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Perspectivas sobre a presença internacional da China: estratégias, processos e desafios

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EDITORIAL

PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE: STRATEGIES, PROCESSES AND CHALLENGES

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EDITORIAL

CARMEN AMADO MENDES

This thematic issue is the result of collaboration with the Macau Scientific and Cultural Centre (also known as CCCM). This issue is particularly a product of the CCCM China Conferences, which are held annually in the spring and in which the authors participated. The CCCM is a scientific research centre based in Lisbon with the mission of producing, promoting, and disseminating knowledge about Macau and China in general, acting as a platform between Portugal and the People's Republic of China, as well as between Europe and Asia. This journal contains five articles in total. The first two articles look back at developments in the first decade of the millennium, and provide important analysis that contributes to our understanding of the events that mark the present-day. The remaining three articles focus on contemporary political issues, and deal with various aspects of Chinese domestic and international politics. Each of the papers presents original research, with independent and novel findings, that will certainly be of use to the readers of the issue in understanding recent issues that concern China in the twenty-first century.

The first paper, by Anabela Santiago, titled '*Evolução dos processos de agenda-setting na República Popular da China – o caso ilustrativo das reformas de saúde*', provides a substantial analysis of the way in which health policy agenda-setting in China developed, principally during the first decade of the 21st century. The research is particularly timely since it provides its readers a substantial explanation of agenda-setting – from a health perspective – in the PRC from when the SARS crisis first began up to around 2013, and consequently allows a better understanding of the direction in which health policy was moving and would have continued moving, if it had not been for the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The second paper, by Daniel Bicudo Vêras, which is titled '*A diáspora chinesa no Brasil: dispersão, mitologia da terra de origem e promessa de retorno*', deals with an aspect of the complex development of Sino-Brazilian relations approximately fifteen years ago. It is a well-researched study of what remains a timely and important topic, namely the evolution of the place held by Chinese in the on-going construction of the Brazilian identity. Taking as a starting point the push-pull hypothesis found in diaspora research, the author focuses on the emergence of Sino-Brazilians, reminding the reader that at least three hundred thousand Chinese are present in Brazil. While the research was commenced in 2003, the author followed up with field studies and interviews in 2006, and completed the study in 2008. The study can be viewed as a contribution to the



diaspora research of Stuart Hall and Adam McKeown, and a very useful addition to the socio-economic analysis employing the Marxian concept the 'industrial reserve army', which accounts for the presence of large population contingents circulating around the world.

The third paper, *'Impact of Chinese Assertiveness on Global order'*, by Bhawna Pokharna, introduces the reader to the topic of the rise of China in the twenty-first century and the extent to which this ascent has changed geo-strategic politics, and the course of global order. The author suggests that as China has enhanced its assertiveness in the global arena, it has been increasingly viewed as a threat to the existing liberal international order, and focuses on recent developments, especially during the pandemic and immediate post-pandemic years. While China is said to be on the way to becoming a superpower with its substantial economic growth, military modernization, and a strong political system, the author identifies what is held to be the irresponsible, impetuous and rash behaviour of China during Covid 19 global pandemic as raising questions about the future of liberal world order. The author suggests that since Xi Jinping became President, the PRC has embarked on the road to superpower status, posited on his philosophy of the China Dream. The Belt and Road Initiative has unfolded Chinese global ambitions and extended its outreach tremendously, with China set to abandon the existing liberal international order, that is dominated by the western powers, and take steps to become a major player in the international arena.

The fourth paper, *'The institutional challenges for the European Union in the face of the new Chinese investment wave'*, co-authored by Jorge Tavares Silva and Rui Pereira, provides an analysis of the consequences of Chinese investment in Europe, particularly how Chinese investments may challenge European unity, both regarding the institutional structure of the EU, but also in the formulation of foreign policy towards China. After an analysis of the past history of EU-China relations, taking up great moments in EU-China cooperation as well as examples of disagreements and antagonisms, the paper focuses on trade and economic relations, and provides the principal bilateral statistics for these fields of interaction. The article concludes by discussing the consequences of Chinese trade and investment in Europe, including the pressure that is exerted on formal arrangements and administrative European routines.

The concluding paper in the issue, written by myself and Hou Xiaoying, is titled *'Portuguese Strategies towards China during the Covid19 Pandemic'* uses the Theory of Asymmetrical Negotiations (TAN), advanced by Habeeb in 1988, to analyse how three factors - commitment, alternatives, and control - can be said to have influenced Portugal's strategies towards China during the Pandemic. The paper tests the effectiveness of TAN in explaining the strategy choices made by small states towards large states, and thereby enriches our understanding of Portugal's ongoing diplomacy, and the diplomatic possibilities available to small states. Its hypothesis is that when a small state has a high level of commitment, unfavourable alternatives, and limited control over a single issue in its relations with a large state, it finds itself at a disadvantage in terms of the 'balance of power', and resorts to soft negotiation strategies. Conversely, when a small state has a degree of advantage, it tends to adopt hard negotiation strategies. The article tests this supposition, using the case of Portugal as an example,



and ultimately concludes that small states generally adopt mixed strategies in their international relations since the 'balance of power' remains always in flux.

Note: The first two articles were originally written in Portuguese, the other three in English.

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Esta revista temática foi organizada pelo Centro Científico e Cultural de Macau (CCCM), na sequência da participação dos autores nas Conferências sobre a China, que decorrem anualmente na primavera no CCCM. O CCCM é um centro de investigação científica sediado em Lisboa com a missão produzir, promover e divulgar conhecimento sobre Macau e a China em geral, atuando como plataforma entre Portugal e a República Popular da China, assim como entre a Europa e a Ásia.

Os primeiros dois artigos desta revista fazem uma retrospectiva dos desenvolvimentos na primeira década do milénio, contribuindo para o entendimento de acontecimentos que marcam os dias de hoje. Os dois restantes artigos analisam questões políticas contemporâneas, abordando vários aspetos da política doméstica e internacional chinesa. Os autores apresentam investigação original e inovadora, certamente útil ao leitor para a compreensão da China no século XXI.

O primeiro artigo, "*Evolução dos processos de agenda-setting na República Popular da China - o caso ilustrativo das reformas de saúde*", de Anabela Santiago, aborda a forma como a definição da agenda política de saúde na China se desenvolveu, principalmente durante a primeira década do século XXI. A investigação é particularmente oportuna uma vez que oferece uma explicação substancial da definição da agenda política – de uma perspectiva da saúde – na RPC desde que a crise da SARS começou até cerca de 2013. Consequentemente, ajuda a compreender a direcção da evolução da política de saúde até ao surto da pandemia de Covid-19.

O segundo artigo, "*A diáspora chinesa no Brasil: dispersão, mitologia da terra de origem e promessa de retorno*", de Daniel Bicudo Vêras, aborda um aspeto do complexo



desenvolvimento das relações sino-brasileiras nos últimos quinze anos, nomeadamente a evolução do lugar ocupado pelos chineses na construção em curso da identidade brasileira. Tomando como ponto de partida a hipótese *push-pull* encontrada na investigação da diáspora, o autor centra-se na emergência de sino-brasileiros, lembrando o leitor que o Brasil tem pelo menos trezentos mil chineses. A investigação, iniciada em 2003, incluiu trabalho de campo e entrevistas em 2006, e foi concluída em 2008. O estudo deste tema oportuno e importante pode ser visto como uma contribuição para a investigação da diáspora de Stuart Hall e Adam McKeown, e um acréscimo muito útil à análise socioeconómica que emprega o conceito marxista de "exército de reserva industrial", que explica a presença de grandes contingentes populacionais que circulam por todo o mundo.

O terceiro artigo, *"Impact of Chinese Assertiveness on Global Order"*, de Bhawna Pokharna, apresenta o leitor ao tema da ascensão da China no século XXI e a medida em que esta ascensão mudou a política geoestratégica, e também o curso da ordem global. O artigo sugere que, à medida que a China tem aumentado a sua assertividade na arena global, tem sido cada vez mais vista como uma ameaça à ordem internacional liberal existente, focando-se nos desenvolvimentos recentes, especialmente durante os anos da pandemia e da pós-pandemia imediata. Embora se diga que a China está a caminho de se tornar uma superpotência com o seu crescimento económico substancial, modernização militar e um sistema político forte, a autora identifica o que foi considerado um comportamento irresponsável, impetuoso e precipitado por parte da China durante a pandemia global do Covid 19, nomeadamente o levantar de questões sobre o futuro da ordem mundial liberal. A autora considera que, desde que Xi Jinping se tornou Presidente, a RPC enveredou pelo caminho para o estatuto de superpotência, apoiada na sua filosofia do Sonho da China. A Iniciativa Faixa e Rota é uma demonstração das ambições globais chinesas de alcance muito abrangente, permitindo à China abandonar a ordem internacional liberal existente, dominada pelas potências ocidentais, e caminhar no sentido de se assumir como um grande ator na cena internacional.

O quarto artigo, *"The institutional challenges for the European Union in the face of the new Chinese investment wave"*, de coautoria de Jorge Tavares Silva e Rui Pereira, aborda as consequências do investimento chinês na Europa, especialmente a forma dos investimentos chineses desafiarem a unidade europeia, tanto no que diz respeito à estrutura institucional da UE, como também na formulação da política externa em relação à China. Após uma análise da história das relações UE-China, incluindo grandes momentos na cooperação bilateral e exemplos de desacordos e antagonismos, o artigo centra-se nas relações comerciais e económicas, disponibilizando as principais estatísticas bilaterais para estes campos de interação. A conclusão apresenta as consequências do comércio e investimento chineses na Europa, incluindo a pressão que exercida sobre acordos formais e rotinas administrativas europeias.

O artigo final deste número, que escrevi em conjunto com Hou Xiaoying, intitula-se *"Portuguese Strategies towards China during the Covid19 Pandemic"*. A Teoria das Negociações Assimétricas (TNA), avançada por Habeeb em 1988, serve de base à análise de como três fatores - compromisso, alternativas e controlo - influenciaram as estratégias de Portugal em relação à China durante a pandemia. O documento testa a eficácia da TNA na explicação das escolhas estratégicas feitas por pequenos estados em



relação a grandes estados, contribuindo para a compreensão da atual diplomacia portuguesa e das opções diplomáticas à disposição dos pequenos estados. Quando um pequeno estado tem um alto nível de compromisso, alternativas desfavoráveis e um controlo limitado sobre uma única questão nas suas relações com um grande estado, encontra-se em desvantagem em termos do "equilíbrio de poder", e recorre a estratégias de negociação suaves. Pelo contrário, quando um pequeno estado se encontra em situação de vantagem, tende a adotar estratégias de negociação duras. O artigo testa esta hipótese, utilizando o caso de Portugal como exemplo, e acaba por concluir que os pequenos estados geralmente adotam estratégias mistas nas suas relações externas, uma vez que o "equilíbrio de poder" permanece sempre em fluxo.

Apenas uma nota final para referir que os dois primeiros artigos foram originalmente escritos em português, e os últimos três em inglês.

EVOLUÇÃO DOS PROCESSOS DE AGENDA-SETTING NA REPÚBLICA POPULAR DA CHINA – O CASO ILUSTRATIVO DAS REFORMAS DE SAÚDE

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Resumo

Este ensaio é um exercício exploratório que visa traçar um esboço dos processos de agenda-setting na República Popular da China (RPC), usando em concreto o caso das políticas de saúde. Para tal, começa-se por traçar uma breve descrição do sistema de saúde chinês do período Maoista até à contemporaneidade, procedendo-se a uma análise mais aprofundada do período contemporâneo, de 2002 – ano de mudança de liderança do Partido Comunista Chinês e consequente novo Plano Quinquenal – até à atualidade. O objetivo é perceber a evolução dos processos envolvidos. A análise é feita com base no modelo analítico dos Múltiplos Fluxos, defendido por John Kingdon, tomando como exemplo as reformas do sistema de saúde chinês. O objetivo é perceber os pressupostos que têm vindo a nortear a definição da agenda política chinesa e apontar tendências futuras com base no quadro evolutivo resultante deste trabalho.

Palavras chave

Agenda-setting; República Popular da China; modelo de Múltiplos Fluxos; Políticas Chinesas de Saúde; Sistema de Saúde Chinês

Abstract

This essay is an exploratory exercise that aims to outline the agenda-setting processes in the People's Republic of China (PRC), specifically using the case of health policies. To this end, it begins with a brief description of the Chinese health system from the Maoist period to the current one, followed by a more in-depth analysis of the contemporary period, from 2002 – year of change of leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and consequent new Five-Year Plan – to the present day. The goal is to understand the evolution of the processes involved. The analysis is based on the Multiple Streams analytical model, advocated by John Kingdon, taking as an example the Chinese health care reforms. The main objective is to understand the assumptions that have been guiding the definition of the Chinese political agenda and to point out future trends based on the evolutionary framework resulting from this work.

Keywords

Agenda-setting, People's Republic of China, Multiple Streams model, Chinese Health Policy, Chinese Healthcare System



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EVOLUÇÃO DOS PROCESSOS DE AGENDA-SETTING NA REPÚBLICA POPULAR DA CHINA – O CASO ILUSTRATIVO DAS REFORMAS DE SAÚDE

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Introdução

Neste ensaio, aborda-se o Modelo dos Múltiplos Fluxos enquanto modelo de análise para a formulação de políticas, em particular, para a análise do processo de *agenda-setting* no setor da saúde, tendo como objeto de estudo a República Popular da China. Em primeiro lugar, faz-se uma breve descrição do sistema de saúde chinês no período em estudo. De seguida, traça-se um quadro explicativo do processo de *agenda-setting* na era contemporânea, com o intuito de perceber como é que essa etapa da formulação de políticas se desenvolve, com que pressupostos e critérios e quais os seus principais objetivos e tendências futuras.

Breve descrição do sistema de saúde chinês de 1950 até à atualidade

A Revolução Cultural ocorreu durante a liderança de Mao Zedong. Neste período, a maior parte da população chinesa estava concentrada nas zonas rurais. Os cuidados de saúde eram prestados principalmente dentro das comunas e tinham tendência a crescer com um número crescente de centros de saúde e recursos humanos médicos (Silva et al., 2013).

Em 1950, no Primeiro Congresso Nacional de Saúde, foi estabelecido um conjunto de princípios a fim de alargar o acesso aos serviços de saúde a toda a população (Hesketh & Zhu, 1997: p.1544):

- A medicina deve servir os trabalhadores, camponeses e soldados;
- A medicina preventiva deve ter precedência sobre a medicina terapêutica;
- A medicina tradicional chinesa deve ser integrada com a medicina convencional ocidental;
- O trabalho de saúde deve ser combinado com movimentos de massas

Apesar de todas as conquistas sobre a liderança de Mao, durante os dez anos da Revolução Cultural, o sistema de saúde existente sofreu um revés. De facto, a Revolução



Cultural é um período marcado por lutas políticas dentro do PCC que levaram a uma posição mais repressiva e ditatorial por parte de Mao Zedong. Os trabalhadores urbanos, incluindo médicos e enfermeiros, foram enviados de volta para o campo para trabalharem como camponeses. As escolas e universidades médicas foram fechadas, bem como departamentos de especialidade em hospitais. Os serviços de saúde eram principalmente prestados dentro de áreas administrativas, conhecidas como comunas, e aplicando a medicina tradicional chinesa.

O sistema cooperativo de saúde em vigor foi gradualmente extinto entre 1978 e 1981. De acordo com Duckett (2011), especialmente nas zonas rurais, a abolição das comunas deu origem a uma crescente prestação privada de serviços de saúde, visando uma contribuição partilhada entre doentes e governo, no que diz respeito ao investimento na saúde. Nas áreas urbanas, o processo de transição ocorreu a um ritmo mais lento, porque foi sobretudo influenciado pela privatização de empresas, que só aconteceu na década de 90, essencialmente com o florescimento das Empresas Municipais e Aldeias (*Township and Village Enterprises*) e a criação de Zonas Económicas Especiais, bem como o consequente aparecimento de prestadores privados de serviços de saúde.

A RPC assistiu a uma libertação quase completa das responsabilidades governamentais em relação ao sistema de saúde em favor dos organismos locais e da iniciativa privada, o que levou a custos elevados de cuidados de saúde primários básicos e a uma cobertura de seguro mais fraca em todo o país. Alguns indicadores, tais como a mortalidade infantil e a esperança de vida, melhoraram em comparação com o período de Mao, mas não de forma significativa e, em termos gerais, a satisfação da população com os cuidados de saúde primários não era boa.

No período seguinte, liderado pelo presidente Jiang Zemin, o sistema de saúde permaneceu, grosso modo, como estava desde os anos 90. Esta década não foi marcada por grandes mudanças nesse campo, portanto o acesso a cuidados de saúde na RPC era extremamente deficiente devido aos custos dispendiosos de consultar um médico ou comprar medicamentos, até os considerados mais básicos. A agitação social começou a aparecer e a desafiar o lema superior do Partido Comunista Chinês (PCC) de alcançar uma "sociedade harmoniosa". Este lema viria a ser a bandeira de governo do Presidente Hu Jintao que presidiu ao PCC de 2003 a 2013 e que estabeleceu em 2004 um plano estratégico intitulado "O Caminho de Desenvolvimento da Ascensão Pacífica da China" (*Zhongguo Heping Jueqi de Fazhan Daolu*), com vista a alcançar o objetivo uma sociedade harmoniosa do ponto de vista político e socioeconómico.

Consequentemente, o governo começou a pensar em possíveis reformas na saúde, as quais pudessem melhorar o acesso, a qualidade dos serviços e os custos com saúde. Assim, em 1998 e em 2000, as reformas em saúde foram realizadas para restabelecer alguns dos fundos e seguros de saúde existentes na época de Mao Zedong e, a fim de alocar mais recursos em instalações de cuidados primários, hospitais públicos, e assim por diante, com o propósito último de alcançar um acesso mais amplo da população aos serviços de saúde e a preços mais acessíveis.

A grande reforma viria, no entanto, a ocorrer no final de 2003 com a reintrodução do seguro de saúde para toda a população – naquela época, 75% da população não estava



coberta por nenhum seguro – e em 2009 com o sistema de saúde a ser colocado como uma das principais prioridades da ação do governo (Yip & Hsiao, 2015).

Em 2013, quando Xi Jinping assumiu a liderança do governo da RPC, uma nova reforma do sistema de saúde foi iniciada, com uma ligeira mudança nos valores sociais. De facto, Xi decidiu aprofundar a reforma económica e confiar mais nas regras do mercado. De acordo com Yip e Hsiao (2015: p. 58), “esta abordagem pró-mercado também se aplica ao último ciclo de reforma da saúde”. O objetivo agora é introduzir regras de mercado como forma de promover o investimento privado, mas também motivar os hospitais públicos a melhorarem o seu desempenho, pois passariam a enfrentar a concorrência privada. Além disso, a RPC designou como principais indústrias de crescimento os serviços de saúde e a biomedicina, beneficiando essas duas áreas de incentivos fiscais.

Os efeitos dessa reforma recente ainda não são conclusivos, pois é necessário mais tempo para se poder avaliar o impacto das medidas aplicadas. No entanto, pode-se apontar desde já que o sistema de saúde nas últimas décadas, oscilou sempre entre duas ideologias principais – a abordagem centrada no Estado e a abordagem de mercado – de acordo com o conjunto predominante de valores sociais assumidos pelo líder do PCC.

Modelo dos Múltiplos Fluxos – breve descrição

Este modelo teórico foi desenvolvido por John Kingdon em 1984 e considera as políticas públicas o resultado de quatro grandes processos: o estabelecimento de uma agenda de políticas públicas; a consideração das alternativas para a formulação das mesmas; a alternativa escolhida de entre as disponíveis e, por fim, a implementação da decisão. A sua atenção centra-se essencialmente nos processos prévios à tomada de decisão, ou seja, na formação da agenda e nas alternativas para a formulação das políticas (Kingdon, 1984).

No que diz respeito, à formação da agenda decorrente de uma mudança, esta converge de três fluxos: (1) problemas; (2) soluções ou alternativas; e (3) política (Béland & Howlett, 2016).

1. Fluxo dos problemas: decorre da perceção de problemas vistos como “públicos”, na medida em que se torna necessária uma ação do Governo;
2. Fluxo das soluções: decorre de propostas oriundas de peritos que examinam os problemas e propõem um conjunto de alternativas possíveis;
3. Fluxo da política: decorre de fatores influenciadores do corpo de ação política como campanhas de grupos de interesse, mudanças de governo, eleições, entre outros.

Estes três fluxos são relativamente independentes entre si até ao surgimento de algum acontecimento que despolete uma janela de oportunidade, que os faça convergir (Birkland, 1997). Tal como Kingdon (1984, p.2) referiu: “*The separate streams of problems, policies, and politics come together at certain critical times. Solutions become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to favourable political forces*”.



Apenas quando isso acontece é que um tema é considerado como um problema oficial, entrando na agenda e no processo de política pública (Béland & Howlett, 2016). Por norma, esses acontecimentos que se constituem como janelas de oportunidade são acontecimentos negativos como desastres naturais, crises, ou incidentes que afetam a sociedade civil no seu todo, ou grupos de destaque (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).

O modelo dos Múltiplos Fluxos tem sido largamente usado para explicar determinados tópicos ligados à formulação de políticas, nomeadamente, no que diz respeito à formação de agenda e à tomada de decisão.

Agenda-setting – enquadramento teórico e especificidade do caso chinês

O processo de *agenda-setting* refere-se essencialmente ao processo de priorização de problemas públicos em função do seu grau percecionado de relevância, determinado por três agendas: a agenda dos *media*, a agenda pública e a agenda política, num determinado momento (Kingdon, 1984,1995).

Para traçar a evolução do processo de *agenda-setting* na RPC, este trabalho baseia-se essencialmente nos resultados de um artigo científico intitulado “*Changing Models of China’s Policy Agenda Setting*” da autoria de Shaoguang Wang, publicado em 2008 na revista *Modern China* (volume 34, pp. 56 -87).

Este autor definiu um quadro conceptual relativo ao processo de *agenda-setting* baseado em duas variáveis: (i) os agentes responsáveis pela inclusão na agenda e tomada de decisão; e (ii) o grau de envolvimento e participação da sociedade civil. Dessa matriz resultam seis modelos aplicáveis ao processo de *agenda-setting* na China, os quais se encontram sistematizados na Tabela 1, abaixo.

