Politicians, regulators, viceroys and 5G auctions
Date
2021-12
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CICEE. Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
Language
English
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Abstract
Under a positive view, underlying this paper, independent regulation has been widely
accepted in the European Union to solve some problems created by the discretionary
power of politicians. However, independent regulators also enjoy substantial
discretion. This is constrained by widely accepted good regulation practices, at least
in part enshrined in law. Failure to comply with good regulatory practices is a source
of regulatory discretion that jeopardizes the case for independent regulation. It is
argued that the process followed by Anacom to issue the 5G auction regulation misses
important steps inherent to good regulatory practice and so it risks weakening, or wipe
out, social support for regulatory independence in electronic communications markets.
This outcome is not inevitable. Improving regulatory governance is still an option,
eventually supported by the public, and some proposals are offered along these lines.
Keywords
Regulated industries, administrative law, economics of regulation, telecommunications
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Journal article
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Open Access