruins of Mvuleni are submerged by vegetation already evident in photographs from the early 20th century and belonging to the National Archives. In the central part of the façade stands a row of doors flanked by windows with ogival arches of clear Arab influence.

**Image 10 - Façade of the old Portuguese house in Mvuleni, Unguja.**



Source: Photograph by Maria João Castro.

### 7. Trunks/cases

Made from fine woods and decorated with brass, silver and mother-of-pearl inlays, Zanzibar trunks reflect the Indo-Portuguese style imported from Goa. Known as *sanduku* (from the Arabic *sanduq*) or *kasha* (from the portuguese *caixa*) these pieces of furniture replace dressers, wardrobes and wardrobes and are inherited from one generation to the next as treasured possessions.

## II – Immaterial Heritage

### 1. Vocabulary

There is still today in the Swahili vocabulary a set of words whose origin dates back to the Portuguese. Most of these words are related to the sea and we can understand why: because they were the first to boost maritime commerce on the Swahili coast, despite the fact that there was already traffic in the region before. By way of example, we list the following words which, because they are more common, are easily audible in everyday conversation:

**Table 1 -Examples of Swahili words of Portuguese origin**

| | |
|---|---|
| almirante | almiranti |
| amarra | amari |
| bandeira | bendera |

| | |
|---|---|
| barquinha | barikinya |
| batel | batela |
| bomba | bereu |
| boia | boya |
| bolo | boleo |
| bule | buli |
| caixa | kasha |
| cárcere | gereza[17] |
| cana | kana |
| chapéu | chepeo |
| companhia | kompania |
| copo | kopo |
| fronha | foronya |
| lenço | leso |
| limão | mlimau |
| manteiga | manteka |
| mesa | meza |
| padre | padri |
| pão | pao |
| parafuso | parafujo |
| pistola | batola |
| roda | roda |
| sapato | sapatu |
| tabaco | tumbako |
| vinho | mvinyo |
| xaile | shali |

## 2. Photographers

Various period photographs, taken by professionals with surnames such as Gomes, Coutinho, Souza, Almeida or Silva, subsist to this day in a "sultanate" of photographers of Portuguese descent that has been studied, allowing us to begin to understand the dynamics of the journey of Portuguese Indian residents to the island of Zanzibar.[18]

This movement occurred at the end of the 19th century when Goan families from Portuguese India disembarked to open photographic studios. The *Coutinho Bros*was probably the first commercial photographic house in East Africa, having formed a partnership in 1890 with A. C. Gomes (who had run a studio on the island of Zanzibar since 1870), owned by the Coutinho brothers, both of Portuguese origin. The sons of A. C. Gomes continued the family business by signing *A. C. Gomes & Cº, photographers, Zanzibar*; some years later we found stamps with *Copyright issued by A. C. Gomes & Cº, Son, Zanzibar*and finally *A. C. Gomes & Cº, Sons, Zanzibar*.

Today there is only one shop left open, *Capital Art Studio*, on Kenyatta Road. In business since 1930, it was founded by Ronchad T. Oza (? -1993) who, although not of Goan origin, began working as an apprentice photographer for *A.C.*

17 This is the Swahili word for prison and comes from the Portuguese igreja, having its origin in the fact that many Portuguese churches and forts scattered along the African coast were later converted (by the Arabs and the English) into prisons. Hence the analogy.
18 See studies by Pamila Gupta. Online: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325077977_Sensuous_Ways_of_Seeing_in_Stone_Town_Zanzibar_Patina_Pose_Punctum(accessed on 20.4.2021).

*Gomes & Cº, Sons* in 1925. Ronchad became the official photographer of Sultan Khalifa bin Haroub (1879-1960). In 1979 his son, Rohit Ramez Oza, took over the shop, a space that harks back to a bygone era given by the walls lined with black and white photographs. In many of these records, the streets depicted display hanging signs announcing surnames of Portuguese origin showing the profusion of families I up to half a century ago inhabited the streets of Stone Town.

**Image 11 - Capital Art Studio, Rohit Oza, Stone Town**


Source: Photograph by Maria João Castro

All the documentation concerning the Zanzibar-Portugal relations that can be found in the National Zanzibar Archives (ZNA), Torre do Tombo Archives, Foreign Affairs Ministry Library, and Overseas Historical Archives and that contains several documents between the Zanzibar sultans and the Portuguese monarchy.