Tabela 1. Modelos de agenda-setting de políticas na China

<u>Modelos de Agenda-Setting de Políticas na China</u>		Iniciador da Agenda		
		<u>Decisores</u>	<u>Consultores</u>	<u>Cidadãos</u>
Grau de participação	<u>Fraco</u>	Closed-door	Inside access	Outside access
	<u>Elevado</u>	Mobilization	Reach-out	Popular pressure

Fonte: Wang, 2008

1. *Closed-door*: neste modelo, não há espaço para a participação da sociedade civil. Os iniciadores são normalmente os decisores sem participação de outros agentes. Vigorou na China do período imperial, embora ainda não tendo totalmente desaparecido, encontra-se atualmente em desuso.
2. *Mobilization*: neste modelo, os decisores procuram o apoio do terceiro setor para inclusão de determinado tópico na agenda política. Este modelo é muito familiar na China, sobretudo no período maoísta, em que a propaganda era fortíssima no sentido de mobilizar as populações em torno de uma determinada causa ou política pública.



Desde a reforma de abertura económica dos anos 1980, este modelo tem sido menos usado, embora apesar de ter perdido relevância também não tenha completamente desaparecido.

3. *Inside access*: neste modelo, a *agenda-setting* fica maioritariamente a cargo dos consultores próximos dos decisores políticos. Este modelo é bastante aplicado na RPC no que toca a assuntos da esfera da segurança nacional e defesa. Foi popular na RPC no período de liderança de Jiang Zemin em que se começou a valorizar o uso do conhecimento científico e o desenvolvimento da tecnologia, como meios para o desenvolvimento harmonioso da sociedade chinesa. De acordo com Wang (2008), é expectável que este modelo continue a ter preponderância no futuro, em situações e áreas muito específicas, como aliás tem revelado ser até agora.
4. *Reach-out*: neste modelo, os consultores continuam a ser os agentes principais do processo de *agenda-setting*, mas com a diferença de que procuram a aceitação e participação da sociedade civil. A relevância dada à agenda pública tem como objetivo convencer os decisores a aceitarem determinadas ideias e tópicos na agenda política. Não é um modelo muito utilizado na RPC, embora tenha tido um papel importante no setor específico da saúde, aquando das sucessivas reformas do sistema.
5. *Outside access*: neste modelo, pode-se observar muitas similitudes com o modelo de '*inside access*', ainda que os iniciadores do processo sejam distintos. Neste caso, as propostas partem de grupos de interesses e cidadãos, embora ambos com um certo nível de influência na sociedade. Até à atualidade recente, este modelo não tem tido grande peso na formação da agenda política chinesa, mas prevê-se que possa vir a exercer um papel crescente no futuro a médio-prazo (Wang, 2008).
6. *Popular-pressure*: este modelo é semelhante no seu modo de funcionamento ao modelo do '*outside access*', com a diferença de que o grau de envolvimento da sociedade civil e do público em geral, é muito maior. De acordo com Wang (2008), este é o modelo que define o processo de *agenda-setting* da era contemporânea chinesa e veremos na secção seguinte as razões para que tal assim seja, à luz de uma análise baseada no Modelo de Múltiplos Fluxos.

Aplicação do Modelo de Análise

Tal como referido anteriormente, nesta secção será aplicado o modelo de análise desenvolvido por John Kingdon em 1984 – o modelo dos Múltiplos Fluxos – à análise da evolução dos processos de *agenda-setting* na China, tomando como exemplo as reformas do sistema de saúde, ocorridas a partir de 2002 e baseando as nossas assunções num *working paper* desenvolvido por um grupo de peritos neste domínio: "*Universal Health Coverage: the case of China*" de William Hsiao, Mingqiang Li e ShuFang Zhang, publicado em 2014.



i. Fluxo dos problemas

No que se refere ao sistema de saúde chinês, no início do novo milénio, este era o reflexo de reformas falhadas ao longo dos anos 1990, em que a maioria da população não tinha acesso aos cuidados de saúde, ou tinha acesso a preços insuportáveis, sem uma boa cobertura da rede de seguros. Em 2003, surgiu a crise de saúde pública despoletada pela *Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome* (SARS) que veio evidenciar a fragilidade do sistema de saúde na RPC, à data marcado por um modelo de funcionamento orientado pelas leis de mercado e por uma onda de privatizações.

O descontentamento da população começou a tornar-se cada vez mais evidente à medida que o mesmo era alvo de notícia nos meios de comunicação social e à medida que se intensificaram os estudos científicos e os pareceres técnicos quanto ao estado do sistema de cuidados de saúde e ao empobrecimento da população, por via do forte incremento nos gastos pessoais com saúde. Na sequência da SARS em 2003, muitos estudos foram encomendados a entidades peritas no setor da saúde, de entre as quais se destaca o estudo do “*China’s Medical System Reform Study Group*” integrado no *Development Research Centre of the State Council* (DRC), um *think tank* semi-independente com o apoio de organizações internacionais tais como, o Banco Mundial e da Organização Mundial de Saúde, e cujo relatório revelou que as reformas levadas a cabo e as medidas implementadas foram um verdadeiro fracasso (Wang, 2008 e Hsiao et al., 2014). Em 2005, esses dados encontram eco na comunicação social, tal como refere Wang (2008):

“(...) the Pandora’s box had been opened and the public would not accept any further reform measures unless the government made big policy adjustments.”

Medidas viriam a ser tomadas como veremos no fluxo das soluções abaixo, tendo entrado este tema da saúde na *agenda-setting*, por via da combinação dos modelos de *reach-out* e *popular –pressure*.

ii. Fluxo das soluções

O fluxo das soluções passa, segundo Kingdon, pelo espírito de iniciativa de agentes de destaque que identificam os problemas e apresentam alternativas para seu solucionamento. No caso chinês, devido à natureza autoritária característica do sistema político vigente, e apesar de uma mudança gradual deste paradigma pelo poder que advém de novos *media*, nomeadamente a Internet, continua a verificar-se uma margem limitada para o espírito de iniciativa dos agentes individuais, sendo que “as ideologias dos líderes políticos e dos burocratas moldam diretamente a direção das reformas e das políticas associadas” (Hsiao et al., 2014).

O debate ideológico presente na génese das reformas de saúde esteve sempre baseado no financiamento do sistema de saúde, e na dualidade de modelos assentes, ora no controlo do Estado, ora no neoliberalismo e nas leis do mercado.

Em 2003, aquando da crise de saúde causada pela SARS, a RPC já tinha passado de um sistema de cuidados de saúde assente na ação do Governo para um sistema assente nas



leis do mercado, com resultados insatisfatórios. Nesta fase, os peritos estavam divididos em dois campos opostos, os pró-mercado e os pró-estado, embora já houvesse nessa altura uma série de relatórios publicados evidenciando os falhanços da liberalização económica no setor da saúde, traduzindo-se em cuidados de saúde deficitários e a preços inacessíveis para a grande maioria da população chinesa (Hsiao et al., 2014).

Atualmente, ambas as ideologias continuam alvo de debate na esfera dos decisores políticos, dos agentes envolvidos e da opinião pública no que toca, por exemplo, à gestão dos cuidados hospitalares. No entanto, no que diz respeito à prestação de cuidados de saúde primários, ficou definido por meio de várias diretrizes do Governo central de que este era o principal responsável pelo financiamento desses cuidados de saúde que constituir-se como o elo de ligação e o primeiro contacto dos utentes com o sistema de saúde e que deve ser assegurado de forma equitativo para todos (Hsiao et al., 2014).

iii. Fluxo da política

No caso da RPC, o fluxo da política está sobremaneira enredado no fluxo dos problemas e no campo das ideologias (Hsiao et al., 2014). A saúde foi durante anos um tópico que não estava, de todo, como prioridade na agenda. A crise de saúde pública da SARS foi o acontecimento de choque que criou a janela de oportunidade que estava latente desde a década de 1980 e sobretudo 1990.

Em 2004, é criado o documento com os “Princípios Científicos para o Desenvolvimento”, em que um desses princípios se refere precisamente ao campo da saúde, com o intuito de alcançar uma cobertura universal dos cuidados de saúde primários. Nesse alinhamento, é criada em 2006 uma Equipa Interdisciplinar composta por organizações não-governamentais nacionais e internacionais, peritos do Banco Mundial e da Organização Mundial de Comércio, entre outros, para avaliar as medidas necessárias à reforma do sistema de saúde chinês. No âmbito duma conferência de dois dias sobre o tema, ressaltaram as seguintes conclusões do trabalho conduzido pelo grupo de peritos multidisciplinar (Hsiao et al., 2014):

- O Governo deve financiar a prevenção como bem público;
- Se a equidade é prioridade da nação, o Governo deve tomar a responsabilidade do financiamento dos cuidados de saúde;
- Visto que o financiamento nos cuidados de saúde primários para melhorar a saúde é mais eficiente, a RPC deve orientar os seus gastos elevados com os hospitais e reorientá-los para os cuidados de saúde primários;
- Existem falhas severas na prestação de serviços de saúde, no fornecimento por parte de farmacêuticas de renome e nos dispositivos médicos, áreas que devem ser alvo de regulamentação.

Com base nestas recomendações que foram transmitidas ao Conselho de Estado, foi elaborada uma proposta pelos membros desta equipa interdisciplinar que conduziria em 2009 ao mais recente plano de reforma de saúde a ser aplicado a nível nacional. O



procedimento da elaboração da proposta até à sua aprovação final que se efetivou na implementação da reforma em 2009 foi, de certa forma, inédito na RPC, uma vez que a proposta proveio de agentes quer internos, quer externos, considerados “consultores”. Além disso, previamente à versão final da proposta, a versão preliminar foi tornada pública e sujeita aos comentários e sugestões da sociedade civil (Hsiao et al., 2014). Pode considerar-se que foi usado o modelo de *Reach-out*, pouco comum na RPC, mas sempre que usado neste país, o terá sido no setor da saúde.

A dita reforma foi pensada em três fases: de 2009 a 2011, como fase tida de implementação, de 2011 a 2015 como fase de consolidação e finalmente de 2016 a 2020, em que se espera que os objetivos estejam já alcançados. Os objetivos foram delineados de acordo com cinco principais categorias: (1) expansão da cobertura de seguros de saúde; (2) disponibilização de serviços públicos de saúde iguais para todos; (3) melhoria da eficiência e eficácia do sistema atendimento básico de saúde primária; (4) estabelecimento de um sistema nacional de medicamentos essenciais bem regulamentado; e (5) implementação de reformas-piloto em hospitais públicos (Hsiao et al., 2014).

Atualmente, já se encontraria em processo de avaliação, não fossem as contrariedades advindas do contexto de pandemia causado pelo surto de Covid-19, com epicentro conhecido precisamente em território chinês.

Resultados e conclusões

Deste trabalho, ressaltamos que a ideologia influencia o processo de *agenda-setting* e formulação de políticas na RPC, sobretudo na adoção de conceitos tais como equidade, neoliberalismo, forças de mercado e seguros sociais e de saúde. No entanto, a aplicação integral e sem adaptações da liberalização económica ao setor da saúde durante as décadas de 1980 e 1990 não trouxe bons resultados no caso chinês (Hsiao et al., 2014), embora até aos dias de hoje as duas ideologias que opõem Estado vs. Mercado continuem em constante debate, no que diz respeito às políticas de saúde.

Desde a reforma de abertura económica em 1978, o sistema político chinês, embora seja designado de ‘autoritarismo resiliente’, sofreu uma evolução no sentido de ser hoje mais permeável à participação pública de académicos, organizações internacionais, organizações não-governamentais nacionais e grupos de interesse no que toca à identificação de problemas e participação no processo de tomada de decisão (Hsiao et al., 2014).

Ao longo do período em estudo, vários modelos de *agenda-setting* coexistiram, embora sempre houvesse um modelo preponderante nas diversas fases. Ainda hoje coexistem, pois não são totalmente estanques e a sua aplicação varia em função dos assuntos levados para a agenda. No entanto, este trabalho permite concluir que à medida que a influência dos pesquisadores políticos, peritos, agentes de participação da sociedade civil e meios de comunicação social aumenta, os modelos ‘*closed-door*’ e ‘*mobilization*’ tornaram-se um pouco obsoletos, em detrimento do modelo ‘*inside-access*’ que se tornou prática corrente na RPC. Os modelos de ‘*outside access*’ e ‘*reach-out*’ são ocasionalmente



observados, mas a maior mudança de paradigma está no papel crescente do modelo de '*popular-pressure*' na definição da agenda política na RPC.

Nomeadamente, a partir de 2002, em virtude de a RPC ter defendido um progresso baseado no avanço do conhecimento científico, surgiram uma série de grupos de *think tanks* e institutos que começaram a ser envolvidos nos projetos de tomada de decisão política, dando destaque aos modelos '*inside-access*' e também '*reach-out*', este último em particular no setor da saúde. Pode-se inferir que ambos os modelos irão continuar a ter um papel significativo no futuro em termos de *agenda-setting*.

É possível apontar o alcance de um dos objetivos fulcrais da reforma do sistema de saúde: a cobertura universal da rede de cuidados de saúde. Enquadrada na teoria dos Múltiplos Fluxos, requereu a convergência de vários fatores, tais como: (i) o reconhecimento do problema – sistema de saúde não equitativo e ineficiente; (ii) o espaço político criado por momentos catalisadores – crise do SARS em 2003; (iii) ideias inovadoras no campo da política e da alocação de recursos, através das medidas propostas pelo *think tank* interdisciplinar referido acima, entre outras. No caso do contexto muito específico que foi observado no presente trabalho, esta convergência demorou décadas até chegar ao seu ponto de maturação.

A crise de saúde pública oriunda do surto de SARS foi, inegavelmente, o acontecimento que se constituiu como "janela de oportunidade", a qual tornou possível que o problema já há muito identificado e as possíveis soluções (dois fluxos do modelo de múltiplos fluxos) se combinassem entre si juntando-se ao terceiro fluxo da política. Tal como Cobb e Elder (1975) referem, foi o momento em que a agenda pública se tornou a agenda política, por via da pressão popular – tendo imperado, de forma inovadora na RPC, embora com tendência crescente, o modelo '*popular-pressure*'.

Finalmente, é possível concluir que o modelo '*popular-pressure*' só se torna plausível quando as prioridades do público coincidem com as do Governo, o que nos remete para as palavras do Primeiro-Ministro chinês Wen Jiabao em 2006 "(...) a *agenda-setting* está a tornar-se um processo cada vez mais científico e democrático" e "(...) a *agenda-setting* enfatiza soluções para os principais problemas, relevantes quer para a grande estratégia nacional de desenvolvimento social e económico, quer para a população como um todo."

O caso chinês permite uma análise histórica do processo complexo de *agenda-setting* (Wang, 2008), em que o Modelo de Múltiplos Fluxos se revela muito útil na observação e interpretação das várias forças que se enquadram nos fluxos determinados pelo dito modelo, as quais têm de maturar até uma conjugação que resulte em inclusão de um tópico na agenda e consequente adoção de medidas e até reformas mais profundas, como aconteceu no caso do sistema de saúde chinês.

Revelou ser um modelo de análise aplicável à análise da evolução do processo de *agenda-setting* e muito interessante no âmbito específico do setor da saúde, permitindo perceber melhor todo o quadro conjuntural que concorre para a escolha de determinado tópico da agenda política.



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A DIÁSPORA CHINESA NO BRASIL: DISPERSÃO, MITOLOGIA DA TERRA DE ORIGEM E PROMESSA DE RETORNO

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Resumo

O presente trabalho visa a fornecer um panorama da presença de chineses no Brasil, estimados em 300.000. Tendo como base a relação dialética entre Brasil e China, a presente investigação trabalha com as seguintes hipóteses, que são também as linhas de problematização: A China expulsa; O Brasil recebe; Os sino-brasileiros emergem (a síntese do processo). A metodologia consistiu inicialmente em pesquisa bibliográfica. Posteriormente, houve coleta de dados secundários, oriundos do Museu da Imigração em São Paulo. O grosso do material empírico consistiu em entrevistas com cinco chineses - dados qualitativos, transcrição e análise (aplicação de questionários). Além disso, fez-se um levantamento fotográfico e documental da presença chinesa em São Paulo, em pontos da cidade específicos. A pesquisa iniciou em 2003 e o campo e entrevistas foram realizadas em 2006. Após este período, estudou-se comunicação asiático-brasileira em redes sociais. Foi feita então a análise de todos os materiais. Para o conceito de diáspora, foram usadas referências de Stuart Hall e Adam McKeown. Na análise socioeconômica, o conceito Marxiano “exército industrial de reserva” dá conta da presença de grandes contingentes populacionais circulando pelo mundo. O mecanismo de *pull* e *push* entre populações e territórios é uma construção utilizada por Paul Singer e Herbert Klein para explicar o movimento populacional. Sobre a construção de uma identidade brasileira que incluísse também asiáticos e seus descendentes, os trabalhos de Jeffrey Lesser merecem destaque. Sobre a inserção de chineses na sociedade brasileira, foram utilizadas teorias de Sigmund Freud e Eric Hobsbawm. O Brasil, pelo desenvolvimento de seu mercado, torna-se polo de atração de pessoas do mundo todo, inclusive chineses. Como colocado por entrevistados, o Brasil é visto como um país “em construção”. E hoje os chineses têm um lugar na construção de uma identidade brasileira..

Palavras chave

Brasil; China; migração; diáspora; São Paulo



Abstract

This paper aims to provide an overview of the presence of Chinese in Brazil, who are estimated to be about 300,000 in number. Based on the dialectical relationship between Brazil and China, this research works with the following hypotheses, which are also the lines of problematization: China expels; Brazil receives; Sino-Brazilians emerge (the synthesis of the process). The methodology consisted initially of bibliographical research. Later on, secondary data was collected from the Museu da Imigração in São Paulo. The bulk of the empirical material consists of interviews with five Chinese individuals, providing qualitative data, a transcription and an analysis (application of questionnaires). In addition, a photographic and documentary survey of the Chinese presence in São Paulo at specific points in the city was carried out. The research began in 2003, and the fieldwork and interviews were carried out in 2006. After this period, the author studied Asian-Brazilian communication in social networks. An analysis of all the materials was then made. For the concept of diaspora, references from Stuart Hall and Adam McKeown were used. In the socioeconomic analysis, the Marxian concept "industrial reserve army" accounts for the presence of large population contingents moving around the world. The pull and push mechanism between populations and territories is a construct used by Paul Singer and Herbert Klein to explain population movement. Regarding the construction of a Brazilian identity that would also include Asians and their descendants, the works of Jeffrey Lesser are worth mentioning. Concerning the insertion of the Chinese into Brazilian society, the theories by Sigmund Freud and Eric Hobsbawm were used. Brazil, due to the development of its market, has become a pole of attraction for people from all over the world, including the Chinese. As the interviewees said, Brazil is seen as a country "under construction". And today the Chinese have a place in the construction of a Brazilian identity.

Keywords

Brazil; China; migration; diaspora; São Paulo

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A DIÁSPORA CHINESA NO BRASIL: DISPERSÃO, MITOLOGIA DA TERRA DE ORIGEM E PROMESSA DE RETORNO

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1. Introdução

Ressaltando a dimensão cultural do fenômeno migratório, o presente trabalho visa a fornecer um panorama da presença de chineses no Brasil, estimados em 300.000, uma relativamente pequena porcentagem da população brasileira, com mais de 200 milhões de pessoas. Também uma pequena parcela da dispersão dos chineses pelo mundo, estimados em mais de 35 milhões de pessoas.

A China é do Conselho de Segurança da ONU, e desde 2009, o maior parceiro comercial do Brasil. Por estas razões, são cada vez mais frequentes estudos sobre a China do ponto de vista de números, do comércio internacional, e também sobre desenvolvimento (no sentido de experiências que podem ensinar o Brasil a vencer problemas históricos neste quesito). Entretanto, no caso brasileiro ainda há carência de estudos sobre a parte cultural desta relação. A China está investindo seriamente em aumentar cursos e departamentos de língua portuguesa e cultura brasileira, ao passo que o Brasil se mantém estagnado na sua pesquisa sobre a China. O resultado ainda é o mútuo desconhecimento entre os dois países. José Roberto Teixeira Leite (1999), Gylberto Freire e alguns outros poucos pioneiros já destacaram a influência chinesa no Brasil desde os tempos coloniais, num intenso intercâmbio de pessoas, artes, costumes, espécies animais e vegetais entre Brasil, África e Ásia promovido pelos portugueses. A partir dos anos de 1970, surgiram mais estudos sobre a imigração chinesa no Brasil, como o de Yang (1974), que é um trabalho seminal no Brasil.

Centros de pesquisa europeus e estadunidenses têm as suas próprias inquietações e próprios interesses no estudo sobre a China. O Brasil ainda carece de uma perspectiva própria, que contemple aos interesses brasileiros no estudo da China. Basicamente, falta estabelecer uma conexão entre estas duas grandes regiões em desenvolvimento. O que pretendemos adquirir aqui é esta perspectiva, ampliando o entendimento cultural, algo que em muito pode auxiliar as relações bilaterais, melhorando o comércio e intercâmbios que vão além do cultural.

Levando-se em consideração o conceito de exército industrial de reserva (Marx, s.d.: 730-749), há forças de atração e repulsão de população entre regiões do planeta. Obviamente, migrações são recursos para desenvolver a economia das regiões



receptoras, trazendo força de trabalho e qualificações, sem falar no ganho trazido pela diversidade cultural. Entretanto, diferentemente do capital que circula livremente pelo planeta, as pessoas têm sua liberdade de circulação cerceada nas fronteiras. Isto resulta em diversas crises de refugiados, sendo o campo o paradigma do espaço das fronteiras, em que é naturalizada a privação de direitos de certos grupos sociais (Agamben, 2004: 79).

