Investment Timing and Social Welfare under Feed-in Tariff Contract

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dc.contributor.authorBarbosa, Luciana
dc.contributor.authorRodrigues, Artur
dc.contributor.authorSardinha, Alberto
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-12T12:00:44Z
dc.date.available2021-01-12T12:00:44Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a novel model to analyze the effects on the investment timing and social welfare of three feed-in tariffs (FIT) within an oligopolistic market structure. The FIT contracts are the fixed price, the fixed premium, and the minimum price guarantee. The model allows the identification of the optimal time to deploy a renewable energy project and the value of the tariff that maximizes the social welfare for each FIT design. These optimal tariffs generate the same investment timing and the same social welfare.pt_PT
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.26619/UAL-CICEE/WP02.2020pt_PT
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11144/4737
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewednopt_PT
dc.publisherCICEE. Universidade Autónoma de Lisboapt_PT
dc.rightsopen accesspt_PT
dc.subjectInvestment Analysispt_PT
dc.subjectReal Optionspt_PT
dc.subjectFeed-In-Tariffspt_PT
dc.subjectUncertaintypt_PT
dc.subjectSocial Welfarept_PT
dc.subjectDuopolistic Marketspt_PT
dc.titleInvestment Timing and Social Welfare under Feed-in Tariff Contractpt_PT
dc.typeworking paperpt_PT
degois.publication.locationUniversidade Autónoma de Lisboapt_PT
dspace.entity.typePublicationen

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