Reforming military resources and the authority of the United Nations Security Council in implementing coercive military measures

Abstract

The lack of a de facto military component is rather significant in normative and operational terms within the UN system. The differences among the permanent members of the Security Council, which exist since its beginning, have stopped provisions from being enforced which were included in the United Nations Charter, as well as the design of credible and effective alternatives. Considering that what is at stake are coercive military measures decided by the Security Council under Chapter VII, this becomes a decisive issue, as these measures were decided ultima ratio to maintain or restore international peace and security. Without an operational Military Staff Committee, without armed forces and without power of authority in the enforcement process, the Council is limited to approving decisions and held hostage to the options of Member-States, namely its permanent members. To ignore the urgency of a reform implies perpetuating a double paradox: on the one hand, the Security Council is required to take increasingly wider responsibility, laid down in article 24 and, in this context, in art. 42, and this body still lacks adequate military instruments; on the other hand, by correlating the reinforcement of efficiency, legitimacy and enforcement of Council decisions exclusively with the reform of its composition and work methodology, we are neglecting the fact that this change requires a reform of military instruments and of its authority within the scope of the body's multidimensional reform process. This paper begins by analyzing the enforcement mechanism established in the Charter and then addresses the issue underlying the delegation of implementing coercive military measures. Finally, the paper discusses the reform proposals, their guidelines and puts forward possible solutions.