Os movimentos populacionais comunicam regiões, mesmo que os seus respectivos Estados não participem ativamente ou alavanquem as ações. Se são do interesse de suas classes dominantes, as ações ocorrerão (Singer, 1973: 38). Há regiões que têm excesso de população, que não encontra ocupação por ter sido deixada de fora por processos excludentes. Tais regiões são expulsoras de pessoas (*pushing regions*), sendo a Europa e a Ásia da passagem do século XIX para o XX exemplos clássicos. Ao mesmo tempo, regiões de vazio populacional, abundância de terra não-explorada e economias em ascensão atraem força de trabalho (*pulling regions*), sendo todo o continente americano da passagem do século XIX para o XX um exemplo. Levando em consideração tais conceitos de *pull* e *push*, explorados pelo historiador Herbert Klein (2000: 13), aqui se procura identificar as forças de repulsão e atração de população. Se na passagem do século XIX para o XX, a Europa e a Ásia eram lugares de excedente populacional e as Américas eram lugares de vazio demográfico, os emigrantes promovem um encontro que busca suprir as necessidades econômicas das regiões em jogo¹. Neste trabalho especificamente, cabe analisar as condições chinesas que levam parte de sua população a sair, e as condições atrativas do Brasil, em especial São Paulo, para o recebimento de pessoas do mundo todo.

E mais interessante ainda para o presente trabalho é o produto deste processo: o surgimento de uma comunidade que é sino-brasileira. Ao entrevistar membros desta comunidade, procurou-se compreender fatores de *pull* e *push*, bem como a construção desta comunidade, seus valores, tensões (internas e externas), e universo cultural. Daí também a importância do conceito de diáspora.

Segundo o Instituto Sociocultural Brasil-China (Ibrachina), de São Paulo, há 300 mil chineses no Brasil, correspondendo a 5% do total de imigrantes no país. Se a imigração chinesa não é representativa dentro do Brasil, ficando atrás de grupos como portugueses, espanhóis, italianos e japoneses, então por que estudar o tema? Se dentro da diáspora chinesa, a parte brasileira é ainda bastante diminuta, então por que estudar o tema? Dada a relevância das relações comerciais e diplomáticas entre Brasil e China, todos os pontos de conexão que possam aproximar os dois países, minimizando o problema do desconhecimento mútuo, são muito pertinentes. Ademais, é um grupo de imigração contemporâneo, que ainda cresce no Brasil.

Tendo como base a relação dialética entre Brasil e China, a presente investigação trabalha com as seguintes hipóteses:

¹ Em sua vasta pesquisa sobre os processos migratórios de chineses rumo ao continente americano, Evelyn Hu-DeHart destaca a América Latina como espaço privilegiado para a imigração chinesa. Estudando mais a fundo o caso mexicano, a autora mostra como a região foi importante para receber chineses nos diversos momentos de exclusão por parte dos Estados Unidos desde o século XIX (Hu-DeHart, 2013: 89).



- A China expulsa (*push factors*);
- O Brasil recebe (*pull factors*);
- Os sino-brasileiros emergem (a síntese do processo).

De certa forma refletindo a estrutura de hipóteses, além de considerar a perspectiva de retorno que caracteriza uma diáspora, o trabalho se divide em sete partes: 1. Introdução; 2. Deixando a China; 3. Estabelecendo-se no Brasil; 4. Os retornados; 5. Conclusões; 6. Imagens e a 7. Bibliografia.

A metodologia consistiu inicialmente em pesquisa bibliográfica, sobretudo sobre a diáspora chinesa pelo mundo, e sobre a história das imigrações para o Brasil, porém como temas separados, pois havia ainda poucos trabalhos a abordar os dois temas juntos, ou seja, a imigração chinesa para o Brasil. Posteriormente, houve coleta de dados secundários, oriundos do Museu da Imigração em São Paulo.

O grosso do material empírico consistiu em entrevistas com chineses - dados qualitativos, transcrição e análise (aplicação de questionários) – entrevistados livres para discorrer e opinar. O que os entrevistados têm em comum é ter nascido na China, mas procurou-se uma variedade de gênero, grupo etário, origem (ter vindo da China Continental ou de Taiwan, por exemplo), ocupações. Além disso, procedeu-se ao levantamento fotográfico e documental da presença chinesa em São Paulo, em pontos da cidade específicos.

A pesquisa iniciou-se em 2003 para a confecção de tese de doutoramento, que foi defendida em 2008. O campo e entrevistas foram realizadas em 2006. Após este período, o pesquisador voltou-se para a comunicação asiático-brasileira em redes sociais, como YouTube, Facebook e Instagram nos últimos anos. Foi feita então a análise de todos os materiais.

Para o conceito de diáspora, foram usadas referências de Stuart Hall (2003: 25-47) e Adam McKeown (1999: 308), entre outros. É um conceito central nesta investigação, que só pode ser chamado como tal quando existem estas três dimensões:

- Dispersão física pelo mundo (afinal, a palavra vem do grego *dia speiro*, que significa “o espalhar das sementes”);
- A criação de uma mitologia e narrativas sobre a terra de origem;
- Promessa de retorno.

Outro autor que ressalta a promessa de retorno no processo migratório é Abdelmalek Sayad (1998: 176).

Na parte social-econômica, o conceito de Karl Marx (s.d.: 730-749) “exército industrial de reserva” dá conta da presença de grandes contingentes populacionais circulando pelo mundo, basicamente por razões econômicas. Entretanto, quando se pensa deslocamento por falta de segurança, logo se pensa em Giorgio Agamben (2004). A vida da contemporaneidade é a vida na fronteira, questão abordada por Homi Bhabha (2003: 19). Já o referido mecanismo de *pull* e *push* entre populações e territórios é uma



construção utilizada por Paul Singer (1973) e Herbert Klein (2000) para explicar o movimento populacional.

Sobre a construção de uma identidade brasileira que incluísse também asiáticos e seus descendentes, os trabalhos de Jeffrey Lesser (2001: 18-21; 2007: 189) merecem destaque². Sobre a inserção de chineses na sociedade brasileira, teorias de Sigmund Freud (1961), Eric Hobsbawn (1975) e outros que ajudam a lidar com a complexidade da questão³.

O estudo permite identificar uma intrínseca conexão entre processos econômicos, políticos e culturais, sendo o Brasil palco de rápidas e intensas transformações, refletindo tendências históricas e criando uma singular realidade. Ao ouvir a comunidade sino-brasileira e documentar a sua presença na cidade de São Paulo, o trabalho procura sistematizar informações de um assunto relevante para as relações internacionais do Brasil, para o autoconhecimento de suas origens, além de se constituir em ponto de partida para um terreno ainda inexplorado e cheio de possibilidades para expandir. O que resultou foi o registro de fala dos membros de tal comunidade, e um entendimento do Brasil como uma parte deste processo e palco de intensas disputas narrativas, políticas e culturais.

2. Deixando a China

Internamente, a parte meridional da China sempre foi a grande exportadora de pessoas. Desde a Dinastia Qing (1644-1912), as províncias de Guangzhou e Fujian eram as terras mais populosas, onde o caos social se fazia sentir. Criminalidade, desemprego, e empobrecimento eram abundantes na região, sendo um fator para explicar a saída de pessoas. Ao mesmo tempo, tais regiões, por serem costeiras e portuárias, eram mais abertas e oferecedoras de oportunidades e acesso ao Oceano Pacífico, sem falar na proximidade de Hong Kong e Macau. De certa forma, as comunidades chinesas pelo mundo têm pronunciados traços do sul da China, mais do que do norte ou outras regiões. Isto se dá pelo fato de que mais chineses saíram justamente desta região. Em certa medida, houve fluxo de trabalhadores vindos de Macau, alguns dos quais sequestrados ou enganados sobre sua vida nas Américas. Estamos aqui a falar do período da

² Para ser aceita, a identidade asiático-brasileira precisa ser amplamente discutida e negociada, conferindo a este grupo a condição de eterno estrangeiro (Lesser, 2001: 18-21; 293-294). Mais recentemente, Lesser (2007: 189) faz uma reflexão acerca de estereótipos que envolvem os asiático-brasileiros, sobretudo as mulheres – que são sexualizadas. Como os japoneses são o paradigma de imigração asiática para o Brasil, tais questões afetam diretamente a comunidade Nikkei brasileira, ou nipo-brasileira.

³ Freud (1961: 114) salienta o narcisismo das pequenas diferenças, postulando que há mais problemas entre culturas próximas do que entre culturas distantes, porque está sempre presente, em cada povo, o medo de ter a sua identidade confundida com a do outro. Já Eric Hobsbawn (1975: 103-121), por sua vez, ressalta o caráter artificial dos nacionalismos, à medida que estes são rapidamente construídos para servir de instrumento para certa classe social que ascende. O autor demonstra aqui a íntima relação entre migração e nação – e como esta noção de nação será construída nas comunidades no exterior. Já nas tardias unificações da Itália e da Alemanha no século XIX, pode-se ver nitidamente a fabricação de nacionalismos para servir a um interesse de classe. A artificialidade do conceito de nação é também um assunto amplamente trabalhado por Gellner (1983: 56). Já Anderson (2008: 71), por sua vez, faz detalhada análise das nações como comunidades imaginadas e sobre o que enseja esta construção.



exportação de mão-de-obra *coolie*, que se deu de 1810 a 1920 pelas mãos de portugueses e ingleses, que eram concorrentes entre si (Yang, 1974: 18-20).

De fato, temos números de chineses pelo Brasil e pelo mundo, mas não se pode ter uma precisão. Fatores como migrações ilegais (*boat people*, cabeças-de-cobra, tráfico de pessoas) e o fato de muitos chineses circularem com passaportes outros que não da China podem explicar a imprecisão. Por exemplo, muitos chineses entraram no Brasil com passaporte moçambicano, por viverem neste país africano, em certos casos por gerações. Caso tenham vindo antes de 1975, estes chineses entravam com passaporte português. Todos estes fatos obscurecem as estimativas.

Na China, emigração é um tema sensível. De certa forma, desfavorece a reputação do governo chinês, à medida que evidencia que muitos deixaram o país em busca de melhores condições de vida. Inicialmente tidos como traidores da pátria, nos fins do século XIX, a partir do momento em que mandam dinheiro de volta à China, passam a ser vistos como beneméritos relativamente ao país de origem. Novas identidades, então, são criadas. *Huaren* (华人) ou *huaqiao* (华侨) são os chineses ultramarinos. Seus descendentes, os *huayi* (华裔). Mais recentemente, as lideranças políticas falam mais em *zhonghua da jiating* (中华大家庭), ou grande família chinesa, em seus discursos. Isto não só salva a reputação da China como também torna estes chineses no exterior de certa forma sujeitos ao controle do Estado chinês. Os chineses têm uma forte cultura de retorno à terra natal, e isto se dá na ligação com a aldeia rural de origem (até recentemente a maioria do país era agrário), remessas de dinheiro do exterior ou mesmo repatriamento de corpos para serem sepultados na China. Em São Paulo é muito comum encontrar associações de chineses ligadas a uma determinada província ou cidade, muito mais que ao país todo.

3. Estabelecendo-se no Brasil

Enquanto a iniciativa *coolie* (苦力) teve ampla aceitação como mão-de-obra asiática para substituir a força de trabalho escravizada de origem africana em diversos países no século XIX, no Brasil isto não se deu. Chineses mineradores dominaram o cenário no Chile, África do Sul e Austrália. No Peru, destacaram-se como extratores de guano, ao passo que nos Estados Unidos, Canadá e Panamá foram construtores de estradas de ferro. Em Cuba, foram amplamente empregados como agricultores. Diferentemente, no México e Indonésia, os chineses se converteram em poderosa burguesia comercial, tendo enfrentado, por seu destaque conquistado na sociedade, severas hostilidades por parte de populações locais.

No Brasil de fins do século XIX, o último país a abolir oficialmente a escravidão nas Américas, colocou-se um acalorado debate sobre a substituição de mão-de-obra escravizada. Marcado pelo racismo, tal debate era sobre a política de “branqueamento” da população e incentivo da vinda de imigrantes europeus ao Brasil, sobretudo para as lavouras de café do sudeste. E posteriormente, a crescente industrialização do estado de São Paulo. Realmente, a Europa se via com crescente contingente populacional empobrecido, carecendo de terras e ocupação. Processos excludentes, como as tardias unificações da Itália e da Alemanha, faziam crescer aquilo que Karl Marx (s.d.: 730-749)



iria designar como exército industrial de reserva. Ao mesmo tempo, tais regiões viam crescer internamente movimentos sociais questionadores, como o socialista e o anarquista. Inicialmente, tais trabalhadores politizados não se deixavam contentar pelas condições de vida e trabalho no Brasil. Desta forma, começaram a ser considerados os trabalhadores asiáticos.

A primeira iniciativa oficial de se trazerem de trabalhadores *coolies* ao Brasil se deu ainda na época colonial, na corte de D. João VI em 1812, em que poucos plantadores de chá vieram ao Jardim Botânico do Rio de Janeiro – iniciativa que resultou em fugas e suicídios, dificultando muito o prosseguimento da iniciativa *coolie* no país austral, a despeito de posteriores tentativas e missões diplomáticas. A dinastia Qing, envolvida em problemas internos de caos social, guerras do ópio, pressão de nações imperialistas, ao constatar as más condições de vida destas populações, achou por bem interromper o fluxo. Ele ainda ocorreu, contudo. Por exemplo, o dia 15 de agosto é desde 2018 o Dia da Imigração Chinesa (data federal), em referência à chegada do vapor Malange, em 1900 (tendo feito a rota Lisboa – Rio).

O Brasil ainda estava interessado em trazer trabalhadores asiáticos, e então recorreu aos japoneses, um grupo de trabalhadores preterido pelos Estados Unidos, e também numeroso pela excludente Restauração Meiji do século XIX. Desta forma, em 1908, atracava no porto de Santos o Kasato Maru, com os primeiros japoneses, transformando-os a partir de então no paradigma da imigração asiática no país – tendo hoje a comunidade Nikkei mais de 1,5 milhão de pessoas no Brasil, entre japoneses e seus descendentes.

No Brasil, como a iniciativa *coolie* não prosperou, a comunidade chinesa é predominantemente urbana, com forte traço empreendedor e chegada por iniciativas familiares. Tal situação é bastante diferente de imigrações ao Brasil que podem ser consideradas “tuteladas”, como a italiana ou japonesa. Há marcos na história da China que interferem na imigração chinesa para o Brasil. Se até 1950 predominavam os chineses continentais no Brasil, entre esta data e 1980 chegaram mais taiwaneses. Após este marco, os chineses continentais retomam a proeminência no processo. Isto nos leva a inferir que após a Revolução Chinesa de 1949, o país se fechou, tornando mais difícil a emigração. Neste tempo, a ilha de Taiwan era mais aberta, e muitos a deixaram pelas tensões políticas existente entre as extremidades do estreito de Taiwan. Pelo mundo, as comunidades chinesas se incrementaram de cultura letrada e se revitalizaram após a Revolução de 1949, devendo-se ao fato de que pela primeira vez elites intelectuais emigraram expressivamente da China. E o que a década de 1980 nos sinaliza? É o momento da reforma e abertura, garantido acesso e oportunidades da população chinesa continental para o estrangeiro.

De qualquer maneira, o processo migratório é sentido de formas diferentes de acordo com as gerações. No caso de chineses no Brasil, muitas vezes os filhos funcionam como mediadores e até interpretes entre os pais e a cultura do país; entre o diminuto mundo doméstico e o amplo mundo social exterior. Filhos únicos tendem a dominar melhor o chinês, ao passo que crianças e jovens com irmãos tendem a aprender o português mais rapidamente. Obviamente, há choques culturais dentro da própria família. Os jovens *huayi* não se conformam por terem colegas brasileiros com uma vida muito mais livre e relaxada do que a eles – e não raro questionam os pais. Os mais velhos tendem a viver



em enclaves, muitas vezes nunca aprendendo o português ou tendo amizades fora do círculo chinês.

Em *Mal-Estar na Civilização*, Freud (1961: 114) dá conta do chamado “narcisismo das pequenas diferenças”, em que há maiores problemas entre culturas próximas do que entre culturas distantes. Assim, por exemplo, entre chineses e japoneses, entre povos do Oriente Médio, ou entre portugueses e espanhóis. Muitas vezes, na terra de origem, as pessoas vêm de civilizações que competiam por recursos, ou determinados rios ou terras. Mais do que isto, entretanto, o estudo de processos migratórios deve levar em conta que, entre civilizações próximas existe o medo e o perigo de ser confundido com o outro. Ou seja, o perigo da perda da própria identidade. Em São Paulo, isto se deu com todos estes grupos. Os chineses têm suas tensões internas e externas à colônia. Por seu caráter fragmentado, a diáspora chinesa no Brasil muitas vezes apresenta uma maior ligação à província de origem do que à Grande China propriamente dita. Curiosamente, os japoneses, por serem a maior imigração asiática no Brasil, acabam por ditar a distribuição espacial dos chineses e outros asiáticos, que acabam por gravitar em torno destes japoneses, em princípio.

O bairro paulistano da Liberdade torna-se o ícone espacial das imigrações orientais no Brasil. Transformado pela arquitetura japonesa, seus letreiros e lanternas, o lugar se torna espaço de disputas narrativas em curso no Brasil. É vendido como “bairro japonês”, mas hoje em dia poucos japoneses vivem ali. Estes já estão espalhados em outros bairros da cidade, sendo a maioria dos orientais que lá vivem chineses. Há também alguns coreanos. Antes da chegada dos primeiros orientais ao bairro, entretanto, ele era essencialmente africano. A Praça da Liberdade era lugar de execução de escravizados rebelados, e a igreja que ainda está lá ostenta o nome Igreja dos Aflitos. Era o pranto destes aflitos que o bairro via correr. O local se torna um simulacro de Oriente na arquitetura e comércio, onde cada vez mais artificialmente há pressão para vender a imagem japonesa e apagar a história africana anterior. Isto é apagar uma herança que justifica o próprio nome Liberdade. O governador do estado João Doria Jr. renomeou a estação de metrô Liberdade para “Japão Liberdade” em 2018. O bairro tem uma feira dominical, onde se está tentando proibir a comercialização de comidas não-orientais. Comidas do Nordeste brasileiro, em especial. Tudo isto é o apagamento da história pregressa do bairro. Hoje em dia há relatos de que está em vias de se criar artificialmente uma “Chinatown” em São Paulo. Aliás, entre os entrevistados da pesquisa, uma Chinatown no Brasil não se justifica por dois motivos:

- Não há escala para isso. Cerca de 300.000 chineses vivem no Brasil, metade dos quais em São Paulo. Não se compara a cidades estadunidenses, australianas ou canadenses;
- Os chineses do Brasil sentem que não precisam se isolar, pois se sentem incluídos na sociedade brasileira.

Hobsbawm (1975: 103-121) já destacara o caráter artificial e fabricado dos nacionalismos, e como estes escamoteiam as identificações de classe. Talvez um exercício interessante seja realmente tentar buscar identificações mais universais baseadas no lugar ocupado nos processos produtivos.



Estas e outras questões contemporâneas têm sido abordadas pelo canal de YouTube chamado Yo Ban Boo, criado em 2016 por jovens brasileiros de ascendência asiática. Aliás, mais recentemente o pesquisador voltou-se a este assunto, porque ele é a continuação natural do processo analisado desde a pesquisa doutoral defendida em 2008. O canal discute diversas questões sobre o que é ser asiático-brasileiro. O Brasil, apesar de sua diversidade étnica e racial, é um país racista. Se ainda há pessoas que não se convencem do racismo sofrido pelos descendentes de escravizados africanos, ainda mais difícil é ilustrar a questão do racismo contra asiáticos (Veras, 2021: 291). Tsang (2018: 304), por sua vez, por meio da análise dos conteúdos de um website dirigido por chineses no Brasil, e dedicado a este público (o BrasilCN.com), em língua chinesa, identifica pontos abordados também por Anderson (2008). Por exemplo, identifica como a China é construída como comunidade imaginada – e muito mais ampliada pelo capitalismo virtual (algo que Anderson não chegou a abordar). Substancialmente mais ampla do que um capitalismo impresso. O espaço virtual é potente criador e amplificador de comunidades imaginadas.

Voltando à questão do racismo contra asiáticos, uma faceta singularizante que ele possui é a questão da “minoría modelo”. Trata-se de um grupo de não-brancos que tem êxito educacional e econômico, e que acaba desta forma servindo para justificar as piores situações vividas pelos negros no Brasil. Ao mesmo tempo, os asiáticos são alvo de racismo, pois a eles é negada individualidade, além de serem frequentemente desumanizados, hostilizados e associados a estereótipos. Pouco se fala, mas na história do continente americano os asiáticos já sofreram diversas restrições legais por conta de sua origem e fenótipo. Após a pandemia de covid-19, a questão se exacerbou em diversos países. Como apontado por Lesser (2001: 293-294), diferentemente de outras identidades étnico-raciais mais aceitas como sendo brasileiras, uma identidade asiática-brasileira tem sempre que ser negociada, ao invés de ser aceita a priori.

4. Os retornados

E a promessa de retorno? Desde 1997 a China tem atraído pessoas do mundo todo – e muitos chineses retornam. Intrigados pelo próprio país, são agora atraídos pelas condições de estabilidade da sociedade chinesa em vários aspectos. O ingresso de investimentos vindos de chineses no exterior já existia há décadas, mas agora cada vez mais chineses voltam: as chamadas *haigui* (海龟 – as tartarugas marinhas que voltam a nado). Há também os chamados *haidai* (海带 – alga marinha), aqueles que não souberam se adaptar ao processo e são engolidos. Os retornados são no geral conhecidos como *guiqiao* (归侨). Para Ho (2015: 199), o que vai diferenciar os *haigui* dos *haidai* é o fato de que enquanto os primeiros utilizam suas habilidades adquiridas no exterior como um ativo para se destacar profissionalmente, para os últimos, ter passado tempo longe da China foi um fator dificultador de retornar ao mercado chinês.

Há um fenômeno ligado à migração chinesa, que embora reflita a cultura do país, quando reproduzido no Brasil, pode levar a problemas inesperados. Os chineses que têm filhos no Brasil os mandam para os avós criarem na China. Isto não é diferente dos movimentos migratórios rural-urbano internos na China. Entretanto, quando estes filhos crescem, são



cidadãos brasileiros, e que não sabem nem a língua do país, ao mesmo tempo que a China não sente qualquer obrigação para com eles. Os consulados brasileiros na China tentaram contornar esta questão criando materiais que apresentam o Brasil. Por fim, há notícia de que o governo chinês está aceitando estes jovens como cidadãos chineses. Esta é de certa forma, uma questão de retornados. Desde 1980 a República Popular da China não permite que cidadãos chineses tenham dupla nacionalidade, o que para a diáspora se tornou motivo de agonia. Assim, na verdade os chineses no estrangeiro têm que escolher entre manter a cidadania chinesa e adotar uma outra. No caso destes jovens, portanto, também deve haver esta escolha, daí também o motivo de uma certa tensão quando da opção.