## Pemba Island

### 1. Chake Chake Fortress

It is believed that the fortress of Chake Chake[19]was of Portuguese origin (1594). The old space - a kind of sixteenth-century barracks - is believed to have been destroyed by the Omanites to make way for a new defensive building, a fortress. The traces of the Portuguese garrison are not visible but there are records dating from the early 19th century that describe it as being rectangular in plan, with two square towers and two round towers at the corners, topped by thatched roofs. As is known, the round towers are typical of Arab and Swahili architecture of the time, but the square towers are unusual and indicate the possible Portuguese influence. Today it houses the Pemba Museum showing, History and Culture of the Island including early history, polity, maritime culture, colonial occupation and ways against it, years of politics, independence and revolution.

[19] Online: http://memoria-africa.ua.pt/Library/ShowImage.aspx?q=/BIVG/BIVG-N026&p=17 (accessed on 21.4.2021).

### 2. Bullfights

Introduced in Pemba during the Portuguese colonisation, bullfights take place during the most varied celebrations on the island, such as New Year's Day. Reminiscent of a tradition established in the 17th century, bullfights are seen as a test of bravery of the men who own cattle and are kept within a strong community and festive character in small villages such as Chuale and Kangagani.

Having concluded the non-exhaustive list, and contrary to what Oliver and Mathew wrote that "the Portuguese presence for 200 years contributed nothing to art and architecture" and that its passage was "a mere lost dream" (Oliver, 1963:168), we can see that this was not merely residual but relevant in the sense that it left a legacy that time has seen fit to extinguish. However, in the last decades, we have begun to understand its scope, thanks to new investigations, excavations and analyses that have been carried out through partnerships and protocols with foreign entities and that have brought to light some significant data that have filled in some of the less clear areas of history.

Having said that, we must not forget that the definitive victory of the Muscat Arabs over the Portuguese in 1698 and the English colonialism that turned the island into a British protectorate for part of the 19th and 20th centuries contributed to a dilution of the vestiges of previous cultures, as happens in all historical processes.

## III. Non-final considerations

Having traced the itinerary of part of the Portuguese heritage in Zanzibar, it is important to understand that history is a discovery in permanent crescendo that is built and put into perspective in a dynamic of multiple approaches. The very vision of the cultural and artistic assets that make up a country's heritage is constantly reconfiguring, which means that there is no one-focused or definitive view; rather, there are approaches that, being interdisciplinary, transnational and intercommunal, leverage the construction of a responsible and attentive cultural heritage policy. Because heritage can be an instrument of resilience for local communities and a fundamental element in maintaining a common identity. In fact it has been used as a prospective force capable of promoting well-being and cohesion, contributing to a more inclusive and sustainable society, within a more altruistic and solidary geopolitical dynamic.

In this sense, if we take into account the growth of a sustained tourism market with Zanzibar's resources, this could be the catalyst for an improvement in the quality of life of its population and the sedimentation of its cultural identity. Of course, balancing this equation is challenging and poses a number of questions for the government. Since tourism is a recent phenomenon (1970s) in the archipelago - driven by the decline of clove cultivation from 1975 onwards - it was seen as a substitute for the inflow of foreign currency to the island, based on an offer that combines not only leisure (végiatura) but also an Arab-Swahili culture of its own. The success of this commitment is reflected in the fact that tourism contributes more than 27% of the gross domestic product (Keshodkar, 2013:71) - data from 2012 - which not only shows the ascendancy of the sector in the economy but also poses new challenges to its preservation (Zanzibar Mail, 2020:7).

In the field of philosophy, ethnology, anthropology or art historiography, the understanding of the nature of a given artistic heritage was often anchored in a Western-matrix thinking (Palmeirim, 2006: 14) that postcolonial studies have stirred. What perhaps seems basic in this context is that, regardless of currents, lines of thought or ethnocentric positions, the cultural-artistic heritage mapped out in a given territory integrates an aesthetic and symbolic genealogy that determines the present time and experience. In this sense, the visual research of a phenomenology of place constructed under several historical-artistic layers is fully realized in Zanzibar.

In any case, in the diaphanous and mellifluous palimpsest that is Zanzibar, the island-joia of the Islamic and Swahili civilization presents itself today as a tourist focus of choice that goes far beyond the univocal offer of the beach destination. Because the richness of the heritage and memory resulting from a narrative based on the blending of Arab, African, Indian and Lusitanian cultures, places its territory as a reference destination for Indian culture. This circumstance constitutes a challenge for the archipelago's guardianship because it is centred on balancing an equation of great fragility and complexity: conservation, development and sustainability.