5. Conclusões

Para além da junção de um material que documenta a presença chinesa em São Paulo (fotos, coleta de jornais chineses, levantamento de endereços importantes), há algumas constatações sobre o processo diaspórico chinês no Brasil. O Brasil, pelo desenvolvimento de seu mercado, torna-se polo de atração de pessoas do mundo todo, inclusive os chineses, a partir do fim da escravatura. Como colocado por entrevistados, o Brasil é visto como um país “em construção”, muito mais novo do que a China. E hoje os chineses têm um lugar na construção de uma identidade brasileira.

Em suma, forças *pull* e *push* atuam entre pessoas chinesas e o território brasileiro. Os chineses pelo mundo constituem uma diáspora, mesmo que com múltiplas e diversas identidades (*zhongguoren*; *huaren* / *huaqiao*; *huayi*, *zhonghua da jiating*, Hong Kong, Macau; 56 etnias). Conforme pode se perceber sobre as tendências de fluxo para o Brasil, isolamento/ abertura da China são determinantes no processo migratório.

Historicamente, o Brasil tem sido polo de atração de população. Como colônia de exploração, o Brasil sempre aguçou a imaginação europeia, conforme relatado por Mello e Souza (1986: 21). Leite (1999: 23), por sua vez, destaca o antigo contato Brasil-China, há séculos promovido pelo colonizador português. Na época de substituição da mão-de-obra escravizada, em fins do século XIX, todo e qualquer imigrante não-europeu desafiava o ideal étnico das elites brasileiras. Concomitantemente, a iniciativa *coolie* no Brasil foi frustrada à medida que as incipientes negociações tiveram pouco avanço. A complexidade da identidade asiática no Brasil se intensifica na questão da “minorias modelo”. Se por um lado ela é enxergada como bem-sucedida, por outro é também vítima de racismo e estereotipação, num país em que a branquitude dá o tom das relações raciais. O Brasil, embora atraísse povos por uma demanda de força de trabalho, é hoje um país de emigração. Há mais de 2 milhões de brasileiros pelo mundo, um processo iniciado na década de 1980 (a chamada “década perdida” – pela estagnação econômica do período), sendo os Estados Unidos, Portugal, Itália e Japão destacados destinos de brasileiros. Desde aquela época, as sucessivas crises econômicas brasileiras levaram à falta de perspectivas de trabalho. No caso de Portugal, Itália, Japão e até Alemanha, muitos brasileiros recorreram a estes países por eles oferecerem às comunidades de descendentes abertura para imigrar, na maioria dos casos com ocupações de baixa qualificação.



Os sino-brasileiros são uma comunidade fragmentada e heterogênea, constituída em ondas desconexas, muito dependentes de iniciativas individuais. Conforme já apontado, nos anos de 1950 e 60 é marcada a vinda de chineses ao Brasil, especialmente taiwaneses. A partir dos anos de 1980 aumentou a vinda de chineses continentais, que segue. Tensões da terra de origem também migram para o Brasil. Um exemplo disso é o mal-estar todo mês de outubro, em que chineses continentais comemoram a data nacional dia 1, e os taiwaneses a celebram dia 10. Isto mostra a complexidade das identidades e formações diaspóricas. Os sino-brasileiros não só transformam a sociedade brasileira, como também são transformados por ela. Constituem, por fim, algo novo, diferente da sociedade chinesa (adaptando sua culinária a ingredientes locais, mudando aspectos culturais mesmo que em enclaves). Em diferentes graus, de acordo com a geração, preservam traços da antiga cultura chinesa, artes, ciência, *guanxi*. E por fim, têm sempre a perspectiva do retorno; seja o retorno físico como *haigui*, seja o retorno por remessas de dinheiro para a terra natal, ou então como investimentos na China, ou por fim na criação de uma grande comunidade imaginada nas artes, literatura, religião, ou no ciberespaço.

6. Imagens

Imagem 1: Hospedaria dos Imigrantes. São Paulo. Recebeu mais de 3 milhões de trabalhadores de todo o mundo, de 1888 aos anos de 1970. São Paulo, com o capital acumulado com a economia cafeeira, investiu na industrialização no século XX, tornando-se mercado aquecido e atraente para mão-de-obra do mundo todo.



Foto: Daniel Veras, 2006 (Veras, 2008: 118)



Imagem 2: As caricaturas da época retratam os debates marcados por racismo e preconceito sobre a possibilidade de se trazerem trabalhadores chineses. No Brasil a iniciativa *coolie* não foi levada adiante.



Fonte: Litografia de Angelo Agostini in *Vida Fluminense*_-1871, reproduzido por Leite (1999: 115)

Imagem 3: O Templo Zulai, no município de Cotia, estado de São Paulo. Iniciativa da comunidade chinesa do Brasil, é o maior templo budista da América Latina.



Foto: Daniel Veras, 2006 (Veras, 2008: 220)



Imagem 4: O bairro paulistano da Liberdade. Palco de disputas narrativas na cidade. Um simulacro de Oriente e tentativa de apagamento da história africana no bairro



Foto: Daniel Veras, 2006 (Veras, 2008: 180)

Imagens 5, 6 e 7: Comemorações de Ano Novo Chinês no bairro da Liberdade. O evento atrai multidão de entusiastas, descendentes de chinês ou não



Foto: Daniel Veras, 2006 (Veras, 2008: 189-190).

Imagens 8 e 9: Escola taiwanesa no bairro da Vila Mariana, cidade de São Paulo. Escolas locais preservam as tradições da região de origem. Aqui, celebração do Ano Novo Chinês



Foto: Daniel Veras, 2006 (Veras, 2008: 223)

Imagem 10: Colégio Sidarta, no município de Cotia, estado de São Paulo. O primeiro colégio do Brasil a incluir em sua grade curricular o idioma chinês.



Foto: Daniel Veras, 2006 (Veras, 2008: 224)

Imagem 11: Vendedor de *chaofan* (arroz frito) em van do bairro das Perdizes, cidade de São Paulo



Foto: Daniel Veras, 2006 (Veras, 2008: 208)

Imagem 12: publicações em língua chinesa produzidas na cidade de São Paulo, tendo como alvo a comunidade chinesa de *huaren* e *huayi*




Foto: Daniel Veras, 2006 (Veras, 2008: 222)



Imagem 13: a Rua 25 de Março, em São Paulo. Importante ponto varejista que concentra comerciantes chineses, sobretudo na área de eletrônicos



Foto: Daniel Veras, 2006 (Veras, 2008: 170)

Imagem 14: a Missão Católica Chinesa, situada à Vila Olímpia, cidade de São Paulo. Sob a liderança do veterano Padre Pedro, ponto de encontro de chineses, religiosos ou não, de diferentes províncias de origem. Ademais, uma instituição que sempre ajudou muitos chineses recém-chegados, sem casa, sem conhecidos e sem falar português



Foto: Daniel Veras, 2006 (Veras, 2008: 216).



Imagens 15, 16 e 17: Material concebido pelo autor brasileiro Maurício de Sousa para o público de jovens chineses nascidos no Brasil, mas que não conhecem nada do país sul-americano, pois foram criados na China. O material é fornecido pelos consulados brasileiros em Shanghai e Guangzhou para estes jovens que, de início têm cidadania brasileira.



Foto: Daniel Veras, 2015.

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- Instituto Confúcio no Brasil, disponível em <https://www.facebook.com/groups/mandarim.brasil/>
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Yo	Ban	Boo,	disponível	em
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCmPMXwu814q8IDOd_OTx26Q				
Bro	Capitalista,	de	Christian	Jao
em	https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCksNHNRPJMK7xRBjq6nqDTQ			Haksabatugi,
disponível				
Pula	Muralha,	Liao	Si	e
Lucas				
Brand,				
disponível				
em				
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6qjUYfE_cG4PHWVs9MMBIA				
Chinesa	Brazuka,	de	Yolanda,	disponível
em				
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCMCMTLrqJDqkQuLdauYVAdg				
Chiu	Yi	Chih,	Filósofo	taoísta
nascido				
em				
Taiwan,				
disponível				
em				
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THE IMPACT OF CHINESE ASSERTIVENESS ON GLOBAL ORDER

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Abstract

Chinese assertiveness has increased considerably in the international arena, with enhanced Chinese influence in all spheres. China has become a political, economic, and military power, flexing its muscles in the international politics. China's rise has affected the existing liberal global order and caused the advent of a new cold war. China, being a staunch communist regime is presenting a challenge to the liberal international order. Thus, the present paper attempts to explore how Chinese assertiveness has affected the global order.

Keywords

China's Rise; Liberal International Order; Chinese Assertiveness; New Cold War; Wolf Warrior Diplomacy

Resumo

A assertividade chinesa aumentou consideravelmente na arena internacional, com uma maior influência chinesa em todas as esferas. A China tornou-se uma potência política, económica, e militar, flexionando os seus músculos na política internacional. A ascensão da China afetou a ordem global liberal existente e provocou o advento de uma nova guerra fria. A China, sendo um regime comunista convicto, apresenta um desafio à ordem internacional liberal. Assim, o presente documento tenta explorar como a assertividade chinesa tem afetado a ordem global.

Palavras-chave

Ascensão da China; Ordem Internacional Liberal; Assertividade Chinesa; Nova Guerra Fria; Diplomacia Wolf Warrior

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Introduction

The paper attempts to shed light on the impact of China's rise in the international arena. China has made remarkable progress since the Communist Revolution, which took place in the year 1949. Internal reform programmes such as the Great Leap Forward, the Second Revolution, the Four Modernizations, and the China Dream all resulted in China's development in all spheres of statecraft. Belt and Road Initiative has augmented Chinese outreach across the globe and transformed it into a global player. China's transition to a market-oriented economy while remaining an ardent Communist regime politically is a distinctive feature of blended government. Fruits of economic liberalisation were reaped in the form of China's moving fast on the path of becoming a superpower of the 21st century. Simultaneously, China's military advancement with modernised weapons and a well-developed military system and progress in other fields has taken it far ahead of other countries. Chinese confidence is evident in its dealings in the international arena, where it strives to take things in its stride, thus posing a challenge to the existing international order. The paper endeavours to apply the analytical approach and the theory of liberalisation to make the study rigorous.

The rise of China in the 21st century is a great phenomenon which has changed geo-strategic equations and the course of global order. The increasing power of China has enhanced its assertiveness in the global arena, which seems to be a threat to the existing liberal international order. The paper focuses on recent developments that are taking place, especially during the pandemic era, which pose a challenge to the existing international order. China boasts of becoming a superpower with substantial economic growth, military modernization, a strong political system, and farsighted leadership in the international arena. The irresponsible, impetuous, and rash behaviour of China during the COVID-19 global pandemic has again raised questions about the future of liberal world order. A New World Order with China as its major player is definitely not safe and secure. Since Xi Jinping became President, China has been moving fast to become a superpower for a host of reasons. Xi's vision of China Dream, the Belt and Road Initiative, his tough stance on various international issues, his hegemonic attitude toward neighbours, and the overall progress of the Chinese nation. The Belt and Road Initiative has unfolded Chinese global ambitions and pushed its outreach tremendously. Now China discards the existing Liberal International Order dominated by western powers and ups the ante to become a major player in the international arena.



China Dream

China Dream is a concept proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping that reflects his vision for his country and its people, which is to make it enormously strong by regaining the Chinese nation's lost glory. Xi's early days of hardship shaped him as a more confident and powerful leader and helped him to develop his own vision of his country and its people, which was manifested in his decisions and actions after he became President. President XI promulgated his vision of the Chinese Dream, which means a "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation". He aspires to modernise China with more economic development, military advancement, and political reforms. The vision seeks a judicious combination of power and prosperity to enable 1.4 billion Chinese to become rich, to become powerful and to be respected. (Allison, 2017).

Xi's war against corruption during the initial years of his presidency consolidated his grip on power. His massive communist party restructuring programme and attempt to connect it with the masses won him applause and further consolidated his position. As a mark of Mr. Xi's influence, the Chinese Communist Party voted in favour of writing his philosophy, called "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era," into its constitution. Prior to Xi, Mao, who led the communist revolution in 1949, and Deng Xiaoping, who implemented economic reforms in the 1980s, had established it as a significant fundamental law of the land. (BBC, 2021: May 12th) As Maoism was the post-revolutionary ideology of communist China, nationalism is now a core ideology in China. Xi's consolidation of power and his nationalistic rhetoric established him as a paramount leader. His crackdown on corruption, suppression of freedom of the press and dissidents, and his hold on power made him the most authoritarian leader since Chairman Mao. Xi was also instrumental in amending the Chinese constitution to end the compulsion of a maximum of two terms for the president, which was supposed to be a chance for President Xi to remain in power for an indefinite term (Susan Shirk, 2018). All these developments contributed to securing his position as paramount leader. Moreover, his hardline attitude towards Taiwan, Hong Kong, in the South China Sea, with Southeast Asian neighbours, with India, Japan, and the USA, indicates Chinese assertiveness in the international arena.

The Belt and Road Initiative

The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative is the signature project of Xi Jinping aimed at establishing China as a superpower of the 21st century. The project intends to augment trade and cooperation by connecting different continents of the globe. The project is an attempt to resuscitate the legacy of the ancient Silk Road stretching from Asia to Europe, which got its name from the silk that was carried along it. The project is taking shape with various connectivity and logistic projects being built at various places across the globe. The BRI has myriad objectives, such as infusing strong impetus to enhance political mutual trust; deepening economic cooperation; promoting people-to-people contact; and increasing cultural exchanges among relevant countries. These objectives are to be achieved through joint cooperation, common development, and regional integration. All countries along the Maritime Silk Road have appreciated the plan and aim to develop and benefit together from the project.



The widespread network of trade routes developed as part of the initiative will link China to many established and developing markets, creating considerable opportunities for Chinese industries. The PRC believes that opening up trade to new markets in this way will sustain the country's economic growth long into the future while also raising living standards for a large portion of the Chinese people. The project aims to divert Chinese manufacturing overcapacity to other markets in the world. The project is also an attempt to rectify economic inequality among the different regions of China itself.

The 19th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China, which was held in 2017, has also approved the project (PWC, 2017), which has multiple aims to enhance China's international stature and also to boost domestic industries. The project seems important also in the manner of re-establishing the credibility and legitimacy of the Communist party by creating a situation of economic affluence in the country. The project involves the global ambitions of China as it would augment its influence considerably and contribute to making it a new superpower of the 21st century. The project connects 4.4 billion people, or roughly 66 percent of the global population of more than 65 countries, with a GDP of \$29 trillion. The gargantuan project would significantly enhance Chinese outreach across the globe while giving it ample opportunities to meddle in global affairs. The Chinese presence in every nook and corner is a giant step for China, which is very much in consonance with its grand strategy to become a superpower.

Wolf Warrior Diplomacy

China has always been an aggressive country, but its "wolf warrior" diplomacy became prominent during the pandemic period. It denotes the aggressive posture and non-leaning down attitude of Chinese diplomats. Chinese envoys are getting loudmouthed in their speeches and tweets, and adopting an aggressive posture by which Chinese authorities have to protect their national interests. It also suggests the chauvinistic attitude of China and a sense of contentment where there is no need to maintain friendly ties with other countries. The nomenclature has been taken from the Chinese movie *Wolf Warrior II*, released in 2017, having the patriotic slogan "Whoever offends the Chinese will be wiped out, no matter how far away". The term has been described by different scholars characterising Chinese foreign policy, such as "the new mixture of confidence and increasing insecurity combined" (Peter Martin, 2020), "assertive, proactive, and high-profile" (Zhiqun, 2021), "confrontational and combative" (Jiang and Westcott, 2021), "Major Country Diplomacy" (Smith, 2021), "Cyber-Nationalism" (Sullivan and Weixiang, 2022) etc.

Chinese leaders and officials staunchly believe that their belligerent attitude and aggressive posture are necessary to defend China's national pride and self-respect, and it is also supposed to be a response to baseless targeting by the western powers. China's former envoy to the UK, Liu Xiaoming, proclaimed this changed Chinese attitude as a need of the hour and said, "Where there is a 'wolf', there is a warrior." (Kewalramani, 2020). Chinese national interest diplomats seek to defend Chinese national interests in a confrontational way. It is a sort of justified defence against the west, which is determined to contain it. Wolf warrior diplomacy is manifested in Chinese actions while dealing with its neighbours and other countries. Hua Chunying and Zhao Lijian, the



Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespersons, took to Twitter to defend Chinese policies during the COVID-19 outbreak. Zhao replied in a tweet in March 2020 that "if someone claims that China's exports are toxic, then stop wearing China-made masks and protective gowns." He said in another tweet that "It might be (the) US army who brought the epidemic to Wuhan." (Zhiqun Zhu, 2021).

In the early 2020s, at the time of the massive outbreak of the covid pandemic from Wuhan, the world condemned China for playing a dubious role, which resulted in spreading the crisis. The Chinese behaviour reflected a rash and berserk attitude which culminated in the severance of ties with many countries. For instance, in April 2020, a Chinese coastguard ship sank a Vietnamese fishing trawler near the Paracel Islands, and when Vietnam objected, the Chinese foreign ministry responded by saying Vietnam's claims to the area are "illegal." (Zhiqun Zhu, 2021) China has shown acute fierceness in its relations with Hong Kong, Taiwan, South China Sea, USA, Australia, India, USA, Japan, Russia, etc.

Hong Kong

China's violation of the "one country and two systems" principle and human rights abuses are doing much harm to the people and their freedom in Hong Kong. China introduced a new security law in the year 2020 to curb the freedom of the press in Hong Kong. The National Security Law, which identifies four types of activities such as terrorism, secession, subversion, and collusion with "foreign forces" as punishable, carries a maximum sentence of life in prison. Article 35 of this law says that anybody convicted of crimes under the law will be deprived of the right to run for public office for life. (Human Rights Watch, 2021). The law discards Hong Kong's Basic Law and also disregards the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. The authorities' crackdown on Apple Daily, which resulted in its closure, suggests the brutality of the law. (HRW, 2021). At the G-7 Summit in 2021, the leaders called for the restoration of political institutions in Hong Kong and to end the unwarranted suppression of those who promote democratic values, rights, and freedoms in Hong Kong. (The Guardian, 2021: March 13th).

China has introduced myriad laws to curb freedom of speech and democracy in Hong Kong since taking over the island territory in the year 1997. In the year 2003, the Hong Kong government introduced national security legislation to prevent treason, sedition, subversion, and secession against the Chinese government. In 2012, it amended Hong Kong school curricula to promote Chinese identity. In 2014, Beijing proposed universal suffrage to vote for the chief executive of the city, but the candidate should be from the short list of China. In 2019, China proposed an Extradition Law which could have allowed extradition to the Chinese mainland for prosecution. This saw a massive protest for months by the people of Hong Kong and caught international attention as well. Finally, the Chinese government caved in to enormous pressure and withdrew this legislation. (Maizland, 2022).

Thereafter, China put forward Security Law 2020, which also had repercussions in the form of massive protests by the people of Hong Kong. It also evoked international reactions wherein the USA, Canada, Britain, and the EU have imposed numerous sanctions against China. But China, unmoved by all these developments, created the



Greater Bay Area Project, which is again an ambitious project to connect Hong Kong with the cities of Guangdong province in China. (Dezen Shira, 2019) It is going to enhance the economic viability of Hong Kong, but at the same time it jeopardises hope for democracy. After evaluating developments of the last few years, it can be concluded that the future does not augur well for Hong Kong and the democratic aspirations of the people are heading towards unnatural death.

Taiwan

For China, Taiwan is a separate province, while Taiwan claims to be an independent state, and this is the reason behind the long-pending animosity between China and Taiwan. China evolved the "One China Policy" and compelled the international community to stick to this. In fact, China has established this principle to be an important part of its bilateral relations with other countries. During the reign of the Trump administration, the USA has supported Taiwan, and present President Biden has assured Taiwan that its commitment to Taiwan's security is rock solid. For a long time, the USA has adopted a strategically ambiguous policy of supporting Taiwan and preventing a war with China. But with recent Chinese intrusions into Taiwanese territory and in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, the US has maintained a proactive approach towards safeguarding Taiwan's security against any possible Chinese aggression.

After the communist revolution in China in 1949, KMT leaders took control of Formosa (present Taiwan, Republic of China) and ran the government from there. When PRC got recognition from the world community, ROC's place was taken over by PRC in various international organisations like UNO and others. Their bilateral relations were marked by tension and instability during those days, coupled with minor conflicts between the two countries. Taiwan too remained under marshal rule from 1949-87, and after that, democracy returned to the island. China and Taiwan have reached an understanding known as the 1992 consensus regarding the conduction of bilateral relations. Both countries agreed to the principle of "One China", although both have different interpretations of that. Thus, they failed to stick to the content of this consensus, which also lacked clarity on the legal status of Taiwan. As the DPP came into power in Taiwan in 2016, it did not endorse the 1992 consensus reached between China and Taiwan. (Maizland, 2022) Tsai, the President of Taiwan, during her opening presidential address in 2016 stated that she was an elected President as per the provisions of the ROC's constitution and that would be the only source of conducting bilateral relations with China. The statement was blatantly rejected by Beijing, and it severed the official ties with Taiwan. (Maizland, 2022) In the year 2019, President Xi reiterated Chinese policy for Taiwan to be incorporated into mainland China under the system of "one country, two systems", the same formula adopted for Hong Kong. Both the major parties in Taiwan, the DPP and the KMT, rejected the proposal in the wake of the crackdown on Hong Kong's freedom. (Maizland, 2022)

In recent times, China has held naval exercises involving an aircraft carrier group near Taiwan. Beijing has also sent aircraft into Taiwan's air defence identification zone on numerous occasions. Taiwan spotted 38 Chinese aircraft entering its Air Defence Zone on November 28th, 2021, creating tensions in the region. (Blanchard, 2021). Taiwan has



accused China of militarily harassing it and warned of countermeasures to be taken if Chinese aircraft move close to Taiwanese territories. This type of incidences is taking place on the regular basis keeping the security of the region under much pressure.

The South China Sea

China is a major player in the South China Sea and, due to its size and location, it has natural geostrategic advantages in the region. Powerful and fearless, China has been actively engaged in consolidating its position in the South China Sea for a long time. The Chinese display of hegemonic attitude creates uproar and a war-like situation in the South China Sea, which is problematic for the region's countries. China claims more than 80% of the South China Sea, and this claim is based on a U-shaped nine-dash line etched on a map. China has disputes with countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, etc. in the South China Sea. A diplomatic clash between the Philippines and China continued recently as the Chinese presence near the Manila claimed area in the South China Sea. Philippine officials demanded the flotilla's withdrawal, although President of the Philippines Duterte reiterated his desire to resolve the issue peacefully. Apparent by the ICJ ruling of 2016, wherein China rejected the International Court's decision, which had given a verdict in favour of the Philippines in South China in a territorial dispute between China and Philippines. (Ankit Panda, 2016)

India-China Stand-off

India and China also have a long history of animosity between their bilateral relations. A recent India-China standoff took place in Ladakh in June 2020 on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The violent brawl of June 1st, 2020, killed 20 Indian soldiers and strained bilateral relations vehemently. Such a violent incident took place after so many years. The situation is still worrisome in Ladakh where China is repeatedly intruding into Indian territory and reports of China's moving forward in Arunachal Pradesh, on the eastern border of India, where new villages have been set up near the border, are affecting bilateral relations.

Dispute with Japan over Senkaku Islands

China and Japan have a territorial dispute over Senkaku island, and they have had so many clashes over this. Recently, China intruded into the waters off the Senkaku Islands for 157 consecutive days (Davidson, 2021). The islands in the East China Sea are presently controlled by Japan but claimed by China, and Chinese vessels intruded into Japan's "contiguous zone" almost daily in April 2021. The contiguous zone is usually used to be the area beyond the territorial sea and which extends up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline that a country claims. The presence of the Chinese vessels on the island is an act of provocation. Japanese Defence Minister Nobuo Kishi asked for US, European and world support to stop Chinese expansionism. He warned that "China is strengthening its military power both in terms of quantity and quality, and rapidly improving its operational capability." (Davidson, 2021).



The China-US Rivalry

China-US differences are evident in the last few years, particularly in the aftermath of China's resurgence in the 21st century as it became a political, economic, and military power. China is posing a challenge to US supremacy in the international arena. During the regime of the Trump administration, the trade war between two countries reached its worst. The US-China trade war has taken the form of a cold war. The current Joe Biden administration is committed to maintaining and strengthening the rules-based international order. The US Secretary of State noted that China's actions in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have endangered the peace of the region and challenged global stability. China's top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, criticised the US stand and reaffirmed Chinese faith in international order based on UN principles and international law and disregarded the dominance of the western world's rules-based international order. (Nikki Asia, 2021).

Chinese Concept of International Order

The present world order was framed in the aftermath of World War II with the establishment of United Nations embedding the spirit of Atlantic Charter of 1941. It embraced the values of liberal democracy – the rule of law, individual freedom, religious liberty, free enterprise, free trade, majority rule with minority rules combining the efforts of Churchill et al. This world order has myriad synonyms such as Rules Based Democratic Order, Liberal International Order and Free World Order etc. (Dowd, 2021). The system is still prevailing but facing immense challenge with the rise of China in the 21st century.

With enormous economic power, military modernization, progress made in science and technology, and subsequent development in all walks of life, China is heading towards the path of becoming a superpower. The unique combination of communist authoritarianism and economic liberalisation increased China's global presence significantly, while making it difficult for international powers to deal with it. Its enormous power, coupled with the aggressive postures of leaders, led it to follow its own course in international relations. China is a member of the United Nations and a signatory of all the important international conventions where it is supposed to obey and respect them. But Chinese actions reflect its hegemonic attitude, which is guided by its deep-rooted national interests, entrenched with Chinese nationalist sentiments to act in the global order on its own terms. China wishes to establish new international relations based on Chinese characteristics and rejects the western world led Liberal International Order.

China's rise is the most important political and economic phenomenon of the twenty-first century. It has consequences for "global security" (Toje 2018), for "global governance" (Beeson and Li 2016; Economy 2018), for "human rights" (Gamso 2019), for "international development" (Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010, Lin 2018) etc. While China's power in international trade is par excellence, it is also growing by other measures of international power. (Grosse 2018) China's growing clout in international production and financial markets is evident in terms of its global manufacturing leadership, stewardship in the assembling of electronics and textiles, and in financial leadership through owning the world's four largest banks. China is also growing in global leadership through the development of new institutions such as the recently signed



Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the landmark Belt and Road initiative (Soong 2018).

In the history of international politics, different scholars have had different opinions regarding international order. It is construed as "international society", "a group of states obeying a set of common rules" (Hedley Bull, 1977), "a systematised group of international institutions" (Mearsheimer, 2019), that all world orders rest on a "set of generally accepted rules" (Henry Kissinger, 2015: 1), and a U.S.-led "liberal" order with an emphasis on "rules-based character". (Ikenberry, 2009). Andrew Moravcsik's liberal theory of international relations focuses on the social groups that shape government officials' orientations and incentives who decide a state's "fundamental" foreign policy preferences. (1997) Now the United States and China are competing to shape the foundation of global system—the essential ideas, habits, and expectations that govern international politics. It has given rise to a new competition, which, according to noted scholar Michael Mazarr, "It is a competition based on narratives, norms, and legitimacy." (2020).

China believes in the Westphalian conception of order with state sovereignty and non-interference as the paramount principles, while undermining the liberal notions of individual rights. This vision cannot be said as less "rules-based" than the United States', in so far as it has faith in the United Nations Charter. It also includes many current forms of international cooperation, including extensive trade, investment, and collaboration on vital transnational issues such as climate change. China is also a staunch supporter of multilateralism, although its actual behaviour sometimes violates existing multilateral norms. Nonetheless, the Chinese world order is significantly different from the order where US influence prevailed (Walt, 2021). China also sticks to core interests of "national unity," "reunification" and "independence" (Swaine 2011).

During the Political Bureau study session of the Communist Party of China on global governance, which was held on October 12th, 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that the fundamental purpose of China's participation in global governance is to serve the accomplishment of the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Xi said, "The rise of developing countries has brought revolutionary changes to the world order. For centuries, powerful countries divided the world and competed for profit and power through war and colonization, but that has been replaced in today's world by rules and mechanisms to balance different interests," he said. (Xinhua, 2015, October 14th) He also advocated democratic and law-based rules to guide global governance so that the global governance system represents the will and interests of a majority of countries in a more balanced manner. (Xinhua, 2015: October 14th)

The Chinese scholar Zhao Suisheng has argued, China is discontent with the current international order because it is dominated by western values and norms. (2017) As a result, China only believes in UN-based international order and advocates that "there is only one system in the world, and that is the international system with the United Nations at its center. "There is only one set of rules that are the basic norms of international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. There is only one order, and that is the international order based on international law. " (Minghao, 2020).



The ambiguity in Chinese words and actions is ostensible in Chinese behavior, which many observers regard as an increasingly powerful China's approach to the post-World War II international order. What does China require to achieve its announced goal of revitalization? What does China's revitalization mean for the international order? President Xi has initiated a grand vision for the PRC—the "China Dream"—which has "Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People" at its core and in which China would achieve the desired goals of a moderately well-off society by 2021 on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the formation of the CCP and the status of a fully developed nation by 2049, which is the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC.

But the Chinese policies highlight the difference in preaching and practice. Major features of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule include: rule by law rather than rule of law; prioritisation of the state over the individual; disrespect for people's rights and freedom; distrust of civil society and NGO's activities; and unwillingness to tolerate individual differences and identities. (Weiss and Wallace, 2021). China opposes liberal internationalism associated with the "freedom agenda," promoting democratisation and a global standard of human rights. As a result, the CCP's interests clash with the more demanding principle of Liberal International Order. As regarding liberal institutionalism and governance via principled multilateralism, China does not have a good record of working within some institutions to advance its interests, like the IMF, the World Bank, WTO, and UNSC, while flouting others, such as the rejection of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ruling on the South China Sea. (Weiss and Wallace, 2021).

An interesting study was done among the youth of various Asian countries to elicit their opinion regarding China's rise in the world. The survey concluded that the youth of Asian countries believe that China's rise will definitely challenge the global order and that China will not maintain peaceful relations with other Asian countries. It suggests that China has not convinced the world about its peaceful rise. (Zhai, 2018).

The recent actions of China in Afghanistan and Iran suggest that it is now ready to accept the tasks of a superpower. China wishes to challenge the USA in the present global order on equal footing and behaving like a major player in the global arena.

China-Iran Agreement

China and Iran signed a 25-year deal in March 2021. (Figueroa, 2022) The deal was proposed to be signed during Xi Jinping's visit to Tehran in 2016, but the situation prevailing at that time was not conducive to it. With the signing of the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, sanctions were lifted against it by the western world, preventing China from formally signing an agreement with Iran. The United States withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal in the year 2018 on the pretext of Iran not following the nuclear deal genuinely and imposed sanctions against Iran. That allowed Beijing to accelerate the process of the China-Iran deal.

Iran has also joined the BRI project and it has myriad objectives for the same, such as enhancing its development and IT infrastructure plan while becoming part of BRI.

First, it would improve Iran's economic prospects.

Second, it would help to minimise its isolation in the international arena.



Third, the project has the potential to give Iran an edge over its rival Saudi Arabia.

Fourthly, the deal also enhances scope for China-Iran military cooperation, and this could be a potential area for growth.

Iran has welcomed BRI since its launch in 2013; the project was seen as an opportunity to connect with the world market through an extensive and ambitious set of land and maritime trade routes. The project gives Iran a prominent place in China's global plan in the new international order. Central Asia has three access points to global markets: to the east via China, to the south via Iran, and to the west via Russia. So, China-Iran cooperation gives an impetus to the project. The first cargo rail from China reached Iran via the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran rail link in the year 2016, and that was construed to be a milestone in the direction of accomplishing the targets of the BRI project (Reuters, 2016: February 16th).

China and Iran signed an agreement on military cooperation in the year 2014 and they also signed a deal to jointly combat terrorism in 2016. The two countries also signed an agreement to expand trade to dollar 600 billion over 10 years period which constitutes an important part of 25 years agreement. Iran's differences with USA brought it closer to China and to develop strong ties with Russia and China. Iran and China have similar views on the international order and US hegemony and both want to end US dominance in the international arena.

Chinese Overtures in Afghanistan

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent control of power by the Taliban gave an opportunity to China in a changed geo-strategic scenario. China endeavoured to fill a void in Afghanistan. It became the first country to give recognition to the Taliban regime, followed by a visit of Chinese leaders to Afghanistan. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said, "China and the Afghan Taliban have unobstructed and effective communication and discussion." (Wang Wenbin 2021). During the US presence in Afghanistan, China was not an active player; rather, it observed qualms in the region. But with the withdrawal of US forces, China is ready to assert itself in Afghanistan. (Zhou Bo, 2021) China has also pledged to extend \$31 million in aid to Afghanistan for food and vaccines (BBC, 2021: September 9th).

Chinese Economic Interests in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is also rich in several other resources, such as uranium, coal, gold, oil, zinc, gemstones, talc, iron ore, lead, sulphur, bauxite, rare earths, chromium, copper, natural gas, travertine, gypsum, and marble. It also has the largest reserve of lithium, a much-wanted natural resource by China which is used as the key ingredient of the large-capacity lithium-ion batteries that are widely used in the renewable energy industry and electric vehicles. China is also eyeing investing in infrastructure and industry projects in Afghanistan. Moreover China also wishes to enhance its BRI Project to Afghanistan, from Peshawar to Kabul, then to middle east would be very convenient for China to make its reach in West Asian and European markets.



Chinese Concern in Afghanistan

It is not that China is not aware of the threat of the possible spread of terrorist activities in Xinjiang. To some extent, Xinjiang's security and stability are the starting point for China's Afghanistan policy (Zhao Huasheng, 2021). Terrorists are present in Afghanistan who are manoeuvring to establish an Islamic state in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, a serious threat to China. Turkistan Islamic Movements has nexus with Al Qaeda, Tawhid Wal-Jihad, and Jamaat al- Jamaat Ansarullah of Afghanistan, a very dangerous preposition for China. Khorasan group of Islamic State, known as IS-K, has also threatened to attack China.

Nevertheless, China is moving forward in Afghanistan with a renewed hope of strengthening its geo strategic position. Afghanistan is considered a graveyard for conquerors—Alexander the Great, the British Empire, the Soviet Union and now the United States. But now China enters—armed not with bombs but with construction blueprints, and a chance to prove the curse can be broken. (Zhou Bo, 2021)

Is it the Rise of a New Cold War?

Two big powers with different ideologies, belief systems, and conflicting interests will lead to a path of cold war. The present international scenario suggests that a new cold war is emerging with the rise of China in international affairs. Both the USA and China are making new equations to keep the balance of power in their favour. The USA has come up with the signing of AUKUS, the Build Back Better World Initiative and the strengthening of QUAD, reaffirming once again the importance of multilateralism. With China's recent hypersonic missile testing, there is a fear of an increase in the arms race, a phenomenon that was missing after the end of the cold war in 1990.

The USA, UK, and Australia signed a pact last year known as AUKUS, which would help Australia acquire technology to deploy nuclear-powered submarines and sharing of intelligence. This is construed to be a response to increasing Chinese militarization and influence in the region, particularly in the strategically important South China Sea. The alliance has also angered France, after Australia backed out of a \$ 37 billion submarine deal with Paris in favour of AUKUS. On the other hand, China has said the AUKUS plan risks severely damaging regional peace and stability. Russia has also expressed its unhappiness over the deal as it would undermine efforts in the direction of nuclear non-proliferation. (Rozanna, 2021)

The Quad is a quadrilateral group of India, the USA, Japan, and Australia. The cardinal objective of the Quad is to prepare the ground for an open, free, prosperous, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region. The Quad also has another important objective to ensure the strategic sea routes in the Indo-Pacific are free of any political or military influence. The group ostensibly aims to curtail Chinese dominance. Thus, the core objective of the Quad is to secure a rule-based global order, freedom of navigation, and a liberal trading system. The coalition also aims to offer alternative financial support for nations in the Indo-Pacific region and ensure a free supply chain for different goods.

The first virtual summit of QUAD took place in March 2021, and the first offline/physical summit took place in September 2021 in the USA, where leaders of the partners took



part in the meeting and reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen their ties in the wake of the changing global scenario. They urged multilateral cooperation in all fields and criticised terrorist proxies in South Asia. A recent summit meeting of QUAD countries was held in Japan in May 2022, wherein member countries discussed issues pertaining to global order in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and Chinese dominance. They expressed their commitment to augment cooperation to face the challenges of emerging trends of global order

Conclusion

China's rise in the international arena has changed the geo-strategic equations and posed a challenge to the existing liberal international order. A typical communist regime with a flourishing market-oriented economy, China has a dismal human rights record and a dislike for political rights and freedom of the people. China is ready to take on the role of a superpower owing to its military, technological, political, and economic power and capabilities. It is striving hard to surpass the USA to become the world's largest economy in the near future. The gargantuan Belt and Road initiative is all set to enhance Chinese presence and influence across the globe and poses a challenge to US dominance. It possesses the military-technological-industrial assets to thwart the values of the Liberal International Order. The pandemic era has witnessed the peculiar aggressive features in Chinese foreign policy known as "wolf warrior diplomacy" in its interactions with neighbours and other countries. Xi's statement "We make no promise to abandon the use of force" while dealing with Taiwan and Hong Kong suggests an autocratic characteristic of Chinese leadership. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Iran Nuclear Agreement (JCPA) has given an opportunity to China to fill the void and establish its foothold in these countries. Chinese assertiveness in the global arena suggests the beginning of a new cold war with US-China rivalry dominating the present order. Both the power blocs are now manoeuvring hard to strengthen their positions. To gain an advantage over its rival, China is relying on BRI, economic power, military modernization, hypersonic missile advancement, and space research; whereas the United States is relying on QUAD, Build Back Better World, AUKUS, and NATO etc.

An increase in Chinese power has allowed it to strive to establish an international order based on UN principles, but looking at Chinese behaviour since the communist revolution in 1949, it seems these principles are meant for preaching and not for practice. Being a communist country, China's rise in international relations does not augur well for democratic values and principles as its policies undermines individual liberty and rights. The world cannot forget the gruesome suppression of democracy and individual freedom at Tiananmen Square in June 1989. China at the helm of the New International Order will imply propagating the ideologies of China Dream, National Unification, and Socialist Modernisation with Chinese Characteristics, which would promote Chinese nationalism while jeopardising the spirit of the existing Liberal International Order.

The world should stand for the rule-based international order with respect for democratic values and the rights and freedoms of the people. Only such a system can ensure global peace and security.



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THE INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE FACE OF THE NEW CHINESE INVESTMENT WAVE

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Abstract

By analysing the historical picture between China and the European Union, focusing on their trade and economic relations, and discussing the consequences of Chinese trade and investment in Europe, this paper aims to analyse the consequences of Chinese investment in Europe, how it is challenging the European unity, its institutional structure and its foreign policy towards China.

Keywords

Sino-European relations; Chinese investment in Europe; European unity; European Union Foreign Policy; Belt and Road Initiative

Resumo

Ao analisar o quadro histórico entre a China e a União Europeia, centrando-se nas suas relações comerciais e económicas, e discutindo as consequências do comércio e investimento chineses na Europa, este artigo pretende analisar as consequências do investimento chinês na Europa, como está a desafiar a unidade europeia, a sua estrutura institucional e a sua política externa em relação à China.

Palavras-chave

Relações sino-europeias; investimento chinês na Europa; unidade europeia; política externa da União Europeia; Nova Rota da Seda

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THE INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE FACE OF THE NEW CHINESE INVESTMENT WAVE

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Introduction

The European Union (EU), in the previous figure of the European Economic Community (EEC), and the People's Republic of China (PRC) established their first diplomatic relations in 1975 still under the leadership of Mao Zedong. After 1978, onwards China's opening up and reforms policy, started a new framework of economic cooperation with Europe that gradually evolved to a comprehensive political partnership in multiple domains. In 1985, both parts signed their first agreement on trade and economic cooperation. This document was based on customs and tariffs issues having to do with markets access (Corre and Sepulchre, 2016: 11). The bilateral relations took great significance after the 1990s and both parts are presently two of the biggest trading partners in the world. In 2008, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe transformed the continent in a favourite destination for Chinese investors.

Facing intense China's economic offensive in Europe – particularly investment – some European governments have begun to express concern. However, there is an ambivalent stance in different moments. We find moments of assertive rhetoric and others of reservation in relation to China. This seem to reveal a clear lack of clear-eyed strategy, more defined by the spur of the moment. The EU ambivalence is entrenched in principles such as values and interests that affect the way to follow its external relations, (Christiansen et al. 2019: 29) and it expresses that the processes of Europeanization in the field of foreign policy has not been successful. This process refers to the political and policy changes caused by the membership in the EU (Wong, 2011: 150).

This paper aims to analyse the consequences of Chinese investment in Europe, how it is challenging the European unity, its institutional structure and foreign policy towards China. First, we analyse the historical picture between China and the European Union, the great moments of cooperation and their antagonisms. Then, we focus on trade and economic relations, presenting the main bilateral statistics on those domains. Finally, we discuss the consequences of Chinese trade and investment in Europe, including pressure on formal arrangements and administrative European routines.



I. EU-China relations: general background

The bilateral relations between the EEC, the previous version of the EU, and China have developed fast since diplomatic ties were established in 1975. Engagement has become more intensive since the signature of the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the EEC and the People's Republic of China in 1985. Annual EU-China summits were launched in 1998 and haven since taken place on an annual basis.

The creation of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2003 has deepened and broadened cooperation in a wide range of areas, and the EU and China have become highly interdependent as a result. They have also launched two senior-level forums to promote wider and deeper cooperation. The High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue, initiated in 2008, focused on areas such as trade, investment, intellectual property rights and market access, and the High-Level Strategic Dialogue in 2010, which addresses issues ranging from climate change and nuclear proliferation to regional security.

Since 2013, the 2003 Strategic Partnership has been broadened and deepened, in line with the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. This has led to a high degree of institutionalization of EU-China ties¹, with an ever-growing number of dialogue formats that cover political, economic and people-to-people relations, but whose results vary significantly (Grieger, 2019).

This Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, which was considered the highest-level joint document guiding the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, has the following sections:

- I. Peace and Security: the EU and China commit to enhancing dialogue and coordination at bilateral, regional and global levels, to meet regional and global challenges together, and work to make the international order and system more just and equitable;
- II. Prosperity: both sides commit to enhance further their trade and investment relationship towards 2020 in a spirit of mutual benefit, by promoting open, transparent markets and a level playing field. Particular importance will be paid to improving opportunities for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs);
- III. Sustainable Development: the EU and China commit to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the areas of science, technology and innovation, space and aerospace, energy, urbanisation, climate change and environmental protection, oceans and social progress, among others;
- IV. People-to-People Exchanges: both sides commit to expand contacts between peoples in order to enhance common understanding and to foster cross-fertilisation between societies in the areas of culture, education and youth.

¹ It was implemented through the annual Summit and three pillars directly underpinning the Summit (the annual High Level Strategic Dialogue, the annual High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue, and the bi-annual People-to-People Dialogue), as well as through the regular meetings of counterparts.



Nonetheless, the European Commission considered that the EU needed its own strategy, one that puts its own interests at the forefront in the new relationship with China (European Commission, 2016). Accordingly, and further to a previous Communication on China launched in October 2006, a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council has been released in June 2016, proposing “elements for a new EU strategy on China”. The main proposals for this new EU strategy are as follows:

- Seize new openings to strengthen its relations with China;
- Engage China in its reform process in practical ways, which result in mutual benefits for bilateral relations in economic, trade and investment, social, environmental and other areas;
- Promote reciprocity, a level playing field and fair competition across all areas of cooperation;
- Push for the timely completion of negotiations on a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and an ambitious approach to opening up new market opportunities;
- Drive forward infrastructure, trading, digital and people-to-people connectivity between Europe and China based on an open rules platform with benefits for all the countries along the proposed routes;
- Promote global public goods, sustainable development and international security, in line with the respective UN and G20 responsibilities;
- Promote respect for the rule of law and human rights within China and internationally;
- Maximize EU cohesion and effectiveness in its dealings with China (“whole-of-EU” approach).