A worthy starting point was the recognition of Stone Town as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2000. Finding the right balance between the quality of life of the inhabitants and the quality of the visitor experience, while ensuring - above all - that heritage values are not compromised, is always a challenge, even though the potential of Zanzibar's resources do not end at Stone Town but go far beyond it. We can only believe that, under the breeze of the Indian Ocean, the legacy of a time when Portuguese expansion involved the installation of emporiums and trading posts by the sea constitutes a memory and a heritage capable of deepening the historical dimension not only for those seeking reminiscences of a shared past but, above all, knowing that only by knowing the past can one have a perspective on the future because the ultimate truth is that "we only exist in the mirror of others"(Lourenço, 2015b).

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## NOTES AND REFLECTIONS

# NOTES ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION AND CONSULAR PROTECTION[1]

**EDUARDO PIMENTEL DE FARIAS**
eduardopimentelf@hotmail.com
PhD in Law, with specialization in International Legal Sciences (Portugal).

In commonparlance,what is called diplomatic protection means, in most cases, a consular protection action. The generic notion of diplomatic protection is used to define a variety of possible forms of protection of the national abroad. This paper seeks to reflect on what lies behind the recurrent inaccuracy or error in the application of correct semantics to the type of protection of nationals abroad. Using the hypothetical deductive method, we find that in theory diplomatic and consular protection are clearly differentiated by two main axes. In practice, however, these two institutes overlap and confuse each other frequently. The solution to the problem referred to would not be based on doubt about the theory, but on the practical performance of the international actors themselves. The lack of a precise distinction between the two concepts of protection would occur more by the combination of factors resulting from the exercise of protection, than of a hesitation about theory.

Under international law, the state may exercise two types of protection for the benefit of its nationals: diplomatic protection and consular protection. Nevertheless, semantic confusion occurs in the application of these two concepts. What is called in common language diplomatic protection means, in most cases, a consular protection action. In other words, the generic notion of diplomatic protection is used to define a variety of possible forms of the national'sprotection abroad.

In theory, though, the distinction between diplomatic protection and consular protection is clear. They are differentiated by two main axes:

1) the preventive nature of consular protection as opposed to the corrective nature of diplomatic protection;
2) by contrast at the representation level. Therefore, while diplomatic protection is intended to correct or repair damage, consular protection is preventive in nature and is primarily intended to prevent the national from being the victim of an illicit act.

[1] Note translated by Hugo Alves.

It is clear, therefore, that in consular protection it is not necessary to exhaust internal resources, since it is a matter of "technical" assistance provided to nationals in difficulty before the commission of an illicit act[2].

The other important distinction concerns the level of representation, since diplomatic protection is exercised by representatives of the interests of the injured state before the government of the offending state, while consular protection directly represents the interests of the individual in the face of the central organs of the host state. This means that in consular protection there is no political representation of the state of nationality. Such protection is initially aimed at protecting the rights of the individual and therefore requires his or her consent. On the other hand, the disinterest of the individual or even his or herexpress opposition to the demand, does not prevent the exercise of diplomatic protection since it is an action of interest to his or herstate ofnationality[3].

In a synthetic way, CAFLISCH clarifies that diplomatic protection is a formal intervention that is based on law and is intended for the execution of international responsibility. And that consular protection consists of assistance provided by consular posts abroad to nationals in distress. For them, they are two different mechanisms, even when consular protection action leads to the exercise of diplomatic protection. This happens quite often since consular protection is revealed as a simpler and less formal means of state action[4].

Indeed, diplomatic protection is rarer than consular protection. The violation must be exceptionally serious for the state to agree to turn it into an action of international responsibility. To this extent, the fact that generates the action of diplomatic protection, unlike consular protection, must have a dimension or an international interest of its own, capable of motivating the will to intervene of the state of nationality. Yet, this motivation depends not only on the legal order, but also on political opportunity. After all, in diplomatic protection the state exercises a right considered discretionary[5].

Nonetheless, despite the clear distinction between diplomatic protection and consular protection, in practice these two institutions overlap and confuse each other frequently. In the LaGrand case, for example, the United States of America tried to convince the International Court of Justice (ICJ)that Germany was confusing consular protection with diplomatic protection. In fact, the basis of the case was the exercise of consular protection whereas the mechanism used to trigger the court is that of diplomatic protection. The ICJ, however, accepted the complaint as an exercise of diplomatic protection and considered that both Germany and its nationals were harmed by the violation of the right of consular protection. On the other hand, in the Avena case the court decided otherwise and ruled that the injury to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention

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2 Cf. Article 55 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963; SHAW, Malcom N.,*International Law*,*Op. cit.,* p.688; TAXIL, Bérangère, *L´Individu, entre Ordre Interne et Ordre International: Recherches sur la Personnalité Juridique Internationale.,* p.493; DUGARD, John,*Septième Rapport sur la Protection Diplomatique*, pp.7-8, 11.