More recently, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy prepared a Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, entitled “EU-China, a Strategic Outlook”, which was made public on 12 March 2019.

Although acknowledging that the 2016 Strategy on China remains the cornerstone of EU engagement, it is argued that there is a need to “ensure that relations with this strategic partner are set on a fair, balanced and mutually beneficial course” (European Commission, 2019).

Under this background, there is a growing appreciation in Europe that the balance of challenges and opportunities presented by China has shifted. In the last decade, China’s economic power and political influence have grown with unprecedented scale and speed, reflecting its ambitions to become a relevant global power: a China that would “stand more firmly and powerfully among the nations around the world” (Xi Jinping, 2012).

Apart from the need to continue to cooperate and negotiate with China, for the first time in these policy strategy papers, China is characterized as “an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of



governance" (EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, 2019: 5), requiring a flexible and pragmatic whole-of-EU approach.

The EU's response to these challenges should be based on three objectives:

- Based on clearly defined interests and objectives, the EU should deepen its engagement with China to promote common interests at global level;
- The EU should robustly seek more balanced and reciprocal conditions governing the economic relationship;
- In order to maintain its prosperity, values and social model over the long term, there are areas where the EU itself needs to adapt to changing economic realities and strengthen its own domestic policies and industrial base.

To fulfil these objectives, were identified ten (10) concrete actions. First, to strengthen the EU's cooperation with China to meet common responsibilities across all three pillars of the United Nations, Human Rights, Peace and Security, and Development. Second, in order to fight climate change more effectively, the EU calls on China to peak its emissions before 2030, in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Third, the EU will deepen engagement with China on peace and security, building on the positive cooperation on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for Iran. Fourth, to preserve its interest in stability, sustainable economic development and good governance in partner countries, the EU will apply more robustly the existing bilateral agreements and financial instruments, and work with China to follow the same principles through the implementation of the EU Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia. Fifth, in order to achieve a more balanced and reciprocal economic relationship, the EU calls on China to deliver on existing joint EU-China commitments. Sixth, to promote reciprocity and open procurement opportunities in China, the European Parliament and the Council should adopt the International Procurement Instrument before the end of 2019. Seventh, to ensure that not only price but also high levels of labour and environmental standards are taken into account, Eighth, to fully address the distortive effects of foreign state ownership and state financing in the internal market, the Commission will identify before the end of 2019 how to fill existing gaps in EU law. Ninth, to safeguard against potential serious security implications for critical digital infrastructure, a common EU approach to the security of 5G networks is needed. Tenth, to detect and raise awareness of security risks posed by foreign investment in critical assets, technologies and infrastructure.

This paper was striking for at least two main reasons. First, it was the speed and the unusual way by which it came about. Even more striking was its bluntness, which is rare in official EU documents (Brattberg *et al*, 2020). Although three years have already passed, the EU considers that it remains valid (EEAS, 2022).

In a direct response, the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, Wang Yi delivered a speech in Brussels in December 2019, where he attacked virtually all the new elements of the European approach, having stated that "we are partners, not rivals", and called on the EU and Beijing to draw up an "ambitious blueprint" for cooperation (Barkin, 2020). He added that Europe and China had to "get mutual perceptions right". Failure to do so



would risk “unnecessary disruptions” to the relationship. This message was clear: if Europe wants smooth relations, it should stop criticizing China.

If bilateral relations were not in a good phase in 2019, they went even worse over the past two years, with a worldwide pandemic of unprecedented repercussions and, more recently, a geopolitical turmoil with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Consequently, EU-China relations have deteriorated, notably related to a growing number of political and economic irritants, including China's counter measures to EU sanctions on human rights, Chinese economic coercion and trade measures against the single market, and China's ambiguous positioning on the war in Ukraine (EEAS, 2022).

Josep Borell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has described the current status of the relationship in a clear and realistic way, following the last EU/China Summit, held in April 2022 (HR/VP Blog, 2022):

“When it comes to EU-China relations, probably the most important thing for us is to keep doing our ‘homework’ and strengthen internal EU resilience. In recent years, we have taken significant steps on the defensive side of the ledger (investment screening, 5G toolbox, anti-subsidies, new procurement instrument) (...) We should always keep the door open to engage with China. Despite all the well-known difficulties, it is important that we recognise that we have a shared interest in managing this relationship in a responsible manner.”

II. Trade and economic relations: the context of the EU debt crisis and the Chinese investment upsurge

Since China joined the World Trade Organization in December 2001, the EU's goods exports to China have grown on average more than 10 percent a year, and service exports by over 15 percent. This has resulted in ample benefits for EU producers and consumers but, as imports from China have also grown rapidly, it has also caused some degree of disruption in EU labour and product markets.

Currently, China is the EU's second largest export market, behind the US, and is the EU's biggest source of imports. Bilateral trade, on average, amounts to €1.9 billion a day.

China's exports to the EU have grown even more rapidly and the EU is now China's largest trading partner and the second largest export market for Chinese goods. In 2021, the EU exported goods worth approximately 223 billion euros to China, around 20 billion euros more than in the previous year (Statista, 2022).

Since 2002, the EU's trade deficit with China has been growing consecutively and it registered € 249 billion in 2021, equivalent to more than 1 percent of the EU's GDP. The widening of the bilateral trade deficit reflects a base effect: it has happened despite the EU's exports to China growing more rapidly than China's exports to the EU. The EU's main imports from China are industrial and consumer goods, machinery and equipment, and footwear and clothing, and the EU's main exports to China are machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, aircraft, and chemicals. Additionally, the EU-China trade in



services amounts to more than 10% of total trade in goods, and the EU's exports of services make up 19% of EU's total exports of goods (Statista, 2022). In 2020, the EU exported €47 billion of services to China, while China exported €31 billion to the EU (EEAS, 2022).

Certainly, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows between the EU and China are closely related to trade, as FDI results in the development of marketing networks, provides financial and transport services and leads to production with a view to selling in global markets. FDI flows can also substitute for trade, for example when investors establish facilities to produce and sell in the same market. Furthermore, the purchase by investors of controlling interests in competitors or suppliers, including raw materials, often fosters global or regional value chains that tend to stimulate trade (Dadush *et al*, 2019).

The European Union (EU) became one of the most relevant destination for Chinese outbound investment. Among the things that Chinese investors seek in Europe are:

- Technology, to include established high-tech assets, emerging technologies and know-how;
- Access to the European market, for Chinese goods and services;
- Access to third markets through European corporate networks, especially in Latin America and Africa;
- Brand names to improve the marketability of Chinese products, both abroad and for the Chinese market;
- Integrated regional and global value chains in production, knowledge and transport;
- A stable legal, regulatory and political environment, particularly in a context of global disruption and political uncertainty;
- Political/diplomatic influence in a region that in aggregate terms remains the second largest economy after the US.

After the economic crisis of 2008-2009, a new wave of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) entered in Europe. There have been a number of attractive assets, from financial entities to infrastructure and companies in economic difficulty (Brown, 2019: 165). In fact, in 2014 and 2015, the EU, estimated to be the largest market for Chinese acquisitions, in terms of value (Hellström, 2016: 13). Philippe Corre (2018), called this wave of investment as an "offensive", revealing some associated concerns in the European countries.

Since 2010, the Chinese investment received in Europe had been questioned (Christiansen, 2019: 98). There are some concerns with the so-called dual-use technologies in advanced fields, such as artificial intelligence, robotics and so forth (Freudenstein, 2019: 84). Germany is already blocking certain sectors to China investment — considered strategically relevant — such as defence, telecommunications, and energy. This happens when foreign investment involves at least a 10% share. In the past 10 years, China has invested at least \$318 billion in European assets (Bloomberg, 2018). Nevertheless, a decrease of 17% occurred in 2017 over the previous year (in




2016, China invested 34.9 billion euros in Europe, the highest level ever recorded), yet representing the second highest value ever, 28.5 billion euros (Hanemann et. al, 2018: 31).

Amidst a general downturn in Chinese overseas investments, the Chinese FDI in Europe declined 36 percent between 2017 and 2018. In 2019, the Chinese FDI in the EU reached €12.2 billion, which is consistent with the global trends in Chinese outbound FDI. It should be mentioned that the EU still fared better compared to other advanced economies, and received more than twice the amount of Chinese investment than the US did in 2019 (Rhodium Group, 2020).

During 2020, Chinese FDI flows in Europe were inevitably affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, completed China's FDI in Europe (EU-27 and the UK) increased 33 percent to €10.6 billion, from €7.9 billion in 2020. The increase was driven by two factors: a €3.7 billion acquisition of the Philips home appliance business and a record high greenfield investment of €3.3 billion. Still, 2021 was the second lowest year (only above 2020) for China's investments in Europe since 2013 (MERICS, 2022: 3).

It is important to note, however, that the nature of Chinese investment in Europe is changing. After years being dominated by Mergers&Acquisitions (M&A), it has become more focused on greenfield projects. In 2021, greenfield investment reached €3.3 billion, the highest ever recorded value, making up almost a third of all Chinese FDI (MERICS, 2022: 3).

Figure 1: China's FDI into Europe Remains Stuck At Low Levels – Annual value of completed transactions in Europe, in EUR billion





China's investment has reached the whole continent, but it continues to be focused on the big economies. The "Big Three" (UK, France, and Germany) jointly accounted for 39% of total investment in 2021. Even so, fear remains in Europe that weakened economies of the south and east could easily be captured and controlled by China.

In 2021, the share of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE's) decreased by 10%, compared with 2020. Their share of total Chinese investment also reached its lowest point in 20 years, at only 12 percent.

The primary sectors for Chinese FDI have been energy, the chemical industry, and infrastructure. This includes the acquisition of the Swiss pesticide company Syngenta, the investment in the port of Piraeus in Greece and the nuclear power company Hinkley Point C in the UK, and investment in the Italian tire company Pirelli. Cosco's participation in the Port of Piraeus represents a preferential entry for the EU and a major maritime transshipment hub for the Mediterranean (Putten, 2014, Putten and Meijnders, 2015: 11).

In 2021, consumer goods and automotive were the top sectors. Due to the Hillhouse Capital acquisition, investment in consumer products surged to €3.8 billion. Activity in automotive was driven by Chinese greenfield investments in electric vehicle (EV) batteries. Together, the two sectors accounted for 59 percent of total investment value. The next three biggest sectors were health, pharma and biotech; information and communication technologies (ICT); and energy (MERICS, 2022: 3).

The magnitude and certain patterns of Chinese investments in Europe have raised some concerns, namely related with:

- The role of the Chinese state in the economy;
- A lack of reciprocity and fair competition;
- National competitiveness and technological leadership;
- Uncertainty about security-related critical infrastructure and sensitive industries;
- Investments as a source of political and geopolitical influence, and divisions within Europe;
- Broader regulatory concerns;
- Intra-European competition for investment;
- A growing "promise fatigue".

As a result of these increased concerns, in 2017 the first discussions started in the EU on the creation of a surveillance mechanism of foreign direct investment, which in reality was an attempt to control the increasing Chinese investment in Europe. In many cases conducted through state companies in strategic sectors such as energy, telecommunications, finance and high technology (artificial intelligence, robotics or semiconductors) (Santos Neves, 2018: 129).

This process was fostered and coordinated by the European Commission, further to the new status of Foreign Direct Investment as EU exclusive competence with its integration



in the Common Commercial Policy after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (1 December 2009).

Consequently, two years after, and In line with similar initiatives adopted by other countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and the United States), which are increasingly toughening their foreign investment controls, the EU Foreign Investment Screening Regulation ([Regulation 2019/452](#)) entered into force on 10 April 2019 and became applicable from 11 October 2020.

With this Regulation, the EU aims to safeguard Europe's security and public order by introducing the first EU-wide foreign investment screening cooperation mechanism and scrutinizing purchases by foreign companies (from all third countries, including China) that target the EU's strategic interests.

The key features of the Regulation (Meilin *et al*, 2020) are as follows:

- Creating a cooperation mechanism between the European Commission and the EU Member States to exchange information and raise concerns related to specific investments;
- Allowing the Commission to issue a non-binding opinion if (i) an investment poses a threat to the security or public order of more than one Member State, or (ii) an investment could undermine projects of interest to the whole EU, such as EU programs for energy, transport and telecommunication networks (TEN-T, TEN-E, Trans-European Networks for Telecommunications), Horizon 2020 and Galileo.

While the Commission will have no direct powers to block transactions, it may nonetheless have the opportunity to 'influence' the outcome of foreign investment screening by issuing an opinion to a Member State;

- Allowing EU Member States to provide comments to the Member States reviewing an investment, when they consider that the investment will affect their security or public order. The reviewing Member State must give due consideration to such comments. Member States may even provide comments where the Member State in which the investment takes place is not conducting a screening;
- Laying out a non-exhaustive list of factors that could trigger a screening process on the grounds of security or public order - and, thus, expanding the scope of investments to be reviewed;²
- Providing certain basic requirements for Member States who choose to introduce a screening mechanism at national level: (i) transparency and non-discrimination between third parties; (ii) established timeframes for screening; (iii) protection of

² This list includes, *inter alia*:

- Critical infrastructure (energy, transport, water, health, communications, media, data processing or storage, aerospace, defence, electoral or financial infrastructure and sensitive facilities).
- Critical technologies and dual use items (artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, cybersecurity, aerospace, defence, energy storage, quantum and nuclear technologies, as well as nanotechnologies and biotechnologies).
- Critical inputs (energy, raw materials and food security).
- Access to sensitive information (personal data).
- Media freedom and pluralism.



confidential information; and (iv) possibility of judicial redress against the Member States' decisions.

The Regulation respects Member States' right to maintain, amend or adopt the screening mechanisms, as well as their decision-making power regarding any investment investigation in their territory. Accordingly, EU Member States' national regimes - not the Regulation - continue to regulate the validity of investments in each EU Member State.

It is important to note that, while the Regulation promotes a cooperation mechanism between the Commission and Member States to exchange information on investment screening, it does not create an EU-level regulator who could issue a binding opinion and block an investment.

This means that the Regulation does not provide any obligation for parties to notify their transactions to the Commission or to suspend them pending the outcome of the Commission's review. Nor does it require harmonization of EU Member States' national investment screening mechanisms, or even create an obligation for EU Member States to introduce such regimes.

However, the EU's new investment screening regime is likely to affect transactions in the following ways: (i) more scrutiny on foreign investments; (ii) longer review periods; (iii) more investments subject to screening.

Consequently, all potentially interested companies (including from China) will face a 'patchwork' of national foreign investment screening regimes in the EU with different jurisdictional regimes and notification requirements, as well as a reformed and more onerous EU framework. Therefore, they will face a dual-track system of merger control and foreign investment review. Planned acquisitions by competitors can also be brought to the attention of the European Commission and of the Member States' authorities anytime these investments present risks for the EU's interests and security.

In a landmark decision, the Dutch government decided to prevent China from acquiring one of its sensitive semiconductor equipment companies, after consulting a White House intelligence report on the dangers of China acquiring that firm. European governments should be able to make those assessments themselves, and European intelligence agencies should be raising similar concerns (Smith *et al*, 2020).

A key question will be whether the EU can learn to coordinate better on FDI screening, both internally and with Member States. There is also the need to increase cooperation with third countries. Now, the EU is already engaging actively with the US Treasury and the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The new European Commission considers investment screening a top priority as part of an overall effort to strengthen European sovereignty (Brattberg *et al*, 2020), according to the principles contained in the Regulation 2019/452.

Further to the entry into force of the FDI Screening Regulation on 11 October 2020, the European Commission prepared the 'First Annual report on the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union', presented to the European Parliament and the Council on 23 November 2021 (COM(2021) 714 final).



One of the main conclusions is that, until November 2021, not all Member States have their FDI screening mechanism already in full implementation. Some Member States have adopted new legislation, others adopted amendments to an existing mechanism, or initiated a consultative or legislative process expected to result in amendments to an existing legislation.

There is no time limit to conclude this process, but one can expect that the European Commission might introduce some pressure in order to guarantee that all Member States are in a similar situation as regards FDI investment screening legislation, as it is stated in the conclusion of the report (COM(2021) 714 final: 20):

"The Commission firmly expects that by the next Annual Report additional Member States will have adopted and strengthened national FDI screening legislation and related mechanisms for potentially risky foreign investments from non-EU countries and that it is merely a question of time before all 27 Member States have such legislation and mechanisms in place."

III. Absence of European institutional answers toward China's economic offensive

The strong wave of investment after the debt crisis created in some EU leaders concerns over China's growing economic presence in Europe. They fear the potential political influence on EU policymaking (CRS, 2019). Further to the surprising characterization of China as a systemic rival and economic competitor (European Commission, 2019). this new approach revealed a shift on how far European institutions were willing to go to face the challenges imposed by Chinese investment (Smith and Taussig, 2020). Following the EU strategy paper of March 2019, European leaders such as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron expressed arguments on the same direction.

The size of the Chinese market and the amount of money used by Chinese investors is a source of significant influence in Europe. The lack of unity in terms of foreign policy gives China an important advantage in negotiations (CRS, 2019). However, it is also highlighted that neither the EU nor individual European leaders have taken the meaningful steps needed to close existing vulnerabilities in Europe's relationship with China, to stand up for European values of democracy and human rights, or strengthen Europe's resolve against Chinese economic and political pressure.

Partly, this was due to significant distractions in the second half of 2019, as the EU had to cope with a leadership transition and the negotiation of the Brexit arrangement. On 31 January 2020, the United Kingdom ceased to be a Member State of the EU. At that moment, the Exit Agreement came into force, guaranteeing an orderly exit of that country from the organization, and a transitional period began, which ended on December 31, 2020. Also, there is domestic instability within Europe, and the coming months are unlikely to produce better results. The EU will continue to face domestic and regional challenges, including ongoing protests throughout France, a weakening coalition government in Germany, and the UK's formal exit from the Union on January 31, which will trigger months, if not years, of additional work to implement.



Whilst many factors contributed for the new EU strategy towards China, the influence of Donald Trump and Joe Biden tensions related to China are very relevant, with the EU recognizing the need to develop more independence from the United States in foreign affairs. Signs that the Sino-US trade war had begun to hurt the Chinese economy may have given the EU confidence that the time was right for a change in strategy towards challenging China for a reciprocal relationship (Quirk, 2020).

In a recent article at *The Economist* (2020), a dozen European ambassadors in Beijing were asked whether China was a source of unity or disunity in their continent. The question divided them. One diplomat calls the 17+1 grouping a mostly benign attempt by China to re-establish fraternal links with ex-socialist countries, and no more divisive than the endless bilateral exchanges that bigger countries, like Germany or France, have with China. Still, he concedes, if China sees a chance to get its way by driving wedges between EU members, it will. "The Chinese take the EU as seriously as the EU takes itself. They are taking advantage of the opportunities we give them," he says. Recent 17+1 drafts talk about cooperation on the basis of the sovereignty of participating countries, worries a diplomat, seeing a coded Chinese challenge to multilateralism and European values. Such papers are a "sneaky way to test how vigilant we are", he sighs.

In Central and Eastern Europe, the 16 + 1 initiative was launched in 2012 (renamed "17+1" after the inclusion of Greece), a new platform for dialogue between China and 16 so-called post-Soviet countries³, 12 of which belong to the EU (CEEC-China, 2017). China's Foreign Ministry has purposely set up a permanent secretariat for relations with this European area. However, there are no permanent representatives from the European states, which indicates an asymmetrical relationship.

China invested already many billions of dollars in the Eastern European region, which is less economically strong. The idea is to increase exports to this area, extend the BRI to the region, and gain greater capacity for influence, at a time when China and the US are experiencing commercial tensions. Europe can be a very relevant partner for Beijing's geopolitical aspirations, in a framework of overcoming American hegemony and building a multipolar world. In fact, while China defends a logic of multilateralism, it does not fail to exploit bilateral dynamics, especially with smaller countries, where it has strong negotiating power. These include the creation of a Chamber of Commerce, meetings of experts and think tanks, a Forum of Young Political Leaders, a forum for education, bilateral political dialogues, a Tourism Promotion Agency (based in Budapest), and an Investment Promotion Agency (based in Warsaw and Beijing) (Europe Now, 2018). Of particular note was the creation of the New Silk Road Institute (NSRI), an independent think tank created in Prague in September 2015 to strengthen ties between Asia and Europe, publicising BRI concepts in the country, led by Jan Kohout, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and adviser to the President (Economist, 2018, p.20; NSRI, 2018). The agreed rules and market rules complement EU projects and policies, avoiding divisions within the European bloc, and particularly harming relations with Germany (South China Morning Post, 2018).

³ The 17 + 1 initiative joins China, the EU, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece; and EU non-members (candidates to EU accession), Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.



Not least significant, China has upgraded the “17+1” meeting, as the next one (initially scheduled for April 2020, it might be postponed further to the new coronavirus pandemics) will be chaired by Xi Jinping. European officials regard this as a Chinese move to undercut one the goals of the Leipzig Summit, which Berlin had intended as a demonstration that Central and Eastern European states would gain more from China by working through EU formats (Small, 2020).

China's increasing investment in Southern Europe, such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, has led countries like Germany to warn European partners about China. This contributed to a scenario of competition between Member States. Some EU members such as Greece became more complacent with China because of huge economic interests, meaning even more Chinese investment and perhaps more access to the Chinese market (ETNC, 2017). The lack of reciprocity and the restrictive practices of China on investment access makes Europe call on protectionist mechanisms. This create a necessity of a common foreign policy and a new context of consensus.

China explores divergences in Europe in its favour and prefers to deal with national capitals rather than the EU as a whole, provoking and encouraging political divisions in Europe and openly pursuing a divide-and-rule strategy. And the EU Member States are often eager to upgrade relations with China individually, even at the expense of common EU policies and initiatives (Maher, 2016, p. 976). For instance, each Member State interpret projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative differently. The same happens with 5G technology. On 5G (fifth generation of mobile networks), and its security concerns, following a request from the European Council for a concerted European approach, the European Commission drafted a plan of legislative and policy instruments essentially involving three steps: a national 5G security risk assessment in each of the Member States, a coordinated European-level assessment, and a common toolbox of mitigating measures to address identified risks. The report on the coordinated risk assessment produced by the Commission's NIS Cooperation Group was released on October 9, 2019. On December 3, 2019, the European Council endorsed the findings and urged all Member States to develop responses. More recently, in January 29, 2020, the European Commission endorsed the joint toolbox of mitigating measures to address security risks related to the rollout of 5G. Through the toolbox, the Member States are committing to move forward in a joint manner based on an objective assessment of identified risks and proportionate mitigating measures. The Commission called for key measures to be put in place by 30 April 2020. In 2022, a new report by NIS confirmed previous security risks. They are mainly a “larger attack surface and more entry points for malicious actors, an increased risk of misconfiguration of networks and potential impacts on other network functions due to resource sharing” (European Commission, 2022).

Some European countries have delayed increasingly urgent decisions over whether Chinese telecoms equipment giant Huawei should be allowed to build their 5G mobile networks. The biggest countries, including Germany and France, are still debating whether Huawei should be given a role in their 5G rollout. After studiously avoiding decisions in 2019, the big European players will need to come down one way or another in 2020. Their decisions will have a ripple effect on smaller countries. In 2021, Bundestag trough IT Security Law 2.0, restricted the role of unreliable suppliers of 5G technology. The new law requires digital companies to notify the government if they sign contracts



for critical 5G components. It also gives the government capacity to block them (Bundestag, 2021).

In a paper released in January 2020, the main European business association, Business Europe, sets out a strategy on how the EU and China can build a stronger and fairer economic relationship.

The paper first demonstrates that there is a shift in the balance of opportunities and challenges in the European economic relationship with China, which means that the EU should reconsider how it engages China. As a result, Business Europe advances four key objectives that the EU should pursue in order to seize the opportunities within the economic relationship and to address the systemic challenges that China's state-led economic system poses to Europe. The four key objectives are as follows:

1. Secure a level playing field between China and the EU;
2. Mitigate the impact of China's government-induced market distortions;
3. Reinforce the EU's own competitiveness;
4. Ensure fair competition and cooperation on third markets.

At official level, the EU has taken concrete steps in two key areas: procurement and subsidies. Having one of the world's largest open procurement markets, the EU has long called for a more level playing field with China in the area of public procurement. An International Procurement Instrument (IPI), proposed by the European Commission in 2012 and revised in 2016, was finally adopted by the EU Council in June 2022, following the green light from the European Parliament).

Under this new instrument, there will be limits of access from foreign entities to the EU procurement market if these same countries discriminate against European companies. The IPI is intended to increase the EU's bargaining to promote reciprocity, address protectionism, and provide new procurement opportunities for EU companies abroad.

Moreover, addressing excessive state subsidies is a top priority for the new European Commission. The new European Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager, has said the EU is considering fresh efforts to curb unfair Chinese competition. The main challenge for the EU is how to deal with state-driven subsidization of state-owned companies and subsidies of whole industries that are currently not regulated.

Consequently, on May 2022, the EU Member States agreed on a negotiating mandate to the Council for the regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market.

The regulation aims to address the distortions created by subsidies granted by non-EU countries to companies operating in the EU's single market. It establishes a comprehensive framework for the Commission to investigate any economic activity benefiting from a third-country subsidy on the internal market and to set up a specific framework for subsidies granted by third countries in the context of large concentrations and large public procurement procedures.



Furthermore, after a long period of negotiations (started in 2013), on 30 December 2020, the EU and China concluded in principle the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI).

In the agreement, China commits to ensuring fairer treatment for EU companies in China, allowing them to compete on a more level playing field. These commitments cover state-owned enterprises, transparency of subsidies, and rules against forced technology transfer. The rules negotiated in the CAI set a high benchmark in terms of transparency, a level playing field, market access commitments and sustainable development (EU Commission DG Trade, 2022).

However, the CAI has not yet been ratified, and at this stage it is difficult to anticipate when that will happen. Consequently, it is not into force yet.

As things stand, the best-case scenario for Europe's approach to China would, *inter alia*, see the EU establishing: an ambitious industrial strategy and set of connectivity plans; a harder-edged approach to trade enforcement; a new China-centred antitrust instrument; reciprocity measures for government procurement; and a heightened security and values focus in its handling of telecoms, data and wider digital issues (Small, 2020).

Conclusion

China is assuming a leading role in the globalized world, the most powerful trading power in the globe. The relations between China and Europe gained a particular importance in this context. After the 2008 European debt crisis, China started a new wave of investment in Europe. It acquired important companies in strategic sectors, and this provoked gradual worries on European countries. Additionally, the level playing field is still not a reality, as there are significant gaps in investment openness between both sides.

After a maximum of €47.4 billion in 2016 and €40 billion in 2018, Chinese FDI into Europe began to decrease in the latest years, and it is not expected to resume to those levels in the near future. There are a number of reasons that might help to explain this: the effects of COVID-19 pandemic, the increased regulatory scrutiny of FDI in the EU Member States, current EU-China political and trade tensions, and the geopolitical impact of the war in Ukraine.

To be sure, Europe will never settle on a single view of China, but it can make efforts to increase awareness of Chinese activities (especially political influence operations) in the EU countries, namely through the investment screening mechanism. It became fully operational last October 2020, but the Regulation is still in its early years, therefore it is too soon for a thorough evaluation on its effectiveness.

At the same time, Europe will have to continue to press Beijing for substantive improvements on reciprocity as regards market access conditions and level playing field (procurement and subsidies are two examples of this). There is no other option, and the EU and its Member States would only gain if they come up with a truly unified voice and strategy.



It is clear that the EU-China agenda was seriously compromised due to several factors, the effects of COVID-19 pandemics, trade and human rights irritants, as well as political issues (the war in Ukraine above all), and prospects are still uncertain for the time being.

Although the COVID-19 crisis revealed, once again, some fragilities of the EU project (the traditional North and South division), the war in Ukraine showed that a more concerted coalition-building efforts among liberal democracies is possible. Despite all their differences, they still have substantial areas of common ground on China, and are starting to face up the limits of what they can hope to achieve alone. This is true not only for trade, but for foreign direct investment as well.

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PORTUGUESE STRATEGIES TOWARDS CHINA DURING THE COVID19 PANDEMIC

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Abstract

Small states, despite their power deficits, are able to influence large states. This paper explores how Portugal appears to have selected strategies to modulate yet improve its relations with China during the Covid19 pandemic. According to the Theory of Asymmetrical Negotiations (TAN) advanced by Habeeb, small states adopt soft strategies when they have high levels of commitment, worse alternatives available to them, and a low degree of control. During the pandemic, an increase in deficits drove Portugal's government to seek to expand exports, attract investment, and improve its competitiveness. The authors find that Portugal has exhibited different behaviour regarding commitment, seeking alternatives, and exerting control in issues related to investment, export, and competitiveness. Portugal has flexibly



employed soft strategies towards China during the pandemic, while reacting to external intervention from the US and maintaining internal compliance within the EU. With these strategies, Portugal has successfully, and without conflict, defended its interests, maintained its EU status, and limited the intensity of competition between the US and China regarding Portugal.

Keywords

Portugal-China relations; small states; covid19; Theory of Asymmetrical Negotiations; strategy choices

Resumo

Os pequenos estados, apesar dos seus défices de poder, são capazes de influenciar os grandes estados. Este artigo explora como Portugal parece ter selecionado estratégias para modular mas melhorar as suas relações com a China durante a pandemia de Covid19. De acordo com a Teoria das Negociações Assimétricas (TAN) avançada por Habeeb, os pequenos estados adotam estratégias suaves quando têm altos níveis de compromisso, piores alternativas disponíveis, e um baixo grau de controlo. Durante a pandemia, um aumento dos défices levou o governo português a procurar expandir as exportações, atrair investimento, e melhorar a sua competitividade. Os autores constataam que Portugal tem demonstrado comportamentos diferentes no que respeita ao compromisso, à procura de alternativas e ao exercício do controlo em questões relacionadas com investimento, exportação e competitividade. Portugal tem utilizado de forma flexível estratégias brandas em relação à China durante a pandemia, ao mesmo tempo que reage à intervenção externa dos EUA e mantém a conformidade interna dentro da UE. Com estas estratégias, Portugal tem defendido com sucesso, e sem conflitos, os seus interesses, mantido o seu estatuto na UE, e limitado a intensidade da concorrência entre os EUA e a China em relação a Portugal.

Palavras-chave

Relações Portugal-China; pequenos estados; covid19; Teoria das Negociações Assimétricas; escolhas estratégicas

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PORTUGUESE STRATEGIES TOWARDS CHINA DURING THE COVID19 PANDEMIC

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1. Introduction

While previous studies concerning relations between Portugal and China have tended to focus on the strategies that could be ascribed to China, this article makes use of the Theory of Asymmetrical Negotiations (TAN), advanced by Habeeb in 1988, to analyse how three factors - commitment, alternatives, and control - can be said to have influenced Portugal's strategies towards China during the Pandemic. The paper tests the effectiveness of TAN in explaining the strategy choices made by small states towards large states, and thereby enriches our understanding of Portugal's ongoing diplomacy, and the diplomatic possibilities available to small states.

In this paper the term *commitment* refers to the extent to which small states need to achieve their own defined goals, and *alternatives* refers to the range of choices available to small states, other than relying on a large state, to achieve its defined goals. The expression *control* refers to the ability of a small state to mitigate the costs of declining to cooperate with an involved larger state, to achieve its goals. The Theory of Asymmetrical Negotiations holds that when a small state has a high level of commitment, unfavourable alternatives, and limited control over a single issue in its relations with a large state, it is at a disadvantage in terms of the 'balance of power', and resorts to soft negotiation strategies. Conversely, when a small state has a degree of advantage, it tends to adopt hard negotiation strategies. This article tests this supposition and argues that small states generally adopt mixed strategies since the 'balance of power' is always in flux.

Portugal is taken here as a case study, and not without reason. Portugal was engaged for years in negotiations with China over the return of Macau to Chinese sovereignty in the 1990s, and as Mendes noted, "The Sino-Portuguese negotiations demonstrate how complex it is for a small, weak country with a tangled political bureaucracy to define strategy, aims and alternative scenarios when negotiating with a large and relatively strong state." (Mendes, 2013:114). Lewis (2009: IX) argued that small states have three specific vulnerabilities. Firstly, they suffer from a resource vulnerability that derives from



the physical location of the state. Secondly, they experience socio-political vulnerability that arises from the management of the state's policy operations and the stability of its decision-making processes. Thirdly, and contestably most important of the three in today's world, is the economic vulnerability that a state experiences, as an economic unit of a specific geographical size in relation to both its domestic resources and the networks of international transactions in which it is involved.

Portugal clearly presents an example of all three vulnerabilities. According to World Bank data, Portugal has a relatively small population of only 10.3 million citizens, thus ranking in 88th place in world ranking. Its territory of a little over 92 thousand km² gives it a world ranking of 109th position in size. Portugal's relatively small population and limited territory have resulted in an economic structure that has led to persistent fiscal deficits and generally low economic activity. The result has been that the divergences between the main political parties over fiscal policy have led to a low level of policy continuity.

Portugal may be small, but it is not weak since it has at its disposition rich diplomatic resources, and promotes economic and technological issues to its advantage. In the diplomatic dimension, Portugal is a European Union (EU) member-state, an ally of the United States (US), and active in establishing a coalition with Portuguese-speaking Countries (PSCs) within the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP). In the economic dimension, Portugal's renewable energy industry can be considered to be at an advanced level. In the technological dimension, Portugal occupies a position at the medium level within the EU, particularly with regard to its initiatives in renewable energy, space technology, new materials, and biotechnology (OECD, 2013). China, the US, and the EU itself have been the three principal sources from which Portugal could borrow financial resources to enable it to address the increased vulnerabilities that it faced during the pandemic. Portugal, as the small state that it is, experienced a high fiscal deficit, social unrest, and even political crisis, thus demonstrating its vulnerability to external shocks. The Portuguese administration took attracting investment, expanding exports, and enhancing its international competitiveness as its key goals to address its vulnerabilities, and consequently has a high commitment to them. When considering whether there were choices available to Portugal, there were few other possibilities, and on top of that it was a fact that, leaving aside the EU, Portugal would face the two dominant economic powers. Ultimately, "For a small country, negotiations with a power require a lot of preparation in order to keep a good level of intervention during the talks. It also demands the understanding of the real intentions of the power so as to conclude whether an issue is really vital for the strong state." (Mendes, 2013: 114)

In March 2019, Brussel launched ten strategic actions aimed at China in its *EU-China: a Strategic Outlook*, and requested EU member-states to strengthen their monitoring and regulation of Chinese investments in the region. The US and EU both exerted pressure on Portugal and offered it alternatives in attempts to reduce any increased commitment on Portugal's side to China. As support, Portugal has access to EU's funds and the internal market as a member-state, while the US provides access to the export market, investment, and technology. Support has come with conditions. The US has defined China as a strategic competitor and has clearly stated that American liquefied natural gas (LNG) would not be allowed to enter the European market through the Portuguese port of Sines if the port were to accept Chinese investment, or if Portugal cooperated with Huawei in



the 5G field (DN/Lusa, 2019; Ferreira and Gaudêncio, 2020; Lusa, 2020; Machado, 2020). Furthermore, if China were to obtain stakes in the Portuguese electric utilities company *Energias de Portugal* (EDP), the company would experience constraining limitations in the US. Under these conditions, in its diplomatic exchanges with China, Portugal principally used an interest-linkage strategy by offering benefits to Chinese investors to attract Chinese financial support, and a balancing strategy by borrowing simultaneously from China and other actors, in an attempt to maintain EU integration and ally itself with the US, to which Portugal gives priority over its relations with China. Portugal also implemented a control-risk strategy on 5G by not taking any clear stance, despite it being an issue on which the US and EU attempted to reduce Portuguese commitment to China. In this way, Portugal managed to 'borrow power' from multiple western allies, and also non-western friendly states, to achieve its goals.

In the following sections, we analyse the factors that influenced and influence Portugal's strategic choices. The first of these sections briefly explains the theory and methodology of the Theory of Asymmetrical Negotiations (TAN). The second section clarifies why Portugal has defined attracting investment, export expansion, and competitiveness as its goals during the pandemic. The third section analyses how commitment, alternative(s), and control on investment-related issues directly influence Portuguese strategies, and the fourth section takes up export-related issues. The fifth and final section focuses on issues related to competitiveness, and concludes with the power resources Portugal uses in its strategy towards China, and the effects that they have.

2. Theoretical framework and methodology

Strategies refer to consciously designed efforts to accomplish previously defined goals within outcomes. The goals and the 'influence capacity' — i.e. the resources available to a small state's government and its capacity to employ the resources — together determine how specific strategies are designed. There are different definitions of what constitutes a small state's goals and its capacity to exert influence. Some scholars focus on the quantitative characteristics of small states, considering them straightforwardly as actors possessing a small population size, limited gross domestic product, a restricted territorial area and a small trade volume, or as having a combination of all these four features (Cooper and Shaw, 2009). For hard-line realists, small sizes are indicators that measure the material power resources of a state. The difference between the sizes of small states and of large states directly explains the deficits of material power resources that small states experience. Hard-line realists view material resources specifically as available resources that are able to produce influence. They argue that small states, as actors with a deficit of material power, take survival as their fundamental strategic goal, and do not really exert any influence on large states.

Focusing on the qualitative natures of small states, Keohane (1969) regarded small states as those with weak influence. He considered that both material and normative power resources are effective in producing influence, and argued that the goal of small states is to strengthen their interdependence, and that this situation explains the two strategy choices of small states, e.g. constructing alliances with one large state to influence another, and participating in an international system in which they obtain equal rights to



make their voices heard. Goetschel (1998) adopts a relational view of power, defending three types of resources to create influence, namely material, normative, and relational resources. He argued that the goal for small states was to maximize influence, and minimize or compensate for the power deficits. In this article we adhere to Goetschel's view and maintain that small states mobilize all their available resources to achieve their goals. The types of resources mobilized can be observed in their real bilateral exchanges. Small states use strategies to grow their internal power resources and borrow resources from large states, or enter coalitions with other small states, to increase their own influence.

Some commentators regard small states as actors with inherent vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities here refer to high exposure to external shocks such as invasions, externally directed coups, mercenary attacks, and economic setbacks (Payne, 2004:626; Briguglio, 2014). Correspondingly, resilience refers to the extent to which a small state can withstand or recover from the negative effects of external shocks (Briguglio, 2014). Briguglio regards resilience as an ability 'that may be inherent or nurtured' in small states. However, other scholars consider that resilience derives from the goal of the internal development policies of small states and their foreign policies (Payne, 2009). On this point we follow Payne's point of view and regard that the goal of small states as being to construct resilience, and that their strategies are efforts to address the underlying causes of their vulnerabilities. To sum up, we maintain that the diplomatic goals of small states can be classified in two categories. One is external, and consists of reducing their power deficit in the existing international power relation network. The other is internal, and focuses on addressing inherent vulnerabilities. The strategic goals of small states are dynamic, and alternate between the two categories. The more resilient a state is to external shock, the more importance it places on reducing its external power deficits. The less resilient it is, the more priority a small state will give to addressing its vulnerabilities. The power resources that small states use can be material, normative, and relational. Small states, despite their small size, once they have employed effective strategies, can gain resilience and influence, and consequently are not invariably vulnerable and weak.

A number of case studies reveal that the strategy choices small states make in their relations with large states are constrained both by inherent vulnerabilities and external power deficits, but few commentators explain the relationship between the two contextual settings and strategy choices. We consider that the Theory of Asymmetrical Negotiations (Habeeb, 1988) coherently explains how inherent vulnerabilities and external power asymmetries moderate the strategies of small states. Following Habeeb's reasoning, we maintain that the perception of inherent vulnerabilities, and related benefit-cost calculations, by the main political parties in a small state determine what diplomatic goals small states will have, and the extent of their commitment to achieving these goals. Their perception of external power relations determines what alternatives will be considered better when borrowing from external power resources. Both vulnerabilities and power asymmetries, by limiting available internal and external power resources to small states, determine to what extent they have control over the issue, or in other words, the ability to achieve their goals without cooperating with a large state.



Small states have at their disposition a wide range of strategies to achieve concessions from a large state. They may request aid using a 'weakness' narrative as a negotiating tool (Keohane, 1969); construct a capacity priority in issues of strategic importance to the large state (Habeeb, 1988; Dinar, 2009); create a coalition with other small states that have common interests in their relations to a large state (Lieberfeld, 1995; Ourbak and Magnan, 2017); draw on the strength of other large states (Keohane, 1971; Cha, 2010; Kuik, 2010; Klöck, 2020); or employ the rights pertaining to their memberships of international institutions, such as voting, participating in consultations, and initiating proceedings (Lee, 2009). The strategies by which small states bring benefits to large states can be seen as soft, and those that bring costs as being hard. From this perspective, we identify a number of examples of the strategies used by small states towards large states in different cases, classifying them on a scale from soft to hard:

- i. Interest-linkage strategy: establishing linkages between small states' issues with advantage to their strategic importance to large states (Haggard and Moon, 1983; Kuik, 2010).
- ii. Balance strategy: drawing on the strength of other large state(s) (Cha, 2010; Keohane, 1971; Klöck, 2020; Kuik, 2010)
- iii. Issue-linkage strategy: using concessions on one issue in exchange for the counterpart's concession on another (Zahariadis, 2017)
- iv. Control-risk strategy: entering into agreement with the large states in an ambiguous and flexible manner, fostering good relations with the large power while providing room for the small state to manoeuvre (Yoffie, 1983; Pacheco Pardo and Reeves, 2014).
- v. Coalition strategy: cooperating with other small states to alter the existing power balance in the favour of small states (Lee, 2009; Ourbak and Magnan, 2017).
- vi. Institutional strategy: using membership in international organizations (Betzold, 2010).
- vii. Threat-causing strategy: creating escalating tensions, military conflict, or even 'defecting' to the opposing camp to force a great power partner to address the concerns of the small state (Schelling, 1960).

In terms of methodology, in this paper we have used standard Documentary Research methods to collect Portuguese official documents, the speeches made by key politicians, and texts on Portuguese-Chinese relations available on the websites of government and mainstream media. Our aim has been to assess the perceptions held by elites of vulnerabilities and power deficits, and thereby Portugal's overall commitment to Portuguese-Chinese relations. The sources we have used include critical articles found in academic libraries, databases and media, and we have made use of the Deductive Reasoning method to undertake qualitative analysis of the collected texts.

3. Portuguese goals during the Pandemic

Our analysis of government documents and the speeches of key-politicians strongly suggests that the Portuguese elites share the idea that attracting foreign investments,



expanding exports, and improving competitiveness should be prioritized goals for Portugal, after the setbacks caused by the pandemic.

Prior to the pandemic, according to the Portuguese National Statistics Institute (NSI), the national resource vulnerability lay in the country's small and ageing population, which had labour market of only 4.8 million workers, the limited diversity of natural resources, and a lack of natural gas and oil reserves. The limited labour market led to low production volumes and low revenues, and the limited diversity of natural resources could not support a well-structured industrial system (Cardoso & Rua, 2019). Limited energy storage led to a high dependence on strategic imports, with Portugal's energy dependency rising steadily from 73.5% in 2013, to 78.3% in 2015 (MCC, 2021). Limited revenues resulted in low investment to develop Portugal's competitiveness through improving industrialisation, increasing production volume and added value, developing transport networks, and training highly skilled labourers (Blanchard & Portugal, 2017; Lopes & Antunes, 2018; OECD, 2013, 2021).