3 Cf. Paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963; TAXIL, Bérangère. *L´Individu, entre Ordre Interne et Ordre International: Recherches sur la Personnalité Juridique Internationale*., *Op. cit.,*p.493; DUGARD, John,*Septième Rapport sur la Protection Diplomatique*, *op.cit.*, pp.7-8 and 11.

4 CAFLISCH, Lucius, *La Pratique Suisse de la Protection Diplomatique*, p.77.

5 PANCRACIO, Jean-Paul et al.,*Communication sur la Protection Consulaire et Diplomatique: Concurrence ou Complémentarité?,* p.80. See also the trial of the Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and PowerCompany, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, par.79.

on Consular Relations caused a direct injury to Mexico. For the ICJ, it was no longer necessary to deal with the Mexican complaint concerning the violation of the right of consular protection under the different angle of diplomatic protection[6].

Another practical example of confusion between the concepts of diplomatic protection and consular protection stems from the Article 23 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Such article provides that all Union citizens are protected on foreign territory by the diplomatic and consular authorities of any member state. The European norm, however, ignores the fundamental differences that exist between these two mechanisms, particularly regarding the conditions for the exercise of diplomatic protection[7].

The confusion is such that a significant part of the doctrine argues that the Article 23 of the TFEU illustrates a case of consular protection and not diplomatic protection. For them, only the amiable nature of consular protection would be able to justify the concept of cooperation proposed in the TFEU. Moreover, the notion of EU citizenship would also not satisfy the nationalityrequirement in diplomatic protection, because it is mediated by the nationality of one of the EU members states[8].

Between diplomatic protection and consular protection, we still find one last identification problem related to international practice. Thelatter has largely shown that states react with a dual purpose: a restorative one, with the aim of constituting the satisfaction of injury, and another of a preventive nature, aiming to guarantee the right to life and property of nationals abroad. CONDORELLI thus developed the concept of preventive diplomatic protection. He believes that the state's preventive actions against the threat or the risk of violation of the international norm should also be part of a wider notion of diplomatic protection. This notion would therefore include the traditional concept of diplomatic protection, which he calls*strictosensu*diplomatic protectionandwhich represents the reaction of the injured state against an illicit fact already perpetrated with the concept of consular protection, which he prefers to call preventive diplomatic protection, but which is the state's reaction against risk[9].

This sense of the wider interpretation of diplomatic protection was not, however, welcomed by the 2006 International Law Commissiondraft Article 1 on diplomatic protection. Its comment clarifies that although it is not necessarily contentious, diplomatic protection is an action after the illicit fact. That is, in TAXIL'S OPINION,a

6 Case *of LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique),* CIJ Recueil 2001, par. 77; *Avena et autres Ressortissants Mexicains (Mexique c. Etats- Unis d'Amerique)*,CIJ Recueil 2004, par.40.Seealso DEEN-RACSMÁNY, Zsuzanna,*Diplomatic Protection and the LaGrand Case,*p.93; ROBERT, Eric,*La Protection Consulaire des Nationaux en Péril? Les Ordennances en Indication de Mesures Conservatoires redues par la Cour Internationale de Justice dans les Affaires Bread (Paraguay c. États-Unis) et LaGrand (Allemagne c. États-Unis)*, pp.413 etss; DUPUY, Pierre-Marie,*La Protection Consulaire sous les Feux de la Jurisprudence Internationale,* p.39 et ss.

7 Cf. Article 23 of TFEU. See commentary by Moura Ramos on the topic *in* PORTO, Manuel Lopes; ANASTÁCIO, Gonçalo,*Treaty of Lisbon-Annotated and Commented.* pp.262-263.

8 Cf. STEIN, Torsten, *Interim Report on "Diplomatic Protection Under the European Union Treaty",* pp.36-37; PANCRACIO, Jean-Paul et al., *Communication sur la Protection Consulaire et Diplomatique: Concurrence or Complémentarité?, op. cit.,* p.83.

9 CONDORELLI, Luigi, *La Protection Diplomatique et l´Evolution de son Domaine d´Application Actuelle,* pp.7-8.

logical attitude because the draft articles on diplomatic protection must be understood in strong connection with the text on international responsibility of the state[10].

For the ILC, therefore, diplomatic protection consists in the invocation by a state, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the international responsibility of another state in the face of injury caused by an internationally wrongful act committed against a subject of nationality of the first state[11].