The result was that Portugal needed to purchase strategic energy resources and expensive value-added products while exporting limited quantities of low value-added products, with high transport costs. Expenditure consistently exceeded revenue. Since the establishment of the Republic in 1974, Portugal has always had to deal with fiscal deficits and only achieved 0.1% positive fiscal returns once, in 2019. Low wages and high unemployment have caused frequent strikes and political struggles between political parties, resulting in politico-social vulnerability. Portugal's two main political parties have long been divided over their fiscal policies. The Socialist Party (SP) has emphasized fiscal expansion while the Social Democrat Party (SDP) has advocated fiscal austerity (Lopes & Antunes, 2018). During the European debt crisis, austerity policies implemented by the 20th SDP-led administration saw the imposition of wage cuts on Portuguese citizens. The SP-led 21st and 22nd administrations from 2015 onwards increased public spending, but were unable to undertake tax relief (De Giorgi & Santana-Pereira, 2020; Moury et al., 2021; Teixeira et al., 2019). The pandemic had a severe economic and social impact on Portugal, and saw fiscal deficits reach 5.8% in 2020. Since the implementation of an austerity policy in 2011, citizens have repeatedly launched strikes and protests, and caused social unrest (De Giorgi and Santana-Pereira, 2020; Moury, De Giorgi and Barros, 2020). This sort of social unrest escalated during the pandemic. Rising fuel prices in late-2021 intensified popular resistance to the government led by Socialist Party (SP). Other political parties took advantage of this situation and voted against the 2022 budget which led to the dissolution of Parliament and early parliamentary elections. Regarding inherent vulnerabilities as the causes of these conflicts, the ruling Portuguese government gave priority to addressing economic vulnerability. It considered that once the existing economic problems were dealt with, revenues could boost Portugal's investment capacity to purchase resources, recruit new members of the workforce from abroad, upgrade wages, and thus resolve socio-political vulnerabilities.

Apart from its economic goals, when considering its strategies towards China during the pandemic, Portugal also aimed to fulfil the requirements of its EU membership and maintain its alliance with the US. The focus of Portuguese diplomacy since the establishment of the Republic in 1974 has been toward three axes, namely the EU, the Atlantic Alliance, and the PSCs (Fernandes, 2018; Silva, 2020; Teixeira, 2010). China



became an import diplomatic alternative to the EU and the US first after the European debt crisis (Miguel and Faria, 2020). In the context of the European debt crisis, Chinese SOEs and private companies were able to acquire large volumes of shares in Portuguese companies by offering preferential terms during the privatisation process under the financial intervention of the Troika, consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (Ribeiro & Cardoso, 2016; Romero, 2017). In the aftermath of the crisis, Portugal accorded strategic importance to China, but still prioritized the EU and the US. Although China offered markets and provided investments that Portugal needed, and still needs, Portugal's trade deficit continued to grow. Compared to relying more heavily on China, as an EU member-state, Portugal has a stable source of funds and its main trading partners are all countries within the EU. The US provides security, and potential military assistance, to Portugal within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Furthermore, Portugal has a trade surplus with the US, and imports Liquid Natural Gas from the US, which is a strategic energy supply. Nevertheless, Portugal has remained lacking in a significant volume of investment, particularly foreign direct investment (FDI).

This article chooses funds in public sector, share purchases in private sector, and Sines port project as investment-related issues, E-commerce as export-related issues, and 5G and new energy as competitiveness-related issues. These issues are the key areas in which US and other EU member-states compete with China in Portugal by offering alternatives during the Pandemic, and Portugal has different degrees of commitment and control. Comparing the similarities and differences in Portugal's strategic choices on these issues contributes to our distinguishing how the three variables of commitment, alternative(s) and control have influenced Portugal's strategies. Basically, except on the 5G issue, where the US has reduced Portugal's commitment by raising the cost of Portuguese cooperation with Huawei, Portugal has a high level of commitment to China on other issues due to its domestic needs. Therefore, Portugal uses control-risk strategy on 5G issue, while on other issues Portugal combines interest-linkage and balance strategy due to its high commitment.

4. On FDI

We have noted that on the crucial issue of FDI, Portugal mainly uses an interest-linkage strategy, combined with a balancing strategy, towards China. The result is that, while actively receiving Chinese capital, Portugal has also vigorously sought for, and seeks, other sources of foreign investment. During the pandemic, Portugal had a high commitment to FDI, worse alternatives within the EU to offers of Chinese investment, and overall low control. Portugal has a high commitment to Chinese investment because Chinese investments appear to be a better choice for three reasons. Firstly, despite having financial support from within the EU, Portugal is still unable to achieve fiscal balance, and therefore needs investment from outside the EU. EU financial support for the decade 2000-2010 was mainly invested in infrastructure, and little funds were used to address other issues related to the improvement of Portugal's low economy activity and international competitiveness (Czuriga, 2009; Teixeira & Pinto, 2019). Consequently,



Portugal has a high exposure to external shocks, as exemplified by the pandemic which resulted in high fiscal deficits of 5.8% in 2020, and 2.8% in 2021.

Secondly, we note that under existing EU regulations, the available policies for down-grading wages and borrowing through loans harm Portugal's economic sustainability. As an EU member state with no autonomy regarding adjustment of monetary policy and public debt, Portugal has attempted to achieve competitiveness in exports by down-grading wages in the labour market (Rathgeb and Tassinari, 2018). Down-grading wages weakens domestic consumption, and boosts exports at the expense of domestic sales. In addition, the resulting protests and strikes caused by wage cuts produced production shut-downs. Besides wage cuts, Portugal has had to borrow to support development plans, with the result that public debt levels have increased consistently. However, according to the EU fiscal regime, once Portuguese fiscal deficit exceeds 3%, the EU mandates the implementation of austerity measures, which may offset the growth brought by borrowed loans, leading to higher debt and continued economic downturns (Hancké & Rhodes, 2016). In this way, the institutional framework of the EU favours the development of export-oriented economies to the detriment of domestic demand-oriented economies such as Portugal (Molina & Rhodes, 2007; Regan, 2017). Based on Eurostat's demographics, with only 2.3% voting weight in the EU Parliament, Portugal cannot trigger any significant economic regime reforms within EU that might favour Portugal's development.

Thirdly, Chinese investments were considered as having the most favourable terms among other choices during the European debt crisis, and received positive comments from the Portuguese elites from influential companies and political parties. According to the CEO of *Electricidade de Portugal* (EDP), Miguel Stilwell D'Andrade, during their partnership, China Three Gorges (CTG) assisted EDP in weathering the European debt crisis. The CTG and EDP jointly identified opportunities for growth, particularly in Latin America, by investing jointly in hydropower projects, and jointly developed new technologies. The Portuguese Prime Minister, António Costa, and Former Foreign Minister, Augusto Silva, considered that China's economic conduct in Portugal was in line with Portuguese and EU legal norms. Some political parties — mainly the right-wing party *Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular* and the left-wing party *Bloco de Esquerda* — resisted permitting Chinese investments. Their concerns were that issues of importance to the Portuguese state could be controlled indirectly by a foreign government if Chinese firms held too many shares in strategic companies. They urged the government, led by Socialist Party, to exercise prudence in opening the Portuguese economy to Chinese investment (Gaspar & Ampudia de Haro, 2020). But, overall, those opposing Chinese investment remained in a minority.

During the pandemic, Portugal has had more investment alternatives in the public sector, but worse alternatives to Chinese investments in the private sector. In the public sector, in addition to the regular EU Structural Investment Fund support, in August 2021 Portugal received from the European Commission €2.2 billion in pre-financing, under the *NextGenerationEU* initiative. In the private sector, in the case of EDP, Chinese CTG remains the largest shareholder, followed by the American enterprise Blackrock with 9.37%. Blackrock has been working to increase its shareholding but thus far has failed to shake CTG's leading position. In the case of Bank Millenium Banco Comercial Português



(BCP), although the Angolan oil company Sonangol, which is the second largest shareholder, does not want the largest shareholder, Chinese Fosun, to acquire more shares, Sonangol itself has gone through a restructuring process due to the fall in oil prices before 2016, and its disorderly investment policy. It is apparent that Portugal has a low degree of control to be able to reject Chinese investment. The Portuguese government itself, because of its high debt and deficits, needs EU funds to invest in public services and cannot renationalise strategic private companies. Foreign capital is unable to change the dominant shareholder position of Chinese capital. With high commitment, worse alternatives, and low control of the issue of FDI, Portugal has adopted interest-linkage and balance strategies. On the one hand, Portugal, in the private sector, permits the growth of shares held by Chinese enterprises in Portuguese companies. In March 2021, Fosun enlarged its shares in Millenium BCP to 30%. In May 2021, the Chinese company China Communications Construction Co., Ltd. (CCCC) purchased 32.4% of Mota-Engil stakes. In the public sector, in October 2020, according to the Portuguese government, Chinese investors who make gains from the sale of Panda bonds issued by the Portuguese government in 2021, will continue to be exempt from IRS and IRC (the income tax that went into effect in the Portuguese tax system on January 1st 1989). These tax exemptions are used to attract Chinese investors to continue buying Portuguese national bonds, issued in Renminbi. As a result, according to *Banco de Portugal*, the Chinese investments stock in Portugal reached 2,923,01M€ in 2021, an increase of 8.5% year-on-year. At the same time, Portugal continues to actively search for other sources of foreign investment.

The Sines port project is a typical case of Portugal's combination of interest-linkage and balance strategies towards China during the pandemic. The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Augusto Santos Silva, has actively encouraged the US and other EU countries to participate in the bidding, stating that the project will allow the US to increase its gas exports to Europe, and reduce the energy dependence of Portugal and the EU on Russia. But Silva has also said that Portugal will keep seeking to attract Chinese investment to expand trade and develop tourism (Wise, 2020). After the visit of US Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette to the Sines port in September 2020, Portuguese Infrastructure Minister Pedro Nuno Santos said that the US interest and potential investment in the Sines port are an opportunity that Portugal must seize. However, thus far the Sines port has not received any investment from any Chinese or American companies, although on April 18th 2022, an international company, consisting of a partnership between the Portuguese Madoqua Renewables, the Dutch company Power2X, and the Danish company Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners (CIP), announced an investment of 1 billion euros to implement the project titled Madoqua Power2X in the Industrial and Logistics Zone in the Sines port, with the aim of producing green hydrogen and green ammonia.

5. On export-related issues related to E-commerce

Generally, in terms of export expansion, Portugal accords significant importance to the Chinese market. In fact, compared to the EU, China is a small trade partner for Portugal since its main trading partners are member states within the EU. The weight of the intra-EU countries exports and imports increased in 2020, reaching 71.4% (+0.7 p.p.



compared to 2019) and 74.7% (+0.9 p.p. compared to 2019) respectively, according to the European National Statistical Institute (NSI, 2021). Compared to the US, China does not provide Portugal with any strategic energy resource but rather with products for daily life, while it is the US that provides LNG. China offers no security support to Portugal while the US does so within NATO. Portugal's trade deficit with China is increasing and reached 2,500 million euros in 2020 while the US was Portugal's 2nd largest trade surplus country in 2020. But, as already mentioned, even these trade revenues are not sufficient to cover its deficits, and since 1974 Portugal has only once demonstrated a trade surplus, in 2019. The present trade network, with its high dependence on the market within the EU hinders resilient construction, and the Portuguese government needs to diversify its export markets. Portugal's exports to China are increasing, and Chinese tourists, although not perhaps as numerous as could be wished, rank first in terms of their spending in Portugal. For this reason, the Chinese market demonstrates the potential to enable Portugal to achieve a balance of trade surplus at some point in the future. During the pandemic, Portugal's overall exports fell by 10.3% in 2020 mainly due to weakened intra-EU trade (NSI, 2021: 9). Looking back over the last ten years, Portugal's trade deficit reached its highest level, after 2010, in December 2021. In this context, the trade volume between Portugal and China has grown against the trend of the global backdrop. Portugal's exports to China increased by 64% in the first five months of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020, and by 18.3% compared to the same period in 2019, the year before the pandemic (Falardo and Sequeira, 2021). China is thus a market that offers a positive possibility to enlarge the volume of Portugal's exports.

During the pandemic, the most important export-related issue was E-commerce, for the global lockdown policy encouraged the development of this sector. The WTO has stated that e-commerce is expected to save the global economy. On the e-commerce issue, according to the World Economic Forum, the epidemic has made e-commerce platforms in China grow faster than anywhere else in the world. In 2020, the China's share of online sales in all retail sales increased to a projected 44%, whilst the UK and US reached 27.7% and 14.5% respectively (Buchholz, 2021; Falardo & Sequeira, 2021). Portugal has a high commitment to Chinese e-commerce platforms, as one means to expand exports to the Chinese market. Portugal currently has Amazon as an alternative to Alibaba. Alibaba and Amazon each offer different advantages. Alibaba's C2C mode and internationalisation strategies help the platform to reach more consumers both within and outside China. Amazon has a better cloud computing system, i.e. Amazon Web Services (AWS) (Abdulrahman & Oreijah, 2022; Wu & Gereffi, 2018). AWS cloud services are more developed than Alibaba cloud services in massive data calculation and open storage (Wang, 2021). Overall, Portugal has a low control over its e-commerce. Two officials of the Portuguese Agency for Investment and External Trade (AICEP) stated that, during the pandemic, the inability of Portuguese companies to connect to their customers was hampered by an underdeveloped online sales model, which hindered their internationalisation (Falardo and Sequeira, 2021, p. 18). Portugal successfully adopted both interest-linkage and balance strategies on e-commerce issues. On the one hand, the Portuguese Trade & Investment Agency (AICEP) acted to improve the sale of Portuguese agricultural products on Alibaba, and invited Alibaba to visit Portugal and offer e-commerce trainings. Specifically, in October 2021, the AICEP negotiated with



Alibaba to enlarge the sale of Portuguese agricultural products, diversifying product categories and sales destinations (Dinheiro Vivo/Lusa, 2021). In February 2022, a Portuguese private commercial association, the Portugal-China Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCILC), jointly with AICEP, organised a visit by Alibaba representatives to Portugal, aimed at involving more Portuguese companies in the Chinese marketplace. In May 2022, Alibaba gave a free course in English intitled "Alibaba Netpreneur Masterclass" through AICEP to Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the Portuguese Ministry of Economy and Digital Transformation signed a MoU with Amazon Web Services (AWS), in preparing the "More Digital powered by AWS" initiative, which aims to accelerate small business growth with AWS Cloudstart, train the next generation of cloud builders in Portugal with AWS Educate and AWS Academy, and support a start-up community in Portugal with AWS Activate. Interestingly, AICEP has also cooperated with Amazon in providing training webinars to assist Portuguese businessmen in using the platform for internationalization. In this way, Portugal is successful in deepening its interdependence simultaneously with both China and the US, and maximising the benefits of cooperation with both e-commerce platforms.

6. On competitiveness-related issues

As concluding examples, we take renewable energy and 5G as two cases that exhibit the phenomenon of competitive-relatedness. On renewable energy, Portugal exhibits a high commitment, has equal alternatives, and a high control on this issue. Portugal's high commitment stems from the fact that it is one of the European countries most affected by climate change. Climate change phenomena such as rising temperatures, shifting rainfall patterns, rising average sea levels, and extreme weather events, exacerbate the pressure on Portugal's coastline, as well as bringing threats of fire, drought, and floods (Government of Portugal, 2020). Portugal has worse alternatives to China. China is the world's largest investor in renewable energy while Portugal possesses advanced technologies. As previously noted, the base of cooperation between EDP and CTG is that EDP contributes technology in a joint research project and expands its reputation in exploring third markets (especially in Africa and Latin America) while CTG provides funds to invest jointly in third markets. In 2013, EDP and CTG jointly acquired shares in the companies that own the rights to develop the *Cachoeira Caldeirão* hydroelectric project (219 MW) and the *Jari* hydroelectric project (373 MW). Although CTG holds a large stake in EDP, the two companies have each acquired shares in other companies in Brazil and Chile to develop their markets. In this way, both sides benefit from this cooperation to develop their internationalization, and as funds are the goal of EDP, Blackrock as the second largest shareholder is a worse alternative to CTG.

Portugal has high control of its renewable energy, and has established technological priority in renewable energy. EDP is the fourth largest wind power company in the world and the largest hydroelectric company in Europe, with operations in thirteen countries, including Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Greece, and the United States. The *European Scalable Offshore Renewable Energy Project* (EU-SCORES) will participate in Portugal with a total investment of €45 million to create the world's first offshore energy array, combining wave energy with offshore wind energy. China, for its part, gives priority to



developing new renewable technology and industry, particularly with wind power and smart grids. This is an initiative to reduce China's dependence on strategic energy imports, and to promote China's image as a responsible global power in combating climate changes (Zhao et al., 2020; Zhao et al., 2011). China maintains that in the next five years, its share of non-fossil energy, in total primary energy consumption, will increase to around 20%. This is to say, Portugal has the capacity for high-end renewable energy technologies, as well as the researchers to undertake independent research, but lacks financial support. China seeks breakthroughs in renewable energy technologies and has the capacity to invest. Hence, Portugal has relatively high control in the issue. The main Portuguese actors who cooperate with China on renewable energy are EDP and REN. During the pandemic, EDP, as a representative of Portugal, made use of interest-linkage and balance strategies at the same time. On the one hand, EDP renewed the strategic partnership agreement with CTG in December 2021, and continued to jointly invest with CTG in Latin American and Africa. On the other hand, EDP's renewable energy arm, known as *EDP Renovável* (EDPR), acquired a Singaporean company active in the solar energy sector, Sunseap, thus diversifying its alternatives to CTG while exploring Asian markets.

On the 5G issue, Portugal has low commitment, equal alternatives, and low control. Portugal's low commitment to 5G originates in external pressure that increased the cost of its working with the Chinese company Huawei on 5G in the commercial sector. Portugal needed to improve competitiveness in the 5G area and Huawei was seen as the leader of 5G developments. However, the US maintained pressure on the Portuguese government from 2019 onwards, linking 5G to security issues. In December 2019, Mike Pompeo warned Portugal that Huawei threatened national security and invades privacy. US government spokesman Robert Strayer, on his first visit to Portugal in February 2020, warned that Huawei was suspected of human rights violations in Xinjiang, and that Huawei could steal confidential NATO data, as well as the daily data of Portuguese residents. Finally, the US Ambassador to Portugal George Glass, in September 2020, threatened that the US would consider stopping LNG exports to Europe through the Sines port if Portugal continued to cooperate commercially with Huawei in 5G.

Portugal has equal alternatives to Huawei 5G after 2021. In December 2021, the world-renowned data analytics and consulting company in the ICT industry, GlobalData released its research titled *5G Mobile Core: Competitive Landscape Assessment*. According to their findings, Huawei's 5G Core portfolio was the strongest, and it was rated as the "leader" among all the 5G core product producers from the world's major telecom equipment vendors such as Cisco, Ericsson, Nokia, and ZET. However, only months later, in April 2022, GlobalData released a new report that identified the company American Affirmed Unity as the "leader" among 5G core products, followed by the American companies Mavenir, Casa Systems, and the South Korean company Samsung. It remains at present unclear whether these companies have caught up with Huawei's 5G advanced technology, or the US ban against Huawei has prevented it from being included in the GlobalData rankings of April 2022. The result is that it is noticeable that Portugal has low control on the 5G issue, facing a lack of competitive companies, products, and professionals. According to a report made by the European 5G Observatory in July 2021,



Portugal and Lithuania were the only two EU countries without 5G services at the end of June that year.

Portugal has adopted a control-risk strategy on the 5G issue. After sustained US pressure, the Portuguese Infrastructure Minister, Pedro Nuno Santos, revealed on July 30th, 2020, that a group created by the Portuguese government to assess risks and cybersecurity issues relating to 5G had completed its work, and had not drawn any conclusions directed against any supplier, including Huawei (Gonçalves, 2020). In responding to US threats linking LNG to Huawei 5G, the former Portuguese Foreign Minister, Augusto Silva, and President Marcelo, stated that Portuguese government would take its own stance (Lusa/PÚBLICO, 2020). Finally, the decision not to take Huawei into consideration for the installation of 5G networks came from Portugal's three largest operators, namely Altice, Vodafone, and NOS, but not from the government (Moreira & Malta, 2020). In this way, the Portuguese government was able to maintain an ambiguous attitude, without taking any clear stance. This control-risk strategy does not harm the US-Portugal alliance at the governmental level and leaves space for domestic non-state actors to maintain their cooperation with Huawei. Portugal makes efforts to avoid any escalation of tensions, but of the six telecom operators licensed to operate 5G in Portugal, only Vodafone Portugal has signed a 5G supply contract with US-based Mavenir. Altice and NOS have declared that they will not use Huawei 5G core, but they and the other three telecom operators, which are Dixarobil, Novo and Dense Air, have thus far not decided upon the provider of their 5G Core products. As an indicator of future trends, it can be noted that the University of Aveiro in Portugal recently jointly constructed with Huawei a 5G+AI Networks Reliability Centre (5GAINER), transforming the entire Huawei 5G issue from being a commercial problem to a technological issue.

7. Conclusion

During the pandemic, politicians and researchers have agreed that that economic setbacks Portugal experienced required increased investment, export, and competitiveness. These were the three key issues to address Portugal's vulnerabilities, and the Portuguese government appears to have accepted these issues as its primary goals. Three strategies were adopted, namely an interest-linkage strategy to attract Chinese investments and gain market access, a balance strategy to obtain alternative support within EU and from the US, and a control-risk strategy to avoid conflict between the US and China. By doing so, without noticeable overt friction, Portugal managed to maximize its interests, control US-China tension regarding Portugal, and intensify simultaneously its partnership with China, its alliance with US, and maintain its adherence to the unity of the EU. During the pandemic, Portugal has used material power resources to develop interest linkages and has not mobilized "normative power" against China. For example, when down-scaling its involvement with Huawei, the Portuguese government has avoided discussion of political issues regarding Huawei as a Chinese enterprise, or suggested that involvement with Huawei poses any economic threat to Portugal's autonomy. Portugal has rather returned cooperation with the world leader to the field of technical development, and not noticeably exerted any normative pressure on China in an attempt to influence Chinese actions. Instead, by avoiding taking any clear stance



between China and Western allies, Portugal manages to continue to project its image as an EU member-state and US ally while maintaining a friendly attitude towards China. It has cautiously, yet successfully, availed itself of power resources from all parties involved, through its balanced diplomatic relations, and managed to take steps to maximize its interests. In other words, Portugal has provided us with an example of the use of relational power resources during the pandemic to achieve its goals.

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