The draft articles of the ILC thus preservethe distinction between diplomatic action and legal action as means of exercising diplomatic protection. The latter, moreover, is part of the expression "other means of peaceful settlement", which covers all lawful forms of dispute disposition, ranging from negotiation, mediation and conciliation to arbitration and judicial arrangement. On the other hand, the term "diplomatic action" extends to all lawful procedures used by states to inform each other of their views and concerns, including protesting and requesting investigation of the dispute[12].

International caselaw goes in that sense and allows diplomatic protection to be admissible only if based on the invocation of the injured interest. Even in the paradigmatic Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ clearly stated that there is only international responsibility if the law has been harmed and not only affected[13].

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 still provides that diplomatic missions have legal competence for the exercise of consular protection. In accordance with paragraph 2 of itsarticle 3, no provision of this Convention may be construed as preventing the exercise of consular functions by the diplomatic mission[14].

Consular agents may also intervene to support the central authorities of the sending state or the diplomatic mission itself in verifying facts on the ground and even in resolving a case of diplomatic protection. Nevertheless, diplomatic action itself needs to be maintained at the level of the central services of the sending state, as it reveals a legal dimension particularly demarcated by a dual interest. It is undeniable that all diplomatic action meets the interests of the individual injured party, but also the interest of his or herstate of nationality as a subject of international law.

It is worth mentioning, however, that consular protection is still unfolding in the figure of consular assistance. According to Article 5(a) and (e) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, protection and assistance are two different consular functions. Whereas in consular protection there is an activity provided by the consular office on a regular and customary basis, consular assistance is provided on an occasionalbasis, with the objective of renderingassistance to individuals or legal entities of the sending state.

For all this, consular protection activity means the following types of interventions: support for an imprisoned national, action against discriminatory treatment of nationals in the host state, technical support in a judicial procedure in which the national is a victim or perpetrator, as well as the protection of the property interests of the national

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10 TAXIL, Bérangère, *L´Individu, entre Ordre Interne et Ordre International: Recherches sur la Personnalité Juridique Internationale*, *Op.cit.,* p.496.

11 Cf. Article 1 of the 2006 ILCDraft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.

12 *Projet d´Articles sur la Protection Diplomatique et Commentaires y Relatifs (2006),* p. 27. See also DUGARD, John, *Septième Rapport sur la Protection Diplomatique*, *op.cit.* p.7.

13 Cf. *Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited,*arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1970. par.46.

14 Cf. Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.

threatened by a nationaldecision, expropriation, or requisition. On the other hand, consular assistance is the aid provided to indigent or hospitalized nationals, logistical and material assistance in case of repatriation or evacuation, as well as support in the repatriation of sick citizens and in the transfer of remains, among other hypotheses. Whereas consular assistance only requires a situation of disgrace or need of the national, consular protection is motivated by the possibility of violation of domestic or international law[15].

Having clarified the distinction between diplomatic and consular protection in theory, it remains to be understood why such confusion persists in international practice. What would be behind the recurrent inaccuracy or error in the application of correct semantics to the type of protection of the national abroad, if the theory on the subject is clear and right?

The solution to the problem, though, would not be based on uncertainty or doubt about the theory, but in the practical performance of the very international actors in charge of that protection themselves. We believe that the lack of a precise distinction between the two concepts of protection is due more toa combination of factors arising from the exercise of protection, than to a hesitation about the theory. Among the various factors arising from the exercise of protection, we can list at least three, which we consider decisive in fostering confusion between the concepts of consular and diplomatic protection: 1) in international practice, institutional actors are often the same for consular protection action and for diplomatic protection action; 2) diplomatic and consular agents do not usually use a strict language that allows toinfallibly dissociate the two protection modalities; and 3) both diplomatic protection and consular protection are even intended to protect the rights and interests of their nationals in the territory of a foreign state.

Finally, in the same sense that we maintain that the reason for the confusion between the concepts of consular and diplomatic protection lies in the actions of the international agents themselves, we also argue that the solution to such inaccuracy will necessarily come from the practice of these same agents. They are, after all, the most interested in clarifying the current limits and possible advances that are observed in the protection of nationals abroad.

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[15] Cf. Article 5 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963; PANCRACIO, Jean-Paul et al. *Communication sur la Protection Consulaire et Diplomatique: Concurrence or Complémentarité? Op. cit.* p.79; BROTÓNS, Antonio Remiro *et al.*,*Derecho International*, p.500; LICERAS, Juan Soroeta*. La Protección de la Persona Humana en Derecho internacional,* p.26; RIDRUEJO, José Antonio Pastor,*Derecho Internacional Público y Organizaciones Internacionales*, p.246.

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